The High Court · 2025

Sn Shvam S.Agra\,val, learned counsel for t Mr. Ashish Kalc, learned counsci counsel for the responderlt No. I e appellant fE prc nting Ms. Sneha Bhogle, Ieamed COMMON ORD ER /Per l{ort'blc. Justic Mou s humi B hattachaty ct)

1. T1're pe titioncr-/appellant, M/ Telangana State industrial Development Corporation Limited, as challenged the impugned ordcr and decree passed b1. the lea ed Commercial Court dated

16.O2.2023, u..hereby the appellant,s Commercial Original petition (C.O.P.No.38 of 2Ot6) filed under s lion 31(1)(a) and (aa) of Thc Stale Financial Corporations Act, I 51, for a decree against the respondents for an amount of R I ,30,31,00O/- wirh inrercsr @ 17.5o/o per annum, rvas dismissed.

2. The present Appeal u,as filecl n 26.12.2024 along with an application (I.A.No.1 of 2025) for co donation of a delay of 514 days in hling the Appeal. The parLi s have filed their respective 2 afltdavits in the l.A. The respondents have strongi), objected to the condonation of delay.

3. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioncr / appellanL and lcarned counsel appcarir-rg for the respondent No.1 in support of their submissions ar-rd considered the case larv cited on behall' of the parties.

4. The pe titioner / appellant has hlcd tu,o affidal,rt s in support of the application for condonaLion of delal-. The scc:ond affidavit is described as an 'Additional Affidavit'for supplemcnting thc reasons stated in the first af{idavit. Thc reasons for thc condonation of delay are set out from paragraph 25 ol the first affidavit. The relevant datcs mentioned are as follou's.

5. The petitioner states that after passing of the impugned order on 16.O2.2023, the pctitioncr applicd lor a Ccrtihe d Copy of the said order and dccree on 22.02 .2023 and thc Certilied Copy was furnished to the petitioner on 07.O6.2023. Upon receiving the copy of the order, the petitioner's Lau, Ofhcer prepared a nole and submitted it to the 'Highcr Ofhcials, for taking a dccision and necessary action. However., the immediate higher olficial, the ,, t 3 Deputy General Manager of the peti ioner 'took long time to go through and understond the impugned rder and after sometime, he had placed it before the Managing Director of the petitioner' Elections were declared rn the State of elangana, during which 'all the offi.ciaLs were busy and no inst ctions Luere coming for the decisions to be taken in regard to legal matters and the issue of the present case LUc.s lyirtg pendinq'. y the time normal work resumed after the State Elections, the Union Elections had commenced and 'again. there tuas lto p ogress in the work incLuding the issue of the present case'. Paragra h 26 of the affidavit further states that even after the Union Elec ons, 'it took some time for normal utork to get resumed. .. ... Howeu got mixed up in the numerous fil circulation...... and hence no decision r, the fi"le of the present case s (hal u.tere pending for es taken as the file itself LUas got mixed up and uent missiruE'.

6. Paragraph 27 of tine affidavit tates that it was only in November, 2A24 that the petitioner r alized thaL 'the decision in regard to the impugned order hod not et been taken' and that the matter was pending. This came to ligh when the respondent No. 1 approached thc petitioner for return o the original Title Deeds of 4 the schedule property. The petitioner gave inslructions to put up the ltle 'but the same uas not being tracecl and it tuas realized thcLt the JiLe uas missing'. Thc petitioner thereafter g:l\,e instructions to trace the filc and place rL bclore thc higher ofticials. It is further stated that 'after a long search and. uith. great dfficulty, the file could be traced out in the seconcj taeek of December, 2024,. The petitioner immediately rreld discussions r.vith counscr and a decision was taken to tile ern Appeal beforc the lligh Court. The Appeal was the r-eafter prcpared aud filcd.

7. The 'Additional Alfldavit, rciLcrates the dares ol. the Elcctions which were mentioned in the first afhdavit. Thc pctitioner sLates that the schedule for the Elections to the Telangana State Legislative Assembly was a,nounced on o9. ro.,2o23 and the Elections wcre held on 30.11.2023. The cmploy.ces of the petitioner-Corporation. being a State Governmenl compan1/, were assigned official dutres for conducling clectiors and therefore, could not 'concentrate on the issue relating to filitg oJ.the present Appettl and. obtaining necessary insttactions, sincc thcy were engaged in election related work. paragraph 6 of the Additional Affidavit states that the Election Commission of India had t i i { I I t { I I I I I i tI r I I I I I I I i I I i announced the schedule for the Gen ral Elections on 16.O3.2024, and the polling in the Siate of Telang na was held on I3.O5.2O24. The petitioner's emplol'ees wcre entru ted with elec[ion duties and 'lheg were compLetelg tnuolued ther in'. The petitioner further states that 'in uiew of such disturban es in utork due to successiue elections, immediate action for filing o the appeal could not be taken up'. Paragraph 7 states that fo lowing the changc of the (iovernment, three Vice Charrmen a d Managing Dircctors took charge in quick succession at thc titioncr-Corporation, which further contributcd to the delzrv in flli g thc Appcal

8. The statements made in the t\\. affidavits hled in support of the application for condonation of del y in liting of thc Appeal have been reproduccd verbalim in lhe prece ding paragraphs. The extracts in italics are reproduced fro thc two affidavits.

