✦ High Court of India · 12 Mar 2025

Darius Shapur Chennair and Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh

Case Details High Court of India · 12 Mar 2025
Court
High Court of India
Decided
12 Mar 2025
Length
3,394 words

Petition under Section 151 cpc praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, ine High court may be.pleased to suspend the operation of the judgment in w.p.No.11883 of 2024, dt: oq.os.zozq, pending disposal of appeal 99ln:-:t_fq._te Appeilants: SRTSRIDHAR REDDY pOTTtcARt Spt_. cp REp FOR THE ADVOCATE GENERAL 99yl-"_"Lf..19" Respondent No..t: SRtVEDULA VENKATA RAMANA SR. COUNSEL REP., FOR M/S BHARADWAJ ASSOCIATES 9lyl-":]Ig the Respondenr Nos.2&3: SRt B. NARSIMHA SHARMA ASST., SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA REP., FOR SRI GADI PRAVEEN XUTrAN OV. SOLIC]TOR GENERAL OF INDIA The Court made the following: JUDGMENT i I I I I I 7, THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL AND THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA UIRIT APPEAL No.3O4 of 2O25 JUDGMENT (Per Hon'ble Smt. Justice Renuka Yara) Heard Sri Sridhar Reddy Pottigari, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for learned Advocate General for the appellants' Sri vedula venkata Ramalla, learned Senior counsel appearing for M/s. Bharadwaj Associates, learned counsel for respondent No'1 and sri B. Narsimha Sharma, learned Assistant solicitor General of lndia appearing for Sri Gadi Praveen Kumar, learned Deputy Sotcitor GeneraloflndiaforrespondentNos.2and3.Perusedtherecord.

2. This is an Intra-Court appeal directed against the order dated o4.og.2024passedbyalearnedSingleJudgeinW.P.No.lISa3of2024, wherein, the appellants/respondent Nos'3 and 4 and respondent Nos' 1 and 2 were directed to initiate and conclude land acquisition proceedings with respect suit schedule land in O'S'No'333 of 1986 on thefrleofthelAdditionalseniorcivilJudge,RarrgaReddyDistrict, within a period of four (04) months and to pay compensation to respondent No. 1/writ petitioner. Initially, respondent No.1 hled Writ Petition vide W'P'No'11883 of 3. 2A24 agarnst appellants/respondent Nos'3 and 4 to initiate land / 2 WA.No.304 of 2025 acquisition proceedings for acquisition of land of respondent No.1/writ petitioner admea.suring Ac. 16-09 gts. of land in Dhakalie No.449 in Sy.No. f / I of Karchala Imarath, Raviryal Village, Mzrheshwaram Mardar, Ranga Reddy District to imprement the order s passed in E.A.No.21 of 2023 in E.p.No. 103 of 2ooz in o.S.No.333 of 1986 on the file of the I Additional Senior Civi1 Judge, Ranga Reddy District.

4. The background facts leading to the rrring of the writ petition and writ appeal are that respondent No. 1 is claiming to be t he absolute owner of the land admeasuring Ac. 16-19gts. irr Dhal<ala No.449 situated at Ravirl'al Village, Maheshwaram Marrdal, Ranga Reddy District (for short 'the subject property') having inheriterl the same through his grandfather syed Mohammed Ghouseddin. Irritialry, the said Mohammed rihouseddin fired o.S.No.333 of 19g6 on the file of I Additional Senior ,3ivir Judge, Ranga Reddy District seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession of the subject property. Trre said suit was decreed on 15.11.L996 declaring the grandfather of respondent No.l as title holder coupled with relief of delivery of possr:ssion. The appellants and res;pondent Nos.2 and 3 did not prefer any appeal, as such, the judgmer.t and decree of the learned I Additional llenior civil Judge, Ranga Redrlv District became frnal. Thereafter, after a lapse of 11 years, the father of respondent No.1 i.e. Syed l4oharnmed Nayeemuddin filed E.p.No. 103 of 2OOZ in O.S.No.333 of 1986 and the t 3 WA.No.304 of 2025 sarne was allowed in his favour on lg 'O4 '2012' Aggrieved by the said order, respondent Nos.2 and 3 hled CRP No'3685 of 2012 before this Court and the same was dismissed vide order dated 08'06 '2022 ' Therea-fter, the legal heirs of the original decree holders including respondent No.1 herein frled E.A.No.2 I of 2023 in E'P'No'1O3 of 2OO7 seeking issuance of warrant for delivery of possession through the Bailiff. Pending issuance of the warrant, the subject property was utilized by respondent Nos.2 and 3 as Missile Research centre. In the circumstances, respondent Nos.2 and 3 opposed E'A'No'21 of 2023 on the ground that it is not possible to deliver the property as Missile Research Centre has been established'

