✦ High Court of India · 24 Mar 2025

B. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officerl, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under

Case Details High Court of India · 24 Mar 2025
Court
High Court of India
Decided
24 Mar 2025
Length
2,645 words

Cited in this judgment

Petition under section 5 of Limitation Act praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High court may be pleased to condone the delay o't (2373) days in filing the above second Ajpear against the Judgment and Decree dated 02to4t2o'18 passed in Appeal Suit no. 1s of 2017 on the file of court of the III Additional District Judge, dadwal, pending disposal of main appeal. lA NO: 2 OF 2024 Petition under section 15i cpc praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High court may be pteased to susPEND the Judgment and Decree dated o2lo4t2o 18 passed in nppeal suit no. 15 of 2017 on the file of court of the lll Additional District Judge, Gadwat, pending disposal of main appeal. lA NO: 3 oF 2024 Petition under order 3g--Rure 1 & 2 R/w Section 151 Cpc praying that in the circumstances stated in the affrdavit ri[J r, .lii"ii of the petition. the High court may be preased to qrant ad-interim i"irn"liJri'r".training rhe respondent and henchmen' agents etc, not to interfer" unJ noi to cause disturbance to the petitioner propertv situat.ed in Sy No. si)n i""'r" extent of Ac..1 .00 qts of Kurumurthv vi'age of crrinna ininin"tr^i, ttandar, Mahabubnagar District, pending disposal of above first appeal. SCHEDULE OF PROPRTY That the property is s situated at Kurumurth the boundaries are ituated in Sy No. 57lA to an extent of Ac.1.00 gts of dry land y viilase of cc Kunta Mandat, Mahab;bn;;;;"D]strict and East : Main BT Road West : Sy No. 5g North : Sy No. 5712 land South : Sy No. 56 land Counsel for the Appellant :SRl BOLLU NAGARAJU Counsel for the Respondent : Dr CHALLA SR|NIVASA REDDy The Court delivered the foltowing: COMMON JUDGMENT HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY I.A.No.l of 2024 IN/AND SECOND APPEAL No.555 of 2o24 COMMON JUDGMENT: LA.No. I of 2024 is filed to condone the delay of 2373 days in filing the Second Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated 02.04.2018 passed in A.S.No. 15 of 2017 on the file of the Court of the III Additional District Judge, Gadwal

2. Heard Sri Bollu Nagaraju, learned counsel for the Appellant, learned counsel representing Sri Challa Srinivas Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent

3. It is represented by learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent herein hled a suit for injunction in respect of land admeasuring Ac.1.00 gunta ln Sy.No.57/A situated at Kurumurthy Village of C.C.Kunta Mandal, Mahabubnagar Mandal against the petitioner herein. The trial Court, aJter consideration of the entire material and evidence placed on record, decreed the suit uide judgrnent and decree dated

13.ll.2Ol7 in O.S.No.20 of 2012. Aggrieved by the same, the 2 LNA,] l.A.No.1of 2024 lolAnd S.A. No 555 of 2024 respondent herein preferred an Appeal in A.S.No. lS of 2017 on the file of the IIIrd Additional District Judge at Gadwal arid rhe frrst appellate Court ulde juclgment and decree dat<:d 02.O4.2OlB allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the tria_l Court. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the hrst appellate Court, the present Second Appeal is hled with a delay of 2373 days.

4. In the affidavit fiied in support of the application for condonation of delay, it is contended that the petitioner engaged a counsel in the appeal and the appeal was allowed uide judgment and decree dated O2.O4.2018, however, his counsel did not inform him about passing of the judgment and decree in the appeal. It is averred that due to ill-health and family issues, he could not follow up with his counsel and he was unaware of passing of the judgment in the appeal. It is further averred that in the month of October, 2024, he approached his counsel and enquired about the status of the appeal, and his counsel informed about passing of the judgment and decree in the 3 LNA,J l.A.No.10f 2024 lnlAnd S.A.No.555 of 2024 appeal. Immediately, he hled an application on O5.1O.2O24 before the trial Court for obtaining certifred copies and after obtaining the same, he approached this Court challenging the judgment and decree passed by the hrst appellate Court. It is further averred that as there is a delay of six years in hling the appeal, the present application is filed to condone the delay of 2373 days 1n frling the appeal and prayed to allow the application.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is not aware of the court proceedings as he was suffering from ill-health and because of pandemic situation due to COVID-19, he could not pursue the matter and enquire about the status of the appeal. He would further submit that the counsel engaged by the petitioner to contest the matter before the trial Court did not inform about passing of the judgment and decree in the appeal. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner has a very good case on merits arld therefore, prayed to allow the appeal. l 4 LNA,J LA-No.1 of 2024 tnlAnd s.A.No.555 0f 2024

6. The respondent did not file counter_afhdavit however, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that there is inordinate delay in hling the appea,l and the petitioner failed to explain delay of each day which is mandatory. He would further submit that except blaming the counsel, the petitioner utterly failed to explain the delay and further no material is placed in proof of his ill-health. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the application.

