The High Court · 2025

Order

This Writ Petition is frled under Article 226 of Constitution of India seeking the following relief: "...1o 6sue an appropiale uit or direction parttallorlll one tn the nature of Wit of Ceiiorin, quash the impugned order of suipenston frdti service and charge sheet issuer/ vide common Proceedtngs No.Pl/ 227(O8y 2O24-V&SO/ CHZ, dated 18.1O.2024 suspertdtng tlrc petitioner from seruice and charge sheeting the Petitioner as arbitrary, capricious, in uiolation of An-14, 21 & 3OOA of the ConstttLttiort of India and conseE-rcntlg the petitioner praA lhis Hon'ble Court maA be pleased to dilect the respondents to reinslate the petitioner into seruice along uith all consequentictl benefits in tlY interest of iustrce . - . "

2. Heard Sri V.Narasimha Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms.D.Sai Mahita, learned counsei representing

Sri R.Anurag, learned Standing Counsel for Telangana State Road Transport Corporation for the respondents. Perused the material available on record.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that while the petitioner was working as a Constable at respondent No.3- Depot, he was suspended from service uide common proceedings, dated 18.10.2024 alleging dereliction of duty by N.Jagan (Head Constable), who was on duty, and the I 2 Wp 3233I 202.1 petitioner as thev failed to observe the unknorr.tr persons, who theft the RTA seized vehicle bearing No.AP 39 QZ 2295 (KIA Car) and left the depot from the main gate at about 1.6:20 hours on

08.10.2024. Upon receiving suspension order an,C charge sheet, the petitioncr made a representation, date<l 21.1O.2024, requesting for relevant documents and respondent No.2 furnished thc said documents on O5.l 1.2024. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his explanation on O6. ll.2024 stating that on 08.10.2024, his duty began at 16:0O hours and ended at O0:00 hours. Hourever, the petitioner reported frrr duty at 16:28 hours and that fift)' one vehicles seized by the FfA authorities were available at the Depot. After signing the duw register at 16:28 hours, the petitioner sent a photocopy of the same to respondent No.2 through his phone. The said photocopy shows the reportir-rg time u/as 16:28 hours. Therefore, the allegation that the petitioner failed to prevent the theft o1- car at 16:20 hours, on thc firce of it, is unfounded. Howeve:r, the theft car was recoverecl on 20.10.2024 and is under poltce custody in Hayathnagar. It is further submitted that the petitioner is on 4 3 Pli,.t wp :12:l3l 2021 verge of retirement and he sha-ll retire on 30.06.2025 on attaining the age of superannuation. Further, the records furnished to the petitioner reveal that unknown persons met N.Jagan, RTC Head Constable and the said N.Jagan allowed these unknown persons to take papers that were kept in the said car. The unknown persons then took the car from the mann gate at 16:20 hours when the RTC Head Constable- N.Jagan, was not at the security gate. Therefore, the petitioner should not be held responsible. Hence, learned counsel prays this Court to quash the impugned common proceedings, dated