5. Having heard the respondent No'1 and respondent Nos'2 and 3' the E.P Court disposed of the E.A directing respondent Nos'2 and 3 to initiate land acquisition proceedings with respect to subject land vide orderdatedlT.|o.2o23.TherespondentNo.lfrledthewritpetition aggrieved by the inaction of respondent Nos'2 and 3 in initiating land acquisition proceedings in spite of the fact that the subject land is in possessionoftheMinistryofDefence.Thewritpetitionisfrtedseeking grant of compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation and TralsparencyinLandAcquisition,RehabilitationandResettlementAct' 2O13. The learned Single Judge referred to judgments of the Hon1ele Supr7ne Court of India in Hindustan Petroleum Corpa' Ltd' v 4 WANo.304 of Z)25 Darius Shapur Chennair and Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh2, wherein, it is held that when the state acquires from private parties for public purpose, reasonable compensation has tc be paid and thus ordered the appellarrts and respondent Nos.2 and 3 to acquire the subject land within four months.

6. Aggrieved try the said order of the learned Single Judge, the appellants frled the present appeal on the ground that the :;ubject la,d belongs to the covernment and that respondent No.1 and his arcestors were never in possession and therefore, the judgment and rlecree dated 15.11.1996 in O.Si.No.333 of 1986 are nullity. 7 . The learned counser for the writ appetants wo,ld subrnit that the land in every revenue v lage will be arlotted with survey nurnber except Grama Kantam land (vilrage site). The word 'Biladakala, rnea,s land without any survey number i.e. land which does not belc,ngs to arry private person or individuar, but belongs to the Government. Further, it is submitted that the suit in o.S.No.333 of 19g6 was filed without mentioning aly t,oundaries except mentioning the subjer:t land as Dhakala No.449 admeasuring Ac. 16_ 19 gts. Respondent No. 1,s ancestors allegedly purchased the subject land in auction, h owever, no documentary prooJ' is availabre and there is no reason staied for not ' (2005) 7 scc 627 ' lzozo; z scc soe a. 5 WA-No.304 of 2025 mentioning the name of respondent No' 1's grandfather in the revenue records. More particularly, it is submitted that the land under the control of Nizam's dominion was brought under the Central Administration when the erstwhile Hyderabad District was formed in 1949. The H.E.H. the Nizam has submitted an Inventory of properties belonging to him in List-I, List-II and List-III, to the Government of India, for its acceptance. The Government of India vide D'O'No'F2(1)- H/5O, dated 10. 11.1953 accepted the Lists-I and II as private properties of the Nizam, whereas the property in List-III consisting of kalchas admeasuring approximately 23,000 acres is not approved and would be under the operation of Government by the Hyderabad State Tenancy and Revenue Laws' List-III properties were not approved by the Government of India as personal properties of Nizam' Therefore' H.E.H. the Nizam has no right or title over the land' As per List-III' Sl.No. I shows the OIIice building of the Sharqhi (Eastern Taluk) called Kancha lamarath, adjacent to the Hill of Baba Sharfeeduiinh Shahen' Sy.No.l, admeasuring 4330-31 acres, but there is no mention as Dhakala No.449. The total land admeasuring Ac'15'964' 15 gts'' including Kancha Imarath was acquired by the then Collector and the Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad District' duly notifuing the lands under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894' An amount of Rs'4'O0'0OO/- was paid to H.E.H. the Nizam towards compensation with 15% statutorJl' - \ \ 6 WANo.304 of 2025 allowances. The matter was czrrried to the Hon,ble Supr*me Court of India in s'L'p' (cn'il) No-246 0f 1g60 a,,d the subject prop.rty was held to be the lald vested in the Government of A.p. and the appellant Nawab Mir Osn:.an Ali i.e., H.tr.H. the Nizam of Hyde:rabad shall handover possession of the state of A.p and that the Gover^ment of A.p shall not be liabb to pay interest on the amount ol Rs.4,00,00 O/- and sha,ll not be entir,led to profits. on the basis of order of the Hon,ble Supreme Court, the Government of A.p acquired the lands ald H.E.H. the Nizam has rost his right and title over the rands covered under List_ III kanchas. As per the revenue records, the Imarath x ancha was recorded as Bilad'akala, with a total extent of Ac.4 076.OO 15ts. and the same was allotteri to the defense authorities for establishment of missile range vi,le G.o.Ms.No.1724 Food & Agricuit,re, dated 79.09.7969 on lease basis. Thereafter, through various proceedings, the said land undr:r List-III was in possession of various Government Departments/Instil.utions. The entire land has no entry fbr private persons and the arcestors of respondent No.1 were never in,ossession of the subject rand and there is no entry of the names of a.cestors of respondent No.l in the revenue records. The subject lald is in possession of the Grt'ernment for more than 100 years in the control of various departments. While so, the respondent No.1 obtained fraudulent decree on the basis of false documents without mentioning 7 WANo.304 of 2025 the boundaries Errd survey number of Kancha Imarath. These facts though stated by the writ appellants in the counter in the writ petition, the same were not considered by the learned Single Judge. Hence, it is prayed that the order ofthe learned Single Judge be set aside. B. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that though the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District passed an order for initiating land acquisition proceedings, the respondent authorities on one pretext or the other are postponing the matter and depriving the fruits of decree.

9. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 submitted that their stand before the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District in E.A.No.21 of 2023 as well as before the Writ Court is that they have no objection for initiating land acquisition proceedings provided the State Govemment takes necessary steps at its end.

10. A perusal of the record shows that the writ appellants were parties to the proceedings in O.S.No.333 of 1986 before the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District but they did not contest the suit. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 only appeared before the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District and the suit was decreed on 15.11.1996. Further, there was no opposition by the writ appellgnts to the E.P frled in the yea:. 2OO7 and the order dated 8 WANc.304 of 2025

19.O4.2O12 pass,id in the said E.P has become hnal. Wtrt:n E.A.No.21 of 2023 was frlecl, respondent Nos.2 and 3 gave consent tor initiating land acquisition proceedings as the land was in their r:ontrol. The prayer in the tr.,A, was for delivery of possession of the subject land through the Court Bailiff. However, since the subject land was not available for delirzering possession and since respondent \os.2 and 3 agreed to initiate land acquisition proceedings, the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judg,:, Ranga Reddy District instead of orderin g delivery of possession ordere.d the writ appellants and respondent Nos.2 and 3 to initiate land acquisition proceedings.

11. As per the record, the State Government i.e. rvrit appellants who are claiming to bt: the owners did not contest the suit wht:n the same was frled in the yr:ar 1986 and the same was decreed in tht: year 1996. since there was n,o challenge to the judgment and decree of the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District in O.S.No.333 of 1986, dated 15.11.1996, the writ appellants herein would not have locus stondi to ctLallenge the same belatedly in the year il.O24 in ttre writ petition or in the year 2o2s in the writ appeal. The wrir appellants ought to have pres;ented their case of being title holders and possessors of the subject pr,)perty before the rearned I Additionar Senior civil Judge, Ranga Redrly District but not in this writ appeal. ,.,---/- \ \ 9 WANo.304 of 2025 \

12. Having concluded that the writ appellants do not have locas standi to challenge the judgment and decree of the learned I Additional Senior civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, there are three points that go to the root of the matter about the maintainability of the writ petition. To begin with, the respondent No.1 frled a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. Having filed a suit for recovery of possession, the respondent No.1 is entitled to only relief of declaration of title a]1d recovery of possession and no other relief. The learned I Additional Senior civil Judge, Rarga Reddy District as an Executing Court has jurisdiction to implement the decree without exceeding its scope. The scope of the decree was to deliver the possession of the subject land to respondent No.1 either physically or symbolically. while so, the learned I Additional Senior civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District merely on the basis of representation made by respondent Nos'2 and 3 ordered them to initiate land acquisition proceedings'

13. In this regard., the Hon'ble Supreme court of India in so;nu.Irlol Agraual & Ors. Vs. Ashok Kutnor Kothari & Ors's with respect to exercise of jurisdiction of executing court in execution of a decree has held as below:- "15. This Court has time and again cautioned against the Execution Court adopting such an approach. ln Topanmat Chhoto,mo,l a' r clvtL oo{n LNO(S). IIIl-l3lIOF2021[4.4SPECIAI-LEAVEPE|ITION(CIvlL)NOS' I]478'I1479 oF 20221 l0 WA.Nc,.304 of 2025 Kundomal Gangdam4, a three-judge bench held as follows: "It is a well-settled principle that a Court executing a clecree cilnnot go behind the d,3cree: it must take the decree as it stands. for the decree is binding ard conclusive between the parties to the suit". !et again, in Meenakshi Saxena a. ECGC 1,14s, rt was reitr:rated that: "The whole purpose of execution proceedings is to enforce the l,erdict of the court. Ilxecuting court while executing the decree is only concerned with the execution part of it but nothing else. T,he court has to take the judgment in its face value. It is settled,law that executing coLrrt cannot go beyond the decree. But the diffrcu).ty arises when there is ambiguity in the decree with regarcl to the material aspects. Therr it becomes the bounden duty of the court to interpret t]e decree in tJ-re process of giving a true effect to the decree At that juncture thr: executing court has to be very cautious in supplementing its interpretation and conscious of the fac.: that it cannot draw a new decree. The executing court shall strik e a fine balance between the two while exercising this jurisdictiorr in the process of giving effect to the decree."

