A.R.Vilas.itha v. The State of Telangana

Petition under Article 226 of lhe Constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased issue a Writ or order preferably in the nature of Writ of [Vlandamus/Writ of Certiorari and after calling 'for records pertaining to the impugned Proceedings/Order GO [\/s No. 20, Law (LA, LA andJ Home courts.A2) Department daled 2-4-2019 passed by 1't Respondent and also consequenfly quash the dismissal order issued by the 2nd Respondent vide Order ROC No.731 and 152512016-Vigilance Cell dated 9-4-19 as illegal, arbitrary, contrary to law, wholly without power or jurisdiction and violative of Articles 12,14,16 and 21 of constitution of lndia and also consequently quash the Charge l\ilemo issued by the 3rd Respondent vide Order ROC No.7311201G-Vigilance Cell, dated 27-12-16 as wholly without power or jurisdiction, contrary to law and consequently quash the Suspension order issLred vide Order No. ROCNo 73112016-\/igilance Cell dated 20-4-16 issued by the 3rd Respondent as illegal, arbitrary contrary to law and consequently declare that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated with all full consequential benefits like arrears of salary, seniority etc and consequently direct the Respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with all full consequential benefits like arrears of salary, seniority etc. lA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section '151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased suspend impugned Proceedings/Order GO [\/s No. 20, Law (LA, LA andJ Home courts.A2) Department daled 2-4-2019 passed by '1't Respondent pending disposal of the above writ petition. lA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 15'1 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may(e pleased to take into consideration the present additional affidavit and kindly admit the above Writ Petition by taking into consideration the explanation given for the delay. Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI DR K. LAKSHMI NARASIMHA Counsel for the Respondent No.1: cP FOR LAW LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS Counsel for the Respondent No.2: SRI c. VIDYA SAGAR, SENIOR COUNSEL REPRESENTING MS. UDAYA SRI, SC The Court made the following: ORDER THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARS ING RAO NANDIKONDA WRIT PETITION No. 36516 of 2024 ORDER: (per the lloi'ble Si Justice P. Sarn Koshg) The instant Writ Petition has been frled by the petitioner challenging the order passed by respondent No' I uide G'O'Ms'No'2O' dated 02.04 .2olg, and also challenging the consequential order passed by respondent No.2 uide oRDER RoC'No'73 1 e $2512016- Vigilance Cell, dated Og.O4.2Olg, declaring it to be illegal' arbitrary' contrary to law and wholly without jurisdiction'

2. Heard Dr. K. Lakshmi Narasimha, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Law & Legislative Affairs appearing on behalf of respondent No'l and Mr' G' Vidya Sagar' Iearned Senior Counsel representing Ms' Udaya Sri' learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No'2'

3. There is no dispute of the impugned order having been served upon the petitioner promptly. Though the impugned order was served promptly in April, 2019, the instant Writ Petition has been filed on 3O.1O.2O24 i.e. after a gap of more than 5/' years' When the matter was initially taken up for admission ald upon the Bench putting up a query so far as the delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Writ Court, the petitioner took time to address the same and meanwhile filed an additional affidavit. In the additional affidavit, the petitioner has primarily put the blame for not hling the Writ Petition promptly upon the different Counsels she had approached and consulted; all of r.r,hom dccording to the petitioner did not co-operate in prompt filing of the petition. The additional ground that the petitioner has taken is also that of the hnancial distress she went into after having lost her employment and the effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic that took place during the period 2O2O-2O22.

4. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner in the additional afhdavit has referred to a series of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme I Court wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the delay laches have to be considered more pragmatically and with a liberal view ald also heid that the delay or limitation in condone delay petitions or the requests should not be rigidly applied particularly when the petition pertains to enforcement of fundamental right or where the petitioner / litigant has been subjected to great injustice.

5. Having hearcl the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner, admittedlv considering the date of dismissal and the date of filing, there is a delay of more t]nan SYzyexs.5Y" years gap is not a small period for a person to agitate his / her grievance before any Court of law. What needs to be appreciated at this juncture is that the petitioner in the instant case was working as a Judicial Officer rn the State of Telangana. The petitioner is a person who is fully aware of the rights and remedies available to her subsequent to the order of dismissal from service Lraving been passed and she is a-lso supposed to know law well. Therefore, the plea of ignorance and also not being aware of her legal remedies cannot be sustained

6. From the explalation that has been given in the additional affidavit a-lso, the first explalation provided is that after the impugned order having been served upon the petitioner and she having been dismissed from service with effect from 09.04.2019, she re-located herself ald came to Hyderabad and started staying with her elderly t parents. The further explalation so provided also shows that for the first time she approached an Advocate in January, 2022. This itself shows that for a period of around 3 years, she did not avail any legal recourse or supposed to avail legal recourse during the intervening period and now she is trying to take advantage of the Covid-l9 Paldemic that took place in between. The Covid-l9 Pandemic or for that matter the lockdown also was imposed roughly after 1 1 months of the impugned order was passed, which by itself is a long period of time for any person to approach Writ Court ventilating their grievance, particularly when the impugned order is one that of dismissal from service arrd moreover it is difficult to accept the contention of the petitioner, that she could not approach the Writ Court only because she did not get a favorable support from any of the lawyers she had consulted before fiiing of the present Writ Petition. When the petitioner had approached one lawyer who for whatsoever being the reason had not filed the petition promptly, the petitioner being a Judicial Officer ought to have been cautious enough to ensure that she files a petition immediately either by engaging another lawyer or by filing a petition herself. The explanation so provided by the petitioner is not justifiable or plausible explanation for the inordinate delay of more than 5 % years. 7 . Apparently urhen there is a clear laxity on the part of the petitioner in asserting her right and trying to rekindle the cause of action which the petitioner herself had forsaken for a long period, discretion cannot be exercised in favour of such a person