18.IO.2024 in respect of the petitioner and direct the respondents to reinstate him into service aiong with all consequential benefrts.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner and N.Jagan both were placed under suspension vide impugned common proceedings, dated lB.IO.2024, as they were involved in dereliction of duties. While they were on duty at 1.6:20 hours on 08.10.2024, RTA seized vehicle bearing No.AP 39 QZ 2295 (KIA Car) was stolen by I + unkno\ /n persons, thereby, they have tarnished the image of the respondents-Corporation, which shows the gravity of the case. It is rvell settled principle of law that the suspension is not penalty as there is no severance of relationship between the employer and the employee. Since the petrtioner failed to perform his duties as a Security Guard as per his ailotted duty timings and as there is a strong prima facie czrs;e against him, the suspension is justified. Further, the petitiorrer himself has admitted to have not joined the duty at the alkrtted time slot, which itself amounts to misconduct. As per the petitioner's own explanation, photocopy of the register will be shared soon after reporting to the duty. However, the reporting time cannot be pin pointed onll'.by looking at the time when the photo is shared by the emplor-ee/petitioner. The petitioner, onl5. to escape from the charges. has created multiple versions of his own explanation shou,ing different reporting times and different u,orking hours. To explain it in detail, the petitioner in his explanation to the charge sheet has mentione<l that his duty hours start from 16:30 hours to 00:00 hoursr and he has 5 PK,J reported to the duty at 16:28 hours and contrary to the same' in the Head Guards report register, the petitioner submitted that his duty hours are from 16:00 hours to 00:00 hours and he reported to duty at 16:3O hours' The contention of the petitioner that he shared photocopy of the register at 16:28 hours and his reporting time is also at 16:28 hours is nothing but crafting a lie to suppress the reality' It is further submitted that the whatsapp group, to which the photocopy was shared' was created solely for the purpose of checking attendance and the time of signing the register when relieving is to prevent employees from leawing early. Hence, sharing of photocopy do not have any validity nor does not qualify as evidence to show the reporting time. ln the preliminary enquiry' it has been brought to the light that the offence of theft has been committed when both the petitioner and N'Jagan were duly present and while they were on duty and even though, N'Jagan has allowed the unknown persons into the parking spot, the commission of theft happened while the petitioner was on the duty' Hence' the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against both N'Jagan I 6 (": |t( .J ald the petitioner. Therefore, the respondentsi are justified in placing thc pctitioner under suspension. Hence, ,,earned counsel prays this Court to clismiss the Writ Petition.

5. This Clourt has taken note of submissions of learned counsel for thc respective parties.

6. Now thc point for consideration is: Whethcr- this Court can interfere in disciplinary proceed ings at the stage of charge sheet/ ch:u-ge memo and whether the petitioner's suspension from service is justified?

7. The scope of judicial review in a challenge t.o the initiation of disciplinan' proceedings is u,ell settied in law.

7.1. ln Union of India u. Kunisettg Satganaraganal, where the emplo-vec. challenged the charge memo dated 23.12.2003 and rn the said charge memo, it was alleged that the employee claimed resen,ation against ST roster point in rhe promotional post, though he did not belong to said category. Instead ol replying to thc aforesaid charge, the employee fil,--d 6.4., 6.9o." 1 (2O06t I 2 SCC :23 I 7 theCentralAdministrativeTribunal.TheTribunaldisposedof O.A. directing the employee to submit his reply to the charge memo. Instead of frling reply' he hled Writ Petition before the High Court and High Court allowed the Writ Petition' The Union of India preferred appeal before the Honble Apex Court' Relying the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Executiue Engineer' Bihar State Housing Board u. Ramesh Kumar Singh l(19961 1 SCC 327: JT (1995) 8 SC 33 11, Special Director u' Mohd' Ghulam Ghouse t(2OO4) 3 SCC 44O : 2OO4 SCC (Cri) 826 : AIR 2004 SC 1467j, tJlagappa u. Diuisional Commr', Mgsore [(2001) 10 SCC 6391, State of U.P. u. BrahmDatt Sharma [(1987] 2 SCC 179 : (1937) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 9431, the Hontrle Apex Court held as under: ".-.14. The reason uhy ordinarilg a wit peliliotl should not be enterlained against a meie shortt cause notice or chorge-sheet $ that qt th(rt stage ti:.e wrlt Petltlon mqg be held to be [email protected]' A mere charge-s=heet or shotx'-cause notlce does not gfiE rlse to Lng c@use ij i&u", becolaLse lt does r.ot o.,lr.oru.ltt to an qdoe?se order whlch hos been issued bg il|ects tie dghts o! ang Pantg unless the to do so' It s quite possible that after i'p"rton nollilng no luidlcttin co,'nsidering the ieplg io lhe shottrcctuse notice or after holding an enqurry or hotd that the tii-i"tn itg .oni"lrred mag drop the proceedings .and/ .iorg." or""not .stablished' It li uell iettted thqt s wrlt Petition lles showtouse right o! ang Partg ls lnJrlnged' A -mere ii"7 iodce or chaige_sheet ioi, r.it lnlrtnge the rlght oJ aftgone. lt ls or othenDlse iiig -n"n o final ord,er ln4tosing sotne adierselg aliecclng a Pqftg is passed, that the said Pd'r'tg cq'n bc sald, to hque ang grleuqnce' .1llu'r.lshm,e'r.t "oro. -so,'ar,e 8 ('.t

