V. Sur',endra Babu, aqed 52 years v. 1. State Bank of Hyderabad

explanation. Further, he had stated that landlord who is the prime evidence was not examined and Sri K' Venugopal' whose report was taken into consideration for estab'lishing the charges was not examined in the enquiry and petitioner was not given opportunity to rebut the evidence of Sri Venugopal' However' the 3'd respondent uide impugned proceedings dated 23.07.2011 imposed penalty of 'reduction to lower grade from MMGS'IItoJMGS.Iandplacedpetitioneratstartingbasicpay of JMGS-I i.e.Rs.14,50o l-' The petitioner will earn regular increment after completion of every year from the date of such placement. The period of suspension will be treated as off-duty whereby he will not be eligible for any payment other than the subsistence allowance already paid to him' He will not be eligible for any increment during ihe period of suspension and the period of suspension will not be counted for service' Petitioner preferred Appeal on 08'09'2011 to the 2'd respondent - Appellate Authority, which, after considering the entire disciplinary proceedings, by order daled' 24'0l'2012' reduced the punishment to that of 'reduction to lower grade from MMGS- IItoJMGS-IandplacehimatthebasicpayofRs'17'50O/-in JMGS-I. He shall earn his regular increment after completion of every year from the date of such placement' He will be eligible 4 for promotion after one year from the date of the order of pendency. Other terms of the penalty shall remain unchanged, Aggrieved thereby, petitioner is before this Court.

2. Sr.i y.V. Satyanarayana, learned courrsel for petitioner submits that charges levelled against petitic ner are vague, not spr_'r:ific and not in conformit5r with the disciplinar5r regulations. [{r: submits that crucial documents wore not supplied so as to enable his ciient to submit reply during the course of enquiry nor principai witness was examined or whose report, charges 1 to 3 were held proved in the enquiry as also the defence witrLess Dr. Vinod Joseph Devadass who sig.red the lease agreemen t as GpA of land owner which is fatal to tlre case of respondents According to learned counsel, enquiry report was not supplit:d at the frrst instance before accepting tLLe said report by the disciplinary authority which is in crear violation of Article 31 1(2) ol l-he Constitution. Finally, it is urged that the 2.d respondent - appeilate authoritJz passed non_speaking order, impugned in this Writ petition, without assigning arry reasons. In support of his submissions, learned cc,unsel placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon,ble Supreme rlourt 5 inSurctChandraChakrabarlhgo.st^teofWestBengall, Gooerrlment of A.P' tt' A' Venkata Raidu2 ' Stat'e oJ Uttaranchalo.Kharksinghg,stateof.M.P.tl.Chintaman Sadashiaa Vishampagan4, KuldeeP Singh u' Comtnissioner' of Polices, State of uttor Pradesh u' C'S' Shanm'a5 ' Oryx Fisheries Prtucrte Limited u' tlnion of IndiaT and Roop Singh Negi a. Puniab National Banks ' Sri Ch' Siva Reddy' Iearned Senior Counsel on 3. behalf of the respondent bank' based on the counter affidavit frled by the Deputy General Manger' submits that as per the bank rules, any officer, who is transferred in the middle of the academic year would be provided with reimbursement of accommodation at the place where from he has been transferred. Accordingly, petitioner was permitted for rent reimbursement at Chennai from where he was tralsferred' After histransfertqTarnaka,hemisusedthepaymentofrentstothe landlords at Chennai frorn t7 'lO '2008 to O2'O2 '2O 1O' He made the payment of rent in different methods which are unknown to ' am tgzt sc lsz '?(zool) t scc lla r(zooe)zsccL&s698 o aIR t96t sc t6z3 ' i19se; z scc to 6 em. t968 158 ' (2olo) l3 scc 427 ' (2009) 2 scc 570 6 the bank. Most of the payment vouchers were not- made available in the bank. The misconduct committed by petitioner was specified c:learly in charge Nos. 1 to

