The Hon'ble Supreme Court in lrfan Naka v. The State of Uttar Pradeshr held as follows

Counsel for the Appellants: Sri T. Pradyumna Kumar Reddy, Senior Counsel Counsel for the Respondent: Sri Arun Kumar Dodla, Additional Public Prosecutor The Court delivered the fotlowing JUDGMENT: 3 HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER HON'BLE SRI JIISTICE ANIL I{I'MAR JI'KANTI CRIMINAL AppEAL No.t224 OF 2OL7 JUDGMENT: (pe. Hon,ble Si Justice K.Surend.er) l. The appell,a,rs are questioning their conviction for the offence under Section 3(t2 r lw 34 of Ipc vide judgment in s.c.No. 194 of 2or3 dated 31.08.201/ passed by the XII Additional Drstrict and sessions Judge, Vikarabarl, Ranga Reddy District.

2. Brieflv, the facts of rhe case are that p.w. 1 is the father of the deceased. His de.eased daughter u,as married to o.e Narsimlu (L.w.5) six years prior to the incident. They were living happily. Bheemaiah, who is the father of Narsimiu took loa, of Rs. 12,oc0 /- from the Bank and without reparring the said roan, said Bheemaia-r died. Since then, Narsimlu and thc deceased daughter-in-raw of sairl Bheemaiah were not in a position to clear the loan. Vexed rvith h er life, she burnt herself on 24.06.2012 at 9.3o p.m in the absence of Narsimlu. Hearing her shout for help. neighbors rushed there, extinguished rrre and took her to Vikarabad Hospitar for treatment. From vikarabad Hospitat, she was shifted to C)smania General Hospital and while undergoing treatment, she diecl on 29.06.2012.

3. On the basis, of the said complaint on 3O.O(I.2O12 by p.W. 1, crime was registere'd under Section 124 of Cr.p.C for suspicious death 4

4. Before the complaint was filed by p.W. 1, requisition was given to the Magistrate on 27.06.2012 i.e., three days after the incident, for recording dlng declaration. p.w.9 is the Magistrate, who went to the hospital and recorded her dying declaration. According to p.W.9, when questioned as to what happened, deceased answered that four days prior around 7.OO p.m, when she and her agnates fought with each other, they poured kerosene on her and lit her on hre. When p.W.9 specifically questioned as to who were the persons, the deceased informed him that one Hanmalthu and Hanmamma, (appellants herein), poured kerosene on her ald set her ablaze. p.w.9 further stated that the deceased was in a fit state of mind throughout the recording of dying declaration. 5 The statement made by the deceased formed basis to file charge sheet under Section 302 of IpC The Section of law was altered from Section 774 Cr.p.C to Section 3O2 of IpC on 29.Og.2O12. The appellants \,t ere arreste d. on 29.1O.2012, i.e., nearly four months after the death of deceased- 6' After the death of the deceased on 29.06.2012 and complaint being frled, inquest proceedings were conducted by p.w.g, Tahsildar of Dharur. Thereafter, the body \.vas sent for postmortem examination and the postmortem Doctor/p.W.l0 opined that the death w,as on accqunt of burns. 5

7. P.W. i, \,,,ho is the father of the deceased, ir: his statement before the court stated that the deceased used to suffe: from schizophrenia. Since there wer.e dnes, and notices were receivecl from the Bank, she committed suic:ide by burning herself. p.W. I / tather was declared hostile to the prosecution case.

8. In the Dyirg Decraration, the deceased stated that p.w.2 is the person u,ho was present when the incident happened. However, p.W.2 turned hostile to the prosecution case and state.d that he does not knorv anything zrbout the case. p.W.4 is the mot\er of the deceased and she also stated that the deceased committerr suicide in rriew of loans that were outstanding and after receiving notices from the Barrk. Similar is the evidence of p.ws.3 and 5. All the wrtnesses p.ws.l to 5 u'ere declared hostile to the prosecution case.

9. P.Ws.6 and 7 are the independent r.r,itnesses to seizure and rnquest, who also did not support the case.of the prrtsecution.

