The High Court · 2025

I.A.No.l of 2025 IN AND coMCA. Itlo.4 of2O2s Mr. Vivek Kohli, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. p.Srinivas, learned counsel for the appellant. Mr.A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr.p.Vamshi Krishna, leamed counsel for the respondent Nos. I and 2. Mr.Jeevesh Nagrath, leamed learned counsel for the respondenl No.3. Mr. K.Bhaskar Rao respondent No.4 appearing party_in_person. representing Sri N.Aravind, ,senior ^Counsel " . "' ' COMMON oRDER: Qter Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya) The proposed appellant/progressive Construction Limited, seeks leave to assail an order d,ated 14.70.2024 passed by the Commercial Court in Commercial Original petition (COp.No.70 of 2023) hled by the respondent Nos.l and, 2 in the present Appeal. The Commercial Court passed the impugned order restraining the respondent Nos.3 and 4 from revoking the Powers of Attorney d,ated 22.72.2006 and rr.o2.2o11 executed by the respondent No.3 in favour of the respondent No.2 in the present Appeal. 2 To simplify matters, the proposed appellant (progressive) was not a party before the Commercial Court. An application to itpp6ad Progressive was ultimatery not decided and the cop i I I I 2 MB,JI & BRMR,J I.A.No.1 of 2025 in/and COMCA.No.4 of 2O25 was inst.zrd disposed ol The Commercial Court trcords in paragraph 4l of the impugned order that the COP rvas taken up for hearinSl irt the instance of the respondent Nos 3 and 4 and disposed of *'ithout issuing notice to Progressive.

3. The rr',;pondent Nos.1 and 2 in the present ApPeal were the pet-ition::r Nos. i and 2 in tJne COP before the Commercial Court. 'l'he respondent No.3 in the Appeal was the rcspondent No.1 in tkie COP and the respondent No.4 herein (authorized representative of the respondent No.3) was the responrlent No.2 in the COI'.

4. The r :spondent Nos. 1 arrd 2 in the Appeal filed the COP under se'cti,rn 9 of The Arbitration and Conciliation r\ct, 1996 (1996 A<:tJ , lor restraining the respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein from terrri: tating/revoking the POAs dated 17 .O2.i101 1 and

27.11.'.2A06 r:xecuted by the respondent Nos.3 and 4 in favour of the respcn,:ent No.2, pending disposai of the arbitration proccedinl;s initiated by the respondent No.1 herein.

5. The ( ,rmmercial Court allowed the petition an,1 granted the praye:- :f the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 t.e., restrained the responder t \os.3 and 4 from terminating/revoking the POAs dated 17 .O2.2O 1 1 and 27 .11 .2006. , ) \ \ \ ' a. ?) MB,J & BRII{R,J I.A.No,t of 2O2S inlatrd COMCA.No.4 of 2O2S

6. First and foremost, it should be stated that although the impugned restraint is against the respondent Nos.3 and 4 i.e., PCL Intertech Lenhydro Consortium Joint Venture (UV) and its authorized representative K. Bhaskar Rao, the said respondents have not challenged the impugned order passed by the The only challenge as on date is by Progressive/the proposed appellant who was not a party to the COP before the Commercial Court Commercial Court.

7. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the proposed appellant places the relevant facts leading to the present Appeal and submits that the proposed appellant is vitally affected by the impugned order. It is submitted that the respondent Nos.1 ar.d 2 are acting to the detriment of the JV (the respondent No.3) by fastening liabilities on the JV without authority. Counsel submits that the respondent No.2 has opened a Bank Account without any authority in law which is also causing severe prejudice to the proposed appellant and the JV. Counsel urges that the proposed appellant is a necessary and proper party to the proceedings since the appellant is a constituent of the respondent No.3/JV and is materially affected by the impugned order restraining the respondent No.3 from terminating the POAs. It is also submitted that the pOAs, which ! 4 MB,J & BRMR,J I.A.No.I of 2O25 in/aEd COMCA.No.4 of 2O25 formed thc -.ubject matter of the COP, were superse'1ed by a POA dated 1tt.05.2018.

