✦ High Court of India · 11 Mar 2025

The High Court · 2025

Case Details High Court of India · 11 Mar 2025

2. Shri.V.V.S. Somayajulu Head Human Resource and Adminislration UNI- SANKYO LIMITED, (now known as SANZYME BIOLOGICS PRIVATE LIMITED) Plot No 13, Sagar Colony, Road No.2 Banjar,a Hills, Hyderabad - 500 034. ... Respondents/Petitioners

1. The Deputy General Manager, (Fermentation) UNI-SANKYO LIMITED (now known as SANZYTME BIOLOGICS PRIVATE LIMITED) H No T-4-115, Sy.No.25B and 259 Mahabubnagar Road, Gagan Pahad Village Rajendranagar N4andal, Hyderabad -501 323. 2 ShriG. Suryam Advocate, lnquiry Officer UNI-SANKYO LIMITED, (now known as SANZYI\,4E BIOLOGICS PRIVATE LIMITED) Plot No. 13, Sagar Colony, Road No.2 Banjara Hills, Hyderabad -500 034. ...Respondents/Respondent Nos.2 & 3 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to vacate the interim orders daled 10-O2-2023 in lA No. 1 of 2022 in CRP No. 3072 ot 2022. Counsel for the Petitioners: Smt. Manjari S. Ganu Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Narendar Jatli The Court made the following: ORDER TIIE IIONOURABLE DT. JUSTICE G.RADIIA RANI CTVILREvISIONPETITION No.3072 of 2022 ORDER: This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioners - defendants 1 and 2 aggiewdby the order dated 09'1 l'2022 passed in I'A'No'218 of 2022 n O.S.No.316 of 2009 by the leamed IV Senior Civil Judge' City Civil Court' Hyderabad in allowing the petition filed by the respQndent No'1 - plaintiffunder Orier XVI Rule 14 read with Section l5l of CPC to summon the Managing Director of the petitioner No l Company' 2. The brief facts of the case are that O'S'No'316 of 2009 was filed by the respondent No'l - plaintiff seeking the relief of declaration that the enqutry proceedings conducted against him on the basis of the charge sheet issued by petitioner No'2 and the termination order dated 03'12'2010 issued by the Chief Finance Officer and Secretary of Det'endant No l Company' as without jurisdiction, illegal, null and void and in gross violation of principles of natural justice and to grant decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from conducting the enquiry proceedings against the plaintiff and for mandatory injunction directing the defendants 1 to 3 to pay net monthly salary from the month of September, 2008 to February' 2009 along with all other attendant servicebenefitsandtocontinuetopayfuturenetmonthlysalary. I 2 Dr.cR& J ffp_!072 2022 3 During the course of trial, PWs.l to l0 rvere exanrined on behalf of the plaintiff. on behall of the defendants, rhe del'endant No.2 was examined as DW.l and hc was cross-examined on several dates and the same was not yet completed. While the case was at that stage, the respondent No.l _ plaintiff filed I.A.No.2l8 of 2022 to issue witness summons to the l\{anaging Director of the defendant No.l company by name Mr.Jay Soman. 'fhe petitioners herein filed their counter opposing the said application. 'l'he triar oourt on considering the contentions ot both the leamed counsel, allowed the petition issuing witness summons to the Managing Director of the petitioner No.l ()ompany.

4. Aggricved by the said order, the petitioners preferrect this revision

5. Heard Smt. Manjari S.Ganu, rcamcd counset for the petitioners and Sri Narendar Jalli. leamed counsel for the respondents.