10. P.w.8 is the inquest MRo, who recorded stat(]ment of witnesses during inquest proceedings. According to p.w.g relatives of the deceased informecr that the deceased burnt herself due to the Ba,k loans which had to be paid and notices that were received from the Bank. According to his opinion in the inquest report, the deceased committed suicide, l 6 I l. The only evidence in the case against the appellants is the dying declaration that was recorded by the learned Magistrate/p.W.9, three days after the incident. It is not exptained by the prosecution as to why no complaint was filed by the parents of the deceased or any of the relatives, when the incident happened on 24.06.2012. The father/P.W.1 lodged complaint a-tter the death of the deceased and in the complaint he specificaily narrated that the deceased committed suicide on account of the pending dues with the Bank.

12. Though the dying declaration can form sole basis for conviction, however, the reliability of the said dying declaration also needs, to be looked into by the Court. Learned Magistrate had recorded dying declaration in a printed format that he had carried to the hospital. In the printed format, the questions 1 to 5 are printed. Accordingly, the very sarne questions were asked by the Magistrate. The said procedure adopted by the Magistrate by carrying a printed proforma and asking the questions printed in the proforma, is contrary to the procedure laid down. In facts of a case and the surrounding circumstances, it is for the Magistrate to ask questions regarding the mental capability of a person injured and satisfy himself/ herself regarding the mental status and to see whether the person giving statement is in a fit state of mind. The questionnaire which is already prepared, cannot be made basis to satisfy oneself that the patient was in a fit state of mind. The -]lir-e----:.1 -_.:s! 7 mechanical mar ner in which the questions were zrsked on the basis of a printed format, is incorrect ald it reflects non al)plication of mind by the Magistrate ; n asking preliminary questions and not basing the sarne on the sittration.

13. We have gone through the dying declaratior:. The w.riting of the learned Magistrirte cannot be deciphered since the writing is not legible. However, going through the evidence of p.W.9, in response to questions posed by P.W.9 as to how she received injuries, the deceased stated that four days prior, there was an altercation with the agnates and tu-o persons namely Hanmanthu and Hanmamma, poured kerosene cn her and set laer ablaze. 11 The decease.d was in pain and suffering since rhree days, hence, in the backgrounC of the present case, when it is rrdmitted that there u,ere disputes, it las to be seen whether there is a,y corroboration to the version given by the deceased. Corroboration is required mainly in the back ground of the parents of the deceased and other witnesses stating that the burns received by the deceased .,vere suicidal. The version of the parents of the deceased ald other rvrtnesses from the inception is that the deceased and her husban<i were due some amounts to the Bernk and the Balk had issued noti:es. Unable to pay the said amounts, she committed suicide. 8 *'

15. There is no whisper from any of the witnesses that there was any quarrel in between the deceased and agnates, that is, the brothers or sisters of her husband.

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in lrfan @ Naka v. The State of Uttar Pradeshr held as follows: "60. Since time immemorial, despile a general consensus o./ presuming that the dying declaration is true, they have nol been slricto-sensu occepted. ralher the general course of action has been thul judge decides whethcr thc essentials ofa dying declaration are met and d it can be admi:'sible, once done, il is upon the duty of the court to see the extent to v,hich the d1,ing declaration is entitletl io credit. 61 . ln India too, a similar pattern is .fbllowe d, where the Courts are first required to satisfy themselves lhat the dying declaration in queslion is reliable and truthful before placing any reliance upon it. Thus, dying declaration while carrying d presumption of being true musl be wholly relioble ond inspire confidence. Were there is any suspicion over lhe veraciS, of the some or the evidence on record shows that the dying decl ration is nol true it will only be considered as a piece ofevidence but cannot he the basis./br conviction alone.