15. V,:tit junsdictto is discretionary Jurisdictton ond hence such disctetion under Arllcle 226 sholald. not ord.lnarllg be exerclsed bg quqshlng q show-c@use notice or cho."ge-sheet. 16- Nt) doubt, irt :;orru' uery rare q.nd. exceptlona.l cases the Hqh Courl c(o1 .luctslT a cllarlte sheel or show-cctuse notice if it s lound to be whollg ruithout junsdictlon or lor some other rea,son if lt is wholtg illegal. HLtLueuer , orditrtrilq tlrc High Court shouLd 4ot inte.kre in such a itlllcr " (etnphasis supplied) In Secretary, Ministry of Defence and. Others a

7.2. Prabhash Chand.ra Mirdh2, the employee \^.as served with charge memo alleging that he demanded and accepted bribe. Challenging the said charge memo, employee filed O.A. before the Central Administrative Tribunal, alleging thLat the charge memo was issued bv subordinate to the appoir.ting authority and the O.A r.vas allowed by the Tribunal hol.ding that the charge memo \ /as issued by authority subordinate to the appointing authoritv. Writ Petition preferred on behalf of Union of India u,as dismissed. On behalf of Union of India, appeal was preferred belbre the Hon'ble Apex Court. In the said case, relying upon previous judgments, the Hon'lcle Apex Court held as under: "...12. Tlrus, the lqtu ott tle isstte cqn be summq.nsed to the elfect tho:t the charge slteet cetulol qeterallg be a subject-matter of ctnlliige os it does ,rot ctcluersetg alfect the rights of the delinqtent unless il is eslabLished tltat tlte sdnrc hos beetl tssued bg an authoritg tlot compelent 2 (2012]' 11 SCC ,i65 9 Pti J to initiate the disciptinary proceedings. Nelther the d.iscipttnary proceed.lngs lnor the charge.sheet be quashed. at an lnltlal stage i It toould be q. premqture sto.ge to d.eal wlth the lssues. proceeitngs are not llable to be quashed on the ground.s that proceed.lngs hdd. been lnltlated. qt a belo.ted st@ge ot could. not bi conclud.id ln a reasonable perTod unless the d.elag createg prejudtce to thq dellaquent emplogee. Gravltg o.f q.lleged mlscond,uci ls q. rereuq.nt Jactor to be to,ken lnto consld.eratton whlle quashlng the proceed.lngs." (emphasis supplied)

8. The rational principles from the above decisions are: (i) Ordinarily writ does not lie against show cause notice/charge memo; (ii) entertaining writ petition against show cause notice/charge memo is dehors to the limit of judicial review/exceeds the power of judicial review at the threshold; (iii) issuance of show cause notice/ charge memo, does not adversely affect/infringe the rights of the employee; does not amount to an adverse order; (iv) normally a charge-sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous as determination of correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. It would be premature to deal with the issues; 10 o (v) in onll \.er]. rare and exceptional cases, if it is found to be u,holl1, rvithout jurisdiction or for some other reason, if it is wholly illegal, Court can exercise power of judicial review at the stage of show cause notice/ charge memo; (vi) discretion undel Article 226 should nrrr- ordinarily be exercised to quash charge sheet/ show cause notice.

