VasaviShanthinikethan, White Fields, Kondapur, K v. Rangareddy, Hyderabad

Sukhi Proiects LLP. plot No. 59, Sagar Society, Road No. 2, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad- 50,1034 Axis Bank Ltd., Srinaoar Colony Branch, D. No. g_3-9602, Near Vivekananda Schoot of pG Studiesl naain noiq siiii;s;; C;ffi;.;{"yderabad _ 500073 HDFC Bank Ltd., yousufgudq Qra1c.h, Q_ 3_231Mt62tc1, Ground Ftoor womens co-c,p Housino Soctetv, Sii krirti Nr;;; 6;;. Roads, yousufduda, Hyderabad - 501045 lClCl Bank LtC., Reo bv irs Branch lv!q!a.ger, Srinagar Colony Branch, B-3_ 833/'t 0s Nitsiris Buitdin-s, xamaiipuii b Jr'".v, Iiio?Yrtro ... Respondents lA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under section ',5'1 cpc praying that in the circumstances stated rn the affidavit fired in srpport of the petition, the High court may be preased to stay all further proceedings in CoP.No. 100 of 2024 on the file of the Adclitional special court in the cadre of District Judge for Triar and Disposar of commerciar Disputes, City Civil Court at Hyderabad pending disposal of COMCA. Counsel for the Appe ants Counsel for the Respondent 1 to 4 & l: Sri M Ravindranath Reddy Se.nior Counsel, represeniin g Sri B Srinarayana Sri Sunil B Garu Senior Counsel, representing Smt. Manjari S Ganu Counsel for the Resporrdent No 9 Counsel for the Resporrdent No 10 : The Court delivered the fo owing Judgment : : Dr M P Kashyap Sri Sudarshan Narahari I l L i I I I I l l l THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO COMCA.No.4O of 2o24 Counsel for the appellants: Sri M.Ravindranath Reddy, leamed Senior Counsel representing Sri B. Srinarayana. Counsel for the respondent Nos.l-4 and 7: Sri Sunil B. Ganu, learned Senior Counsel representing Smt.Manjari S. Ganu. JUDGMENT Qter Justice Mousl.umi Bhattacharya) The present Commercial Court Appeal arises out of a docket order dated 11.12.2024 passed by the learned Commercial Court at Hyderabad on an application filed by the appellants under section 9 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the 1996 Act) i.e.,I.A.No.26O of 2024 in COP.No. 10O of 2024. The appellant frled the COP.No. 1OO of 2024 for restraining the respondent Nos. I - 7 frorn causing any changes to the rights of the petitioners in two projects of the respondent No.7 LLP : "Sreesumeru" and'SreeTatva".

2. The appellants filed the I.A for interim protection in line with the orders passed by this Court on ll.Og.2}24 as modihed by orders dated 27 .O9 .2024 and OI .IO.2O24. In the alternative, the petitioners sought continuation of the order dated 11.O9.2O24 all constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal or orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. 2 DIB,J &, BRMR,J COMCA.No.4O of 2024 Submissions made on behalf of the Parties:

3. Learned fjenior Counsel appearing for the appellants relies on the Supreme Clourt decision rn Arcetor Mittat Nippon steel India Limited vs. .Essar Bulk ""enninal Limitedt to submit that the interim protection granted by this rlourt in civil Revision pelitions frled by tbe petitioners should contin,t: till constitution of the Arbitrar rribunzrl or till the orders are pass;ed by the Arbitral rribunar as the court ha.s applied its mind to the nrerits of the matter. Counsel submits that the commercial cc,urt allowed the parties to frle pleadings with extensive documents and that the I.A. frled by the petitioners was ripe ior final disposal. courLsel submits that the Arbitral rribunal was constituted on 26.11.2024 pursuant to an order dated 22.11.2024 urtder section 11(6) of the 1!)916 Act. Counsel assails the impugned crder dated 11.09.2024 to urge that the Commercial Court should not have closed the appellants' application under section 9 on the ground of an efficacious rem€:dy being ava able to the afpellants before the Arbitral Tribuna-l. coun,sel submits that there is every likelihoocl that the respondents would withdraw money from the respondent No.7 LLp and render the a.bitration infructuous unless the appellants continue to remain protec tr:d. L(2O22) I SCC 712 ir. MB,J A. BRMR,J COMCA.No.4O ola 2024 4. l.earned Senior Cor.:nsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 _ 4 and 7 opposes the contentions of the appellants/petitioners and submits that the prayers in the I.A. are untenable and contrary to law. Counsel submits that the appellants failed to make out a case for interim protection before *re commerciar court and that the commercial court is yet to entertain the matter as per the dictum in Arcelor Mtttal (supral. Counsel submits that there was no question of the Commercial Court continuing to adjudicate the section 9 application in the absence of having entertained the merits of the dispute. Decision:

5. We have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties and carefully considered the material placed before us. We organize the decision under the following heads.