5. It is submitted _ further that d uring the departmental enquiry, petitioner was . given ample oDportunities to defend his case ald all the documents relir:d upon by the management were sersed on petitioner and there were no allegations with regard to holding of enquiry and the findings of the Enquiry Authonty. He submits that the Appointing Authorit5z / Disciplinary Ar-rthority sent letter dated 07 .O7 .2Oll to petitioner along wir:h the findings of Enquiry Off,rcer dated 14.05.2011 arrd the orrlers of Disciplinary Authority dated 08.06.201 1 proposinr3 the punishment arcl sought for his submissions, if aly. If aly documents are not provided to petitioner which were not relied by the bank, .hat cannot prejudice his interests. Lr:arned counsel submits that bank need not eiamine landlord <Iuring the departmental enquiry but the burden to prove that house taken for rent belongs to a particular landlord and the rent was paid to him, was on petitioner who failed to establish the same. It was not th€ issue whether he stayed il the rented accommodation or not, but he misled the malagement in utilizing the facilily of the leased accommodation. petitioner also 7 has not established that money transactions between the landlord and the tenant on account of alleged repairs and also the adjustment of monthly rents with the consent of landlord for 13 months as he alleged; in view of the misconduct committed ' by petitioner there was loss to the bank to the tune of Rs.2,27 ,7OO l- towards rent. According to learned Senior Counsel, it is well- settled that departmental enquiry is not a criminal proceeding to establish the charges beyond all reasonable doubts' The preponderance of possibilities is a guiding principle to establish the misconduct in the departmental enquiries' When the records clearly speak that palrment of rent was made by irregular methods and against the regular practice of the bank' the question of examining the landlord does not arise' He submits that in respect of departmental enquires, the principles are well-settled more particularly with regard to intervention of the Courts and Tribunals. In this regard, he relied on the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Haryana a. Rattan Singhs, State of Karnataka a' M' Gongaraito ' GM e ArR l97z sc l512 'o 12o2oy 3 scc az: 8 Operations S.B.L u. R. perigasutanttil l , (Inion of .India u- Dorai Swami (dated. 19.04.2022), Boloram Bordoloi l. Lakhimi Gaolia Ba.nkt2, Chainnon I4C "f India a. A. Finally, learned Senior Counsel subntits that .Masilamanil3. departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance rvith the _ provisions of law and the bank rules. The Enquiry Authr.rrity has categorically held that charges I to 5 were estabiisher,l by the management and by following the rules of the ba nk, the competent authority awarded the punishment. The A ppellate Authority, after considering the material on record, reduced the punishment au,arded by the Appointing Authority, her Lce, the same need no Lnterference at the hands of this Court.

4. Having heard learned counsel on eithe.r side, perused the record.

5. The first contention raised by learned courLsel for petitioner is that charges are vague and inconsistent. Acl:ording to petitioner, no evidence was led to show that he was not staying in the leased accommodation during the disputed period nor was there any evidence to show that rents were not rr:ceived r'1zo15;: scc ror " lzoz t; t scn sst tr AIR Ontine 2012 SC 4 26 9 by the landlord for the said period' He submits that charges 1 to 3 could be proved by examining the landlord Dr' Vima1 Joseph DevadasorhisfatherDr.JameshJoseplrHowever,learned Senior Counsel submits that petitioner admitted that he ' understood the charges mentioned in the charge sheet during the enquiry; even though he is entitled for leased accommodation, he failed to give the correct particulars of the landlord and he entered into an agreement of lease with one person and remitted the rent to some other person which fact wasestablishedinthedepartmentalenquiry.Whentherecord clearly shows that Iease agreement was entered with Dr' Vimal Joseph Devadas, the real owner was Dr' James Joseph and in the application, the address of the house was mentioned as Door No. 21, Old' No. 131, Vanniar' lst street' whereas he has taken permission to take on lease H'No' 134, Vanniar Street, Dr. Vimal JosePh Choolaimeda, Chennai-94 belonging to Devadas, hente, the burden is on petitioner to prove that house taken for rent belongs to particular iandlord and rent was paid to him. Further, petitioner failed to establish that the entire amount received from the bank towards the leased accommodation was paid to the correct landlord' l0

