The High Court · 2025

Order

(Per The Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)

1. The instant Writ Petition has been filed for a Writ of Certiorari quashing the Procedural Order No.15 dated 15.09.2025 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal as being perverse and in contravention of the principles of natural justice and equal trealment of parties under the provisions of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (,the 1996 Act') and thc ICC Rule s.

2. By the saicl impugned Procedural Order, the venue of thc Closing Hearing in the Arbitration was- shifted from Delhi to London, UK.

3. The petitioner prays for restoration of the venue to a location in Hyderabad. The petitioner also prays for an interim order for stay of the Arbitration Procecdings pending before the Arbitral Tribunal in ICC. \ 2

4. The petitioner is a respondent in an Internzrr i rnal Arbitration between a foreign parly and its Indian counterpa -t and another party based in Mumbai (3 claimants). Hycl:,.r bad, India, is designated as the venue of the Arbitral proceedings

5. The Arbitration Agreement is inserted in a lontract dated 24 .O8.2012 and envisages Arbitration with a foreig -r contractor of a contract value of more than Rs.20 crores governed ry the Rules of Arbitration of International Chamber of Commer > (,lCC Rules), Paris.

6. The Court granted petrtioner on 07. IO .2025 ex parte ad interim prr tection to the directing the Arbitral 'l ibunal not to proceed in terms of an email dated 05.10.202: whereby the

petitioner was asked to confirm the bookings at lI) lC, London by 6:O0 PM on that date. The Court made it clear rl at the interim order would remain for a limited period of I r-re until the respondents entered appearance and that the partLr s would be at liberty of exploring Hyderabad or New Delhi as ait:.native venues for the Closing Hearing. The Court further made it,) rar that it had not granted the prayer for stay of Arbitration. 7 The respondents entered appearance pursuar r ro notice and Senior Counsel n,as heard on several occasions tr rreafter. The gespondents are the claimants in the Arbitration j .l 3

8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents has urged that the Writ Petition is misconceived being in violation of the settled law with regard to the remedy provided to a party to an Arbitration to approach the Courts. Senior Counsel submits that the impugned Procedural Order does not suffer lrom perversity and is in consonance with the terms of reference and the ICC Arbitration Rules which confers authority on the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on an appropriate location. It is furthcr argued that the wril petitioner did not objecL to the Inlernational Disputes Resolution Centre (IDRC), London, in the meeting held on

15.O9.2025 culminating in the impugned Procedural Order No.15.

9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks to sustain the interim order on the ground that the Arbitral Tribunal did not have any reasonable justification to shift the venue from New Delhi to London and failed to consider Hyderabad as a viable option. SenionCounsel submits that the ICC Rules as well as the law relevant to the subject places primacy on lhe consenl of the parties which is not reflected in the impugned procedural Order. It is also submitted that the respondents are adamant in terms of holding the Closing Hearing only rn London as opposed to any place in India. Senior Counsel pJaces rccent emails exchanged between the parties in this regard. ,/' / I 4 \ '-o1

10. We have considered the submissions of botlr the parties with - reference to the case lall, cited and intent to givr: I decision under distinct heads. Maintainabilirv of the Writ Peri Ilon I 1. The Writ Pctition has been filed under A .t l:le 226 of th-e Constitution of India on the ground that the rmprr jred Procedural Order is arbitrary, was passed in bad faith and in ontravention of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner ha; relied on recent decisions of the Supreme Court in furtherance r { r ls contention. The law rvith regard to the interference in Arbitr: t on Proceedings under Article s 226 and 227 of the Constitutror r of India is as follows:

12. Courts have dec.lared that an interventior / i 1lte rference in Arbitration through the route of Article 226 is onl1. .r arranted where the writ petiti'oner is able to make out a case of grorir pcrversity and Iack of inherent jurisdictron. In essence, interferer t e under Article 226 /227 is permissible only if the order is perversc ,o the extent of "..-must stare in the foce...": Serosoft Solutions ptt Ltcl. u. Dexter Capital Aduisors Put. Ltd.l. In that decision, the I ,upreme Court r 2025 INSC 26 I \ 5 underscored that the High Court,s should not interl_ere with orders passed by Arbitral Tribunals and shouid only exercrse the power under Artic.le 226/222 in exceprional cases including of bad faith. In Serosoft (supra), the Supreme Court found that the High Court had unnecessarily interfered with the directior --- "'" u,ciutrons passed by the Arbitral Tribunal.