6. Line up of facts leadins to the Impusned Order:

03.o9.2024 The Commercial Court refused to pass zrn ex parte interim order in the C.O.P. filed by the appellants without issuing notice to the respondents. The matter was made returnable ot 2O.O9.2O24. t7 .o9.2024 The Commercial Court a-lso refused to entertain the three interlocutory Applicadons filed by the appellants. The appellants filed four Civil Revision petitions against the above orders. The Court grinted limited protection to the appellants by way of suspending the impugned orders passed by the Commercial Court on i l 4 MB,J&-BR.MR,J COMCA.No.4O of 2024 O3.O9.2O24. The High Court made it clear t].at the suspension is interim in nature and the respondents shall be at liberty of taking steps for vacating the interim order of suspension. The High Court modifred the order date<l 17.09.2024 by permitting the respondent no.7 LLP to rvithdraw the amounts for paJrment of statutory dues and stalf salaries. The respondent No.7 was directed to giver a statement of the amounts withdrawn as well as tl.e mannr:r in which it has been used for payment to the appellants. The respondent No.7 sought further modification of tlre order dated 27 -O9 -2024 for payment to vendors subject to verification by tlle appellants. The responctent No.7 also sought for a direction on the Commercial Cour: to hear the C.O.P. within a certain timeframe. The High Court directed the Commercia_l Court to dispose of the C.O.P. by 02.12.2024 upon notic'e to the respondents. The order dated 27.09-2024 wets ttrereafter modified to permit the respondent No.7 to release payments to the vendors upon verification of the withdrawn amounts by the appellalts. tearned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.7 submits that the direction with regard to verification of the withdrawals shall be followed in both projects of the respondent No.7 namely, 'SreeSumeru' and "SreeTatva". The docket order was passed by the Commercial Court recording the submission made on behalf of the appellants that the respondents are alienating tlle properties. The respondents were directed to file their counter by 22.10.2024/ the returnable date. 27 .09.2024

30.o9.2024 0L.to.2024

12.O2.2024 17 .7L.2024 The Commercial Court passed an order irr I.A.No.2O3 of 2024 fied, by the appellants for impleading t}le ICICI Bank Limited as the respondent No.10 in the C.O.P. The Commercial Court allowed the petition for impleadment of ICICI Bank Limited as a party respondent to tlee C.O.P.

22.7L.2024 The Division Bench presided over by the Hon,ble The lhief Justice of the High Court appointed Justice -.Nageswara Rao, Former Supreme Court Judge as the sole ,lrbitrator to resolve the disputes between the parties.

27.tr.2024

05.L2.2024 to.t2.2024 7t.12.2024 5 MB,J 6z' BRIfrR'J COMCA.N0./K, ol 2024 The Arbitral Tribunal was constituted. The first procedural order was made on 01'12'2024 ' The appellants filed I.A.No.26O of 2024 in COP.No.10O of 2024 for interim protection in line with the order of this Court dated 1 1.09.2024 as modified by the later orders till appropriate orders are passed by the Arbitral Tribuna-I. The appellants also undertook to file an Application under section 17 of the 1996 Act before the tubitral Tribunal within ten days from ttre date of interim protection granted by the Commercial Court' The appellants hled their statement of claim along with documents before the Arbitral Tribunal' The Commercial Court passed the impugned order in the appellant's t.A.No.26O of 2024 closing the I'A' on the ground that the apPellant's have ellicacious ald alternative remedy in approaching the Arbitral Tribunal under the 1996 Act.

20.12.2024 The appellants frled the present APpeal which falls for Decision: Are tte appellants/ petitioners The point entitled to the relief claimed in I.A. No.26 O of 2O24?