14. Further, with regard to issue of whether the .rder of civil court ca,, become the subject matter of a writ petition under Article 226 of constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme court ol India in state o! Madhga Pr,,desh as. Bh,,ilo'r Bhai and other$, has held ils under:- "At the same time we carnot lose sight of the fact that the special remedy provided h Art. 226 is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtarning relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. It has been made clear more thal once that the power to give relief under Art. 2..|6 is a discretionary ltower. This is specially true in the case of pr.)wer to issue 'lrits in the nature of mandamus. Among tJ:e several rnatters 4 ArR 1960 SC 388 s (2or8) 7 SCC 479 6 ArR 1964 SC 1006 W,{uNo.304 of 2)25 which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy ard what excuse there is for it. Another is the nature of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequentiar reliefl Thus, where, as in .these cases, a person comes to tlle Court for relief under Art. 226 on the allegation that he has been assessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the court, if it hnds that the assessment was void, being made under a void provision of law, and the payment was made by mista_ke, is still not bound to exercise its discretion directing repayment. Whether repaJrment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its ou.n facts and circumstances. It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay dovm any rule for universar apprication. It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinar5r remedy of mandamus. Again, where even if there is no such delay the Government or the statutory authority against whom the consequentiar relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on grounds like limitation, the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue t.l.e writ of marrdamus for such payment. In both these kinds of cases it will be sound use of discretion to leave the party to seek his remedy by t}le ordinary mode of action in a civil court and to refuse to exercise in his favour the extraordinar5z remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution". \ 15' In view of the regal ratios raid down in above citations, ..^/e are of the considered view that the writ court ought to have considered three / pertinent questions as below: t2 WA.No.304 of 2025 i. Whether the learned I Additiona.l Senior Civil Judge, Ranga R,:ddy District had jurisdiction to exceed,/convert the scope of the decree i.e. effectively changing the nature of suit frrr recovery of possession to that of a suit for mandatoly injunction by directing respondent Nos.2 and 3 to initiate land acquisition proceedings? 1l Whether the judgment and decree of a civil court ca-n be implemerrted without following procedure contemplated under E.l) proceedings in CPC? iii. Whether 1.he order of an Executing Court in E.A.ltlo.2l of 2023 can become the subject matter of a writ petiti,)n?

16. Without <:onsidering the above questions, the Writ Court proceeded to pass the impugned order dated O4.09.2024. Hence, by setting aside thal- order, we deem it necessary to remancl the matter back to the learned Single Judge for passing orders after duly considering the above questions as to maintainability. 17 . With the above direction, the Appeal is, disposed of As a sequLel, Miscellaneous Petitions, pending if any, stand disposed of To, //TRUE COPYII SD/. B. SA ATHI JOINT REGI TRAR SECTION OFFICER

1. The D_efence Secretary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Defence, Sough Block, New Delhi-1100'1 1

2. The Director of DRDL, Research Centre lmarat (RCl) Vignan Kancha post, Hyd-500069

3. Two CCs to ADVOCATE GENERAL, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. IOUTI

4. One CC to SRI M/S BHARADWAJ ASSOCIATES Advocate tOpUCI

5. One CC to Sri Gadi Praveen Kumar, Deputy Solicitor General of lndia [OPUC] 6. lhe Section Officer, Writ DB Section, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. ,/

7. The. Section Officer, POSTING Section, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. 8 Ing Section Officer, Writ NON SERVICE Section, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad.

9. Two CD Copies KKS o .t , I / HIGH COURT HAC,J & RY,J DATED:1 210312025 JUDGMENT WA.No.3O4 of 2025 k o u 1i1E S 14 02 AP8 2015 \ h. ( * oAsp 4 ::':--s DISPOSING OF THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS 0,

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