8. Lczrrn ri Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.3/JV s'-11)ports the case of the proposed appellant a nd urges that the l)()A dated 18.05.2018 given on behalf ol the JV mandated t rat all acts on behalf of the JV wiil be done under the joint si6{natures of the respondent No.2 and the h4anaging Director 6 [ r..-re proposed appellant. Counsel submits that the impugned crder restrained the revocation of superseded POAs n,hich r,.,ou,1 inevitably affect the POA dated i|i.05,2018 mandating; oint action by the respondent No-2 and the Managing tiirector of the proposed appellant. Counsel adopts the submisr.;:ons made on behalf of the proposed appellant by stating that 1.he respondent No.2 has opened a Bank Accotlnt in the name o'thc JV and that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 are subjecting thc proposed appellant and the JV to further liabilities ir the proceedings pending before the D::1hi High Court.

9. l,earned Senior Counsel appearing for the rtrspondent Nos.1 anc .1, who were the petitioners before the Trral Court, points to rrr:ts of suppression on the part of the proposed appellant. (lounsel submits that the proposed appellant was ) \ \ t ; 5 MB,J & BRMR.J I.A.No.l of 2O2S ln,/aad COMCA.Io.4 of 2O2S aware of lrting ot COp.No.7O of 2023 / petitlon under section g of 1996 Act as well as the interim order dated 31.08.2023 as the respondent Nos.l and 2 had sent the notice of invocation of arbitration dated 05.10.2023 to the proposed appellant. Counsel submits that the appellant hled a reply to the notice on 08.11.2023. According to counsel, there is no explanation from the proposed appellant as to why the proposed appellant chose not to implead itself in COp.No.70 of 2023 before the Commercial Court. Corrnsel denies any prejudice treing faced by the proposed appeliant by reason of the impugned order.

10. We have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the proposbd appellant, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (petitioners before the Trial Court) and the respondent No.3 [JV, who is presently supporting the proposed appellant for leave to Appeal). 1 i. The present Application i.e., I.A.No. i of 2025, has been hled for granting leave to the proposed appellant to challenge the impugned order dated 14.1O.2024 passed by the Commercial Court restraining the respondent Nos.3 and 4 from revoking the two pOAs executed in favour of the respondent No.2 herein. The respondent No.2 is the nominee of the respondent No.l and the power of Attorney holder of the respondent No.3. 6 MB,J| & BRMR,J I.A.No.1 of 2025 inland COMCA.No.4 of 2O25

12. We 1ir st wish to refer to the relevant facts u'hi':h led to filing of CC t).No.7O of 2023 by the respondent \los 1 and 2 under ser;tic rL 9 of the 1996 Act in the Commercial Cou rt.

13. Thr: I t:spondent No.3 and Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Limited ('lehri Hydro') entered into an Agreement on 74.1l.2Ot)2 for "Construction of Civil Works of Dam. Spillway & Power Ho';se of Koteshwar Hydro Electric Projecr, Koteshwar, Uttaranchal The respondent No. 1/Rithwik Projects approached the responr'.,:nt No.3/PCL Intratech for sub-contrarlting the work. On lt, ll.2OO2, the respondent No.3 entere<1 in,o a Sub- Contract 1\greement with a joint venture betwcen M,/s.Swathi Constructio rs and M/s. Rithrnik Projects (M/s.Rithr.vik Swathi Joint Vcn tr r re) . Under this Sub Contract Agreemc nt dated 76.11.200.2. the respondent No.3 agreed to give a Power of Attorney in iavour of the person authorized by M / s. Rithwik Swathi JV. On 30.O1.2003, the respondent No.3. represented by Mr.Bha skar Rao 1fi6 respondent No.4), executcd a Power of Attorney in lavour of the respondent No.2 (P.Nagesr,rara Rao) wl-ro is th.e Managing Partner of M/s.Swathi Cons,ructions. Tehri Hydrc approved the JV with M/s. Rithwik Sr.val,hi JV on