7. That is whether the Commercial Corrrt should continue interim suspension of the earlier orders passed by the Commercial Court on O3.O}.2O24 and the restraint on the respondents from taking money out from the LLP (R7) until orders are passed by the Arbitral Tribunal' It is necessary to examine the statutory object of section 9 of the 8. 1996 Act read with the Supreme Court decisiot in Arcelor Mittal (supra) for a just conclusion to the controversy' 6 MB,J&BRMR,J CoMCA. No.4O ol 2024 Section9 of Th,e Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Obiect:

9. Section 9 contemplates interim measures by the Court. Section 9(1) authorises a party i.e., a "parff to an Arbitration Agreement (as defined in secr:i()n 2(ixh)) to appry to the court for interinr protection before, during or after arbitral proceedings or at any time after making of the arbitral Award but before the Award is enforced ir.: accordance with section 36 of the Act. The interim protectionsavarlable to the applicant/parlr are primarily for preservation of the subject_matter of the Arbitration lrgreement and includes a wide array of discretionary protective orders

10. Section 9[2) contemplates a pre_arbitration scenario and after a party has obtainr:d an interim measure of protection under section 9 (1) of the Act. Siection 9(2) mandates that arbitration shall commence within 90 days fr.rn the date of such interim protectlon or within such further time as the court may determine. . The court would be the court under ser:tion 9(1) i.e., the court which passed the interim I 1. Section. 9(i)) conceives of a situation after constitubc,n of the Arbitra_l Tribuna[ and contains an embargo on the Court from entertaining an zLpplication under section 9(1) for interim nleasures unless the Court finds existence of circumstances which renders the remedy available to a party under section lT to be inef[rcacious. Section 17 provi<Ir's for interim measures ordered by the Arbitral 7 MB,J&BRMR,J COMCA. No.tK) of 2024 Tribunal. In essence, section 9(3) mandates a seamless transition of proceedings pending before a Court under secLion 9(1) to the Arbitral Tribunal once the latter is constituted within the time frame provided under section 9(21 that is within 90 days from the interim order.

12. Section 9(3) aims to prevent multiple levels of adjudication for the same relief and encourages a forward-looking momentum for dispute-resolution after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. The only break in that momentum is wherethe section 9 Court has already dealt with the application under section 9(1) on merits. This creates an exception to the bar under section 9(3) - that the Court shall not entertain the 9(1) petition once the Arbitral Tribunal has been constiruted. Has the section 9 Court "entertained" the dispute between t].e parties in the present case?

13. The penultimate paragraph of the impugned order dated

11.12.2024 passed by the Commercial Court records that '..... the heaing of tlrc main COP has not get commenced in uieu of seuerol interlocutory applications and. tLLe learned' arbitral tibunal uas constituted on 26.11.2024........" :l

14. The Trial Court again records a few lines later "-... The learing in the present COP is not Aet commenced, h.en e, Ercstion of "entertaining" the same does not arise.' 8 MB,J & BR.MR,J COMCA-No.4O of 2024

15. Therefore', the section 9 Court makes a categorical statement that it has note etertained the petition filed by the appellants under section 9 of the Act (C.O.P.No.IOO of 20241.

16. This Court is of the firm view that the Court hearing, a petition is the only Court which is competent to opine whether that Court has entertained a nlzrtter or not. In this case, it is the Commercial Court and the Commercial Court aione which can form that vievr. The view expressed by tht: section 9 Court runs counter to the stand of the appellants.

17. The High Court in the present Appeal is not competent or armed with the necessary facts to arrive at al opinion on ll-hether the Commercial Court has entertained the C.O.P. or not. We are simply not in a position to take a different view of the matter i.t:., that the Commercia-l Court had "entertained" the C.O.p. in view of the categorical recording of the Commercial Court/Trial Court.

18. Even if we \vere to assume that the impugned order contains an incorrect record:Lng and that the Commercial Court had in.cleed dealt with the merits c,f the section 9 petition filed by the appellant, the orders on record show otherwise.

19. Admittedly, there is no order on record reflecting that the Commercial Courl entertained the C.O.p. i.e., dealt with it on merits. l_}, 9 MB,J 6r, BRMR,.' COltCA,t{o,4O of 2024 The only orders relied upon by the appellants are docket orders passed by the Commercial Court on 15.10.2024 in the C.O.p. recording the contentions of the parties with regard to a_lienation of assets/apartments.

