Writ Appeal No. 47 of 2025 · The High Court · 2025

Counsel representing Sri Singam Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the appellants and Dr. P. Ravi Shankar, learned counsel representing Sri B. Nageshwar Rao, learned counsel for respondent No. 1.

2. This is an Intra-Court appeal preferred by the appellants aggrieved by the order dated 14.11.2024 passed by a learned Single Judge in W.P.No.256O2 of 2016, whereby, the order dated 28.O2.2O 15 reverting respondent No.1 from the position of Administrative Officer (AO) to Assistant Administrative Offrcer (AAO) has been quashed. Further, the adverse remarks in respondent No. 1's Annual Performance Appraisal Report (APAR) for the year 2Ol4-2O15 issued by respondent No.2 are quashed. Further, the appellants were directed to restore respondent No. I to her position as Administrative Off,rcer (AO) with all consequential benefits i.e. to pay arrears of salary, allowances 2 X\ A.No -17 of 2025 arrd other firrarLr:ial benefits which were denied to her ari a result of reversion an,l adverse remarks in the Annual Perlbrmance Appraisal Rt:port (APAR). Brief facts leading to filing ofthe appeal:

3. The respondent No.1 is an Assistant Adm ir ristrative Officer (AAO) of the appellants' corporation and is agglieved by the reversion order dated 28.02.2015, whereby, she is reverted from the pc,sition of Administrative Officer (AO) to /\ssistant Administrati ve C)fficer (AAO).

4. The lespondent No. 1 was promoted as Admir'.istrative Officer (AO) virlr: order dated 11.05.20i3 and took ctrarge on

20.05.2013. Afle r promotion, respondent No.1 u'as on probation for a period tf o:re year which may be extended for a maximum of one mor€ yeilr. While so, she availed various leaves from

22.07.2013 to 28.02.2015 during her probation period AS follows:

22.O7.2013 to (,i'.08.2013 - Privilege lrave 08.08.2013 to ( i'.09.2013 - Privilege Leave 08.09.2013 to ( i'.10.2013 - Sick kave 08.10.2013 to t?'.11.2013 - Sick Leave 08. 1 1.20 13 to C,:i.01 .2014 - Sick Leave 04.O 1.2O 14 Saturday attended ofhce O6.OL.2O|4 b 44.07.2OL4 - Maternity Leave O5.O7.2O\4 to \t .O7 .2014 - Sick Leave 19.O7.2014 to 1t.08.2014 - Converted sick leave 19.08-2014 b a2 .O9.2014 - Converted sick leave 17 drrl's 31 da1-s 30 days 3 L days 57 days 18O days 1 4 clays 31 days 15 days ., WA.No.47 of 2025 O3.O9.2O14 to 2l-O9.2O14 - Converted sick leave 19 days 22.09.2014 to 01.10.2014 - Privilege l.eave 10 days O2.1O.2O14 to 11.1O.2014 - Privilege Leave - 10 days l2.l0.20l4 toOl.l1.2OI4 - Extra Ordinary Leave - 21 days O2.ll.2ol4 to Ol.l2.2ol4 - Extra Ordinary l€ave - 30 days 02.12.2014 to 31.12.2014 - Extra Ordinary Leave - 30 days 01.01.2015 to 28.02.2015 - Extra Ordinary l-eave - 59 days 2105 days leave availed during probation excl Maternity Leave 18O d (Out of 4OS days Extra Ordinary Leave availed was 14O days PL-68 days, SL - 132 days, CSL - 65 days, EOL - 14O days = Total 4O5 Leave arrailed after Reverslon

5. During the probation period, the respondent No.1 was transferred to Nizamabad Branch as an Administrative Offrcer (AO) vide order dated 09.O5.2O14. On 21.O5.2O14, respondent No.1 sought her retention in the place of posting on transfer by presenting representation and the same was rejected Uy ttre competent authority. On 23.05.2O14, the competent authority extended the probation period by 4 months with effect from

