✦ High Court of India · 24 Mar 2025

B. in Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Oflicerl, the Hon,ble Supreme Court held as under

Case Details High Court of India · 24 Mar 2025
Court
High Court of India
Decided
24 Mar 2025
Length
2,598 words

...RespondenUAppellanUPlaintiff in SA and Responde"Y[:,i8.?"jr"ij;! IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 5 of Limitation Act praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to Condone the delay of (2373) days in filing the above Second Appeat againt the Judgment and Decree dated 021O412018 passed in Appeal Suit No.16 of 2017 on the file of court of the lll Additional District Judge, Gadwal, pending disposal of main appeal. lA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 R/w Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant ad-interim injunction restraining the respondent and henchmen, agents etc., not to interfere and not to cause disturbance to the petitioner property situated in Sy No. 57lA to an extent of Ac.3.'14 gts of Kurumurthy Village of Chinna Chintha Kunta Mandal, Mahabubnagar District, pending disposal of above first appeal. SCHEDULE OF PROPRTY That the property is situated in Sy No. 57lA lo an extent of Ac.3.14 gts of dry6 land situated at Kurumurthy Village of Chinna Chintha Kunta Mandal, Mahabubnagar District and the boundaries are: East : Main BT Road West :Sy No. 58 North :Sy No. 5714 and Sy No. 27 land South :Sy No. 57l'l land lA NO: 3 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to SUSPEND the Judgment and Decree datedO2lO4l201B passed in Appeal Suit no. 16 of 2017 on the file of court of the lll Additional District Judge, Gadwql, pending disposal of main appeal. Counsel for the Appellant : SRI BOLLU NAGARAJU Counsel for the Respondent : Dr CHALLA SRINIVASA REDDY The Court delivered the following: COMMON JUDGMENT I HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY I.A.No.1 of 2O25 IN/AND SECOND APPEAL No.2 of 2025 COMMON JUDGMENT: I.A.No.1 of 2025 is filed to condone the delay of 2373 days in hling the Second Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated O2.O4.2018 passed in A.S.No. 16 of 2017 on the hle of the Court of the IiI Additional District Judge, Gadwal.

2. Heard Sri Bollu Nagaraju, learned counsel for the Appellant, learned counsel representing Sri Challa Srinivas Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent.

3. It is represented by learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent herein frled a suit for injunction in respect of land admeasuring Ac.3.14 guntas in Sy.No.S7/A situated at Kurumurthy Village of C.C.Kunta Mandal, Mahabubnagar Mandal againSt the petitioner herein. The trial Court, after consideration of the entire material and evidence placed on record, decreed the suit uide judgrnent and decree dated

13.71.2017 in O.S.No.21 of 2012. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent herein preferred an Appeal in A.S.No.16 of 2OlZ on the hle of the IIIrd Additional District Judge at Gadwal and the \ 2 LNA,] l.A.No.1 0f 2025 IN/AND first appetlate court urdejudgment and decree o*"ji)13i.'l'Jru a-llowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court, the Appeal is filed with a delay of 2373 davs. present Second

4. In the affidavit frled in support of the application for condonation of delay, it is contended that the petitioner engaged a counsel in the appeal and the appeal was allowed ujde judgment arrd decree dated 02.04.201g, however, his,counsel did not inform him about passing of the judgment and decree in the appeal. It is averred that due to ill_health and family issues, he could not follow up with his counsel and he was unaware of passing of the judgment in the appeal. It is further averred that in the month of October, 2024, he approached his counsei and enquired about the status of the appeal, and his counsel informed about passing of the judgment and decree in the appeal. Immediately, he filed arr application on O5. lO.2O24 before the trial Court for obtaining certified copies and after obtaining the same, he approached this Court challenging the judgment and decree passed by the frrst appellate Court. it is further averred that as there is a deiay of eight years in filing the ,, j appeal, the present application is hled to condone the delay of LNA,J l.A.No.1 of 2025 IN/AND S.A.No.2 of 2025 / 2373 days in filing the appeal and prayed to allow the application.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that thd petrtroner is not aware of the court proceedings as he was suffering from ill-health and because of pandemic situation due to COVID-19, he could not pursue the matter and enquire about the status of the appeal. He would further submit that the counsel engaged by the petitioner to contest the matter before the trial Court did not inform about passing of the judgment and decree in the appea-l. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner has a very good case on merits and therefore, prayed to allow the appeal.