20. The other orders of the Commercial Court are in the LA. frled by the appellant (l.A.No.2O3 of 20241 on tl .I1.2O24 with regard to impleading ICICI Bank. There are no other orders placed by the appellants to show that the Commercial Court either considered the C.O.P. or I.A.No.260 of 2024 frled by the appellants in detail, i.e., on facts or in law or reserved the same for orders. 2I. Therefore, we carnot accept the contention of the appellants that the Commercial Court entertained the C.O.P. to the extent ofcircumventing the prohibition in section 9(3) and marking an exception thereto. In other words, that the Commercial Court was relieved of tlre statutory obligation under section 9(3) to cede territory of the section 9 petition in favour of the Arbitra,l Tribuna_I. notwithstanding its formation on 27.11.2024.

22. We therefore conclude that the Commercial Court did not "entertain" the appellants' section 9 application in line wit}:, Arcelor Mittal (supra). 10 MB,J& COMCA.No.4O of 2024 The Supreme rlourt's decision I-imited Vs. Essar Bulk Terminal Limited (2022t r scc 712 in Arcelor Mitto.I NippotT Steel India

23. kalned llenior Counsel appearing for the appellant relies on paragraph98 of the Report in Arcelor MittaltotJrge that th e section g Court has the Ciscretion to pass an interim order as the section 9 Court has alre.arly entertained the matter.

24. We find the said contention to be unacceptable for the following reasons

25. First anC foremost, the facts in Arcelor Mittal srere entirely different. In that case the section 9 Court had concluded rhe hearing and reserved t.h,: matter for judgment. Hence, there was no dispute on the issue of v,hether the Court hadentertained the dispute between the parties. T-he Supreme Court came to a specific finding that the section 9 Court had entertained the application before constitution of the Arbitral Tribrrnal.

26. Contrary to the facts in Arcelor Mittal, the section 9 C,curt in the present case has made a specific recording in the impugned order that the hearing in th,: C.O.P. had not commenced at all.

27. Second, Arcelor Mittabxplains the expression .entertain, to mean 'admit to consideration' : Lakshmi Rattan Engg. Works Ltd.. 1,,s. CSp.as in considering a matter on merits. Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. ,AIR 1968 SC 488 ,. 11 MB,J&BRMR,J COMCA.No.4O oJ 2O24 Vs. PunnuSatw3dwelt on the word tntertain as to adjudicate upon' or 'to proceed on merits' as opposed to a mere 'initiation of proceedings'. It was in the context of the meaning ascribed to the word bntertainedln Arcelor Mittalthat the Supreme Court presewed the sanctity of the adjudication before ttre section 9 Court notwithstanding constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.

28. In our considered view, Arcelor Mittol does not come to the aid of the appellant since the section 9 Court has not admitted the dispute to consideration at all.

29. Jaga Industies Vs. Mother Dairy Calcuttaainvolved a specifrc finding of the section 9 Court having considered the matter in detail (hence entertained) upon exchange of pleadings/affidavits. Inefficacv of the remedv under Section 17 - the second limb of Section 9(3) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

30. Section 9(3) of the 1996 Act reads as under: "13) Once the arbitral tribunol lns been constituted, the Court slnll not entertain an opplicotion under sub-section (1), unless the Court finds that ciranm.stances exist which mag not render the remedg prouided under section 17 efficacious. " '3(1971) 3 SCC 124 42023 SCC Onl,ine CaI 2051 72 ""*.ff;i"Zif#;X 3 1 . The exception to the prohibition on the section 9 Court from entertairring the section 9(1) application would only be triggered wher,-- the Court is satisfied that frling an application for interim protection before the Arbitral rribunal under section 17(1) would n,cr. afford effective relief to the petitioner.

32. The statutory object behind the second limb of sr:ction 9(3) is clear. The ,A.:t aims to preserve the intention of tht: parties to arbitrate ald uphotd the sanctity of the arbitral process. The object is a'lso to prevent courts from trespassing into ttre arbitral domain where the parties have already taken steps in aid of arbitration by ,oonstitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Act also intends to prevent multi-domain and simultaneous litigationsbetween the same parties and for the same, cause at the cost of ttLe chosen dispute-resolution mechanism. The overall aim is for a clock-wise motion of adjudication as opposed to the hands c,f the clock ticking in reverse motion rvhere the section 9 court r'ourd be flooded with a,xious petitions resurting in jettisoning of the arbitral process.