20.O5.2O14 up to 19.09.2OI4. On 2a.O9.2014, the respondent No.l made a request for transfer to Hyderabad as her husband is working in the Zonal office, Hyderabad. On l4.IO.2Ol4, the competent authority extended the probation period by 2 months with effect from 2O.09.2OI4 up to l9.ll.2ol4. Again on 29 .7O.2O14, the competent authority proposed transfer of respondent No. l's husband to Nizamabad subject to his consent. On 16.L2.2014, the competent authority extended the 4 \YA.No.17 <-rf 2025 probationiar y tr)eriod by 3 months from 20.l I .2014 up to 19.O2.2O15. \\'hen respondent No. 1 did not coml)lete her probation lrenod, on 2a.O2.2O15, she was reverted from AO to AAO vide rl entral Office order as per Rule 16(21 of Staff Rules, 196C.

6. Aggr eve,1 by the reversion order, respondent I'lo. 1 hled writ petitior allt:ging that she gave birth to a prematurr: baby on 27 .Ol.2O14 wh ich required specialized medical care .:ncluding 4O days in an incubator. Ever since, respondent No.t2 started harassing lrer ald one such instance included transfer of respondent No.l from Hyderabad to Nizamabad Branch in May 2014 white she was on still maternity leave. Accr:rding to respondent No l, she gave a formal complaint on 22.06.2073 to appellant Nr.3 alleging sexual harassment of women at work place. The respondent No.3 called her on 30.O6.2013, but proper inqu Lry rvas not conducted and no action rvas r,aken on her complai;rt. According to the respondent No.1, said t:ailure to address her cornplaint and to take action against res;pondent No.2 was a part of effort to discredit her professiona I record. Also, her re.,ersLon was not based on her performance but was an act of rr:trlialion for her complaint against responderLt No.2 &' r,'l.",.:r -F 5 WA.No.47 of 2025 The aJorementioned grounds urged by the respondent

7. No.1 are upheld by the learned Single Judge as follows: The petitioner has a-lleged that she was subjected '8. toharassmentandgenderdiscriminationbythefourth including derogatory comments about trer respondent, pregnancy and health The Court frnds that the edtioner's constltu te a vlolation of her righ ts claim s. if proven would under the Sexual Haras sment of Women atW orkplace . The (Preventron Prohibitron aJId Redre SSal) Act 2013 respondents failedtoaddress tl:epetitroner 's complaintof timelv and effective manner. The harassment sexist remar ks and subiected oetitioner's claim of b humiliatron, Dartl cularlYln the workplace. is CONCC rnlnq, and the Court frnds that the failure to conduct a proper se on the part rnqulry lnto these a-Ile notes that of the respondents This Court further evidence to respondents have not provided sufficient r retaliation. counter petitioner's claims of harassment o quent action Failure to act on her complaint and subse taken against her, including reversion and adverse remarks, suggest a pattern of retaliatory behaviour in response to petitioner's complaints against the 4dt atloNSlSA serlous respondent. This Court finds that there 1S a reasonable to suspect that transfer was punitive in nature and oner was unfairly subjected to this tralsfer " ""

9. petiti (emPhasis suPPlied)

8. On the basis of above findings' the learned Single Judge held that respondent No'l's allegations as to sexual harassment' substantiated and therefore, set BendEr bias and retaliation are I 6 \\ A.\o :t7 of 2025 aside thr: or([er of reversion dated 28.O2.2O15 with all consequerrtral trenelits in terms of arrears of salary, allowances and other h.rarx:ial benefits leading to filing of the writ appeal. Contentlons of the appellants:

9. Learrred counsel for the appellants would subn-rit_ that the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is errone ous as the respondent No : was absent from duties for major part of her probation pt rioc resulting in inability to assess her suitability for the promott:d post. On that count, learned counsel for the appellants referred to the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules l()'cO at Rule 16 (1) and (2) which is exrracted and produced below: Proba tion on Promo tion: 16. (1t Ar employee promoted to a higher post shall be tre,r[ed as on probation in the higher post for a peri,rd of one year in the case of promotions to posts bel,tnging to Classes I and II arrd 6 months in other cases. Provided, however, that the competent autl ority may in its discretion extend the penocl of probation, but in no case shall t]le total period of q1q!ation exceed ia) in the case of promotions to posts belonging to (llasses i & II 2 Years 'b) ;rr other cases 1 year (12) ArL employee on probation shall be 1iable to be rer,'rled without notice at any time. ..-+-F!:.'E*- 7 !7A.No.47 of 2025