7. Before adverting to merits of case, it is apt to examine the principles and parameters to be considered for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Llnion of India and- another u. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhog (D) through hb LR (SLp (Ciuil) No.21O96 of 2019 d_ated 03.04.202a), by referring the judgment of the same Court in Esha Bhattacharjee u. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Acad.emy & Others teol3) j2 SCC 6491, held that "delay should. not be exansed- as a matter of generositg. Rendeing substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party". / r_q/ .// 5 LNA,J l.A.No.1 of 2024 lnlAnd S.A.No.555 of 2024 B. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officerl, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "li- The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inqction or lack of bona ftdes cannot be imputed to the partg concemed, whether or not sufhcient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Yrde Madanlal v. ShyamLal I\2OO2) t SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 10Ol and Ro,m Nath Saov. Gobqrdhan Sc.o l{2OO2) 3 SCC 195:AIR2002 SC 12O11 .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party trut it has to be applied with alt its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 'A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal naxilr, dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is- the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the 'zor: 1r+1 scc sr 6 LNA,J l.A. No.1 of 2024 tnlAnd S.A.No.555 of 2024 'sufhcient cause" rvhich means an adequate and enough reason which preventcd him to approach the cburt within limitation. In case a party is found to bc negligcnt, or for want of bona lide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justificd ground to condone the dclay. No court could be justihed in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delav. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevenl a lltigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay w.ithout any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing a]1 order in violation of the statutory provisions arld it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

9. From a reading of the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the Hon'ble Apex Court at paras_11 and 12 of the judgment interrupted the expression "sufficient cause,, and at para_ls summarized the law with regard to the issue of limitation.

10. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another2, Hon,ble Apex Court having considered catena of decisions, including pundlik Jalam patil ' 1zotz1 t scc s!;z / .,. 1 LNA,J l.A.No.1of2024 tn/And S-A.No-555 of 2024 (dead) by LRs. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another3, wherein it was held that, "17....... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for Iong time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights". and observed that taking very lenient view in condoning t1.e delay, particularly, on the Government Undertaktng, observed as under:- part of the would not Government be proper '29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for Iixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant ajrd not of the sleepy.

30. Public interest undoubtedly is a pararnount consideration in exercising.the courts, discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. pursuing stale claims arld multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. prompt arld timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be ' (zoos) rrlsc 448 \ 8 \; .\ ,.o.*"., "rt#li , o *" r* Jiltil allowed to indulge in an], act to unsettle the settled legal rlghts accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving beneflt to rvhich they are otherwise not entitled, in aly fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application hled under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the lardlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proccedings woul<1 not serve any public interest- Settled rights cannot be lightty rnterfered with by condoning inordinate detav without there being any pioper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no pubtic interest-" 1i. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors private Limiteda, Hon,ble Supreme Court held as under: .'63. ....-. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona f.de and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always beadng in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity anrl justice, what may now be lost by the first party,s inaction, negligence or laches." n lzoztl a scc tso I 9 LNA,J l.A.No.1of 2024 lnlAnd S.A.No.555 of 2024

12. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is.welI settled that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and unless sufficient and plausible reasons are shown, the delay cannot be condoned. While condoning the delay, the Courts should also see the substantial rights accrued to the opposite party ald also the passage of considerable time.

13. Condonation of delay is not a matter of routine, more so when there is huge inordinate delay and, therefore, the petitioner ought to have offered detailed, cogent reasons, plausible explanation for inordinate delay of 2373 days, in filing the appeal. The reasons stated in the aJlidavit are vague, unsatisfactory and does not inspire the confidence of this Court. The petitionei is trying to blame the counsel for the delay in frling the appeal on the ground that the counsel on record did not inform him about the passing of the judgment and decree in appeal. However, the petitioner failed to explain as to why he did not pursue the matter or follow up with his counsel, which 10 1 \, \ LNA,] LA.No.1of 2024 tnlAnd S.A.No.555 of 2024 clearly shows that there are clear latches and default on the part of the petitioner. Further, the petitioner has not placed any materia_l in support of his contention that he was suffering from ill-health and that he was affected by COVID_ 19. Therefore, it is not a fit case to condone the inordinate delay of 2323 days in filing the S.A.

14. In view of the foregoing reasons and legat position and as no plausible and convincing reasons are shown lbr condonation of inordinate delay of 2373 days in filing Second Appeal, LA.No.1 of 2024 is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. consequentry, the S.A. also sta.ds dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand dismissed SD/- K. SRINIVASA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SEc/ofi OFFICER To,

1. The lll Additional District Judge, Gadwal(with records, if any) 2. The Junior Civil Judge at Atmaku(With records, if any) 3. One CC to SRI BOLLU NAGARAJU' Advocate [OPUC] 4. One CC to SRI Dr CHALLA SRINIVASA REDDY' Advocate [OPUC] 5. Two CD Copies ADK/SWT HIGH COURT DATED: 2410312025 i /,: (/

1.. ,i COMMON JUDGMEN l.A.No.1 ot 2024 ln/and SA.No.555 ot 2024 .,1 .J.,s ? "il(:I IU ,ii s* (i DISMISSING THE SECOND APPEAL AND l.A.No.1 ot 2024 WITHOUT COSTS ) \

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