9. Keeping in mind above principles, it is necessary to assess the issue. The basic facts are not in dispute. [t is also not in dispute that RTA seized vehicle bearing No.AP 3,9 QZ 2295 (KLA Car) was stolen by some unknown persons on 08.1O.2O24 at 16:20 hours

10. lt is the case of the petitioner that the allegations made against him are unlounded as he was not at fault for committing theft of the RTA seized vehicle and he was not on duty at the time when the said vehicle was committed theft. A perusal of the lnaterial on record would show that as per duty allocation register the petitioner has to report at 16:00 hours and as per his own version, he has reported to duty at 16:28 hours. It is the contention of the respondents that if the 11 PKJ petitioner reports duty in correct time, the vehicle woul€l'not have been committed theft and thereby, the petitioner has committed dereliction of duty without reporting his duty on time. Whether the act of the petitioner in not reporting to duty on time amounts to dereliction of duty or not can only be determined after evaluation of evidence on record and not at a premature stage. It is well settled that at the preliminary stage, the Court cannot interfere in disciplinary proceedings. Whether the petitioner failed to report to duty on time or there were inconsistent statements in his explanation is a matter that needs to be examined by the disciplinary authority during the enquiry. It is for the disciplinary authority to determine whether the charges against the petitioner are substantiated. In exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court cannot undertake such an exercise. The evaluation of the evidence is within the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority. Thus, the question of interference of this Court in disciplinary proceedings at the stage of charge sheet/charge memo does not arise. f L2 d

11. The conduct, cliscipline, duties and resporrsibilities of an employee pu blic selvlce are governcrl by servlce rules/ regulation s. Or-r allegation of misconduct, employer IS entitled to takr: disciplinan, action which may lead to dismissal/ removzrl lrom service. The power t,t suspend an empioyee flou,s out of power to take disciplirLary action on allegation of misconduct. The conduct nr.tes/ regulations delineate the power of suspension and competent authority to exercise such power. When an allegation of misr:onduct comes to the notice of disciplinary authority and in the opinion of disciplinary authority that it is not desirable to €ntrust duties to .delinquent emplo.yee u,hile enquiry/investigation is in progress/proposed, the competent authority rnay place his service under slrspension. Suspension of ser.vice results in temporary u'ithdravr.al of duties and respon si bili ties of the delinquent employee. During the period of su spension, the relationship of mastcr and servant subsists; the employee continues to be otr the rolls of employment and is not entitled to take up anr, other assignment. He is still arnenable to 13 r,li J disciplinary control of the employer for any other miscohduct also. He is only disabled from attending to his work. He is not entitled to draw pay and allowances. For his. s-ustenance during the period of suspension, he is paid allowance which in normal parlance called'subsistence allowance'.

12. Ordinarily, an employee's servlces can be placed under suspension in the following contingencies: a) Where disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or pending. b) Where the disciplinary authority was of the prima facie opinion that the employee is engaged in activities prejudicial to the interest and security of the State; c) Where the case against him in respect of criminal offence is under investigation, enquiry or trial; d) Pending investigation/ enquire into allegations, it is for-rnd not desirable to continue the employee in service in public interest; e) Such continuation * service during pending enquiry/ investigation is iikely to prejudice the L4 \ t'' wF 32311 2O2a investigation, trial, enquiry; there is tr possibility of tampering of documents, influencing the r,r'itn65sss, sgg; f) It is also permissible to suspend an r:rnployee if his continr.ratior-t is likely to cause/encourage indiscipline in the organization

13. In mattcrs of suspension, the exercise of extra-ordinary porver of j uclicial review vested with this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of india is very linlted. Scope of consideration is limited to the extent of e.xamining the competence of the authority who places an errnployee under suspension; arltitrary exercise of power; selecti.r'e suspension; allegations are frivolous/ technical in nature; strspension was rn'holiy unu,arranted; and there lvas no application of mind. In matters of suspension, each case has to be exirmined in the factual back qround of given case. , I I ? .;J.i c 15 PIi,J