22.O5.2OOb as sub-contractor as per the principal Agreement

1.2OO2. The respondent No.3 again issu€rd a POA dated 14 't ) :.' l MB,T' & BRMR,J I.A.No.1 of 2O2S ialand COMCA.No.4 of 2O25 1n dated 27.t2.2OO6 favour of the respondent No.2 (P.Nageswara Rao) who is the authorized representative of the respondent No. 1.

14. The respondent No.3 invoked arbitration. in 2007 against Tehri Hydro in relation to the loss suffered by the respondent No.3 during execution of Hydro_Electric project. In 2O0g, the M/ s. Rithwik Swathi JV was dissolved by a Deed dated 31.03.2008 pursuant to which the respondent No. l/Rithwik Projects took over the assets and liabilities of the erstwhile JV. The respondent No.1 entered into a fresh Sub-Contract Agreement on 01.04 20Og with the respondent No.3. P.Nageswara Rao/respondent No.2 (for the respondent No. 1) continued to represent the respondent No.3 as its pOA holder. An Arbitral Award dated 17.12.2OIO was passed in favour of the respondent No.3 and against Tehri Hydro wherein the respondent No.3 was awarded Rs.72 Crores along with 1g% interest. Tehri Hydro approached the Delhi High Court to set_ aside the Award under section 34 of the 1996 Act. The respondent No.3 contested this application through its agent/POA holder (p.Nageswara Rao) in the Delhi High Court.

15. The respondent No.3 through K. Bhaskar Rao (the respondent No.4 herein) executed another POA dated I 8 MB.J & BRMR,J I.A.No.1 of 2025 hl a'rd, COMCA.No.4 of 2O25 \7 .O2.2O11 in favour of P.Nageswara Rao empowerillg him to represent a rLd contest the arbitration proceedings on behalf of the respon, lent No.3 as its PoA. The PoA dated 1 7 .12.2011 r.vas in oc rrtinuation of the POA dated. 27 .1 I .2C06. On i5.11.2013 the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 enterecl into an Agreement lbr apportionment of amounts received under the Arbitrzrl A'r'ard dated 17.L2.2O1O. The respondr:nt No.3, representec by P.Nageswara Rao, raised further claints against Tehri H1,dro in 2O13 which resulted in another Arbitral Award dated 26.1., .2O2O in favour of the respondent No.3.

16. ln 1]t) 8, the respondent No.2 executed tu,o POAs dated

18.05.2018 and 20.O7.2O18 in the joint names of P.),lageswara Rao and I).Praveen (Director of Progressive / proposecl appellant) for thc linited purpose of Niti Aayog compliancr:s. The responderrt \o.1 filed petition in 2019 seeking execution of the Arbitral Award dated 17.l2.2OlO before the Delhi High Court.

17. <)n 2t).12.2011, the Delhi High Court directed Tchri Hydro to deposi - Fls.4SO Crores within 6 weeks and pern-ritted the responderrt \o.3 to withdraw this amount b5. furnishing Bank Guarantet:s and by giving an undertaking that the entire amount rr.ir:hdrawn shall be deposited with intercst if the Arbitral Au:.rd is set aside. The respondent No.1 lurnished 9 MB,J & BRMR.J I.A.[o.l of 2O2S inland COMCtt. o.4 of 2O2S Bank Guarantees equivalent to Rs.45O Crores thereafter. A sum of Rs.24.7S Crores was disbursed to the respondent No.3 and an amount of Rs.425.25 Crores was disbursed to the respondent No.1 through escrow accounts which were opened for the purpose of receiving the awarded amount of Rs.45o Crores. i8. On 12.O2.2023, Tehri Hydro,s application under Section 34 was dismissed bv the Delhi High Court. P.Nageswara Rao, on behalf of the respondent No.3, filed an application for Tehri Hydro to deposit the remaining amount of Rs' 1010.25 crores as per the Arbitral Award dated tz . r2.2oro. Tehri Hydro preferred an Appeal under section 37 of .the 1996 Act which was subsequently dismissed by the Delhi High Court filed a Speciai Leave petition against the dismissal before the Supreme Court and on 26.07 .2024 the Supreme Court stayed the Execution Proceedings before the Delhi High Court.