6. In view ofthe rival contentions, it is to be seen that to substantiate charges 1 to 5, no documentarJr evidence was produced by tb.e respondent bank. The allegations were made based on vouch.ers, but they failed to produce the same. during. enquiry and no voucher was marked in the findings of the Enquiry offrcer. The respondent bank except statirLg that charges are clear and unambiguous and that petitiorrer a-lso stated in the enquiry that he understood the charges, have not stated how charges are clear and distinct from each olher, in conformity wittL Regulation 68(2) (ii) of the State B anik of Hyderabad (Oflicers) Disciplinary Regulations on which crharges were framed. In this connection, Regulation 68(2)(iiil gains importance. It postulates tlnat 'tahere it is proposed. to l.,.old an enquiry, the Disciplinary Authoitg shnlt frame d.efinite and_ di-stinct charges on the basis of the allegations against the' officer and the articles of cLnrge, together with o statement of allegations, lbt <>f documents relied on along u_rith copg <:f such documents and list of tuitnesses along uith copg of Staternent of utitnesses, if aru1 on which theg are based shall be commur,_icated. in uriting to the Offi.cer, uho sholl be required_ to submit, tuithin such time as matJ be specified. bg the Disciplinary Authoritg.' In this case, admittedly, no list of witnesses and docume nts is 11 furnished. In the judgments relied on by the learned' counsel for petitioner irr Surat Chandra Chakrabarthg's ccse (supra)' itisheldthat'inthisconnection'referencemagbemadeto Fundamental Rule 55 uthich prouides' inter alia' tlnt uitLnut- preiudice to tle prouisions of the Pubtic Seruants Enquiry Act' 1850, no order of dismissal remoual or reduction sholl be passed onamemberofseruiceunlessheisinformedintllritingofthe grounds on uhich it is proposed' to toke action and has been afforded an adequate opportunitg of defending himself' .The grounds on u'thich it is proposed to take action haue to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges uthich haue to be communicated to the person charged together lDith a statement of the allegations on wlich each charge is based and ang otLter ciranm.stance uthich it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated' This nle embodies a principle uthich is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate oppirtunitg for d'efending oneself' If a person is not told clearlg and definitelg uhat the allegations are on ttthich the charges preferred- against him are founded' he cannot possiblg' bg projecting his oun imaginatiory discouer alt the facts and circumstances that mag be iru the contemplation of the authoities to be establisled against him'' In the absence of such 12 particulars, this Court finds some force in the contention of learned counsel that charges are vague,

7. As regards the other confention that crucial documents were not supplied to petitioner for giving reply to the charges during the course of enquiry ald crucial witness,es were not examined, ; s concerned, it is to be observed that pr:titioner addressed the lDnquiry Officer for supply of documents and his defence vrdtness;es to be called during the course of enquiry dated 11.03.2011. According to petitioner, no do.cument including lease agreement was supplied to him; lurther, vouchers and other documents, which were referred tc in the charge memo including lease agreement were not sl:.pplied. Whereas learn ed Senior Counsel submits that doc-.rments relevant and recuired to establish the charges were hled by the bank and petitioner was given opportunity, however, he failed to rebut the evidences, hence, he has no right to claim ncrw that the bank has not produced the documents sought by l.Lim. In this regard, it is to be observed that when petitioner rrrade a specific request for supply of documents by the letter dated

11.O3.2011, no clocuments were supplied but imputation s were read out ald exhibits were marked.. Though respondents contend that they supplied documents, no proof in support of 13 the said contention was frled. Hence, the contention of learned counsel for petitioner cannot be brushed aside' Further, the charge -.mo *as-i"sued based on the 8. report of Sri K. Venugopal- The said report was also not - furnished to petitioner at the time of issuing the charge memo nor before proceeding with the enquiry' However, it was placed as MR 212 during the course of enquiry and marked as Ex'ME 1/ 1 and the author of the said document was also not examined which is contrarSr to the procedure and Regulations of the bank' Though respondents contend that in the departmental enquiry strict rules of evidence are not applicable but preponderance of probabilities is the guiding principle, the basic principle that when a report is filed to establish the charge which was produced behind the back of petitioner and which was only the basis for establishing the charge, examining Sri K' Venugopal is must and he has to be produced as evidence and an opportunity ought to have been given to petitioner to cross-examine him' Not only that, respondents failed to examine the defence witness s Dr. Vimzrl Joseph Devadas, S/o Jamers Joseph, laldlord who is the signatory to the Iease agreement and charges 1 to 4 are based on the lease agreement signed by Dr' Vima-l Joseph Devadas . In the charge memo d'ated 1'8 ' 12 '20 I 0 , the original 14 owner of the house was shown as Dr. James Joseph bu;_ not Dr. Vimal Joseph. Devadas and a wrong lease agreem{lnt was submitted and rents were paid through various methods to Dr. Vimal J<,seph Devadas and caused loss to thr: bank., Petitioner therr'fore, requested through letter dated 11.r13.2011 to examine Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas as defence witnerss No.2, but the Enqr,riry Offrcer did not consider the said :-equest. Failure to exantine the material witness is fatal to the case of respondents.