6. Leamed counsel for the petitioners submifl.ed that as per the averments of the plaint and the documents liled along with the plaint, the appointment letter dated 15.11.1984 and the other letters placing the plaintifl'on probation, order of confirmation, re-designation and subscquent promotion letters were issued by either the Secretarl or the Manager / Authorized Signatoq, ol. the Company. None of the said lefters were issued by the Managing Direckrr of the Company. 'fhe charge sheet dated 2g.ll .200g was issued by th(. petitioner No.2 - defendant No.2. 'l'he appuintrnfrt of defendant No.4 as lnquiry officer was &: 'I 3 Dr.GR& J crp-3072 2022 also made by the General Manager' Finance and Secretary of the defendant No.l Company through his letter dated 24'12'2008' The defendant No'l Company being juridical person' could be represented by its employees by virtue of authority given to them and it was not necessary that only the Managing Director of the Company had to represont in all matters in person' The Managing Director was not in picture in person at any point of time either during the appointment of the plaintiff in defendant No'1 Company or issuance of charge sheet and also during the inquiry proceedings, which were conducted by authorized representatives' who were employees of the Company working in different capacities' The petitioner No'2 was authorized to represent the Company in the suit and the General Power of Attomey given to him was marked as Ex'B12 The petitioner No 2 was given power for initiation of the disciplinary proceedings against the erring employees and to take all necessary action including issuing charge sheet' show cause notices and to represent the Company before the inquiry proceedings' Courts' Tribunals' etc' The Board Resolution dated 13 '03 ' 1999 of the defendant Company evidcncing powers of Mr.Jay Soman and power to sub-delegate his powers to Senior Managers of the Company, was marked as Ex'B16 The petitioner No'2 was authorized by the defendant Company through its Board Resolution dated 21'06'2008 to represent the Company and to lodge necessary petitions' complaints' applications' appeals and cases before various Courts against its employees' ex-employees' etc' and .1i 4 Dr.GR& J crp_3072 2022 the said resoluti()n was marked as Ex.B17. After de-merger of the petitioner No.1 company and its divesting into lvvs.sanzyme Biologios privare Limited in pursuance ol' r he order of the Hon'ble NCLT. Hyderabad Bench dated

23.08.2017 , M/S.Sanzyme Biologics private Limited authorized DW. I to represent the Company before the courts vide its Board Resolution dated

28.08.2018. l'he same was marked as Ex.Bl8.

