Prosecutor High Court · 2025

Order

This Criminal Petition is hled seeking the Court to quash the proceedings against the petitioners/ accused Nos. 1 and 2 in Crime No.464 of 2024 of KPHB Colony Police Station, Cyberabad Commissionerate, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 467 and 468 of the lndian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'lPC').

The brief facts of the case are that in May-June 2O 17, de facto complainant lodged a report before the Police stating that Paladugu Sunitha Devi and her husband Raghuram approached him to rent the 2nd floor portion of his property bearing H.No.16-3-V/6a8, Vasanth Nagar Colony, Hydernagar. Raghuram incroduced himself as a general manager working at HCL Technologies Ltd, with an annual package of rupees One crore. He also claimed that a senior potitician in Andhra Pradesh was close to them and their business associate. On the pretext of investing in the share marke t, Raghuram, his wife P. Sunitha, his sister Papayi @ 2 SKS,J Crl.P.No.lS76() of 2024 Padmasri, and his brother-in-law Dineel convinced him and his wife to invest in the share market with promises of higher returns. Raghuram and his wife Sunitha deceitfully took Rs. I ,45,5O,OO0/ - on different dates, pretending to invest in the share market, They also opened a bank account in ttre name of the de-facto complainant and operated it without his knowledge or consent.

3. When the complainant discovered the misappropriation of money and the series o[ criminal acts committed by Raghuram and his wife Sunitha, he questioned them. In response, they attacked him and his family members. Immediately, the complainant fited a complaint against Raghuram and his wite Sunitha at KPHB police Station, which registered Crime No.24O of 2O2l under section s 44g, 42O, 452,406,5O6, and 12O-B IPC, dated 26.C'3.2O21. During the investigation, Sunitha Devi and Raghuram admitted to deceiving the complainant, taking money for personal needs, and promising to return the amounts. They requested the complainant to withdraw the criminal complaint and provided five cheques for repayment, which \r,erc later dishonored. The complainant then filed complaints under Section I3g of the NI 3 sKs,J Crl-P-I{o- tS75O of 2024 Act against them, which is pending adjudication in Court. As a counterblast to the FIR and cheque bounce cases, Raghuram and his wife Sunitha filed a false case against the complainant at Raidurg Police Station, misusing documents. The Raidurg Police investigated and closed the case as fa-lse. Similarly, Sunitha Devi and her husband Raghuram created a fake agreement of sale dated 07.O5.2021 regarding the complainant's house property bearing H.No. 16-3-V/688 (PIIN 1141607483l, Vasanth Nagar Colony, Hydernagar, and a fake receipt d,ated, 07.O5.2O21 by forging tJ e complainant's signature.

4. The alleged agreemcnt of sale dated 07.O5.2O21 and the alleged receipt dated O7-O5.2O21 are forged and fabricated, and the complainant did not execute these documents. The accused, being habitual offenders, filed a false suit for speciirc performance bearing O.S.No.38 of 2O2L before the III Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Il Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge cum Principal Family Judge, Medchal-Malkajgiri District, at Kukkatpally. Basing on the said complaint, the Police registered a case against the 4 SKS,J C.I.P-No. t5760 of 2024 petitioners, vide Crime No.464 of 2024 , for the offences punishable under Sections 42O, 406, 467 and 468 of IPC.

5. Heard Sri S. Nagesh Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf o[ the petitioners as well as Sri Arun Kumar Dodla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondent No.l-State and Smt. Kanumuri Kalyani, learned counsel appearing on behalfof respondent No.2.

6. l,earned counsel for the petitioners submittccl that the impugned proceedings do not disclose any cognizable offence, particularly under Sections 42O, 406, 467, itnd 468 IPC and that the charge-sheet in FIR No.24O of 2O2l contains similar contents to the impugned FIR, rendering the petitioners liable to undergo a second trial on the same set o[ facts, which is unjust. He further submitted that the hling o[ the impugned FIR is flau,ed by an unexplained and unreasonable delay of over three years, despite the respondent's knowledge of the alleged fabricated documents and that respondent No.2 is aware of the pendency of O.S.No.38 of 2023 has {iled these proceedings as a counterblast, attempting to convert a civil dispute into a criminal proceeding to arm-twist thc petitioners- He contcnded that the entire causc o[ action SKS,J Crt-P.No.l5760 of 2024 arises from an alleged contractual dispute, which cannot be converted into a crimina-l proceeding, especially at the instance of the violating party, and thus, . the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed.