9. In this connection, it is relevant to notice the law laid down on the subject. The Hon'ble Supreme Crrurt in Chintamqn Sadashiua Waishampagan,s case (sttpra) , held as under: " Ther: as to the frle of the Razakars it is really surpri:;ing that this file should t,e reported to have been lost. The respondent's r)ase was that the Razakars in question for whose release he is alleged to have accepted the-bribe were released on the recommendation of the District superintendent of Police and under the orders of the civil Adminisrtrator of Adilabad. The hle was therefore relevant ald, according to the resl)ondent, the suggestion that tfie Iile had been lost was untrue and it ffas not produced becaus,: it was apprehended that, if produced, it would support his defence. It ii true that the enquiry oificer stated that he had made a search in his offir:e but it could not be traced and that he was e:rquiring from the Collectrrr and trying to find out whether the file could be Jound in the Collector's office. Apparendy the respondent was grver 11 letter addressed to the Oollector wherein he was requested to show the file to the 15 respondent if available. He was, however' told that the file was not traceable. It is in connection wit]- the alleged loss of this fite that the criticism made by Mr Justice Sen about the indecent haste made in the enquiry becomes relevant. If only more diligent efforts had been made to discover the hle the enquiry officer would have 6een able to see whether the plea made by the respondent on the strength of the said hle was genuine or not. It is in the light of these facts that the High Court has held that the enquiry was not satisfactory, and that in substance the respondent had been denied a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges framed against him. There is no dispute that under Articte 3 1 1(2) the respondent is entitled to have such a reasonable opportunity- A proper opportunity must be afforded to him at the stage of the enquiry after the ctrarge is supplied to him as well as at the second stage when punishment iSabouttobeimposedonhim.Ifthefirstenquirywasmateriallydefective and denied the respondent an opportunity to prove his case it is impossible to hold that a reasonable opportunity guaranteed to a public servant by Article 311(2) had been afforded to the respondent in the present case.

10. In Khark Singlt's colse (supra)' it has been held by the Hon'ble SuPreme Court as under: reading of the enqui'ry report also shows that the respondent herein was not furnished with the required documents The Department'! witnesses were not examined in his presence Though the respondent -'ho -"" the writ petitioner specifically stated so in the affidavit before t}e High Court in the writ proceedings' those averments were specifically controverted in the repty-alEdavit filed by the Department. Mere denia't for the sake of denia-l is not an answer to the specific ilegations made in the a-ffrdavit' Likewise' there is no evidence to show that aJter submission of the report by the enquiry officer to the disciplinary authority, the respondent herein was furnished with the copy of the said report along with all the relied upon docrrrnents When all these infrrmities were specifically pleaded and brought to the notice 16 of the appellai e authority (i.e Forest Conservator), he rejected the same but has not pointed out the relevalt materials from the records of the enquiry officer ;rnd disciplinar5r authority to support his decision Hence, the appellate rrrthority has also committed an error in dismisr.ring the aPPeal of the r.. ;pondent- 11 In KuldeeP Singh's c4se (sttpra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: " The original complaint was not placed on the record and it was the staterent, recorded by SHO D.D Sharma, which was produced before the en,l,riry ofhcer. The absence of the original complaint, therefore, indicates that there was, in fact, no complaint in existence which further sLrpports the statement of the Department's own v.itness, Smt Mcena Mishra that no payment was made by her on 22-2-191)0. Thc cnquiry officer did not sit with an open mind to }.old an impartial domestic enquiry which is arr essential component of the principles of nrrlural justice as a-lso that of "reasonable opport !rnity", contemplated by Article 311(2) ofthe Constitution. The "bias" in favour of the Departnrent had so badly affected the enquiry officer's whole faculty of reasoiring that even non-production of the complainant.s was ascribed to the appellalt which squarely was the fault 1f the Department. O1:e the Department knew that the labourers were employed somervhere in Dev.li Khanpur, their presence could havc been procured ard- they could have been produced before the enquiry :fficer to prove the cl.a-rge framed against the appellalt. He has acl ed so arbitrarily in thr: matter and has found the appellarlt guilty in s rch a coarse manner that it becomes apparent that he was merely carrying out the commaxd from some superior officer who perhaps directed ,,fix him up".

