E.Vijayender Rao v. District

The nauseating levels to which the liquor business in the State has reached is exemplified in this case itself. The wine shop is permitted to be named after ‘Tulasi’. Neither the petitioner, nor the third respondent hesitated, before attaching the sacred name to an objectionable profession or avocation. When the same is pointed out, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that his client would seek change of name and that the respondents may have to consider it. The petitioner is a licencee in Form A-4 issued under the provisions of the A.P. Excise Act 1968 (for short ‘the Act’) and the Rules made thereunder. He established the shop in the authorized premises in Teegalpahad Village of Adilabad District. The Prohibition and Excise Inspector, Mancherial, visited the shop on

28.11.2008. He found that a person, by name Cheerla Srinivas Reddy, was handling two plastic cans, filled with liquor. According to the inspection report, ‘Original Choice’ whisky supplied by the A.P. Beverages Limited was emptied into the tins, so that, it can be filled into empty bottles of high range brands. On finding that the activity undertaken in the shop is illegal, the Prohibition and Excise Superintendent, Mancherial, the third respondent, passed an order, dated 28.11.2008, suspending the licence, in exercise of power under Section 31(1)(b) of the Act. The same is challenged in this Writ Petition. Sri K.S.Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner submits, that the third respondent did not issue any notice to the petitioner, as contemplated under Section 31 of the Act, and in that view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. Learned Government Pleader for Prohibition and Excise, on the other hand, submits that the impugned order was passed placing the licence under suspension, pending enquiry and for such a measure, show cause notice is not necessary.

Section 31 of the Act empowers the third respondent to impose the punishment of cancellation or suspension of the licence. Suspension contemplated under this provision is a substantive penalty. This Court held way back in the year 1982 that the licencing authority has inherent power to suspend the licence, pending enquiry. The difference between suspension, pending enquiry, on the one hand, and the suspension as a substantive punishment, on the other hand, is clearly manifest. Different consequences follow from out of them. Therefore, the order itself must be clear as to the nature. In the impugned order, it is not even mentioned that the suspension of the licence of the petitioner is, pending enquiry. On the other hand, Section 31(1)(b) of the Act deals with suspension, obviously, by way of substantive punishment, which can be imposed only after issuance of notice and conducting enquiry. Admittedly, such a course was not adopted.

On this short ground, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. It is, however, left open to the third respondent to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. Dt.03.12.2008 L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J _______________________ Note: Communicate operative portion of the order by wire at party’s costs. (B/o) GJ