The High Court · 2025

East Main BT Road West Sy No. 58 Sy No. 5712 land South Sy No. 56 land Counsel for the Appellant Sri Bollu Nagaraju Counsel for the Respond rhe courr derivered the r< rllowing: Common Judgment ' 'J;[Jflligfiir:rriuTEHr" .l l I HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALTSHETTY I.A.No.1 of 2025 IN/AND SECOND APPEAL No. 1of2O25 COMMON JUDGME NT: I.A.No.l of 2025 is filed to condone the delay of 2372 days in filing the Second Appea-l against the Judgment and Decree dated 02.04.2018 passed in A.S.No. 14 of 2Ol7 on the file of the Court of the III Additional District Judge, Gadwal.

2. Heard Sri Bollu Nagaraju, learned counsel for the Appellant and Ms.N.Vani Shree, learned counsel representing Sri Challa Srinivas Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent. J It is represented by learned couhsel for the petitioner that the respondent herein Iiled a suit for injunction in respect of land admeasuring Acs.2.14 gutnas in Sy.No.57/A situated at Kurumurthy Village of Chinna Chinthakunta Mandal, Mahabubnagar Mandal against the petitioner herein. The trial Court, after consideration of the entire material and evidence placed on record, decreed the suit uid.e judgrnent \ ) 2 LNA,J 1., \.No.1 of 2025 IN/AND S.l No.1 of 2025 and decree dated 13.11.2017 in O.S.No.23 of 2OI2. Aggrieverl b.. the same, the respondent herein pr eferred an Appeal ir.r A. S.No.14 of 2Ol7 on the file of the IIIrd Additional Districl ,-l rdge at Gadwal and the first appe11ale Court uide judgment arrl decree dated 02.04.2018 allou,e,l -he appeal and set a sir le the judgment ald decree passe d L y the trial Court. Augr i,:r,ed by the judgment and decree passed by the first appellat e Court, the present Second Appeal rs iled with a delay of '.2.)7 2. days.

4. In the affidavit filed in support of the p et tion, it is contendecl tirilt the petitioner engaged a counsel .n the appea-l and the app:al was allowed uide judgrnent arcl decree dated

02.O4.2OlB. Hou,ever, his counsel did not infonn him about passing ,r1' t re judgment ald decree in the appeal and it is averred that rlue to ill-health and family issues. he could not fo1low up, ivir h his counsel and he was unawar. of passing of the judgment in the appeal. It is further averre'd tJrat only in the mont.Lr of October, 2024, he approached his cc'unsel zurd enquirecl ab tut the status of the appeal, and h s counsel informecl r1b )ut passing of the judgment and decree in the LNA,I l.A.No.1 of 2025 IN/AND S A.No.1 of 2025 appeal. Immediately, he filed an application on 05. lO.2024 before the trial Court for obtaining certified copies ald after obtaining the same, he approached this Court challenging the judgment"ai-rd decree'passed'by the first appellate Court. It iS - further averred that subsequently, as there is a delay of six years in filing the appeal, the petitioner prayed this Court to condone the delay of 2322 days in liling the appeal.