33. Section 17'(1) of the 1996 Act, deals with interim measures ordered by the .,fu^bitral Tribunal and after the 2015 amendment offers a generolrs. bouquet of protections to a party during the 13 MB,J & BRTIR.J @MCA.No.4O oJ 2024 course of t]le arbitral proceedings. The power of the Arbitral Tribunal under section 17(1) is at par with that of the Court under section 9(1) and affords fult-bodied relief to a party in tlle arbitration. This would be evident from the second part of the section 17(1)(e) providing for plenary powers to the Arbitral Tribunal to gralt discretionary protection to the parties and equates that power to the section 9 Court by use of the words: "(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the arbitral tribunal to be just and convenient, and. tte arbitaral tribunal shall houe the same pouer fir moking orders, as tle court Lta.s for the purpose of, and in relation to, ang proceedings before it."

34. Section l7(2) fort:fies this power by placing any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on the same plane as an order of a Court including for the purpose of enforceability purposes'

35. Therefore, the revitalized section 17(1) ald (2), post- amendment, casts a weightyburden on the party to persuade the Court to hold on to the Section 9 petition despite formation of the Arbitral Tribunal. The burden of making out a case for the Court to hear the matter, even after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, rests on the pa-rty who resists being relegated to arbitration. The party seeking to put the breaks on arbitration, 'at least for a limited period of time, must discharge the onus of I4 MB,J AE, BRMR,J COMCA"No.4O of 2024 proving the r3;ds1sn6e of factors which would render the relief under sectiorr 17(1) inadequate or inefficacious.

36. There mzLy be factors to plead inefficacy before the Arbitral Tribunal including by reason of non-availability of arbitrators, infrequent sittings of the Tribunal or any other disabLing factors. Notably, the :rppellant has not shown any reason in the present case to discharge the burden cast on the appellant under the second limb of section 9(3) i.e., the reasons for the appellants, unwillingness to approach the already-constitutect Arbitral Tribunal. The appella,ts have arso failed to show the inefficacy of the reliefs provided under section 17 (l) of the Act.

37. Paragraprt 4.9 of the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal ' 2.2O24requiring the respondent to file a reply passed on 0 1 . within two weehs from the receipt of an application made by the other party, is not reason enough to show inefficien cy of the statutory reme,Cy under secfion 17(1).paragraph 4.,9 simply preserves the requirement of natural justice. The procedural order does n.t contain any embargo in fiIing time-sensitive applications where a party needs urgent interim relief. _--___-i_?_ - - 15 MB,J &, BPMR,J COMCA.No-4O of 2024 The power to make the assessment of whether a matter has been entertained under section 9(3) rests wit]- the section 9 Court alone:

38. The appellants' prayer for setting aside of the impugned order is misconceived and contrary to law.

39. The appeilants' stated position is that the Commercial Court ought to have held on to the section 9 application, or alternatively, passed an order in the nature of the order passed by this Court on

11.O9.2024 until the appellants approached the Arbitral Tribunal with a section 17 application. The relief sought for is contrary to the mandate of section 9(3) as well as the decision of the Supreme Court irr Arcelor Mittal (supra). The reason for this view is as follows:-

40. First, the assessment of whether a petition under section 9(1) of the Act has been entertained or not rests with the section 9 Court alone and cannot be decided by ary other Court. The assessment is made on a subjective basis, i.e., the extent to which the Court feels it has applied its mind to the matter. In the present case, there is no record available before us to come to a conclusion that the Commercial Court hadin fact commenced hearing of the section 9 application or acLively engaged with the merits of the dispute in the section 9 petition. 16 ""*.f;;ifr1f#;X 4L. Second, I>y the order dated 11.09.2024 passed bv this Court, the impugned orders passed by the Commercial Court ot O3.O9.2O24 were suspendr:<l for the sole reason of not disclosing rr:ersons. The order dated 11.1)9.2024 was an ex porte order. The respondents were not representoct on that date. The order was also subsequently modifred by orclers dated 25.09.2024, 27.O9.2O24, 3O.O9.2O24 and OL.1O.2024 re,r()rding the correct facts represented on behalf of the respondents.

42. Admitted.lr,, the Commercial Court had passed detaiied orders in the four I.As til,:d by the appellants which v/ere not brotrght to the notice of the H:igh Court on 11.O9.2024. Apart from the modifrcations made to the order dated 11.09.2024, the orders passed by the High Court in the four C.R.Ps. filed by the appellants make it clear that the High Court did not delve into the merits of the C.R.ps. and only attempted to beLl;rnce the interest of the parties in terms of withdrawal of amounts frorn the respondent No.7 (LLp). Therefore, irsking the Commercial Court to continue the order passed by the Higtr Court till the appellants fil,:d a section 17 petition before the Arbitral Tribunal is completely mrsccnceived since the High Court passed the crder only as a stop-gap n-leasure till the disputes were thrashed out before the section 9 Court.