72. In C.S. Shartn.;'s case (supra), the Hon,ble Court observed thus: ,/., t7

6. The first question is whether this inquiry was made under sub-rule (1) or (3) of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. It is arr admitted fact that Sharma was a temporary employee and t]-rerefore his case would fall to be governed by sub-rule (3) of Rule 55 if it could be said that the enquiry which was being made was for a specific fault or on account of his unsuitabilif for service- Sub-Rute (1) of Rule 55 is a genera_l rule for enquiries where the conduct ofa person is inquired into for misconduct but sub-rule (3) says that that sub-rule sha-ll not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer, or to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank a temporary government servant for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the service. Sub-rule (3) says that in such cases, the probationer or temporary government sersant concerned shall be apprised of ttre grounds of such proposal, given an opportunity to show cause against the action to be taken against him, and his explanation in this behalf, if aly, shall be duly considered before orders are passed by the competent authority. If the third sub-rule applied, it is obvious that the kind of enquiry made complied with its requirements. The first sub- rule, however, provides for a full-blooded enquiry which is the counterpart of a regular trial: witnesses have to be examined in support of the a-llegations, opportunity has to be given to the delinquent oflicer to cross-examine them ald to lead evidence in his defence. In our judgment the present case was governed by the tirst sub-rule and not the third sub-rule. The third sub-ru1e deals with the unsuitability of al offrcer for the. service or with a charge for a_ny specihc fault. This fault means a fault in the execution of his duties and not a misconduct such as taking bribe etc. which are charges of a more serious nature, affecting the character of the individual concerned. The collocation of the words "any specifrc fault" or "on account of unsuitability for service" give the clue of the distinction between the third sub-rule and the first sub-rule. An officer who is, for example, habitually lazJr or makes mistakes frequently or is not polite or decorous m4y be considered unsuitable for the service. Another officer who makes a 'grievous default in the execution of his work may be charged for the specific individual fault, that is a dereliction or defect in the execution of that dufy. Where l8 there is arr allegation that an oflicer is guilty of a misconduct such as accepting brilre or showing favours, the matter is not one of sper ific fault in the execution of his work but something more. That matter $,ili fall to be governed by the hrst sub-rule because you cannot charge a rrlan with criminal conduct without affording him adequaie opportunity to clear his character. \,tr Aggarwal fairly pointed out that the Governnrent had appointed the enquiring officer to take action under Rule 55(1) and it is thus quite ck:eLr that the Government viewed the matter alsc in this 1ight. 11, therefore, follows that if the procedure under lhe first sub-rule had to be followed, adequate opportunity had to be i;liven to Sharma to lead evidence on his own behalf to clear himself of serious charges which .,r,,ere levelled against him and give evidence on .,ris owri behalf. It rs obvious that he has not been able to lead his defenl)e or to give evidence : n his own beha-lf. The question is whether he has to thank himself o- the omission proceeded because of some action on the part of the errrluiring officer. Considering the whole matter eve are satisfied that thr: enquiring officer was to blame and we shall no,,v show why we think s] Throughout the enquiry, as late as February 24, IgS4, Sharma had again and again given indication that he woul,1 lead evidence in his ,lefence- At frrst he had given a list of three witoesses which he later iLroplified to four leaving out one from the original l,st and adding two neu names. He had also stated that he wanted to examine himself in his defence. The learned Commissioner who was holdi:rg the enquiry on more thar one occasion stated that he would be affordr,.d this opportunity artd also that a date would be fixed for the examinarion of the defence witnosses. It is true that Sharma was playing for tirne and on the 2nd of February (before the date of hearing came) he put in an application that he would like al a journment of 20 days before he submitted a filal list of witnesses with their addresses. This application was rejected on Febmar5z 6 but between February 6 alrd April g, when the report was rnade, two long months passed and it was possible for the Commissionr_,r to haye frxed a date, on which, if he was so minded, ,t-.g-.-_ l9 Sharma could bring his witnesses in suPport of his case or tender himself for examination. No action was taken between February 6, 1954 and April 8, 1954 to enable Sharma to Iead his defence, if any, in support of his part of the case. This omission. in our judgment was sufficient to vitiate the whole proceeding because no enquiry of this type in which there are charges of a crimina,l nature can be said to be properly conducted when the defence of the offrcer is either. frustrated or ruled out. It was submitted by Mr Agarwal, that the witnesses were being summoned by him to clear himself of the cha;ge of owning a car without having the visible means to afford it and this charge was not accepted by the State Government. This is true enough, but the State Government carne on the scene much later. In so far as the enquiring oflicer was concerned, he had accepted the atlegation against Shapma and even if the original list be considered, Sharma was entitled to lead evidence with regard to the car itself. It is possibte that if a date had been fixed, he wou1d, not only have 1ed evidence with regard to the car, but would have brought witnesses to clear himself of other charges, but no such opportunity was clearly alforded to hirn. Further before the case closed, the Commissioner had before him a list of four witnesses and fair ptay demanded that he should have fixed a date a-nd left it to Sharma to procure attendance of his witnesses on that date, but if no date was fixed, Sharma was not expected to bring his witnesses day after day in the hope that the Commissioner would examine them any day. The enquiry cannot be said to comply with the elementary principles of'natural justice and therefore we have no hesitation in accepting the decision of the High Court that ttre enquiry was vitiated'