24.04.2024. Tehri Hydro

19. The Court is informed that disputes arose between the respondent No.1 and 3 pursuant to which the respondent No.1 invoked Arbitration which is presently pending before a learned Sole Arbitrator. As on.the date of filing of the claim statement of the respondent No.1, an amount of Rs. 1010.25 Crores stood _l / i 10 MB,J & BRMR'J I.A.No.1 of 2025 in/and COMCA.I[o.4 of 2O25 deposited l:', Tehr' Hydro before the Delhi High Cor rrt out of ivhich thr: I e spondent No.1 is entitled to 94 5o"" tci'r'ards its share in t( .'ms of the Agreement dated 15 1i 2O1:i and the Memoran,lt tm of Understanding dated 29 ') 1'2019 and ll.O3.2OitC. The respondent No 1 issued a notict invoking arbitratio n on 15.70.2023 under Clause 18 of the '\greement dated 15.1 .2013. The respondent No.3 refuted the claim in its reply da:e,: 08.77.2023. The learned Sole Arbitrator was appointeci tn 15.02.2024 by the High Court on ren application filed b1' thrr re spondent No.1 under section i 1(6) o1 the 1996 Act. A substitute Arbitrator was appointed on 02 05 ll024 This arbitratron is pending as on date. 20 . We rrow propose to discuss the core issue c,f acljudication i.e., the pr:i.'/er for Leave to Appeal. 'Leave trt AIlpeal' for non-partv Appellants:

21. Sr:cti:,n 96 of The Code of Civil Procedurc, 1()08 (CPC), contelnplar es appeals from original decrees and provides under sub-secti(rl : (1) that an appeai shali lie from every decree passed by any Co.rrt exercising original jurisdiction to the competent Court irrc h r,ling an original decree passe d ex pat1,z: Section \ 1 \ i1 MB,J & BRMR.J I.A.No,I of 2O2S in,/a;d COMCA.No.4 of 2O2S 96(2). Sections 96_100 of the CpC do not restrict the categories of persons who can prefer an appeal. Section 96, in particular, simply provides for appeals from original decrees and does not differentiate between the parties and non-parties to the suit in the context of preferring an appeal.

22. The above provisions do not contain any threshord rimits for a non-part5r to challenge a de cree before a competent Court nor do they put any fetter on the Court from adding a party who the Court deems necessary or proper for adjudication. The only threshold iequirement is that the non_party to the original proceeding must be impacted by the decree or decision and must establish the prejudice to the Appe ate court for Leave to Appeal. The settled assumption, as pronounced by the Courts, is that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal unless he/she satisfies the Court that he/she falls within the category of persons affected by the decision.

23. In other words, a person who is not a party to a decree or order may, with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he/she is bound by the decree or is aggrieved by it: H. Anjanappa Vs. A. prabhakart. ./ r 2025 scc Online sC 183 b t2 MB,J & BRMR'J I.A.No.l of i2O25 in/and COMCA.No.4 of 2O25 B. Maheshs. The lirrpreme Court has opined on the issue ol 'Leave to 24 Appeal' itr r;everal decisions including in Smt 'Iaton Kumar Golchct u t,/t/ s. Gotcha Properties (P) Ltd' '2 and l,/[g Paloce '\ Division Mufitalhl A;ded Co-operatiue Society u Kuppala BaIa Bench ,rf ",.ris Court in P. CLenga Subramantyaa, Calcutta High Court in tJnited Commercial Bank u. Honununt Sgnthetic* and the Bombay High Court io The Prouince or' Bombag u. Westent India Automobile Association6 also clealt "1/ith this question. The consensus reflr'cted from these dccis,icns is that a person, who is not a party 1o a suit or proceedirLg may prefer an appeal with the leave of the Court Reddy u and such I :ave should be granted if the person is pr:judicially- affectcd try ,:. judgment or order.