6.1. l-eamed c.unscl lbr the petitioners submitted that lhe trial court erred in assuming that thcre u'as an allegation of fraud made against the petitioner No.2 / DW.1. The avermenrs madc in the affidavit fired along r,r ith the petition would only speak about dcposing falsehood and producing forg,:d and fabricated and fictitious document b1 DW.l. The observation of thc trial court that the complaint ol one department head against the respondenl No. 1 - plaintiff was not filed beforc the (lourt and the same was in the custody o{'the Company, was erroneous. 'lhc same was marked as Ex.M2 in the inquiry proceedings filed as Ex.Bl and the rep.rt ol-the Inquiry officer was filed as Ex.82. The observation of the trial court that I)w.1 was not giving evidence properly and as such it was necessary to call fbr thc Managing Director of the company to give e'idence, was contrary to facts. The trial court committed an en,lr in allowing the petition. If thc authoriz-ation given to DW. l \r'as not proper, it was for the plaintiff to take adr antage ofthe sarrelvhile arguing the matrer. For that reason, it was not ncccssary b calt 1br the Managing Director of thc Company to give ' ..r]#H'i evidence, especially, when his evidence was not necessary for effective a judioation of the dispute involved in the matter' The trial court though referred several judgments cited by both the parties' failed to apply the ratio of the said judgments while passing the impugned order and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs' v' Hartar Singh Sanghar, of the High Court of Kerala in M/S'Kaliyara Estates Private Limited v. State of Kerala and Others2 and of the High Court of Delhi in Atul Kumar singh v. Nitish Kumar and otherss and prayed to allow the revision bj setting aside the order dated O9'll'2022 passed in I'A'No'218 of 2022 in O.S.No.3l6 of 2009 by the leamed IV Senior Civil Judge' City Civil Court' Hyderabad. Leamed counsel for the respondent No l - plaintiff on the other hand 'l . contended that the respondent was appointed on 15'11 1984 as a Laboratory Technician. Thereafter he received various promotions and irrally he was discharging duty as Manager (Production) in the petitioner No'l Company' Without there being any reason' the petitioner No'2 issued show cause notice calling explanation from the respondent No'l- plaintiff' The respondent No'1 - plaintiff submitted his detailed explanation including lacking of power with the petitioner No.2 for initiating disciplinary proceedings against him. However, 12010 (96) AIC 245 '? 2012 (3) KHC 386 r 2019 DHC 5897 I 6 Dr.GR& J crp 3072 2022 the petitioners proceeded with the conduct of inquiry and thereafter issued the impugned order of rermination. The same was questioned in o.S.No.3l6 of 2009 on the Iire o| rhe reamed IV Senior civir Judge, city civit court Hyderabad. The rcspondenr No.r - plaintiff fired LA.No.2rg of 2022 specifically to establish his termination as bad, as the person, who did not have any power to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, had initiated the same. The trial court aflcr considering the bye-laws, the board rcsolutions and the decisions cited h\ both the parties a owe<I the petition filed hy the rospondent - plaintiff. Thc lloard passed a resolution delegating the po,r,er to the Executive Director and re-de signated the post of Executive Director as Managing Director. As per the resolution. the initiation of disciplinary proceedings also would need to be conducted b' the I'rxecutive Director / Managing Direotor. Dw.l admitted that Exs.B I to [].12 r,r,cre not signed by the Managing Dir.ector, as such the petitioner No 2 was not authorized for initiation of disciprinary proceedings. DW.1 further admirted that hc wourd examine the Managing Director, but as he failed to take ncccssary stcps, the respondent No.I - plainLifl' filed the I.A. to issue summons to the Managing Director. It was further submittcd that on a perusal of the marerial availabre on record, the triar courl rightly passed the orders' 'Ihere rvas no i,egalitl or impropriety in the said order. The petitioner No.2 intentionally creatcd a faise story for initiation of disciplinary proceedings without the consenr of the Managing Director, due to which the respondent I i) 1 Dr.GRl& J crplolz 2022 No.l - ptaintiff had undergone mental harassment as well as agony' which could not be compensated in any manner' The petitioner No'2 retired from servtce rn the year 2017 andhe was given extension up to 2020' Thereafter' there was no relation to him with the company. It was not permissible for him to endorse his signature in the vakalat' The petitioner No'2 approached tha Court with unclean hands. The petitioner No'2 himself admitted that the charge sheet was issued against the respondents on his own accord' but not with the consent of the Managing Director and relied upon the Division Bench judgment of High Court ol Kerala in Jortin Antony v' Padmanabha Dasa Marthanda Varmaa and prayed to dismiss the revlslon Order XVI Rule 14 of CPC pertains to summoning the witnesses' lt reads 8 as follows: "14. Court may of its own accord summon as witnesses strangers to suit'- Subject to the provisions ofthis Code as to attendance and appearance and to any raw for the time being in force, where the court at any time thinks it necessary (to examine any person, including a party to the suit)' and not called as a witness by a party to the suit, the Court may' of its own motion' cause such person to be summoned as a witness to give evidence, or to produc€ any documen* in his possession on a day to be appointed' and may examine him as a witness or require him to Produce such document'" g. Order XVI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the Court to surrunon witnesses, who are not parties to the suit, when the court believes it is '2000 Law Suit (KER) 237 7 I Dr.GR& J crpl072 2O22 necessary in the interest of justice or when a party to the suit provides 8 information that con''inces the court to exercise its powers. But under this rule, the Court cann()1 summon the party as a witness. [lut, by virtue of the amendment olthc Clode in the year 1976, Lhe power of the Court was enlarged to include the porver to summon a party to the suit also tc, give evidence, if it felt that it was necessary.