13. In view of the discussion supra, in particular' the law extracted, this Court is in complete agreement with learned counsel for petitioner that enquiry was conducted without following the Regulations of the bank. 20

14. Lr::rrned counsel for petitioner also contends that enquiry reporl was not supplied to his client at the frrst instance before accepr ing the enquiry report. It . is submitl ed that wherever disc iptinary authority is not the Enquiry Authorit5r; then the enquiry report has to be given at the first place before accepting thc same by the Disciplinary Authority to the delinquent oflrcrer is the law declared by the Hontrle Apex Court in ECIL u, Karunakarla. In the said judgment, it is hel,1 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: " \Vhat are the duties of the enquiry officer appointecl by the disciplinary alrthority to conduct the inquiry, is the next questjon and this Court in ... N D'Siiva v Thc Unir-rn Of India . 1962 Supp 1 SCR 968 ,{IR iq62 i{ 1 !30 has in terms held that the question of inrposing punishment carL only arise after inquiry is made and the repor- of the enquiry officer is received. It is for the punishing authority to llropose the punishmert and not for the inquiring authority to do so. Ths latter has, when so rerluired, to appraise the evidence, to record its con,:lusion and if it thinks proper to suggest the appropriate punishmer rt. But neither the con<:lusion on the evidence nor ihe punishment wh:.ch the inquiring authority may regard as appropriate, is binding upcn the punishirr.g aulhority. In that case, the charge served upc,n the delinquent officer by the enquiry officer itself incorporated the pr:posed punishment- Flence it was a-lso observed that in the commun ication addressed by the enquiry officer the punishment proposed to be imposed upon rtre appellant if he was found guilty of the charges could not properly be set out. Two things, therefore, emerge from this decision, viz., t}rat it is rLot the function of the enquiry officer to propor;e a.ny ro ltoos; 5 scc s3l 2l punishmentevenafterherecordsfindingsofguiltagainstthe delinquent employee' Much less can the enquiry officer do so at the stage of serving the charges on the employee' Secondly' it is for the disciplilary authority to propose the punishmenj after receipt of the report of the enquiry ofhcer which suggests that before the authority proposes the punishment, it must have applied its mind to the evidence and the findings recorded by the enquiry offrcer"' In the present case, admittedly' the disciplinary 15. authority is not the Enquiry Officer and further' he has accepted the enquiry report and held that charges are proved andrecommendedmajorpenaltywithoutSupplyingtheenquiry report at the Iirst lnstance, however' at the time of issuilg show cause notice proposing punishment' the report was supplied by which time, enquiry report was already accepted ald a decision was taken to impose a major penalty' Added to this' as contended by learned coundel' ttre 2nd respondent passed the order impugned without assigning any reasons' The said Authority simply reduced the punishment but it has not stated onwhatgrodnd,itarrivedtosuchaconclusion'Inthisregard' learnedcounselreliedonthejudgmentoftheHonbleSupreme Court in Oryx Fisheries Pltt' Ltd' case (supra)' wherein it is held as under: It is of course true that the show-cause notice cannot be read hypertechnicatly and it is well settled that it is to be read 22 reasonably Brr'- one thing is clear that while reading a sholr_cause notice the person who is subject to it must get an impressiori :hat he will get an effer:live opportunity to rebut the allegations containerl in the show-cause notrce and prove his innocence. If on a reasonable reading of a show-cau;o notice a person of ordinarJr praaence gets the feeling that his reply rc the show-cause notice will be an empty ceremcny ard he will merel,z knock his head against the impenetrable .,va_ll of prejudgect opinion, such a show-cause notice does not commencr: a fair procedure especially when it is issued in a quasi-judicial pro<reeding under a statutory regulation which promises to give the person proceeded against a reasonable opporfunity of defence.