10. The probation period of respondent No. 1 as an Administrative Ofhcer (AO) commenced on 2O.O5.2013 for a period of one year up to 2O.O5.2O14. As per above section, respondent No. 1 belonged to Class I and Class II employee and therefore, the probation period shall not exceed two years i.e. total period of about 730 days. 1) The respondent No. 1 failed to complete her probation period within one Yea-r. 2\ Her period of probation was extended three times for a period of 9 months. 3) Out of said period of 730 days, as referred in paragraph No.5, respondent No. 1 was absent for a total number of 4O5 days excluding maternity ledve of 18O daYs. In that context, the learned counsel for the appellants 11. referred to judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Swati Singh vs. M.P.Kshetra Vidyut Vitraa Co'Ltd'r, wherein' it is held as follows: "22. In the opinion of this court, there is a difference between malice in fact and malice in law' Malice in fact means express or actual malice, ill-will towards a particular person; an actual intention to injure' It implies desire or intent to injure while malice in law or implied malice means wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse (See: Black- s Law Dictinoary-Six ' (2014) r MPU 308 8 \\A.No.'17 of 2025 Delt xc l)dn.). Malice in fact or actual mafice relates to the lctlrl1 state or condition of mind of the person who dirl the act. Malice in fact is where the malice is not esl-a ;lished by legal presumption or proof of certain fiicts, but is "o be found from the evidence in the case [See (2003) U SCC 567 : (AIR 2003 SC 4536) (Chairman and MI), BPt Ltd. V. S. P.Gururaja)1. Ma,lice in its legal st:nse mea rs rr.alice such as may be assumed for a wrongful act dont int:ntiona1ly, but without just cause or exctls3 or one ff r€asonable or probable cause. The term 'maii< e in fact' wo.rld come within the purview of the said definition. [Sce AIJt 2006 SC 2912 (R.S.Garg v. State of U-P ) and AII? 199 I SC 1260 (State of Bihar v. P.P.Sharma)1".

12. Furtter, the learned counsel for the appellants referred to the judgmer: t of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Rajneesh Khajuria v. M/s. Wockhardt Ltd'.2, for the same legal prt.'position.

13. Furtt er, the learned counsel for the appellants rt:ferred to the definitic n of "sexual harassment" in comparison with the allegations r-ract: by respondent No.1 alleging sexual harassment. It is vehementl'r argued that the allegations made by re spondent No. 1 do not fatl under the dehnition of sexual harassr-'rent and therefore, nc biils can be alleged on the part of the rvrit appe llants in not ta.k ng action pursuant to the complaint iliven by respondenlr No l. It is argued that the respondent ltro.l was reverted only o n account of her absence to dutv <h.Lring the ' AInoNLINT 2o2c sct 34 ") 9 WA.No.47 of Z)25 probation period. More particularly, it is emphasized that during pendency of the writ petition, respondent No.1 was confirmed in the post of Administrative Officer with effect from 01.O6.2017 and the same shows that there was no malicious intent in reverting respondent No. 1, Contentions of respondent No.l:

14. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 would submit that the writ appellants have acted with malice and bias in reverting respondent No.l from the post of Administrative Officer to Assistant Administrative Officer by failing to extend the prohation period and by failing to act on the complaint given by her against respondent No.2.

15. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 vehemently emphasized that though the respondent No. t has given complaint against respondent No.2, the writ appellants have maliciously taken the appraisal of respondent No.l with regard to her performance as Administrative Ofhcer from respondent No 2, that too after his retirement from post' It is emphasized that respondent No.2 has no locus standi to give appraisal report about perforqeance of respondent No. 1 post his retirement' In that context) the learned counsel for the respondent No. I referred to the statute enacted for preventing sexual harassment of women at l0 WA-No.47 of 2025 workplace anc the definition of "sexual harassment" al. workplace against w(,m( r). The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 referred to judgment r>f the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Sarita ChoudharT vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and a.nother3 in Writ Petit on (C) No.142 of 2024, referring to Article 10 of Internatior al Clovenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights for special prctection to mothers during reasonable period before and after child birlh coupled with freedom from discrimination or equal protection rf laws during pregnancy and maternity of a ',voman are precious r gh:r; of women at workplace. Further, tire 'learned counsel {br res,pondent No. 1 referred to judgment of tlte Hon,ble Supreme Oourt of India in Medha Kotwal Lele and others vs.Union of India and othersa, wherein, it is held as follows: "Even after 15 years of Vishaka judgment dilted 13.0 3. 1'197, m€rny women still struggle to har.e their nrost basir; rights protected at workplaces. The belief of the Cons,titrLr.ion Framers in fairness and justice for women is yet t I be fully achieved ai the workplaces in the country. The attltude of neglect in estabiishing an effective rand comlrreht:nsive mechanism in letter and spirit of Vishaka Direr:tio:'rs by the States as well as employers itr the priva te iurd public sector has defeated the very objeclive anrl lrurocse of the directions" I 3 Writ petitior (C) llo. I42 of 2024 o (20 t 3) I sc,l292 ;,'l t1 WANo.4? of 2025

16. With respect to adverse remarks in relevant record' reference is made to judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indu Bhushan Dwivedi vs' State of Jharkhand and anothers, wherein it iS held that imposition of punishment, past uncommunicated adverse remarks and entries in service records cannot be sustained. In Anoop Jaiswal vs' Government of India and another6' 17. it is heid that reasonable opportuniry should be given to defend the allegations of grave misconduct which may lead to stigma' Likewise, in S. Ramachandra Raju vs' State of OrissaT' the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that solitary adverse report against employee for one year to the exclusion of entire service should not form a foundation for forming opinion resulling in compulsory retirement'

18. Further, judgment in Sukhdeo vs' Commissioner Amravati Division, Amravati and anothers is about compulsory retirement which is not applicable to the facts of the present case' The judgment of the Hon'trle Supreme Court of India in Oev Ollt ..'-2?-.' 'AIR 20t o sc 2472 u AIR 1984 sc 636 'AIR 1995 sc t l t *1r99oy s scc ror t2 WA.No.47 of 2025 ys. Union of India and otherse is about gradings, perforrnance of lpod', \rery good', 'average' of 'poor' and said employees gradation is rrot e pplicable to the facts of the present case Analv sis ofthe Court:

19. A perusal of the record reveals that respondent No'1 challenged her reversion primarily on two grounds i c. 1) Non- extension of probation period due to maternity leave and !l) malice on the part o - the writ appellants in not conducting prope r enquiry into the alkgatior-rs made by her against respondent No.2 On this count, the Lile IrLsurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules', i960 clearly stipul ate that the employee who is promoted to rl higher post would lre t:eated as on probation and the total p'eriod of probation shrLll;rot exceed two years. Further, as per Rule 16 (2), an employee on probation can be reverted at any point of time without notic3. Srnce respondent No.1 was promoted to th': post of Administrative C)fficer (AO) with effect from 20 05 2013, her probation was tr end on lg.O5-2O14 and her suitability for said post was to Le as;sessed during said time period' l)ue to her leave extensions d rring probationary period for 4 months i e ' from to lg.Og.2Ol4, later 2 months i.':. from to lg.ll.2Ol4 and 3 months i'r:' from

20.O9.2014 uP 1 20.05.2014 uf, n (2008) 8 scc 725 '-) l3 WA.No.47 of 2025

20.71.2014 up to 19.02.2015, the probation period was extended for total period of 9 months i.e. up to 19.O2.2O15.

20. The purpose of probation as held in Rajesh Kumar Srivastava vs. State of Jharkhandro is that "a person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in serrrice". It is further held that there are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation and that at that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer are generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be conhrmed, or he should be released from servlce.