10. The Division Bench .judgmenr of High Court of Kerala relied by the leamcd counsel fbr the rcspondenl No.l - plaintiff in Jortin Antony v. Padmanabha Dasa Marthanda Varma (cited supra), held that: "13. lt is clear liom Rule I4 ofOrder XVI ofthe Code as amended that the Court has the porvcr rvhen it thinks it neccssary to examine a party to the suit or to compel a parn to the suit to give evidence so as to enable the Court to take a decision satisfactory to its conscience. But this power availabie to the Court and made specihcatly available by the amendment brought to Rule 14 cannot be confused rvith rhe right of a party to call upon an opposite pany to give evidence on his bchalf. ('learly. when a party to the suit does not mount rhe box to speak in support of his case' in the pleading, that can be a circumstance which rvould enable the Court to accept the case of the opposite party. That can also be a circumstance s here the Court can draw an adverse inference against the party who has withheld himself liom the witness-box. But those consequences arising out of non-appcarance of a party as a witness cannot confer a right on a party to the suit to cite his opponent as his own witness. The power available to the Court under Rule l4 Ot'Order XVI cannot be confused with a right to a party to the suit. Whereas Rule 7 enables the Court to call on any person whether a party to the suit or a non-parr), 1o the suit lvhojr lresent in Court to give evidence and provides the consequenccs tbr the failure of that person to give eviderrce. Rule 14 also enables the Corlr1 k) summon a person to give evidence even il.he is not present , I -l 9 Dr.GRR. J (llp'l072 2022 in Court whether he be a Party or only a witness of its own accord and in furtherance of its quest to give a just decision in the cause' As regards a party to the suit even this power was not available until the year 1976 and this power becomes available only after the insertion of the amendment of 1976' All that Rule 2l says is that in case where the Court thinks that it is necessary to dkect a party to give evidence, the procedure regarding a witness could be applied by the Court regarding that party as wel[' As recognized by Shamsuddin' J' in Mary Francis v. Kesavan [(1993) I Ker LT 4]' the Court is not powerless in summoning an opposite party if there are suitable reasons and that summoning could be in exercise of its power under Rule 14 ofOrder XVI ofthe Code " I 1. The Company represented by its Managing f)irector was shown as defendant No.l and the respondent No'l - plaintiff had filed an application seeking summons to examine the Managing Director of the Company' Though the Court has power to summon him as a witness' there should be justifiable reasons to compel him to give evidence'

12. As seen from the documents filed along with the plaint' the appointment letter of respondent No'l - plaintiff dated 15.11.1984 was issued bY the C.SubrahmanYam. Placing the Secretary of the ComPanY bY name Sri respondent No-l - plaintiff on probation marked under Ex A2 dated 08'05'1985 was also signed by the Secrelary of the Company Sri C'subrahmanyam' The confirmation of probation marked under Ex'A3 dated 31'03'1986 was also The re-desigration of the signed bY the Secretary Sri C.SubrahmanYam' petitioner from the post of Laboratory Technician as Manufacturing Chemist marked under Ex.A4 dated 10'08'1989 was signed by the Manager of the r 10 Dr.GRR, J erp-3072 2022 Company by name S.Dora Babu. The promotion orders issued to the respondent No. I - plaintifl' marked under Ex.A5 dated 19.01.1993 was signed by the Authorized Signatory of the Company Sri S.Dora Babu. The further promotion given to the respondent No.1 - plaintiff as S<:nior Executive of the Company, markcd under Flx.A6, was also signed by the General Manager (Finance & Personnel) of the Company Sri S.Dora Babu. 'l]he re-designation of the post of the rtspondent No.1 - plaintiff as Unit Manager, M/S.Sanryme & Sporlac, marked rrnder Ex.A7 dated 3\.12.1995 was also signed by the General Manager (Finanec & Personnel) Sri S.Dora Babu. The re-designation of the post of the rcspondent No. I - plaintiff as Manager (Produ<fion), marked under Ex.A8 dated 28.()4.2003. was signed by the General Manager (Operations) by name Sri A.A.Huhlikar.