8. It is by now rvell settled proposition of law that though for frling a Writ Petition no fixed period of limitation is prescribed, nonetheless it has to be filed promptly, if not within a reasonable period of time. In the said circumstances when a petition, that too, ,tf an Ex-Judicial Officer who is fully conversant of the laws and the lega1 remedies available to her, approaches Writ Court after a gap of more than 5% years agitating her dismissal from service it clearly reflects the petitioner to be guilty of delay laches- The Writ remedy should not be permitted to be invoked by such indolent person and cannot now be permitted to take advantage of her own deliberate act of not approaching the Court promptly that too at this belated stage. The Writ remedies are always available to somebody who is ever vigilant arrd not indolent at all.

9. It would be relevant at this juncture to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babul wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the aspect of delay laches in paragraph No.16 has held as under, viz., "16. Thus, the doctine of deLag and loches should not be lightlg bntshed aside. A utrit court i.s required to ueigh the explanation offered and the acceptobilitg of the same. TLe court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutionoL court it has a dutg to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself aliue to the primory pinciple that uthen an aggieued person, u.tithout adequate reasorl, approaches the court at his outn leisure or pleasure, the court uould be under legol obligation to scrutinise ' {zorc) + scc roa a uhether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, deloA comes in the utag of equitA. [n certoin cirxlmstonces deLag and laches mag not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay u-tould on.lg inuita disaster for the litigant utho knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reJleL:ts inoctiuitg ond inaction on the port of a Litigant - a litigant LDho hes forgotten the basic norm.s, namelg, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and. second, lau.t does rtot permit one to sleep and ise like a phoenix. Delay does bing in hazard. and, causes injury to the lis."

10. Earlier also in the case of State of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. and Another vs. Jabar Singh and Others2 wherein arr order of termination itself was challenged, the Hon'ble ! Supreme Court held at paragraph No.43 as under, viz., "43. We are unabLe to countenance the aboue su,bmission of Mr Mehta and Mr Sangal insofar as it relates to the non- maintainobtLity of the toit petition and the delag ond laches. It is not tn dispute thot tLLe effectiue alternatiue remedg u)os not auoiled of bg mang of tLrc workmen. as detaiLed in poragrapLts supra. The termination r:rCer tuas made in th.e gear 1995 and th,e u,,it petitiols utere admittedLg filed in the gear 2005 afier a delay of 1O gears. The High Cour| in our opinion, was not justifted in entertaining the u-'rit petition on the ground that the petition hos been filed after a delog of 10 gears and that the turit petitions should haue been dismissed bg the High. Court on ' lzooz; 2 scc ttz the ground of laches. We houe alreadg referred to the decision of thi"s Court in U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. u. R.S. Pandeg [(2005) B SCC 264]. This Court speaking through Arijit Pasayat, J. has held in categorical term.s thot tttit petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the stah ory remedy b auailable under the Act unless excgptionol ciranmstances are mode out."

11. In the case of U.P. Jal Nigam and Another vs. Jaswant Singh and Another3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to extend the benefit to the petitioners applying the principle of delay latches. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces into a situation, his Wrtt Petition cannot be heard after a couple of years on the ground that a similar relief has been gralted to some other persons who were vigilant enough and had approached the Court timely and got the relief. L2. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Atx/ind Kumar Srivastava and Others+, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while laying down the legal principles of delay latches had held in paragraph No.22.2 as under, viz., I I "22.2. Hotueuer, thi-s principle is subject to uell-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delags as utelL as acquiescence. Tltose persons uln did not challenge the utrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and uoke up after long delag onlg because of the reason '(zooo) rr scc aoa lzots; r scc:az o (' thot their counterparts uho hnd approached the court eorlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such emplogees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarlg sihtated persons be extended to them. Theg tuould be treated os fence sitters and laches and delags, and/ or the acquiescence, utould be a ualid ground fo"dismiss their claim."

13. In view of the judicial precedents touching the aspect of delay latches referred to in the preceding paragraphs and upon seeing the inordinate delay of more than 5/z years, coupled with the fact, the weak justihcation and explanation which is not plausible or satisfactory in aly manner forces this Bench to hold that the instant Writ Petition suffers from delay laches and deserves to be dismissed.

14. The instant Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

15. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shail stand closed. //TRUE COPY// SD/- L. LAKSHMI BABU ASSISTANT REGISTRAR I ECTION OFFICER \ One fair copy to THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY (For His LordshiP's Kind Perusal) AND One fair copy to THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA (For His LordshiP's Kind Perusal) To, TJ - GJP Affairs, New Delhi. Buildings, Hyderabad

1. 1'l L.R. Copies. 2. The Under Secretary, Union of lndia, IVlinistry of Law, Justice and Company 3. The Secretary. Telangana Advocates Association Library, High Court 4. One Ce to Sri DR K. Lakshmi Narasimha, Advocate [oPUC] 5. Two CCs to GP for Law Legislative Affairs, High Court for the State of Telanqana, at HYderabad [OUTI 6. One CC to lt4s. Udaya Sri. SCIOPUC] 7. Two CD Copies rj, HIGH COURT DATED:0310212025 , -!\,..,;aN ., .\. ,\ a ORDER WP.No.36516 of 2024 1 1 l4AB 2025 .1?.,.* O:-.!'o4Tr-;1[.O i 4 DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS CDfo'" W