9. The dates mentioncd in the t o af{'rdavits contain several unexplained time-gaps. Thc impu ed order was passed on

16.02.2023 and the application for Ccrtified Copy thereof was made on 22.02.2023. Although the C rtil"ied Copy nas made rcady on 07.06.2023, the next date mentio ed in the Additional Afhdavit 6 \": - \r, \ \ IS 09.IO.2023 (the announcement ol thc schcdule for the Telangana Legislative Assembly Elections), follos,r:d by the conduct of 1.he Ele ctions on 30. 1 t .2O23

10. 'lhe petitioner has rlot cxplained the lapsr: ol fbur montlts between 07.06.2023 and 09.1O.2023. Thc seco;rcl uncxplained g:rp is from 30.11.2023 (the clate of the Legislative .,\ssentblv elcctior_rs) to 13.05.2024 (polling date lor the General Eleclior.rs in thc Statc of Telang:rna). Thcre is no cxplanation for the inrct_\,.cning pcriod o[ six rnonths from Novembr'r, 2023 to May, 2024. 1l Apart from the gaps in thc timeline, the rcasons stated for the dclay are as follows: (i) Thc Dcputy Cencral Managcr of tl.rt,pctiiioner look a long time to go through and undcrstancl tl_rc impugnccl order; (ii) All thc officials of the petition er-Corpora tion rr.cre busv with the election duties; (iii) No instructions were issued to the olficierls regarding the legal matters; M l i i 7 (iv) The llle of the present c se was mixed up with the oth er files; and (r) Thc llle was ultimatch' los

12. It is evident from paragraph 27 f the first Afhdavit that the respondent No.1 demanding return o the original Title Deeds of thc schedule property triggered the pe tioncr's realization that no decision had been taken with regard to the impugned order and that the file r.vas untraceable. The eforc, from 13.05.2024 to Novcmber, 2024 i.e., for six months th pctitioner took no steps to challenge the impugned order dated

6.O2.2023. Thc pctitioner admits that the hle was locatcd afte a considerable dclay. The Appeal was hled in the second wcek o Deccmbcr, 2O24. No other specil-rc dates arc mentioned in the tu,o affidavits.

13. Section 13 of The Commcrcial ourts Act, 2015 relates to filing of appeals from decrees ol Comrrrercial Courts ar-td Commercial Divisions. Section 13( l A) provides that any person aggricved by the judgment or order of Commercial Coult or from a Commercial Division of a High Cou may file an appcal to the 8 Commercial Appellate Division of thc High Courr u,rthin a period ol sixLl' d21y-s lrom the date o[ the judgment or ordcr. I4. Thc appellant has filed the present Appci:l under thc provisions of The Commercial Courts Act, 2O 15 l.rom the order o[ thc Commcrcial Court along with al application lor.condonatior] of delal- o[ 514 davs. The rcasons statcd in the tri.o allidavits filcc] alo'rg u'itlr the application for condonation o[ <k:]zrr,, havc ber:. narratcd ir r the foregoir-rg paragraphs.

15. Thc llrst question is whether the Court should invoke its discretionary powers to cor-idone the delay

16. Thc :tltpellant entircly relies on section 5 ol The Limitation Act, 1963 wl'rich allows liling of an appeal or:rnv application bcyond thc prescribed pcnod of time subject to Lhc Court bcing satisfied o[ tl-re sufficiency of cause shown by ltc appclla]tL or :tpplicant for the dclay. The burden of proving thc sufliciencv of cau se lies u'i th the appellan t or applicant. :7 a , { t 1 l 9 17 . In Gouernment of Maharashlra ( aler Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Co ractors Priuate Limitedl , th,e Supreme Court considered the applic b1e timelrame under section 37 of The Arbitration and Conciliation cl, 1996 which provides for appeals frcm specihed orders. Section 37 of the 1995 Act does not specify a timeframe for fi1ing of ap eals. Thc Supreme Court concluded that any delay beyond 9O days, 3O days or 60 days (undcr Articles 116, 117 of The Limit tion Act, 1 96 3 ald section 13(1A) of The Commercial Courts Act, 20 I 5 respectively) for hling of arr appeal under section 37 of the 1 96 Act should be condoned by way of exception a]ld not by way of rule. Besides, in Borse Brothers, there was a delay of 131 day beyond the 6O days period provided for hling of an appeal u er section 13(1A) of The Commercial Courts Act, 2O15. The S reme Cou.rt found that the delay had not been explained with su flrcient bona Jides and :rccordingly proceeded to dismiss tlle a -l B. It is now settled that section 5 f The Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to appeals filed und r section t3(1A) of The Commercial Courts Act, 2Ol5: Borse ther.s; also refer to a recent '1zoz11 o scc +oo rY. \ 10 dccision ol thc Supremc Court in Jharkhand" I_trla Lltpada.n Nigam Ltd., Vs. M/ s. Bharat lTeauy Electricals Limitedz.