7. In support of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tarak Dash Mukhaq'ee and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, wherein in paragraph Nos. l1 and 12, it is held as under: '11. We have perused both the FIRs. The respondent no. 4 is the first informant in both the FIRS and the samc are based on the same agreement for sale executcd on l4d June 2O06. The allegation made in both the FIRS is the same. The allegation is that by practising forgery and fraud, the appellant no. I has sold the subject property to appellant no. 2 thereby deceiving the respondent no. 4. The second FIR, which is the subject matter of challenge, was registered nearly four years after the first FIR was registered. The cha[lenge to the first FIR is pending before the High Court- These aspects have been completely overlooked by the High Court in the impugned judgment-

12. If muttiple First {nformation Reports by the same person against the same accused are permitted to bc registered in respect o[ the same set o[ facts and allegations, it r!'ill result in the accused gettlng entangled in multiple criminal proceedings 6 SKS,J Crl. P.No. r5760 of 2024 for the same alleged offence. Therefore, the registration of such muttiple FIRs is nothing but abuse of the process of law. Moreover, the act of the registration of such successive FIRS on the same set of facts and allegations at the instance of tlle same informant witt not stand the scrutiny ot Articles 21 atd. 22 ot the Constitution of India. The tegal position on this behatf has been s€ttted completely ignored by the High Court."

8. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the allegations leveled against the pctitioncrs are serious in nature. The petitioners allegedly forged the signature of the de facto complainant and created a sale agreement stating that the sale consideration u'as Rs,9 crores, of which the petitioners claimed to have paid Rs.8.9 crores in cash, which is itself untenable in [aw. He further submitted that respondent No.2 sent the documents to the forensic laboratory, and the report confirms that thc signature is forged. The original documents are with thc triat court, and the lnvestigating Oflicer needs to examine them. If the document itself is forged, the suit is not maintainable. Admittedly, this case is not a mere breach of contract; it is a clear case of forgery and cheating, which requircs thorough investigation. The mere pendency o[ the civil suit is not a valid ground to quash the proceedings when criminal offences zrre ) SKS.J Crl.P-t{o.157@ of 2024 alleged. Therefore, he prayed to the Court to dismiss the criminal petition.

9. In support of the submissions made by the learned counsel for respondent No.2, he relied upon the judgment of tJle Hontrle Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another, wherein in paragraph No.27, it is held as under:

27. Having discussed the scope ofjurisdiction under these two provisions i.c. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the finc line ot jurisdictional distinction, now it will be approPriate for us to enlist the principtcs with reference to G'hich the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. Hou'cver, it is not only di{Iicutt but is inherently rmpossiblc to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under S€ction 397 or Section 482 ol the Code or together, as the case may be:

27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 ot Lhe Code but the more the power, the more due carc and caution is to be exercised in invoking these porvcrs. The power of quashing crirnrnal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms o[ Section 228 of thc Code shoutd be exercised vcry sparingly and with 8 SKS,J Crl-P.No.lS760 of 2024 circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare 27 -2. "f}].e Court should apply the test as to \.\,hether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted [herewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbabte that no prudent person can cver reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court shoutd not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27 .4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutell, essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enactcd in any of the provisions of the Code or any spccific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

27.6.'lhe Court has a duty to balance the frecdom of a person and the right of the complainan( or 9 SKS'J Crt-P.No. 1576() of 2O2+ prosecution to invcstiBate and pros€cute offender. 27-7. Tbe process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ ulterior PUrpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documcnts annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a "civil wrongl with no "element o[ criminality" and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may bc justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the criticat analysis of the evidence'

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to detcrmine whether there is sumcient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; thc court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they witl constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the Process of court leading to inj ustice. 27-lO.lt is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction-

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a crvil clairn and also amount to an offcnce' merely because a civil claim is maintainablc, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot bc maintained- 10 SKS,J Crt.P.llo- r5760 of 2024

27.12. h exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Courr cannot take into consideration external materiats given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that lro offence was disclosed or that there was possibitity of his acquittal. Thc Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith bv tlre prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charBe is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is <:ven broadly satislied, the Court shoutd be more rnclined to permit continuation of prosecution r ather than its quashing at that initial stagc. The Oourt is not expected to marshal the records (vith a view to decidc admissibitity and retiability ot the tlocumcnts or records but is an opinion forme(l prima facie.