13. The Supreme Court found that the respondent in Bhauen Consttuction u. Exe Engineer Sard.ar Sarouar Nannad.a Nigam Ltd.z had failed to show exceptional circumstances or bad faith on the part of the appellant for invoking the remedy uncler Article 222 of the Constitution despite the ambit of Arricle 22T beingbroad and pervasive. The Supreme Court accordingly found that the High Court erred in utilizing its discretionary power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interdict the arbitration process. 74. Moreover, a foray to the writ Court can only be if the order is the extent of being in patent lack Punjab State pouer Corporation Ltd. u that decision, the Supreme Court relied u. ONGCa to hold that the l{igh Court should have of inherent Emta Coal on Deep perverse to Limtted3. In jurisdiction: Industies Ltd ' 1zozz1 t scc zs '(2020) 17 scc 93 " (2020) 1s scc 706 I 6 dismissed the Article 227 petitiorr as there was rr() perversiLy in the order of dismissal of the petitioner,s application u I ler section 16 of the 1996 Act. The decisions of the Single Benches Cour[ in CS Constrttction Company put. Ltd. u. )) Engineeing Consultant and otherss and Lalit fu,r ,f rhe Delhi High celling Geo and han u. National Agicultural Co. Federation of Ind.ia Ltd. (NAFED)(, ) 1 respect to the limited jurisdiction of the Writ Court in interferirrl; rrrith Procedural Orders passed by Arbitral Tribunals may also be r ( crrcd to in this context I 5. The issue of maintainability of the Writ I,( rition must be ''vcighed on the petitioner,s argument of perversig. i e ., u,hethcr the impugned Procedural Order No.15 is perversc c the extent of amounting to an inherent lack of jurisdictiorr rf the Arbitral Tribunal to pass the said order. Hence, the allegccl I ervcrsity needs to []e testcd on the material placed before the CJurt. Docs the impu qned ProceduraI Order satisfv the E nchmark ol an Exceptional and Rare Case? 1

16. The contours of challenge in the Writ petit rn involve the alleged arbitrary shift of venue from New Delhi to ,onclon despite the same being contrary to the Agreemen[ between I c parties. The petitioner also says that the Arbitral Tribunal,s der:i ;ion to change thc venue violated the mandate of equal treatment ) parties under I \ '1zoz+1scc onLine Det 5161 6 W P (C) 13833/2024, CM AppL. 57s48_57g4g/2024 7 section 18 of the 1996 Act. The documents praced before us reveal the following facts (il Clause X Article 41 of the Agreement designates Hyderabad, India, as the venue of Arbitration. (ii) Clause X Article 43 authorizes the Tribunal to conduct hearings and meetings ,'at any location it considers appropriate,, after consultation with the parties pursuant to Article 1g(2) of the ICC Rules. Article 43 further provides that thc Tribunal ,.may deliberate at any location it considers appropriate,,. (iii) Article 18(2) of the ICC Rules reproduces the language of Clause X Article 43 in that the Arbitral Tribunal may, after consulting the parties, conduct hearings and meetings al any location it considers appropriate, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Articles 18 (2) and 18 (3) provide that the Arbitral Tribunal may deliberate at any location it considers appropriate. (iu) Procedural Order No. 14, dated lZ .O7.2025 records that the main evidentiary hearing was held on 3.7 .2O25-lT .2.2025 at the IDRC, London. Procedural Order No.14 further records that the parties and the Tribunal held a Fourth Case ManagemenL Conference on 75.07.2025 to discuss matters including for the hearing for Oral Closing Submissions. The procedural Order also records that the Closing Hearing shall be held in person and the I 8 venue \ /ill be New Delhi, India pursuant to the joir - request of the parties. The dates for the Closing Hearing vere fixed on lO-16.I2.2025 u,ith 17.12.2025 as a reserved date. (v) The Arbitral Tribunal passed the Impr, 1 ned Procedural Order on 15.09.2025 changing the venue from Ne.,. Delhi To IDRC, London in the presence of the parties/thei. Counsel and re presentative s. (vi) Thc Tribunal sen[ an email to the parri: ;,/ thei r Counsel on 25.09.2025 referring to the impugned Procedr- I rl Order No. 15 and requested the parLies to confirm the bookin. ,[ the venue at IDRC, London for thc Closing Hearing hxed or-r LO-17.12.2025. (vii) Thc petitioner's counsel sent an emait to the Arbi[ral Tribunal on 26.9 .2025 stating that counsel is r vaiting further instructions from the petitioner since the petitione., being a Public Sector Undertaking, is required to undertake certai: administrative compliances in th is regard. (viii) The Wrir Petition was filed on 06.10.2,) )5. The Court granted interim protection to the petitioner on 07.1( . ).o25.