19. Horvever, in Borse Brothers, Lhe Supreme Court madc it clear that the limitation bel,ond 60 days cannot bc stretched to unreasonable limits so as to defeat the objcct o[ The Commcrcial Courts Act. 20 15, whercrn the Legislature made a conscious choice of cappir.rg the timelinc, The delay of 5 1 4 derys is not being castigated here lor its lcngth, but for the appcllart,s lailure to account 1or tltc delay in thc manncr manilated uncler scction.5 of The Limitation Act, 1963. Although, extension of the period of limitation beyond the prescribed timeframe is a matter ol public policy, 'sufhcicnt cause' cannot serve as a convenient excusc to \ ripe out unexplained delays in pursuing stale clarms.

20. Since scction 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the present Cornmercial Cou rt Appeal, the next question is u,hether the appellant has satisfied the requiremcnt of shorrving sufficier-rt causc. In this regard, thc appellant cannot take refugc in the fact of it bcing a Government Company. A discussion on this aspect follou.s in the next paragraph. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 910 rtl!-r l:i-'l 11 11

21. The facts bcfore us are in stark ontrast, both in degree and depth, to those in Borse Brothers. As opposed to thc delay of 131 d:rys in Borse Brothers, the prcscnt ppeal is set behind by 514 days. The only similarity with Borse rothers is that the appellant before the Supreme Court was the overnment o[ Maharashtra (Water Re sources Department). In the rs M/s, Telangana State lndustrial prcscnt casc, the appcllant Development Corporation Limited (formerly Andhra Pradcsh S tc Industrial Devclopment Corporation Ltd.).

22. A State Corporation/ Governmen Dcpartment cannot be put on a pcdestal with privileged timelin s which would be eviden[ from the underlying objective of special statutes which contemplate llxed timclines. These Acts are entity- eutral in terms of Iimitation pcriods. Therc is little doubt that the bjective of a special statute tike Thc Commercial Courts Act, O15 is to ensure specdy rcsolution of high-vatue commerci disputes, without any exceptions. The focus is on quick resolution which includes Government entities when they are par res to commercial disputcs E\ \ 12

23. Morcovcr. the logir ol Government emplovces being oltlivious oI timclincs is totally r-nisplaced. Governmcnt clepa]-tments are expected to ltc stafled with compctent persons rvho are familiar \\,ith Court procccdings cspccially in tjrrrcs u.hen modern technology aiding quick filings and commnnication is readily available. Thc Lar.v of Limitation binds everybodr., including tl-rc Government: I)ostma.ster GeneraL Vs. Liuing Me,dia India Litnited:1. 'lhc Governm('nt or a s ing of thc Governmcnt e r-rjoys the same perks ard suffcrs tl-rc same pitfalls as it llrtvatc cnLity commercial transactions: u,hich bcgs thc qrrcstion whetl,rer the 1n Govcrnm€rnl czm crcate:rnd take shclter under ir parallcl timeline in a fixed pcriod statlrte likc The Commercial Courts Act, 20 15 ?

24. None of tl-re judgmcnts cited on behalf of the appcllant deal with thc spr:cific timiration pcriod prescribcd ultdcr The Commercral Courts Act, 2015. Collector Land Accluisition Offtcer, Anatttnog \rs. Ktttijia. N. L.talakrishnon Vs. M.Krishnamurt.hgs arrd a ITrorc rccen L j udgment ol '.hc Suprcme Court in Mool Chandra Vs. '1zorz1 : scc so: 4 (1987) 2 SCC r 07 5 (1998) 7 SCO 123 I ,l I sv"*'I iI 1 l1 13 Union of India6 deal with the require nt of showing sufliciency of c.1usc under scction 5 of Thc Limitation Act, 1963. In N.BctLakishna (supra), the Supreme ourt dealt with the need to advancc substantial justice wherc t e delay on the part oi the litigant was not dcliberate or caused by malo fdes. Similarly, in Mool Chandra (supra) the Supremc C urt found from the spccific facts of that case that therc was no n gligence attributable on the p:rrt of the appellant. Stteo Raj Sing Vs. Union of IndiaT agrccd rvith thc vicu, taken by thc High Cour in condoning the delay on the part of the Union of lndia on thc round of proper exercisc o[ discretion The Supreme Court reli on State of Manipur Vs Koting Lamkang 8 to hold that thc i personal naturc of State- lunctioning should be given due regar . Sheo Raj Singh hou'cver involved the issuc of compensation p a able to the landowner and w.rs not under a special statute with gorous timelines, namcly, The Commercial Courts Act. 2O 15