62. There is no hard and fast rule for deterntining when u dying declaration should be accepted; the dug'o-f the Court is to dtcide lhis question in thc facls and surrounding circumstances of thc case and be .ful[ convinced of the truthfulness of lhe same. Certoin factors below reproducetl can be considered to determine the same, however. they u,ill only a.fect lhe weighl oJ the dlting declaration and not its admissibility: - (i) Whelher the person making the stolemenl wus in expectation ofdeath? (ii) Wether the dying declaralion was made ul the earliest opportunity? " Rule of First Opportunity " (iii) Whether there is any reasonable suspicion to believe the dying declaration wds put in the mouth of the dying person? (iv) Wether the dying declaration u'as a product of prontptirtg, tutoring or leading at the instance qfpolice or any interested Parly? (v) ll/hether the slalemenl was nol recorded properlT? 12023 Livelaw (sC) 698 9 (yil Whethr:r, tht' dying declarant had opportunity to clearly observe the incident? (r'ii) fi+telh(r. ,he d-ving detlaration has been consislent throughoul? (tiii) llhether. the dying declaralion in itself is a maniJbstalion / fiction of the dying person .t imdginalion of what he thinla transpired? (ix) llthethar. tite dfing declaration v.vs itself volunlary? (x) ln tasa of ,nultiple d1,ing declarations, whether, the first one inspires trulh and cot'.sistat wilh the olher dying decktration? (xi) IYherhct . us pt'r the injuries, il would have been imposstble for lhc deteased to mukc a l.t lrt,r.,. detlaration'? 6-1. lt is tfu du;t of'the proseculio,l to establish the charge d.goinst the accused beysnd the raaronable douht. The benefit of doubt must alwuys go in fuwur of thc uccused. It $ true thol dying declarolion is a substanli"e piece of evidence to ht,relied on prot'ided il is proved thal the same v'as voluntary ond truthJitl und the i( tim r as in a.fit .srate of mind. It is just not enougl, ./br the court to say thut tht Ll.r'ing letluratkttt is reliable as lhe accused is named in the dying it,lun it'n r tlu asailunt 61 It is unsa/i. lr., record the conviction on the basis of u dying declaration ulttna in lht cu.;e.s v'here suspicion, like the case on hand it; raised, as ragards lh( Lorrectnc-\s ol the dying decluration. In such cases, the Court maj, hove to look fbr .sonte torroboraliya evidence by lreating the dying declurulion only as u pitce o/ cviaent'e. The evidence and material available on record musl he prttparly wcighed in each cuse to orrive ol an dppropriL'tt: utnclusion. The rcrron v'lll le .;ot so is thot in the ca.se on hand, although tl,e appellant-convict hu.r heen ndtne(1 it't tha nto iying declarqtions os o person vho -sel lha room on -firt vat tlte :urrounding cirLumstonces render such slalemcnl of tha declarunts vcrt douhll l.'

17. As already discussed, no reason is give'n as to why no complaint was filed on the date of the incident. The Dying , Declaration was recorded four days after the inr:ident. The father- of the deceased/P.W.t has stated in his complaint that the deceased committed suicide unable to repay dr:bts. None of the witnesses have stated anything about ttre quarrel in between the deceased and larnily members/agnates. In the Dying Declaration 10 also, there is no reason given as to why there was a quarrel and the reason for the appellants to pour kerosene on her and lit her on fire. The conviction is solely on the basis of the statement made to the Magistrate by the deceased and in light of there being absolutely no corroboration to the said statement, we are not inclined to rely on the dying declaration.

18. When the Dyrng Declaration is eschewed from consideration, there is absolutelv no other evidence on record to sustain conviction.

19. In the result, the judgment of trial Court in S.C.No. 194 of 2013 dated 3I.O8.2O17 is hereby set aside and the appellants are acquitted. Since the appellants a-re on bail, their bail bonds shall stand discharged.

20. Criminal Appeal is allowed. //TRUE COPYII Sd/. A.V.S.S.C.S.M. SARMA JO]NT REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice K.SURENDER (For His Lordship's Perusal) AND One Fair Gopy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI (For His Lordship's kind Perusal) To, Diskict. (with records, if any) '1 . The Xll Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vikarabad, Ranga Reddy 2. 11 LR Copies 3. The Under Secretary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs. New Delhi . 'ri The Secretanr', Telangana High Court Advocate's Association Library, High Court for the State of Telangana, High Court Buildings at Hyderabad. The Superintendent, Central Prison, Cherlapally, Ranga Reddy District. The Station Hcuse Officer, Dharur Police Station,Vikarabad. Two CCs to the Public Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad [OUT] One CC to Sri T. Pradyumna Kumar Reddy, Advocate IOPUCI Two CD Copies 4 5 6 7 8 9. VI{/gh Y* }.rq:,. HIGH COURT \ \ DATED: 3010112025 ORDER CRLA.No.1224 of 2017 D ttE SI.q 1 ( o c 1)tfim '),+ a S,J :.r.i )t t I ALLOWING THE APPEAL -^rc*@^'w 6*'