5. The respondent filed counter-affidavit stating that the petitioner failed to explain the inordinate delay of 2322 day s in filing the appeal and further, the petitioner did not place any material on record in support of his contention that he was not well and that he followed up his counsel. It is further stated that the application is devoid of merits and is liabre to be dismissed.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is not aware about the court proceedings as he was suffering from ill-heatth and because of pandemic situation due to COVID-19, he could not pursue the matter and enquire about the status of the appeal. He would further rpubmit that the counsel engaged by the petitioner to contest \ 4 LNA,.I I No.1 of 2025 N/AND 1;.A No.1 of 2025 the mattel b,:lore the trial Court did not inform about passing of the judgn ent and decree in the appeal. Lea'n,rd counsel Iurther :;ubnr tted that the petitioner has a ver1 1o rd case on merits anrI t]rerefore, prayed to allow the appeal 7 . Leiarne I counsel for the respondent u'ould srrbmit that except bla mr ng the counsel, the petitioner did r ot make out any case ro condone the inordinate delay of 2372 days and further Lhr: l rrtitroner did not place any material or record in support ol h s. contention that he was suffenng u itlr ill-health ald that l-e .vas effected by COVID-19. B. Before e dverting to merits of case, it is ap - tt examine the principics arld parameters to be cc,r si,lered for condonation ,rf delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court rr Urtion of India ctncl ar c tl'ter u. Jahangir Bgramji Jeejeebhc',1 (D) through his LR (St,P (Ctuil) No.21096 of 2019 dated 03.04 2O2a), by referring th: judgment of the salne Court. in Esha Bhattach.a1je.z u. Managing Committee of Raghunatl,pur Nafar Academll & ()thers [(2013) 12 SCC 649], lnel<l tt at "delag should n-<:i be excused as a matter of geruerositrl. Rendering t 5 LNA,I t.A.No.1 of 2025 IN/AND s,A.No.1 0f 2025 substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite partA". g. In Basawaraj and another v. Speciil Land Acquisition Officerl, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "11. The expression "sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides connot be imputed to the patlA concerned, whether or not sufficren[ cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible- (Vide Mad.anlal v. Shgamlal ll2OO2) 7 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 1O0l and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobordhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 12011 .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that Iaw of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of Iimitation on equitable grounds "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.- The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving ful1 elfect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not' a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 'zor: (r+) scc gr 6 LNA,J l.A.No.1 of 2025 IN/AND S.A.No.1 of 2025

15. The laq, on the issue can be summariscd lo the effect that ,..,,irerc a case has been presented in rh: :ourt beyond linitation, the applicant has to explain thr ,:ou rt as to what rvas the "sufficient cause', which means a I Ldecluate and :r.rorrgh reason which prevented him lo apg rot ch the court '\,ithin limitation. In case a party is found to bt nlgligent, or for ,rant of bona fide on his part in the facts anrl rir( umstances of :he case, or lound to have not acted diliger tl] or l.emained r'r.rctive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the 1elar--. No court could be justified in concloning such an nordinate delay by imposing any con<lition ,vh ltsoever. The rrpnlication is to be decided only within thc pa -ameters laid rlo,,r'n by this Court in regard to the condoriatio r of delay. In ( ase there was no sufficient cause to pre!,c t.tt a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the , tr la1 ,,rithout "ny justifrcation, putting any condition $,hatsoer er, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statlttory lrro,,isions and it larr[amounts to showing utter disregard to th: cg slature.,'