25. Sinct Leave to Appeal is not an automatic right or a matter ol- 1;resumption, the proposed appellant must cstablish the tu,i n :onditions of prejudice and being bound by the impugne<1 order passed by the Commerciai Court. We hence proposc tc deal with that question in the follou'ing section of this judgrrl -'nt, (Jr Sup-e7e Court Cases 573 ,_r9l0 - 2022 sC.C Or Li,r: SC 1063 - 2014 SCC OnLir,r Ap 269 .-AlR 1985 Cal( ur r r 96 "AlR (36) 1949 B , nbay 141 I l 13 MB,J & BRMR.J r.A.No.t of2O2S inlaad COMCA.No.4 of 2O2S Has the tmpuqnedorder? SedA ellant been re 1IIt

26. For ease of reference, it is reiterated that- the Commercial Court restrained the respondent Nos.3 and 4 (JV and its representative) from terminating or revoking the powers of Attorney (pOA) dated 2Z.12.2006 and tZ.O2.2Ot I executed by the said respondents in favour of p.Nageswara Rao (R.2 in the AppeaJ). This impugned order was passed in a petition frled by R. 1 and R.2 in the Appeai under section 9 of the 1996 Act. c7 The proposed appellant was not a part5r in the proceedings before the Commerciai Court. The proposed appellant seeks leave of this Court to file the present Appeal on the ground that the proposed appellant is prejudiced by the lmpugned order section g

28. The undisputed facts, as stated above, show that the proposed appellant claims to be a constituent of R.3_JV Although the proposed appellant and R.3 are separate legal entities in law, the proposed appellant and R.3, for all practical purposes, are one and the same entity since 20O2. Both entities l4 MB,.' & BRMR'J I.A.No.1 of ilo25 in/and COMCA.llo.4 of 2O25 are represc Ited by K. Bhaskar Rao (R'4) and operat€r from the same officia i Premises/ address

29. The ir l:ntity of interest, insofar as the proposed appellant is concerne :i, would also be evident irom ihe contentions and written srtt,rnissions lrled on behalf of the proposed rrppeilant, where all t-e grounds raised by the proposcd appeLlant were urged on trt:ha1f of R.3. These grounds include R' i and R 2 acting to t re detriment of R.3 and fastening liabilitres on R'3 without 6gt.r-rority. The proposed appellant also stalers that R 3 is being oustcd by R. 1/R.2 in the Delhi High Cour-t proceedings and lha[ R.] has opened a bank account without the knorvledge of R.3. Tar other grounds include the proposed appellant being jointll and r;everally responsible for the contract \r'ith R.3 and is a signatory to the Agreement dated 15.11.2013. In fact, neither the proposrr:d appellant nor R.3 have lent any clarig' on the 2013 Agre|rent save and except basing the right to appeal on the said r\5:r'eement by reason of the proposed appella,nt being a signatory r.iereto. The lack of clarity does not assist the proposed 2l,pellant in its prayer for Leave to AppezLl.

