In cases of acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme. Court in Raai Shc,rrna v. State

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant Special leave to present an appeal against the order of acquittal SPl.S.C.N o.1912014 on the file of 1't Additional Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar. Counsel for the Appellant: Sri M.VIVEKANANDA REDDY, Assistant Public Prosecutor (TG) Counsel forthe Respondents: SRIJ.SURESH BABU The Court mirde the following: ORDER THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO APPEAL No.152 of 2tJ-1.7 ORDER: This Crirninal Appeal has been filed by the State aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar in Spl.S.C.No. 1 9 of 2014 dated 29.08.2o-16 acquitting the accused No.1 for offences Und.er Sections 376(2)(i), 42O and 5O6 of IPC and Under Section 3 read with Section 4 of ttre Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and, acquitting accused Nos.2 to 5 for offences under section 42O read. with 1O9 and 2Ol ofIPC.

2. The brief case of the prosecution is that the accused Nos. 2, 4 and 5 are the elder brothers and the accused No.3 is the sister-in-law of accused No.1 and they are the residents of Gudeballur village of Maganoor rnandal. They are the immediate neighbor:rs of the victim. P.W.2 and P.W.3, who are paternal senior uncle and grd.ndmother of the victim (P.W.l) respectively. The victim (P.W. 1) was brought-up in the house of P.W.2 and P.W.3 since her childhood following the d.eath of her father and her rnother rnarried some other person. On 15.O5.2O13, at about 8.OO ! I I 2 A.M., P.W.1 went to the Mary Mernorial School at a short distance frorn her house in order to fetch the drinking water: and accused No.1, with an evil intention to commit a sexual offence against her, followed her after a short while and ,)n reaching the place where P.W.l was fetching the water', he tried to rnolest her- P.W.4, who happened to be there to fetc}r water, tried to interyene in order to save P.W. 1, but accused No.l chided and bornbarded him by sayinl3 that P.W.4 should not make any interference. PW'4 was scared of accused No.l and hence kre left that place. Accused No. 1 forcibly took the victim (P.W.l) into the shrubs and cornmitted. rape on her. He also threatened. her with d.ire consequences of causing harm to her life, in case she disclosed the incident to anybody. P.W.1 returned home at about 1O.3O A.M., and she revealed the facts of ttre incident to P.W.2 and P.W.3. P.W.2 and P.W.3 raised a. disput= before P.W.5 to P.W.S, wkro are the elders of that village. A11 the accused were summoned to that panchayath and they agreed before the panchayath eld.ers that accused No.l w'ould rrrarry P.W.l. Contrary to the said assrrrance, all the accused. resiled frorn their promise and. further threatened P.W.1 that they would cornmit gang rape on her, 3 in case she repeated any dtternpt to raise panchayath again and that they would cause harrn to P.W.2 and P.W.3 also. Accused No.2 to accused No.S also rnade atternpts to send accused No.1 outside the village so. as to cause the obstruction to the criminal prosecution of accused No.1. Under these circurnstances, P.W.1 to P.W.3 decided to give a report to the police and, accordingly, on 29.06.2013 at about 19.OO hours, P W.1 lodged Ex.Pl report with PW13, who was the then Head Constable of Krishna police station, and basing upon the same, PW13 registered Ex.PS F.I.R., against accused No.l to accused No.5 in Crime No.39 of 2O13 for the offences under Sections 376, 417 and 5O6 of IPC. 3- Heard Mr. M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing . for appellant/State and Mr.J.Suresh Babrr, learned counsel for the respondents.

4. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehernently contended that the trial Court rxrithout properly considering the oral and documentar5r evidence addrrced by the prosecution erroneously acquitted the accused persons. He further submitted that the prosecu.tion proved. the case against the accused No.l for the offence under Sections 4 376(t>.1(il,42o and 506 of the IPC and under Section 3 rea"d with section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2Ol2 (for short POCSO Act) and accused Nos.2 to 5 for the offences under Sections 42O read with 109 and 201 of IPC.

5. .He further subrnitted tlrat the trial Court merely on the ground of delay in lodging the cornplaint by P.W.2 came to a <:onclusion that the prosecution failed to explain the delay in lodging the complaint, especially the accused No.1 has ccmrnitted the heinous crime against the victim. He further subrnitted that the delay is not a ground for acquittal of accused No.l as the offence committed by accusr:d No.1 is a heinous crirne. 5A. FIe further submitted that the trial Court acqrritted the acr:used No.1 on the ground that the prosecution failed to pro<luce any medical evidence. Though the prosecution produc'ed and exarnined P.W.2 to P.W.1 1, who are indepe:nd.ent witnesses, and also exhibit P4 to P7. The irnpugrred judgment passed by the trial Court is liable to be set asicte and the accused. persons are liable to be convicted. for the above said offences :- -- -. 5

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that the trial Court after evaluating the oral and documentary evidence on record came to a conclusion that accused No.1 has not cornmitted the offence. The defacto-cornplainant implicated the accused Nos.2 to 5 for the offence under Sections 42O read with 109 and 20 1 of IPC, though the ingredients for the above said offences are not attracted. Sirnilarly, the prosecution failed to produce any rnedical evidence that he has committed the offence under Section 376(21(11 of IPC. The trial Court rightly acquitted the accused persons for the above said offences. Flence, there are no grounds to interfere with the irnpugned judgment passed by the trial Court.

7. Having considered the submissions made by the respective parties and after perusal of the impr:gned judgment, it reveals that even according to the prosecLrtion, the alleged incident has occurred on 15.05.2013 wtrereas P.W.l lodged the complaint on 29.O6.2OL3 after lapse of rrrore than 45 days. P.W. 1, P.W.2 and P.W. 14 gave contradictory statements about the lodglng of the cornplaint. The prosecution failed to prod.uce any rned.ical evidence in support of ttre case. The trial Court has rightly I l! 6 camo to a conclusion that the prosecution has rniserably failecl to decide their burden to prove the offence against accursed persons and rightly acquitted the accused.

8. In cases of acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme. Court in Raai Shc,rrna v. State (Goaernment of IYCT of Delhi) and a.notherl, held t-hat while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appelLlnt Court has to consider whether the trial Court's view can be tenned as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed,.The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the 'rresumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial co'-rrt rendering acquittal."

9. [n Ghureg Lal v. Stqte of Uttar Pradeshz the Hon'ble Supreme Court after referring to several Judgments regarding the settled principles of law and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held at para 70, as follows: "70. In the light of the above, the High Court and other altpellute Courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of Judgments if il is going to overrule or olherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal." t 1ZOZZ18 Supreme Court Cases 536 2 (2OO8l lCt Supreme Court Cases 45 \ \ 7 I. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court wottld have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong: ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave mis carriage of j us tice " ; iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable,' vi) The trial court has tgnored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration o thefindings of the trial court.

3. If two reasonable views can be reached one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction the High Courts/appellate courts must rule infavour of the accused."

10. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of considered view that there are no grounds to interfere with the irnpugned judgrnent passed by the trial Court. f. I i ;l I i I 8

11. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is dismissed. Miscellaneous applications, pending if &oy, shall stancl closed. SD/- L LAKSHMI BABU DEPUTY REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY/ SECTION OFFICER To,

1. The I Additional Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar. 2. One OC to SRI PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (TG) Advocate [OPUC] 3. One C;C to SRI J.SURESH BABU Advocate IOPUC] 4. Two C:D Copies NVB/PSL w .r .l' HIGH COURT DATED :201111202s THE S 2 rI q 7Its * * ORDEFI CRLA.illo.1628 ot 2012 DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL APPEAL o.c6 &"