43. In essenc,s, neither the Commercial Court nor the High Court entertained the dLspute between the parties (the seclion 9 Application l7 MB,J&,BRMR,J COMCA.I{o.4O of 2024 frled by the appellants/C.O.P.No.1OO of 20241 in the sense as held in Arcelor Mittol (supra). Therefore, the matter at hand falls squarely within the embargo in section 9(3) of the Act i.e., the prohibition on the section 9 Court from entertaining a section 9 application once t-he Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted.

44. Third, there is a lack of clarity on the specific relief sought for by the appellants. The appellants have not been able to explain with any precision as to the relief sought in the I.A frled before the Commercial Court.

45. Admittedly, the sharpness of the order dated lL.O9 -2024 was later softened by giving greater leeway to the respondents to withdraw funds from the LLP. The appellants did not challenge the subsequent modifications. Moreover, the appellants also did not tal<e steps for hearing of the C.O.P or the I.As. in the Commercial Court with any diligence.Signihcantly, I.A.No.260 of 2024 frled by the appellants does not contain any prayer for the Commercial Court to hear/entertain the I.A and the C.O.P. on merits.

46. We are therefore of the view that the appellants have not made out a case for setting aside the impugned order passed by the Commercial Court on any error of reasoning on facts or in law or otherwise. 18 MB,J & BRMR,J COMCA. No.4O ol' 2024 The a continuation of interim orders: llants have also not made out a case for 3rrqency for

47. Contrar]' to the submissions made on behalf of the appellants, we do not hnd any material disclosed from the records strtrstantiating the appellants' apprehension of the respondents taking; imminent steps to render the arbitration infructuous. On the other hzrnd, we are informed that l-he appellants have not complied with the order passed by the High Court on 3O.O9.2O24 in respect of payments to vendors subject to verification by the appellants.

44. Wttatever ray be the continuing disputes between the parties, the appellantS h;1vs 161 shown good cause for failing to apOroach the Arbitral Tribun;el with a section 17 Application after 27.11.,2,024. T]ne appellalts were urther required to discharge the onus as to why the appellants refused to initiate proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal from November, ?.O24 - February, 2O25 despite the urgencl, which has been argued bef<rre this court. The fact that the appellant frled the I.A. in the sectio. 9 petition while seeking an extension of time to fire the statement of claim before the Arbitral Tribunal is of furthersignihcalc e. Conclusion:

49. The appel.lants' lack of diligence to protect their rights or continue the in tr:rim orders passed by the High Court does not Ih t9 MB,J EE, BRMR,J COMCA. No/tO oJ 2024 warrant any intervention in their favour. The appellants should be relegated to the chosen alternative dispute-resolution forum for appropriate relief.

50. We are firmly of the view that there is no reason to doubt the effectiveness of a Section 17 application before the Arbitral Tribunal at this point in time. We have carefully considered each and every aspect of the matter including balancing the interest of the parties before us. We do not hnd any grounds to interfere with the impugned order or correct the course of action taken by ttre Commercial Court. In fact, there is no error in the reasons given by the Commercial Courl which requires correction.

51. C.O.M.C.A No.4O of 2024 is accordingly dismissed' A11 connected applications are disposed of. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs. SD/.A.V.S.S.C.S,M. SARMA JO]NT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To, l.TheAdditionalspecialCourtintheCadreofDistrictJudgeforTrraland Disposal of Commercial Disputes, City Civil Court at Hyderabad (with records' if any)

2. 11 LR Copies 5. fh" Und", Secretary, Union of lndia Ministry of Law, Justice and Company 4. The Secretary, Advocates Association Library, High Court for the State of Affairs, New Delhi Telangana, High Court Buildings at Hyderabad 5. One CC to Sri A Srinarayana, Advocate [OPUC] 6. One CC to Smt. Maniari S Ganu, Advocate [OPUC] 7. One CC to Dr M P Kashyap' Advocate [OPUC] 8. One CC to Sri Sudarshan Narahari, Advocate [OPUC] 9. Two CD CoPies VA'/nsk +M . -.,rffili I ',l HIGH COURT' DATED:27102t2025 + o 1gt sl'4 /{: c o7 2l llAs 2ffi * )4:, :ft,: r r'- l ,.* f.( I c.' i. \! JUDGMENT COMCA.No.4O of 2024 DISMISSING T}IE COMCA b