17. The above sequence of events is necessary i'r the context of the impugned Procedural Order and to Article 13 2) of the ICC Rules rvhich empotr/ers the Arbitral Tribunal to conrl rct hearings at t \ t 9 any location it deems fit unless othenaise aqreed bu the parti (underlined for emphasis)

18. The petitioner,s claimed resistance to the change of venue is not reflected from any of the events stated above. The absence of objection to IDRC, London, would lurther be reinforced by the fact that the petitioner attended the evidentiary hearing from 03.O7.2025 to 17.O7.2025 at IDRC, London. The petirioner,s email ot 26.9.2025, immediately after the impugned procedural Order also does not record any objection to the change of venue.

19. It is also relevant to refer to an exchange of messages between the Arbitrators and the petitioner,s counsel on 14.I2.2O24, whe re the petitioner's counsel agreed to Singapore as the preferred venue and made a specific reflerence to Hyderabad being unsuirable for that purpose. The petitioner,s counsel ends the conversation with the prelerred option of Singap ore and London messages lorms part of the counter filed by the respondents The exchange of

20. Hence, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner articulated its objection to IDRC London either before the impugned Procedural Order No.15 or even immediately after the said Order. The very fact that the peti[ioner expressed its inclination, through counsel, to Singapore or London as the venue in December 2O24 I i ! i 10 and attended the evidentiary hearing in July, 2025 at IDRC, London, woulcl considcrably dilute the petitioncr'; stand of IDRC, London being thrust upon the petitioner despitc r s reservation to thc choicc o[ venue.

21. The tcxt ol thc impugned Procedural Or I rr No.15 dated

15.O9.2025 records the petitioner's objection (rrs londent in the Arbitration) to Hyatt Rcgcncy, New Delhi and its -t:sponse to the lmperial, Nerv Dclhi. The impugned Proceclurerl )rder does not rccord any objectron b,r, or on behalf of the petit i, ner specifically rvith reg:rrd to IDRC, London. [n fact, paragr Lph 33 of the impugnecl Procerlural Order records Lhat " both pani 's aqree(dl' that the price charged by the Taj Mansingh, New Delh , fbr the Closing Hcaring datcs in Dcccmber 2025 is cost-prohibiti\, l Therefore, the petitioncr's allcgccl objcction to the shift of r t nue was only restricted to lhc thrce proposed hotels in New De llr . Significantly, the petitioner also did not raise the option of Hydr:x bad as a viable altcrnativc to Nen Delhr or even London in the \ ( eting held on t5.o9.2025.

22. There is also no communication produced l: show that the petitioner protested against the decision to hold lte hearings in IDRC, London, after thc impugned Procedural Or c er. In fact as stated abovc, the pe titioncr's email of 26.9.2025 is c thc contrary, t \ \ t 1,1, that is, the petitioner awaiting complcLion of administrative formalities

23. The above factors lead us to the considered view that the impugne d Procedural Order No. i 5 doe s not amoun[ to an exceplional or rare case warranting interference by the Writ Court in an ongoing arbitration. Is the Impusned Procedural Order No.15 dated 15.9 2025 Perverse?