13. 1'hus, nonc of thc above letters were issued by the lVlanaging Director of the Companl'. 'l he chargc sheet dated 29.1I.2008 was issued by the petitioner No.2 herein. 'l'hc appoinlment of defendant No.4 as Inquiry Officer was made by the General Vanager ([,'inance) and Secretary of the petitioner No.l / Defendant No. [ - Company. Thus, the Managing Director Sri Jay Soman was not in picture al any point of time either during the appointment of the respondent No.l - plaintilf in defendant No.1 Company or issuance of charge sheet or during the inquiry ploceedings. The disciplinary proceedings were l1 Dr.G R& J (xp-072 2022 conducted by the authorized representatives, the employees of the company working in different caPacities'

14. Ex.Bl6 would disclose that Mr'Jay Soman' the Managing Director of the Company can sub-delegate his power to Senior Manager of the Company' Under Ex.Bl2, the Power of Anomey was given by the Managing Director to the petitioner No.2 - defendant No'2 for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the erring employees' The Board Resolution authorizes the petitioner No.2 - defendant No'2 to represent the Company to lodge necessary petitions' complaints, applications, appeals and cases before various Courts against its employees and ex-employees The same was marked as Ex'B17' 15. Thus, the Managing Director of the Company was not a necessary witness to call for to give evidence and his evidence was absolutely not necessary for effective adjudication ofthe dispute involved in the matter'

16.TheHon,bleApexCourtinManKaur(dead)byLRs.v.HartarSingh Sangha (cited supra) had summarized the position' as to who can give evidence in regard to matterc involving personal knowledge as thus: (a) An attomey holder who has signed the ptaint and instituted the sui! but has no personal knowledge of the transaction can only give formal evidence about the validity ofthe power of attomey and the filing ofthe suit' (b) If the attomey holder has done any act or handted any transactions' in pursuance ofthe power of attomey granted by the principat' he may be examined 1 I t2 Dr.GRRr J *p_3012 2O22 as a witness la, proye those acts or transactions. If the attorne), holder alone has personal kno\\ledge of such acts and transactions and nol the principal, the attorney holder shall bc examined, if those acts and transaotions have to be proved. (c) The anomcy holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done b1, the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principalalone has personal knowledge. (d) Where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with or participated in thc transaction and has no personal knowledge of the transaction, and where the cntire transaction has been handled by an attorney holder. necessarilv thc attomev holder alone can give evidence in regard to the transaction. 'lhis frcquentll happcns in case of principals urrying on business through authorized manage rs/att(>mey holdcrs or persons residing abroad managing their affairs through their aftorney holders. (e) Wherc the entire transaction has been conducted through a particular attorney hokler, the principal has to examine ahat attorncy holder to prove the transaction, and not a different or subsequent attorney holder. (f) Wherc different attomey holders had dealt with the matter at different stages ofthe transacli,)n. ifevidence has to be led as to what transpired at those different stages, all thc attorney holders will have to be examined. (g) Where the lau' requires or contemplated the plaintiff or other party to a proceeding. tc, establish or prove something with reference to his 'state of mind' or'conduct', normally thc pcrson concemed alone has to give t:vidence and not an aftomey holdcr. A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his 'bona fide' need and a purchaser seeking specific performance, rvho has to show his 'readiness and rvillingness' fall under this category. There is however a recognized exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attr:mey (who may happen to be a ,:lose famill, member), ft may be possible to accept the evidence of such attomey cven rvith reference to bona fides or 'readiness and willingness'. 13 DT.GRR' J cfp_3072 2022 Examples of such attomey holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm paren! a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad'" (emphasis suPPlied)