25. Exercise of discretion under sec on 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 cmpou,ers the Court to entcrtai an appeal or application u AIR 2024 SC 4046 7 (2023) r0 scc 53r 3 (20r9) I0 SCC 408 t \,lr 14 f beyond trc prcscribed period of limitation subject to thc Court bcing satislied of the sufficiencS, of causr: showr-r by the applicant /appcllar-rt. Thc canse shown mus( bc such that the overarchi.g rcquirement 1.) zrdvancc thc cause of substantial .justice outu,cighs the appclleint,s shortfall in filing the appeal within thc. prcst:ribecl pcriod ol limitation. ,sufficient,causc reflect a sensc o[ purposc :rnd a u,i]lingness to restore diligence. Thc reasons sltorr,,n cannot bc slipshod or nonchalant so as to dcmar-rd crrnrlonzrtion as a mattcr ol cntitlemcnt. IL must bc borne in mtnd that dcla)' may hiLvc crcated equitl. in f:tvour of arnother ir-r the interregn unr.

26. As s(atcd in the loregoing paragrapl.rs, thc appellant only gives sporadrc d:rtcs rvhich randomil, pop up in a timelinc from lrcbruarv, 2O23 to l)ecember, 2021. Thcre is no :ittempt to cxplain or account lor thc long blanks in_betrveen thcsc darcs.

27. It is of crucial relevancc that in paragrapll 7 of the additional affidavit, onc of the reasons mcntioned by thc :tppellant for the delay is that there were t hrcc Vice-Chairmcn and the Managing Directors u'l'ro tool< chargc ol thc appellant corporation in quick ; I iI , I I I a 15 successions. There are no dates menti ned with regard to the date on which the Vice Chairmen and the anaging Directors assumed charge. Counsel appearing lor th respondcnt has however produced G.O.Rt.No.54, dated 11.0 2024 which shows that Dr.E.Vishnu Vardhan Reddy was pl ced in the post of Vice Chairman, Managing Director, and Executive Director of the appellant Corporation on and lrom 1

1.O7.2O24. There was no change in the position of Vicc Chairm / Managing Director of the appellant from 1 1.0 1.2024 till the dat of hling of the appeal i.e., on 26.1,2.2024. I I r { 2A. It is of additional significance t at one of the grounds for passing the impugned order was whcth r the appellant's claim was barred by limitation. The Commcrcial Court after considering the facts, answered the issue againsl Lhe a peilant and in favour of the respondent No. 1. Thus, it is all the ore difhcult to accept that the appellalt would slip into a slumb for 514 days after having t I I suflered an order. inter olio.on thc gro nd of delay { d i i 16 a \

29. We hence do not find any reason, satisfacrory or otherwisc, in condoning the delay of 514 days in fiting the Commercial Court Appeal.

30. I.A.No.1 of 2025 is accordingly dismissed tor the reasons stated above. Consequentl.t, COMCA.No. I of 2O2S starrds rejected. There shail be no order as to costs. Sd/. I. NAGA LAKSHMI JOINT REGISTRAR \ //TRUE COPY// One Fair Copy_to the Hon,ble Justice fUou"nrrnl (For Her Lordship tira peirisrii"" One Fair Copy_to the Hon,ble Justice B.R. Madhu (For His Lordship kind p.;;;;ii-"" \ SECTION OFFICER Bhattacharya sudan Rao Hyd;;;;*'"' The Principar speciar court in the cadre of District Judge for Triar and Disposat of Commerciat Disputes "i 11 LR Copies Union of tndia Ministry of Law, Justice and company I[: ,r.:i,"J_t3:fitary, The Secretary, Telanoana Advocates Association Library, High Court for the State of Tetangana, High Court Aritdi.g, Hii"r"i"o 9n. 99 to Ms Shyam 5 Agrawat, novo"caG fd;U;i" 9n" 99 to Ms. Sneha Bno!te, Advocate fopi:if-", Two CD Copies "i \ \ To, 1 z J 4

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5.,q16.HfI t- HIGH COURT DATED: 2510712025 JUDGMENT l.A. No. 1 ot 2025 IN/AND COMCA.No.I of 2025 DISMISSING l.A. No. 1 ot 2025 AND REJECTING COMCA. No. 1 of2025 { b