The High Court · 2025
Case Details
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Cited in this judgment
crounds of criminal "",,iY^l' M u KH E E D, Ad vo cate "; the Respondent No1. And Sri G.Nagesh ;;;;; Tlie Court made the following: ORDER f"or the Respondent No2. HJ ;J,X,#."1,H"i;:r This petition comin " n.i i 2 /'./ ,.rt ? THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE JUWADI SRIDEVI CRIMINAL PETITION No.14610 of 2024 ORDER This Criminal Petition is filed by the petit,)ner-accused seeking to quash the criminal proceedings iaqainst him in C.C.No.70 of 2023 on the file of the learned F,r rcipal District & Sessions Judge, Nirmal. The offences allegr:,d against the petitioner-accused are under Sections 417 arrd 376 of the lndian Penal Code (for short'lPC')
02. Heard Sri M.A.K.Mukheed, learnr:r:r counsel for petitioner and Sri [Vl.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent Nc "l as well as Sri G. Nagesh, learned counsel for the unofficial respondent No.2. Perused the record 03(a) ln brief, the case of the prosecuti:rn is that the petitioner-accused and the respondent No.2 ar,r residents of Bhainsa Town. The petitioner-accused carn€, into contact with respondent No.2 who was working as a private teacher, which gradually developed into friendship. Or 27 Oj.2016, the respondent No 2 attended the marriage of trer colleague, I 7 from where the petitioner-accused allegedly took her to his house and forced her into physical relationship by alluring her with a promise of marriage 03(b). lt is fudher alleged that thereafter the petitioner- accused continued physical relations with the respondent No.2 and also captured her photographs and videos in compromising situations. Subsequently, the petitioner- accused got engaged to his uncle's daughter When the respondent No.2 confronted him, he is said to have assured her that he would marry her. On 15.09.2017, when the petitioner-accused was preparing to marry his uncle's daughter, the respondent No.2 telephoned him, and though he initially expressed willingness to elope with her, his relatives allegedly persuaded him to perform a second marriage with the respondent No 2, to which she consented 03(c). lt is further alleged that four months thereafter, respondent No.2's engagement was performed with another person. lmmediately thereafter, the petitioner-accused allegedly threatened respondent No.2 that he would publicize her nude photographs and videos, forcing her to cancel the .i / 3 said engagement On 18.03 2018, the petition:r-accused is said to have taken respondent No.2 to Bhodhan, where he married her in the presence of caste elcle:rs sp6 ,;"o obtained a marriage certificate. The first wife of the petitioner-accused thereafter obtained divorcr-. from him Subsequently, the parents of the petitioner-accused sent him to Hyderabad, and thereafter, his attitr Ce towards respondent No.2 changed, as he started thrr:atening her seeking separation. Respondent No.2 has 1urther alleged that her marriage with the petitioner-accused was not accountable, and she lodged the present crimini;,1 case
04. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner-accused is nothing to do with the alleged offences. There is no dishonest or fraudulent intention on the part of the petitioner-accused to cheat tlrt:, respondent No.2, The ingredients for constituting the olfence under Section 376 of IPC as the petitioner-accus:d and the respondent No.2 are married and lived togethr,,r being wife and husband and that the sexual relationship oetween the wife and husband do not amount to rape. Wh e praying to quash the proceedings against the petitioner-r:ccused, he 4 rrllr: a.ii!, relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhil wherein at Paragraph Nos.19, 21 , 22 held that. "19. ln our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge- sheel as lhey stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376 (2)(n) IPC are absent A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164 CrPC dlsc/oses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case ls accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationshrp with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensua/ in nature. A mere breakup of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the pafties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructif into a marital relationship. Further, both pafties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to ' MaNu/sc/lzzelzozq 5 a gross abuse of lhe process of law. Thetr::fore, no purpose would be served by continutnq the prosecution. 21 . As dentonstrated in the above analysi:: the facls as thcy stand, which are not in ..clts )ute. indicate tltat the rngredients of the offence r nder Secllons 376 (2)(n) or 506 lpc are not established in the instant case. The High .)ourl erred irt cottcluding that there was no consent on the paft of the complainant and therefore s/ie,was a victim of sexual assau/l over a period of time and therefore, proceeded to dismrss the applicatton under Section 482 CrpC c),1 a completely misconceived basls. Ihe facts c. the present case are appropriate for the High Co ,rt to have exercised the power available under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of the courf,s pr:,;ess by continuing the prosecution 22 Recently this Court in XXXX ys. Slalr of Madhya Pradesh, (2024) 3 SCC 496 heltt that wlten tltL: relationship belween the paftiet ,uas purely consensual and when the complainant was aware of the consequences of her actions, the ingredrcnts of the offence of rape were not ntade out. Similarly, in pramod Suryabhan pavui,,. v. Slate of lvlaharashtra, (201g) g SCC 608 an,;ing out of identical facts, this Court has enumetried the following 6 '18 To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Secllon 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To esfab/ish whether the "consent" was vttiated by a "misconception of fact" arising otrt of a promise to marry, two propositrons musl be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise. given in bad faith and with no intentton of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."
05. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State as well as learned counsel appearing for unofficial respondent No.2, fairly conceded that the petitioner-accused and respondent No.2 were married on 18.03.2018 at Bodhan in accordance with ftluslim rites and customs. lt is further admitted that a marriage certificate issued by the Qazi and Masjid lmam, as well as the marriage booklet issued by the Telangana State Waqf Board, were obtained 7
06. lt is an undisputed fact that both tl.e petitioner_ accused and respondent No.2 are majors and ,lvere known to each other. A perusal of the record discl<:s;es that the petitioner-accused married respondent No.2 orr 1g.03.20.1 g in the presence of caste elders. lt is also borne :ut from the record that the eariler marriage of the petitioner-rccused had ended in divorce Therefore, it is evident that ffre petitioner_ accused and respondent No.2 are legally wedder:r spouses.
07. It is pertinent to note that the relationship between the petitioner-accused and responderrt No.2 was consensual prior to marriage, and subsequenfly, they are admittedly a married couple. ln such circums.:ances, the petitioner-accused, being the husband of respondent N0.2, cannot be attributed with the offence punisl^able under Section 376 IPC as he falls wrthrn the ambit of i:xception 2 to Section 375 lPC.
08. On a careful scrutiny of the enti.e material available on record, the present complaint appei:trs to have been lodged only after the petitioner_accuse0 allegedly refused to continue his marital life with responden No.2. lt is 8 i::i:. evident that the circumstances leading respondent No.2 to file the present criminal case arose only when the petitioner- accused allegedly changed his attitude and threatened her with separation. Such allegations, however, do not constitute the essential ingredients of the offences under Sections 376 or 417 IPC
09. lt is also significant to observe that both the petitioner-accused and respondent No.2, being majors, entered into a consensual relationship, which subsequently fructified into a valid marriage. lt is not in dispute that their marriage is subsisting. Thus, the petitioner-accused, being the husband of respondent No.2, clearly falls under Exception 2 to Section 375 lPC. Furthermore, the record does not disclose any element of deception or dishonest inducement so as to constitute an offence under Section 417 IPC 10 In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, and having regard to the well-settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision referred to supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that the 9 essential ingredients to constitute the of ,ences Sections 41T and 376 lpc are not made orrt against the petitioner-accused Continuation of the crimina proceedings against him would therefore amount to sheer abuse of the process of law
11. Accordingly, this Criminal petition is; allowed and the criminal proceedings against the petitionerr_accused in C.C.No 70 of 2023 on the file of the learned p.i.cipal District & Sessions Judge, Nirmal, are hereby quashecl. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous arIclications, if any, shall stand closed. //TRUE COPY// SD/.A.PRATHIMA DEPUTY REGISTRAR G SECTION OFFICER One fair copy to the HON,BLE SMT JUSTICE .Jt,rVVADt SRIDEV| (For His Lordship's Kind perur;al) To, t. The Principal District and Sessions Judge, I, lrm::|, 2. The Judicial First Class Magistrate at Bhainsa 3. The Station House Officer, police Station Bhainsa, N rmal 4. One CC to SRt. G.NAGESH, Advocate tOpUCl 5. One CC to SRl. M A K MUKHEED, Advocate [Opt,(]l 6. Two CC to pUBLIC PROSECUTOR, High Court for re State of Telangana Affairs, New Delhi.
7. 'l 1 L.R. Copies. B. The.Under Secretary, Union of lndia, IVinistry of Lar.r,, Justice and Company 9. The Secretary, Telangana Advocates Association L!lt.ary, High Court 10. Two CD Copies Buildings, Hyderabad AG I '---f YIXXf .,?YTeX!*A?Fi*g*{x*al HIGH COURT DATED:29108t2025 t7sEr&[ o €g PAI C, rieo * .1\t a<.\ t z/. ORDER CRLP.No.14610 of 2024 CRLP IS ALLOWED