10. F,'om a reading of the a_foresaid obserr,.ar_ions, it is clear tha.t. the Hon'ble Apex Court at paras- I I jrrd 12 of the judgrne I L interrupted the expression "suflicrer t cause" and at para' I 5 s ummarized the law with regard t c the issue of Iimitzr.tirrn. I I . In Postmaster General and others rrs. Living Media India L,imited and another2, Honble Ape> Court having conslder-od catena of decisions, inciuding I,undlik Jalam ' 1zorz1 rsc: se: l 7 LNA,J LA No.1of 2025 IN/AN D s.A.No.1 of 2025 Patil (deadf by LRs. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and anothera, wherein it was held that, "17....... The evidence on record suggests negtect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Detay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights". and observed that taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the GovernrnefltzvzJ and Government Undertaking, would not be proper and observed as under:- "29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy hxing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to ditatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 3O. Public rnterest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wheiever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitdting their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the benehciary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in ' lzoosy rz sc ++s 8 LNA,.I I A.No 1 of 2025 IN/AND S., \.No.1 of 2025 ar1], raudulent manner. One should not forget th e l)a )ic fact llrat !\'hat is acquired is not the land but the livel hro( of the lend osers. These public interest parameters ought o lr kept ir m rr<l b], the courts rvhrle exercising the discre irn lealing w th the application llled under Section 5 of th€ ,irr itation A,:t. )ragging the landlosers to courts of law vears a[.er the Lcrm ration of legal proceedings would not serwe an1, public .nler,rs,t. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfere( uith by cond )ning inordinate dela1. rvithout there being arr\- proper e>:planatron of such clelay on the ground of invoherrent of pr b1i: rcvenue. [t serves no pubtic interest." In Gowernment of Maharashtra (Water R.esources .12. Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Bor:s(;: Brothers Engineers :l:nd Contractors private Limitecl a , Hon,ble Supreme Oor r -t held as uncler: "6 1 ",,.1.l ..... [n a lit case in u,hich a party has (,th )rwise ac-ed Lon.a fide and not in a negligent manner, a srhlrt delay be.'op 1 pcriod can, in the discretion of the ( ou -t, be r:or Ldo -red, alrvays bearing in mind that the other sir le rf the piclurI is that the opposite party rr-ray have acquirec both in r:r1trit1 :rnd justice, what may no\{r be lost by the first p arty,s irLactir,rL, r're gligence or laches., 1 3. From t I e aJoresaid judgments of th e IJ,rn ble Apex Court, it i:; rvell settled that condonation of delav 15 not a matter of rig tt and unless sufficient and plausiblr reasons are sho\^rri. tlr,: ds1., cannot be condoned. While condoning ^ povfa SCC 1.511 9 LNA,] l.A.No.1 ot 2025 IN/AND S.A.No-1 of 2025 the delay, the Courts should a,lso see the substantial rights accrued to the opposite party ald also the passage of considerable time

14. Condonation of delay is not a matter of routine, more so when there is huge inordinate delay ald, therefore, the petitioner ought to have offered detailed, cogent reasons, plausible explanation for such inordinate delay. The reasons stated in the affidavit are vague, unsatisfactory arrd does not inspire the conlidence of this Court. The petitioner is trying to blame the counsel for the delay in filing the appeal on the ground that the counsel on record did not inform him about the passing of the judgment ald decree in appea_I. However, the petitioner failed to explain as to why he did not pursue the matter or follow up with his counsel, which clearly shows that there are clear latches and default on the pa_rt of the petitioner. Further, the petitioner has not placed any material in support of his contention that he was suffering from ill hea-lth and that he was affected by COVID_19. Therefore, it is not a fit case to condone the inordinate delay of 2372 days in filing the S.A. { l l I rr,_ 10 LNA,J .A.No.1 0f 2025 IN/AND S A.No.1 of 2025

15. In r.ie r as no p lar rr;ible and convincing reasons a r - condon:rtt or of the foregoing reasons ald lega1 p csrtron and shown for cf inordinate delay of 2322 davs in lilrng Second of 2025 is liable tc be dismissed dismissed. Consequentll., the S.A. also There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal, ther efore, I.A.No. 1 altd accord rrgly stands dismi ssed As a. se qucl, the miscellaneous petrtions pr:r drng, if any, shall stand cl s,missed. t \ To, //TRUE COPYII Sd/- M()HD. ISMAIL DEPUIY REGISTRAR SECIION OFFICER 1 ]lr" ilt Additionat I)istrict Judge, cadwat ? Ih" Junior Civit JL dge at Atmakur r. une CC to SRI BC _LU NAGARAJU, Advocate [OPUC] 4. one cc to Dr cHA _LA sRrNv;i;"ii;iyl'ijyJ"rt" 5. Two CD Copies ropu,: ADK/SWT HIGH COURT DATED: 241031r'7-025 v ,- 1 i'- LA,y G 7 * *s \\ .! '' 'il '.i' a=--.--'' UJ \, ORDER l.A.No.1 of 2025 ln/and SA.No.1 of 2025 DISMISSING THE SECOND APPEAL AND l.l\.No.1 of 2025 \