24. [l is evident from the recordings in the impugned Procedural Order that the only point of discussion was whether the three proposed hotels in New Delhi would [-rt thc infrastructural requirements lor the Closing Hearing. The Arbitral Tribunal discussed the suitability of each of these hotels in detail including thc objecLions and response of the parties. Paragraph 31 gives a breakdown of costs for the venues, namely, Imperial Hotel, Hyatt Rejency, Taj Mansingh and concludes that the costs quoted for the three New Delhi venues are significantly higher than the price quoted by the IDRC, London.

25. Paragraph 32 further notes the addrtional costs required lor thc "Epiq" staff to travel to New Delhi. The Court is informed that trpiq is an agency providing evidence-assistance to the parties in the Arbitration. Paragraphs 33 and 34 reiterate that while Taj ,/ I t2 Mansingh is the only practicable solution/venu,: for the Closing Hearing, the asking-price of Taj Mansingh is 6 trr-r :s that of IDRC, London. Paragraph 35 records the Tribunal is r cnscious of the lravel costs of the rcpresenta[ives of the petitio _" rr bul that the closing submissions would essentially require t re presence of Counsel in person and aU the representatives of the clients may use the hybrid facilitv in London for following .l er proceedings. Paragraph 36 records the conclusion of the Tribrr ral to move the venue of thc Closing Hearing to IDRC in London.

26. The impugned Procedural Order is not opaq_1 r with regard to thc decision to shift thc vcnue from New Delhi t I IDRC, London. The Arbitral Tribunal givcs sufficient reasons for Ir : shift of venue, thc primary reason being that of IDRC bei I 1 cost-effectrve compared to Taj Mansrngh in Dclhi. perversit5r, e-., n on a broader understanding ol the rvord, signilies a decision wL i :h is unhrnged, in the sense of bcing removed lrom reasons a;r I evidence. A perverse order is one w,hcre the decision-making ar Lr hority comes to a conclusion without be ing tethered to the subm : sions made on behalf of the parties or maLerial relied on their be-t rlf. A perverse order must also be one u,hich dcfies logic and ( ( n tains reasons cxtraneous to the issue at hand. The impugned If rcedural Order cannot be held to be perverse vieu.ed within these p r 'ameters. I \ j, 13 ...]

27. The petitioncr's contention of the impugned order violating the mandate of equal treatment of parties under section 18 of the 1996 Act would also be belied from the contents of the impugned Procedural Order. The said order does not reflect any objection taken by the petitioner to IDRC, London or any unfair or unequal treatment being mcted out to the petitioner as compared lo lhe respondents. As stated above, the petitioner's participation in the evidentiary hearing in IDRC, l,ondon in July 2025 and the petitioner's Counsel's preference for London/ Singapore in December 2024 as a ve nue of the Arbitration would emasculate the argument of unfair treatment. The petitioner cannot contend that Lonclon was LhrusL upon the petitroner or caught the petitioner unawares

28. The facts and material placed before the Court lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the impugned Procedural Order No' 15 does not breach the benchmark of reasons or reasonabieness so as to amount to a perverse order. Consequentially, we also do not Iind any inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal to shift the venue from New Delhi to London

29. Section 2O(3) of the 1996 Act authorizes the Arbitral Tribunal to meet at any ptace it considers appropriate unless otherwise agreecl by the parties. Section 20(3) of the Act was interpreted in 14 Bharat Aluminium Compang u. Kaiser Aluminium r rchnical Seruices Inc.7 as section 20(3) enables the Tribunal to me et at any place for conducting hearings at a place of convenience. Ar icles 18 (2) and 18 (3) ol the ICC Arbitrarion Rute s, 2021 offe . the same legal position, that is, thc Arbitral Tribunal is free to de ride on a venue according to its convenience unless the parties c isagree to such choice. The same intention is mirrored in Clause ) of the terms of reference which have becn rcfcrred to in the above F lragraphs.