30. R.3 s,rrpports the proposed appellant on the issue of the proposed z:;tpellant's entitlement to challenge the impugned I I 1 i l i5 MB,J & BRMR.I I.A.No.1of2O2S inlani COMCA.IIo.4 of 2O2s order. The reasons given by R.3 for grant of Leave to Appeal to the proposed appellant are identical to those taken by the latter. 3 t. R.3 reiterates that p. Nageswara Rao, as the nominee of R. 1, has opened a bank account in the name. cif JV beyond his authority. R.3 further states that R.l and R.2 are subjecting R.3/JV and the proposed appellant to liabilities. The pOAs, which formed the basis of the impugned order, were revoked by a Power of Attorney dated 1g.05.201g. It is further interesting to note that R.3 states that the application for amencrment (1.A.No.710' of 2023) in the section 9 petition was allowed and that the section 9 petition proceeds on the basis that the proposed appellant has been impleaded as the respondent No.3 in the section 9 petition. If this be the case, the proposed appellant's Leave to Appeal becomes academic and the parties need not have laboured on this question at all.

32. We, therefore, find that there is a complete identity of interest between the proposed appellant and R.3 in terms of the proposed appellant being granted Lcave to Appeal for chailenging the lmpugned order passed by the Commercial Court. 16 MB,.I & BRMR'J I.A.No.1 of 2025 in/and coMcA,No.4 of 2O25

33. Furth;r, regarding the question of prejudice' thrr Court is informcd[t.iLtintheeventTehriHydrosucceedsheforethe Supreme (} rrt in setting aside of the Award dated 1 7 12 2024 in favour cl R.3, the Bank Guarantees furnished by It 1 would havetobeirvoked.Therewouldbeno-prejudicesuffcredeither by the prcposed appellant or by R 3 in terms of partintl with any sum ol'morrt:y in the event the Award is hnally set aside

34. Signilicantly, the proposed appellant failed to take any steps to irnptead itself in the section 9 proceeding's' despite being serve:l nolice of the arbitration proceedings and also being made awa',: of the interim order passed by the Commercial Court on 3).O8.2O23. Hence, for reasons best knorvl-r to it, the proposed rppellant remained invisible from 31.08.2023 to

14.1O.20'2,4 i.e., the date of the impugned order.

35. It is aiso undisputed that the Agreements errtered into betu,eerL the proposed appellant, R. 1 and R.3 including of 15.11.20 Ll' pertain mereiy to apportionment ol amounts receivabk: ;iom Tehri Hydro in the arbitration proceedings. There is nc prejudice shown by the proposed appellant, which i0 indepen<1e.n r of R.3, to support its righ t to appea]. t t : : I I 17 .:*#ii:?,",ffi;l 36. The most fundamental que stion remains as to why R.3/JV, which undoubtediy is the party affected by the impugned order as a si€ "^'o* to the two PoAs' has refrained from chaflenging the re. As of now, there is no appeal filed "u, by R.3 from the said order.

37. The last reason, foregoing paragraphs, as well as the others slplscl in th. reinforces our view that the proposed appellant has been set up to fight a proxy litigation on behalf of R.3. Not only is there an identity of interest between the two, but also obfuscation of the material issue that is whet her the proposed appellant has sulfered any injury independent of the alleged prejudice caused to R.3. The grounds urged by the proposed appellant are intertwined and inseparable from those urged by R.3. Conclus 10n

38. The principie of Leave to Appeal is born in equity. A person prejudiced by a decision must be given a forum to ventilate his/her grievance subject to the Court being satished that the person is prejudiced and bound by the decision. The principle does not allow for relinquishment of the forum for grievance redressal by the entity which is truly affected by the \ 18 MB.J & BRMR"J '^#*'"'j.3:l:f'Ti8;t ir. r:.vour of another who is simply a mouthpi()ce of the decisron affected PaLrtrr to Appeal requires the Court to assess the fact of 39. I.e a're whethcr the decree/order is binding on the preludlce i ru proposed a1'pellant' it is clear' however' that lhere rll no scope for proxy-p'rejudice i'e'' the proposed appellant urginll prejudice on behalf of a party or speaking on behalf of another' prejudice, : nust directly be felt and not one that travels from one party to another. The transfer of prejudice becomes t he deciding factor zigarnst grant of leave when the ltrst party (who is affected by tbe <1:< ision) remains in the background and chooses to urge prejudrce t icariously through another' Simply put' t here is also no room Ior empathy in as much as the proposed appellant being r:r-rpathetic to the injury caused to arlother and challenglinq the decree on behalf of the other party'