21. Further, in Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School vs. J.A.J.Vasu Senalr, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that, "the purpose of probation is to enable an assessment to be made of the performance of an employee and that it serves as an opportunity for probationers to establish by the dint of their work which is rendered during the period of probation, that they are suitable for being retained in service' It is fufther held that on the part of the employer, probation enables 'o 1zott1 + scc ++l rr lzon; rz scc tsz t4 WA.No. l7 of 2025 the apporn [inf] authority to determine the suitabilily of the probationor for retention in service". To determine thr: suitability of responcle rt No. 1 for the post of A.O., her performance was to be assessed fc r zr period of one year, which may exten d upto a maximum peri,rC of two years. While so, respondent No.1 went 9n leave for variousr periods shown at paragraph No.5

22. In a<tdilicn to going on maternity leave for a period of 18O days from t)6.1)7.2O14 to O4.O7 .2074, respondent No. 1 went on leave again on various counts of leave from 05.07.20 14 to 2A.O2.2015. The respondent No.1 was on leave for a pcrrocl of 585 days out of 730 days of probation period. Alternatively, it can be said that rer;pondent No.1 worked for only for a short period of 145 days out of 73C days of probation period. When responrlent No. 1 was going o-r leave continuously, the writ appellants extt:nded the probation p:rirxi on three occasions on 23.O5.2014, 1'+.lO.2Ol4 and 16.12.2014 for a period of 9 months i.e., 4 months u'ith effect from 20.05 2074 wp to 19.09.2014, 2 months with elIect from

14.10.2014 up, to 19.11.2014 and 3 months with eflect from 16-12.2O1,+ ap to 19.O2.2O15. The same is reflected in the relevant record of r:spc,ndent No.l. Therefore, there is no locus for respondent No. I to allege that there is failure on lhe part of the writ appellalts in extending her probation. Only due to lailure on IrI --,7 I Lt l5 WA.No.47 of 2025 the part of respondent No. 1 to attend duties during her probation period continuously, the reviewing officer reported that her performance could not be assessed as she was on leave. It is a point to be noted that the reviewing officer continuously reported that her performance could not be assessed on account of her absence but there are no adverse remarks passed by the reviewing ofhcer as to the quality of performance of respondent No 1 . Therefore, we do not see any strength in the contention of respondent No.l as to failure on the part of the writ appellants in extending the probation period. To accommodate respondent' No. 1 due to her maternity leave, the writ appellants not only gave maternity leave for the period of 180 days but gave additional leave of 4O5 days such as Sick leave, Privilege leave and Extra ordinary leave.

23. The next count canvassed by respondent No.l is about sexual harassment meted by respondent No.2 and failure of writ appellants to take action against respondent No.2 for his alleged misconduct against women at workplace. In that context, there is a need to peruse the dehnition of the term 'sexual harassment' as per Section 2 (n) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2O 13, which is as follows: \ l6 \!A.No 47 of 2025 (n) "ser:ual harassment" includes any one or more ol' the foll,)wx1g unwelcome acts or behavior (whether drrcclly or by mpllcation) namelY:- (i) t hys;ical contact and advances; or (ii) r dt:rnand or request for sexual favours; or (iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or (iv) shorving pornography; or (v) an1' other unwelcome physical, verbal or non r':rbal con durl of sexual nature; 24 Reslronient No.1 gave complaint dated 22-06.20.-3 against respondent No.:2 alleging harassment as follows: \ "Ihe Regional Manager (Legal)' Sn K Jayas Lmha Rao has; "humiliated" me when I went for di5su55ir'rn of DOPA goals with other fellow ollicers. He was complaining me rrith ,)ther male offrcer and "trying to magnify all errors ir, 1.'pirL6f . This is not the first occasion and a1 r:very inst:nct:, he was "commenting sa'rcastically about my knolriecip;e leve1s". I tried to put before him thar I was deeply Lurt and getting democratized by his attitude After 2 oc,;asic,ns, the called me and he tried to divert the topic and tut l>lame on me. I arn very sensitive and if anything happens to me, he v'ill tre solely responsible if he dices not changt: his attitrrde l owards me"