6. The respondent did not hle counter-affidavit however, learned counsel for the respondent wouid submit that there is inordinate delay in hling the appeal and the petitioner failed to explain delay of each day which is mandatory. He would further submit that except blaming the counsel, the petitioner utterly failed to explain the delay and further no material is placed in proof of his ill-health. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the application. \ l 4 Lr::i t.A.No.1"f IN/AND

7. Before adverting to merits of case, it is apt . *l#lrtrin. principles and parameters to be considered for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Apex court in [Jnion of Ind ia and. another u. Jahangir Bgramji Jeejeebhog (D) through hls IR (SLp.(Ciuil) No.21O96 of 2019 dated O3.04.202fl, by referring the judgment of the same Court in Esha Bhattacharjee u. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academg & Others tpol3) 12 SCC 6491, held that ',dela11 should. not be excused_ as a matter of generositg. Rendering substantial justice ts not to cause prejud.ice to the opposite partg". B. in Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Oflicerl, the Hon,ble Supreme Court held as under: "11. The expression "sufficient cause, should be given a l,beral interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inoction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputerl to the partg concerned., whether or not sufhcient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlat v. Shuannlal l(2OO2) l SCC S35 : AIR 2002 SC tOOl and Ram Nqth Sc.o v. Gobardhan Sao [(2OO2) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2OO2 SC l2}rl .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation rray harshly affec t a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour rvhen the shtute so prescribes. The court has no 'zor:1c+1 scc at 5 LNA,J l.A.No.1of 2025 IN/AN D 5.A.No.2 of 2025 polver to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the lau, is hard but it is the lau/', stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that u,here a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate an.l enough reason nhich prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want o[ bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoeyer, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

9. From a reading of the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the Hon'ble Apex Court at paras-11 and 12 of the judgment interrupted the expression "suffrcient cause" and at para-ls summarized the law \ /ith regard to the issue of limitation. -l 6 LNA,J LA.No.1 of 2025 IN,/AND 10. In postmaster General and others vs S.A.No.2 of 2025 Living Media India Limited and another 2 , Hon,ble Apex Court having considered catena of decisions, including pundlik Jalam patil (dead) by LRs, Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another:, wherein it was held that "17.....-. The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated € equ i ty. Deray aereats equi t_vl iJ":: j.:'il;,:::ffi vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights,,. ald observed that taking r.ery lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government ald Govemment Underta J<ing' would not be proper a,d observed as under:_ :.'j "29. It needs no restatemen nxins rime-rimit ro.,,,,*.,,o.,,1 J.l:J::i"":i:t jljT::J"j lifespan for legal remedl for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of th€ vigilant and not of the sleepy.

30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts, disc ",^rr,"". lo,L;ff"H"tH::':j by the releva.,, multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest Prompt and timery payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy- public interest t (zorz) E scc se: t lzoos; rz sc a+a 1 r.A.N".1"fL;li IN/AND ,"qri"il|r: '"1'0" "f demands that the State or the benerlciary the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts thile exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging thc Iancllosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest- Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inorclinate dela_v v,,ithout there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. [t scrves no public interest."

11. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Departmentf rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors private Limited a Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under "63. ...... [n a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fi.de and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond. such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party,s inaction, negligence or laches-" o (zozr) o scc aeo 8 L;li r.A N".1"f lN/AND t2. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon,b*'il:i"E:t", it is well settled that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and uniess sufficient and plausible reasons are shown, the delay calnot be condonecl. While condoning the delay; the Courts should also see the substantial rights accrued to the opposite party a,d also the passage of considerable time. 13. condonation of delay is not a matter of routine, more so when there is huge inordinate delay ancl, therefore, the petitioner ought to have offered detailed, cogent .reasons, plausible explanation for inordinate delay of 2373 days in filing the appeal. The reasons stated in the aflidavit are vag.ue, unsatisfactory and does not inspire the confidence of this Court. The petitioner is trying to blame the counsel for the delay in Iiling the appeal on the ground that the counsel on record did not inform him about the passing of the judgment and decree in appeal. However, the petitioner failed to explain as to why he did not pursue the matter or follow up with his counsel, which clearly shows that there are clear latches arrd default on the part of the petitioner. Further, the petitioner has not placed any materia_l in support of his contention that he was suifering from ill-health and that he was affected by COVID_ 19. Therefore. it is 4 9 not a flt case to condone the inordinate delay of 2373 days in frling the S.A. tNA,J l.A.No.1 of 202S IN/AND S.A.No.2 of 2025

14. In view of the foregoing reasons and legal position arrd as no plausibie and convincing reasons are shown for condonation of inordinate delay of 2323 days in fiiing Second Appeal, I.A.No. I of 2O2S is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the S.A. also stalds dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand dismissed. //TRUE COPY// SD/- K. SRINIVASA RAO JOINT R GISTRAR SEC I{ OFFICER To, '1 . The lll Additional District Judge, Gadwal(With records, if any) 2. The Junior Civil Judge at Atmaku(With records, if any) 3. One CC to SRI BOLLU NAGARAJU, Advocate [OPUC] 4. One CC to Dr CHALLA SRINIVASA REDDY, Advocate IOPUC] 5. Two CD Copies ADK/SWT HIGH COURT DATED:2 410312025 Dr ;3. ,-j' !.) ,( o \ \ =$ .\ ..'/ (,' * a l-l i-: ,i COMMON JUDGMENT l.A.No.1 ot 2025 ln/and SA.No.2 of 2025 DISMISSING THE SECOND APPEAL AND !.A.No.1 ot 2025 WITHOUT COSTS \oc

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