41. ln the instant case the appellate order contains reasons. However, abser.ce of reasons in the original order cannot be compensated b.,' disclosure of reason in the appellate order,,. L6. In Roopsingh Negi,s case (supra), it has been observed as under: ' Furthermore, the order of the disciptinary. autl.rority as a-lso the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them ha.ze severe civil consequences, appropriate reasonr,r should have been assignerl. If the enquiry ollicer had relied upon the co:rfession made by the appellant, there was no reason as io why the order of discharge passed by the qriminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence shoutd n61 have been taken into consideration. The materia-ls brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved- A decision must be ar.rived at on some evidence, uhich is legally admissible. The provisions of the Elvidence Act may noi be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the prin(::iples of. natural justice are 4,s the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not harre been sustained. The infer:nces drawn by the enquiry officer apparen y uere not 23 supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, howevef high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof. L7. Taking into consideration the circumstances stated supra and the law laid down, as extractgd above, this Court is of' the opinion that petitioner is entitled to the relief sought and Writ Petition deserves to be allowed. The Writ Petition is accordingly, allowed, setting

18. aside the impugned orders dated 23.07 .2OI1 of the 3'd respondent and the one dated 24.07.2012 of the 2"d respondent' Consequently, it is directed that respondents shall issue all consequential benefits to petitioner, as is admissible, as per Rules. No costs. L9. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed. That Rule Nisi has made Absolute as above witness rhe Hon,bte siiiltiJ.ijy par-illrrre acting chief Justice on this Thursdav, the -'- Third Diy of Aprii, Two Thousand and Twenty Five' ' P' PADMANABHA REDDY EPUTY REGISTRAR "D/- //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER Head Office, Gunfoundry, To, 2 4 5 1 The Managing Director, State Bank of Hyderabad Hyderabad - 500 001' I::f g?,?Js:%tHl::1.-'"1,f,:':1,3:rLlJ%T,*"r'stateBankof f b1[fl]l,H;3;lsli,'{e 3?ssi o!or'o"o't'd?:' Bff [ "i8fl, AH:s :'Y"'h 3"",: B.J",P"3:,"iB', JIT.%' 3 ? u I?: "ff;illf"n I?: " Hvderabad' )' state B a n k or s tate B a n k or 3:r),t[3x'i'Jfji3'8,'f;.n3i",ilf"",jB:::'fi9#331':'l3l'.'i3ljl3&'{;:::j;:t: 5r)rl 001

6. One CC to SRt \'.V.SATYANARAYANA, Advocate tOpUCl 7. One CC to SRt CH.S|VA REDDY, Sr. COUNSEL FOR BANK [C)PUC] B. Two CD Copies BSR GJP s t HIGH COURT DATED:0310412025 \ ) ORDER WP.No.11203 of 2012 I I oB 1at S7k 7 $ 2 4 ArR 20fi s ) o \ -5' i --- - =-;- ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION, WITHOUT COSTS @q4 €,c---- 'u*\n\u