25. The ' alrove allegations are about "humiliation" during discussion of I)OPA goals with other fellow officers, "rrlagnifying errors in ty ring" and "sarcastic remarks about knowledge levels" of respondent No 1. The complaint shows that responilent No.2 allegedly h rmir iated respondent No. 1 in a group dis<. ussion of goals. In a group discussion, there can hardly anJ scope for !,,rPA _1 t7 WA.No.47 of 2025 indulging in sexl-ra-l harassment. The second allegation is complaining to other male officers magnifying the errors in typing. Complaining about errors in typing can hardly be equated to sexual harassment. Lastly, respondent No.2 allegedly made sarcastic comments about the knowledge level of respondent No.1. The comments about the knowledge levels cannot be in the nature of sexual harassment. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the complaint given by respondent No.1 against respondent No.2 prima facie falls to make out a case of sexual harassment against her by respondent No.2. When the allegations made by respondent No.1 against respondent No.2 are general in nature without any iota of scope for initiating enquiry against respondent No.2 for indulging in sexual harassment, no bias can be found on the part of the writ appellants for not taking action against respondent No.2 on the basis of complaint given by respondent No. 1.

26. Lastly, the grievance of respondent No. 1 is that her reversion is based on the review given by respondent No.2 after his retirement. To ascertain the truth in allegations made by respondent No. 1, her original relevalt record was called for perusal by this Court. The reviewing officer i.e. respondent No.2 retired from service 10 months prior to his appraisal which was 18 V A.No,47 of 2025 1 given on 2t.O3.2O16. In this context, it is to be note<l that his assessmenl w:rl; not only taken after the retirement but his review was taken ()ve;l \\'hile he was in service. The record shou's that the reviewing rfh,:,:r continuously recommended for ertension of probation })ut -rot reversion. The authorities at e\rery stage have given appr x,al to the extension of probation to the maximrlm extent posr;ible. Only after availing maximum amount of leave period, sinr:e [t,:r performance could not be assessed, o]1ly on the ground of ;rciverse leave record, respondent No. I u'as reverted to the post ,>l P.ssistant Administrative Ofhcer (AAO). In the circumstan:es, we do not see any injustice being meted. out to respondent Nc,. 1 in her reversion from the post of Administrative Officer (AO tc the post of Assistant Administrative Olfi:er (AAO). Responden. Nc,- 1's own choice of leave and her aclvtlrse leave record led ro ht:r reversion. There is no inaction on the oart ofthe writ appellrnts in considering respondent No.1's maternitlr leave nor bias ar d rlalice on the part of respondent No.2 anC the writ appellants n tlLe backdrop of complaint given by respondent No. 1 against respontlent No.2 for sexual harassment The record does not make out a valid case of violation of the rights of the respondent Nc. I under Article 31 1(2) of the Constitutio:r of India. The learned Single Judge failed to examine the cc ntents 1 t9 WANo.47 of 2025 respondent No.1's complaint dated 22.06.2013 vis_a_vis dehnition of "sexual harassment, ald arrived at an erroneous conclusion. As such, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. 27 . In the result, the writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 14.11.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.256O2 of 2016. As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, stand disposed of. To, //TRUE COPY// SD/.K.SRINIVASA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER

1. The Chairman, L.l.C. of lndia, Yogakshema Build rngs, Central Office, Jeevan Bima Marg, Mumbai-4O0 021. The Executive Director (Personnel), L I C of-lndia, Yogakshema Buildings, Central Office, Jeevan Biina Marg, Mumbai-400O21' The Zonal Manager, L I C of lndia, Jeevan Omce, Opp. Secr6tariat, Saifabad, Hyderabad, State of Telengana' The Section officer, Posting Section, High court for the state of Telangana at Hyderabad. ThesectionOfficer,WritServiceSection,HighCourtfortheStateof Telangana at HYderabad. One CC to SRI SINGAM SRINIVASA RAO, Advocate [OPUC] One CC toSRl BANAVATH NAGESHWAR RAO, Advocate [OPUC] South Central Zonal ^B.hgOVa,

2. J. 4_

7. Two CD Copies

8. BSR LS /. HIGH COUFIT DATED:0 410412025 JUDGMENI' WA.No.47 c,f2025 t' ., ( ,J 1. 1H ,i SI4I€ 1I APB 2I}25 t a 6O C ALLOWING THE WRIT APPEAL, WITHOUT COSTS 6 1a .'-s