14. At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to a case in Deputg Inspector General o;f Police u. R.S. Mad.hubobus, wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held as under: "-.-18. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the cuse, we are of the opinion thctt the Tibunal ought not to haue interfered with the order of suspension passed bg competent authoitg, particularlg uhen the authoities have got the power under Rule I of the APCS (CCA) Rules 1991 to place an emplogee under suspension pending enquiry. All the aspects haue to be gone into bA the fact Jinding authoitA and the enquiry tuill disclose the truth and othenaise of the allegations. Further, it is seltled preposition of law thot suspension pending enquiry cannot be interkred uith and the Coutts can direct onlA to conclude and complete tle proceedings. In the circumstances oJ the case, the Tribunal tstead of directing tlte authoities to complete and conclude the disciplinary proceedings pending dgainst the respondent within the time frame, exceeded its limit and ouer stepped its juisdiction bg directing the' autlaities that he should be transferred to d fdr off place, uhich is impennissible under lqw and unutarranted.. As the task undertaken bg the Tribunal is impenntssible under law, the order passed bA il suflers from uaious seious legal infi.rmities and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside."

15. The principles that can be culled olrt are: (il The real effect of the order of suspension is that employee contimres to be a member of service of employer but is not permitted to work and further during the period of suspension he is paid slrbsistence allowance. (ii) It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee and not to be lightly passed. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the 3 w.P.No.186 of 2OO9, dated 05.02.2009 1 I i I l 16 f Pt(,J alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. (iii) The suspen sion must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. (iv) The power of suspension should not be exercised in an arbitrary manner and without any reasonabl.e ground, as vindictive and in misuse of power. (") Suspension should be made only when there is a strong pima facie case of delinquency. ("i) Suspension is a device to keep the delinouent out of the mischief ran ge. The purpose is to complete 1,tLe proceedings unhindered. (v) order of suspension can be resorted to pr--nding further inves-tigation or contemplated disciplinary action only on grave charges. (viii) Competent Authority should take intc, consideration relevant facts and attendant circumstances as to how far and to what extent public interest would suffer if the detinquent is not placed under suspension. ; L7 PK,J

16. Having regard to the above principles, it is necessary to consider the provisions of Regulation 18 of the TSRTC Service Regulations. Regulation 18 vests power in the competent authority (usually the disciplinary authority) to place an employee under suspension pending investigation or enquiry into grave charges, where such suspension is deemed necessary in the public interest or if a criminal offence is under investigation or tria-I. This regulation also provides guidance to the disciplinary authority on when to resort to suspension. L7 . This Court is required to note whether suspension was resorted to enforce discipline; convey to all the ernployees that dereliction of duty cannot be tolerated; to ensure that employee would not create impediment in smooth conduct of enquiry and in the larger public interest, it is necessary to suspend the employee. This Court is required to see whether such power is exercised not as an administrative routine or an automatic \ consequence of alleged misconduct; whether there was careful consideration of the issue and in right perspective and due assessment of misconduct of employee. I l i 18 i-|

18. According to the charge memo, there was theft of RTA seizqd vehicle bearing No.AP 39 QZ 2295 (KIA Car) on OB.lO.2024 rvhile both N.Jagan and the petitioner were present on duty at that particular time, thereby, they have tarnished the image of respondent-Corporation. Though the said vehicle was recovered on 20. 1O.2O24, it cannot be said that the allegation of dereliction of duty is not a gross rrisconduct. When the allegation amounts to misconduct, it oannot be said that the employee cannot be suspended. Whether the petitioner had performed his dutv in dereliction manner is the matter for consideration in the disciplinary enquiry. Thtrs, this Court does not fir-rd any error in placing the petitioner under suspension.

19. r 'Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed " Miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this Writ Petition, shall stands closed. There shall be no order as to costs. //TRUE COPYII SD/.T. TIRUMALA DEVI PUTY REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER flii iE is 3[i X IftEAi'3S?3H't#YTfie toeuc;r lwo CD Copies To 1 2 3 PSK, BS 5 t3 HIGH COURT DATED:1 310312025 ORDER WP.No.32331 of 2024 1 r' ': - a fi :-. ,4 16 (i J o 11 APR M ii, I 4rfeu f-ft t DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS GT"old-W