17. Thus, an attomey holder' who had personal knowledge of the acts and transactions performed by him, is the right person to give evidence in regard to the said transactlons The High Court of Kerala in M/S'Kalliyara Estates Private Limited v' 18 StateofKeralaandothers(citedsupra)deprecatedthepracticeof summoning the opposite party as a witness and held that: "5. Summoning the opposite party as a witness is deprecated by this Court in various decisions. See Jortin Antony v' S'P'D Marthanda Varma 12000 (2) KLT 6801; Narayana Pillai v' Kalliyani Amma U963 KLT 5371; Muhammed Kunju v. Shahabudeen [1969 KLT 170]; Syed Mohammed v' Azin 11990 (2) KLT952]andMaryFrancisv.Kesavantlgg3(l)KLT4].Apartytothesuitis entitled to examine himself and give evidence' He is also entitled to adduce such other relevant evidence by examining other witnesses' The Court has power to summon any rvitness whose evidence appears to be relevant' Section 30(b) ofthe Code of Civil Procedure confers vast powers on the civil court to issue summons to persons whose attendance is required either to give evidence or to produce documents or such other objects as mentioned in clause (a)' The power vested in a Court under Section 30 is subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. The power under Section 30 can be exercised either on its own motion or on the application of any party' The conditions and limitations prescribed occur in Order XVI of the Code of Civit Procedure' No right is vested in a party to summon the opposite party as a witness' The Court is entitled to ascertain I 74 "*-il;95ti rvhether thc purposc of sumrnoning witnesses is for adducing rerevant evidence or whether it is f,n attempt to cause inconvenience and embarrassment to the opposite party. It is not the absolute right of a party to summon zrny person as a \yitness or to eraminc any number of witnesses. The Court is not porverless in the mafter of regur;rting thc procecdings for taking evidence in the care. The court below was justificd in dismissing the application, if the evidence sought to be adduced is not relevant. 'fhe persons sought to be examined are the second defendant and ,-,fficials of the Forest Department, rvho satisff rhe term ,.opposite party". No groLrnds are marle out for exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constiturion of India to interfere with the order passed by the court below.,, 19. The High ('()urt of Delhi in Atul Kumar Singh v. Nitish Kumar and others (cited supra) rvhile refcrring to the judgments pas:.ied by various other High courts depre cated the practice of summoning the Senior officers of the Company, who were not required to be examined only with an object to harass or embarrass them irnd held that: "16. Similarly. trre Madras Ftigh Court in Kaliaperumal v. pankajavalli and Others [(1999) 1 MLJ 971held as follows:- paras 5, 6, 7, 8 and (): "5. I do not lhink that the submission made by the leamed Counscl tbr the petrtloner r,.ould bc accepted. In pirgonda v. Viswanath: [MANUA4H,()l 63/1956 : AIR I 956 Bom 25 I ], His Lordship lollowed the decision of l,rivy Council reporled in Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal [MANU/PR/0040/ 1908 : 3l All. I l6], whersin it was held thus: "Mr. Dakr has also relied upon Circular No. 16l of thc Circulars issued by this Court in the Civil Manual. This circular has invited the attention 01'the subordinate Judges to the obscrvations ol. lhe privy Council in Kishori Lat v. Chunni Lal U.L.R. 3l All. ll6 0{)1, their Lordships ol'the privy CoqlaciC have referred to the practice which sometimes scernetl to obtain in some of the Courts in India of calling L5 Dr.GR&J crp-3012 2022 the party's opponent as a witness and they have observed that this practice is highly objectionable' 'Such a praotice" said their Lordships' ought never to be permitted in the result to embanass judicial investigation as it is sometimes allowed to be done'"

6. In Mallangowda v. Gavisiddangowda [AIR 1959 Kant 194]' it is held "Practice of calling the opposite party as a witness should not be countenanced as it is not in the int€rests ofjustice'"

7. [n Narayana Pillai v. Kalyani Ammal [1963 K'L'T' 5371' it is held that the practice of party causing his opponent to be summoned as witness was disapproved in mther strong terms by the Lordships of Privy Council and that as a matter of right, the party cannot have the opposite party as witness'

8.TheabovedecisionwasfollowsbyKeralaHighCourtinacasebetween Muhammed Kunji v- Shahabudcen [1969 K'L'T' 170]' wherein it is held thus: "The practice of a party causing his opponent to be summoned as a witnesshastobedisapproved.Asamatterofrightapartycannot have the opposite party examined as a witness'"

9. In view of the settled legat position' I do not think that the petitioner can compel the second defendant to be examined as a witness for him'"