40. Cn examining the relevant facts culminar-ing in the impugn,:<1 order in the present case, we have no do ubt that the proposed appellant and R.3 are acting in tandem for the purpos€ rf challenging the impugned order. Ther: cannot be any embzrrgo on parties espousing a common cause, SaVe and except uhe,re the impacted parfy (R.3) decjines to come forward. to brave ltre vagaries of an appeal and shifts the burden to ) ) l 19 ,.^;k'Ji+:":;ry,";J another (the proposed its behalf. The propose which can stand on presence of R.3. appellanr herein) to takrr up cudgels on d appellant has not shown sny prejudice its own, independent of the looming

41. The requirement of obtaining ,leave, pre_supposes exercise of discretion by the Court considering the grant of leave. Leave to appeal is not an automatic entitlement of the proposed appeilant. The very fact of R.3 taking on the role of a cheering bystander instead of challenging the impugned order as an aggneved party, raises the spectre of collusion between the proposed appeliant and R.S. The Court would hence ascertain the prejudice allegedly suffered by the proposed appellant in the overall fact-situation. The considered view is that the proposed appellant has not made out a case of direct and irrefutable prejudice for our discretion to be exercised in its favour for grant of leave to appeal.

42. Admittedly, the two pOAs dated 22.12.2006 and 17.O2.2O11 which have been restrained by the impugned order of the Commerciai Court are between R.3 and R.1/R.2. The proposed appellant is not a partlr or signatory to either of these two POAs. , , I I I { 20 MB,.I & BRMR'J I-A.No.1 of 2025 in/and coMCA.No'4 of 2O25 C] princiPles

43. 'l'he !i rpreme court in Anjonappa (supra) ser- out the :gycrning the grant of Leave lo Appeal The :xclude a person who has suffered an imaginary injury In Lhe present case' the proposed appellant has not satisfiedtttbenchmarkofinjurywhichisrequiredfr>rgrantof princiPles leave to APr'eal

44. We t.lrere fore hold that the proposed appelllnt is not entitled -c the leave prayed for against the impullned order passed by ,he Commercial Court dated 14 lO'2021'

45. LA.l.,r.1 of 2025 is accordingly dismissed COMCA No 4 of 2025, along with all connected applicationr;, is also dismisseC There shall be no order as to costs. To, //TRUE COPY// SD/.K.I]RINIVASA RAO ..\ JPINT REGISTRAR \l SE,CTION OFFICER \ 1 The J udge, -r Disposal of C ommercial Disputes, at Hyderabad. rincipa l Sp_ecial Court in the cadre of District Judge for Trial and

2. Mr. K. Bhas;kar Rao, Authorrsed representative pCL lntertech Lenhydro consortium lc'int Venture office ai 7th floor, Raqhava North Block. Raohava Ratna Tower; Chirag Ali Lane. Abids, Hyderaba? 500 00r 3. One CC to SFtl SRTNIVAS POD|CHET|, Advocate tOpUCl 4. One CC to liRt. PAMULA VAMSHI KR|SHNA, Advocate tOpUC] 5. One CC to SRi N. ARAVIND, Advocate (OPUC) 6. Two CD Co6rj6:5; { PSL YP I I i I i HIGH COURT DATED:20/03/202s Common Order :' r.A. NO. 1 0F 2025 IN/AND COMCA.No:4 ot 20',25 rAIt- : s ? r lt ?16 C't .1, { oEs a qI * DISMISSING THE I.A- NO. '1 OF 2025 AND COMCA NO. 4 OF 2025 WITHOUT COSTS I es b le|