27.14. Whcre the charge-sheet, report under Section 17 3(21 of the Code, suffers fronr frrndamental legal defects, the Court may lrc well u ithin its jurisdiction to frame a charge_

27.15. Couplcd with any or all of the above, where tlre Court finds that it would amount to abuse ol. process of the Code or that tlle interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the chargc. The pxrwer is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.c. to do rcal and substantial justice for administration o[ \r4rich alone, the courts exist_

27. 16. These are the principles which individually aDd preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken inro consideration as precepts to exercisc of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction 11 SKS,J Crl.P.l{o. rs75o of 2o24 under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factuat foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should b€ reluctant and shoutd not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied i[ there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.'

10. trarned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the allegations leveled against the petitioners are serious in nature, and the investigation is not yet completed- At this stage, quashing of proceedings against the petitioners does not arise. Therefore, he prayed to the Court to dismiss the criminal petition. In light of the submissions made by both learned I t . counsel and a perusal of the material available on record, it appears that the case was registered based on the complaint given by respondent No.2 concerning the alleged offences The primary allegation against the petitioners is that they forged the signature of respondent No.2 and fabricated an agreement of sale, claiming they entered into an agreement to purchase the property for Rs.9 crores and had already paid an amount of Rs.8.9 crores by way ol cash. These avcrments indicate that l2 SKS,J Crt.P.No.l5760 of 2024 respondcnt No.2 never agreed to sell the property and that the documcnts in question are fabricated-

12. Ttre' first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that there was a delay of one year in lodging the report. To substantiate this, respondent No.2 submitted that he ltecame aware of the document,s fabrication only after receiving the summons in the civil suit l-tled for specific performance of the agreement of sale. After receiving thc noticc in the said suit, he approached an advocatc and discusserl the matter, resulting in the delay o[ one year. Thc allegcd agreement of sale needs to be sent to the Investigating Officcr, who must investigate the matter concerning the forgery ol- the said documents. Therefore, the delay is not a valid ground for allowing this application.

13. The second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that an FIR was already registered for the samc set of facts under FIR No.24O of 2021, and registering another case for the same offences arnounts to abuse o[ the proccss o[ Iaw. However, it is argued that the previous FIR and the allegations therein are different, while the present FIR primarily concerns the fabrication o[ the agrecment o[ salc 13 sKs,J crl-P. o-15760 ot2024 with a forged signature. The contents of the present FIR differ from the frrst FIR, and as the case is at the initial stage, it cannot be said that it is not maintainable. karned counsel for respondent No.2 relied on the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor (supra), wherein it was held that merely because a civil claim is maintainable, it does not imply that a criminal complaint cannot be pursued when the allegations amount to a criminal offence. I

14. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that they have already filed a civil suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, and the respondent has filed a written statement with all defences related to the alleged forged document. Therefore, it is argued that the matter can be adjudicated in the civil suit, and a criminal case is not necessary. However, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a civil suit does not preclude the initiation of a criminal case whe n the allegations pertain to serious offences such as forgery and cheating.

15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, at this stage, this Court does not find any merit in the criminal 14 SKS,J Crl.P-lio.15760 of 2024 petition to <1uash the proceedings against the petitioners. Thcrefore, thc criminal petition is liable to be dismissed.

16. Accordingly, this Criminal petition is dismissed. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, sha stand closed. SD/. MOHD.ISMATL DEPUW REGISTRAR \ \{ \' SECTION OFFICER /ITRUE COPY// To, 1 ThelV-AJCJ-cum.XVAdditionalMetropolitanMagistrateKukatpally, Cyberabad.

2.TheStationHouseofficer,KPHBColonyPoliceStation'Cyberabad

3.TwoCCstothePublicProsecutorHighCourtatHyderabad.(oUT) 4. One CC to Mr. S NAGESH REDDY Advocate [OPUCI 5. One CC to Mr- KANUMARI KALYANI' Advocate IOPUC] 6. Two CD CoPies RC/PSL HIGH COURT DATED: 2610312025 ORDER CRLP.No.15760 of Z0Z4 ,'.,1::::=: -,+ 1r.THE u r;li (h\ r)lit 10 JUr 206 - -.'rA-a (,i ,fl ,r' (. i \-l (-) .E + Accordingly, this Criminal petition is Dismissed 6 6lx