17. I may notice the issues which have been framed in the present case' The issues read as follows:- "i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages and claims as prayed for in the suit? OPP ii) Whether the plaintiff sustained loss of reputation' business opportunity and financial loss on account of the ban order dated 14'11'2006 passed by defendant? OPP i T 16 Dr.GRR, J crpll72-2O22 iii) Whether the ban order dated 14.11.2006 was passed legally and for any valid reason by the defendant? OPD"

18. Factually ,vhat follows is the respondent have failed t,l give any cogent reasons as to rvhy these senior officers of the petitionei are being summone( other than stating that they are necessary to prove the case ofthe respondent. That apart, normalll,the Courts as noted above have frowned upon a party summoning the opposite party or its oflicers for the purpose of recording of evidence. It is clear in the present case that the only object appears to be to harass or embarrass the officers of the petitioner."

22. He further relied upon Amitabha Sen (supra) another judgment by a Coordinate Bench ofthis (lourt wherein it was held as under: "13. After having considered the arguments advanced by the :ounsel for the parties and having examined the decisions cited by them, it is abundantly clear that whilc there is no bar to a party secking the summoning of another party in thc same suit as his witness, it is also clear that such an act is unusual anrl that it should only be permitted if the application for summoning the opposite party is bona fide and is not vexali(,us or an abuse of the process of the Court. Apart from this, there is the standard question which the Llourt has to consider in the case of summoning any witness as to whether it is necessary to summon the witness for which the epplication has been moved. Order XVI Rule I (2) CPC ctearly stipulates that the party desirous ol obtaining any summons for the attendanoe of any person shall file in Court an application stating therein the purpose lor u'hich the witness is proposed to be summoned. This in itself indicates that it is not as if the Court has 1o allow every application for summoning ofa witness- The party seeking the summoning ofa person as a witness has to specifically indicate the purpose for which he or she is proposed to be summonerJ. It is obvious that the Court has to apply its mind and exercise discretion in a judicial manner." I ... 77 Dr.GRR, J crplO12_2022

23. He relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (UO! (supra) to contend that an application filed for summoning witness on vexatious or frivolous grounds should not be entertained by this Court.

24. Similarly, he referred to another Supreme Court judgment, Kokkanda B. Poondacha & Ors. (supra), wherein it was held that oblique motives of parties should be looked into by the Court while deciding application for summoning of witnesses under Order XVI Rule 1." \ \

20. As the affidavit filed by the respondent No.l - plaintiff in I.A.No.2l8 of / 2022 would not disclose valid reasons for summoning the Managing Director of the petitioner No.l Company by name Mr.Jay Soman, except stating that he was hiding and purposefully avoiding to appear before the Court and the order ofthe trial court also would not disclose as to how the evidence of the Managing Director was necessary for eff'ective ad.judication of the dispute, it is considered that the trial court erred in allowing the petition to summon the Managing Director of the Company by name Mr.Jay Soman. As such, it is considered fit to set aside the order dated 09.11.2022 passed in I.A.No.218 of 2022 in O.S.No.316 of 2009 by the leamed IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hvderabad.

21. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the order dated 09.11.2022 passed in I.A.No.218 of 2022 in O.S.No.316 of 2009 by the leamed IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. No order as to costs. 18 Dr.GR& J tp_3012 2022 As a sequel. miscellaneous applications pending in this petition, if any, shall stand closcd //TRUE COPY// SD/- MOHD. ISMAIL DEPYTY REGISTRAR r\\ _ -:, l,JslcrroN oFFrcER To,

1. The lV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad 2. One CC to Sr-nt. Manjari S. Ganu, Advocate [OPUC] 3, One CC to Sri Narendar Jalli, Advocate [OPUC] 4. Two CD Copies karn/eh .jt$&ial .offi' HIGH COURT DATED:1110312025 ORDER CRP.No.3072 of 2022 1tE S)-.q1 ( \. (. 2 3 APB 2125 ( c, .i. t a< q .J * ALLOWING THE CIVIL REVISION PETITION o 11, )u \1.$t

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