30. Enercon (hdia) Limited u. Enercon GM]) 15 carried the interpretation forward to hold that it is not m r rdatory for the Arbitral Tribunal to hold all irs meetings at tl : place of the Arbitration; meetings/ hearings can be held in a : ace other than the designated place of Arbitration cither lor the ct,r .i,enience of the Arbitral Tribunal or for the convenience of the p,r ties. The view taken in Enercon (India) Limited (supra) was reiter,r ed in BGS SGS Soma JV u. NHPC Limiteds. The primacy given to _. .e agreement of the parties in the choice of venuc would consequt rtly require an unequivocal objection raised by Lhe unwilling part-r -o the choice of venue. The objection must be evident from the naterial placed ' 1zotzl s scc sst '1zora1 s scc r ' 1zozo1 a scc z:a I t "\ 15 before the Court- The impugned Procedural Order does not record any such objection taken by the petitioner to IDRC, London. On the other hand, the pctitioner's mail immediately after the Procedural Order appears to be a tacit consent thereto.

31. The law on the subject of whether the Arbitral Tribunal has the authority to decide on a venue independent of the Seat/ Place of Arbitration, would further fortify the conclusion that the Arbitral ! Tribunal did not arrive at a perverse decision or act in excess of jurisdiction in choosing to shift the venue from New Delhi to [,ond on.

32. The inevitable conclusion from the undisputed facts and the law on the subject including the Terms of Reference and the ICC Arbitration Rules is that the impugned Procedural Order No.15 is not manifestly perverse so as to u,arrant interference under Article 226 of the Consritutiun. Does the Writ Petitioner have an Efficacious Alternative Remedv?

33. Section 16 of the 1996 Act deals with the competence of Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction. Sub-section (3) of section 16 provides a remedy to a party to take a plea that the Arbitral Tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority. The I 16 objection shall be raised as soon as the al :ged transgression occurs during the Arbitral proceedings 34' Section 16(5) requires thc Arbirrar rribu: rl to decide on the plea taken by the party under sub_section . ) but permits the arbitral proceedings to continue till making of ,t e Arbitral Au,ard if the Arbitral Tribunal rejects the plca takcn b1, t: : party. Section 16 (6) provides a remedy to the aggrieved partv to I ake an application for setting aside of the Arbitral Award in accorclr r r e ryith section 34 of the Act. Lnc Award in the

35. A rcading of the aforcsaid provisions r ould definitively indicate that a party to an arbitration has thc :,i rLuLory remedy to take an objection to the Arbitral Tribunal ..ting beyond its authority. The party has a further rcmcdy cl sceking recourse under section 34 of the Act for sctting asicie ,'r- event the Arbitral Tribunal reje<;ts the objer:tion i party. Therefore, the writ petitioner who cl;rims r the impugned Procedural Order, could hav(: avr r under section 16 (3) of thc Act complainir; lransgression of the bounds of thc Arbitral Tnl The petitioner could also have waited for thc ma i i Award in the event its plea/ application was 1 Arbitral Tribunal undcr section 16 (3) . The I r r bt: aggrieved by )lea taken by the of the alleged smissed by the u nal's authority. rd r>f the remedy rq ol' the Arbitral Lltioner howevcr t \ \ ? 71 chose to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India instead of availing of the statutory remedy.

36. We prefaced our decision by clarifying that the Writ Court has an extremely limited scopc of interfercnce in respect of arbitration matters and the interference is lurther restricted to rare and exceptional circumstances. The fact that the petitioner chose to give a go-by to an available eflicacious statutory remedy for challenging a Procedural Orcler demolishes the argument of maintainabili ty.

37. We accordingly reject the peLiLioner's contention that the petitioner is without a remedy and the Writ Court was the only forum available to the petitioner. The petitioner has also nol shown any exceptions as to why the Writ Court should entertain the Writ Petition despite an alLernative statutory remedy being available to the petitioner under the 1996 Act u'hich is a complete Code in itself. The Interim order dated 07.1O.2025

38. The order r.vas passed at the ad-inteim stage and was premised on the material placed by the petitioner. The documents disclosed by the respondents in their counter considerably changes the picture. The neu. facts brought to lhe notrce of the Court, l I 18 including of the petitioner participating in the evidr rtiary hearing in IDRC, London in July 2025, substantially transfo: ns the narrative u'hrch u,as prcsented to the Court on 07. I O.2O2S.

39. [t bears mention that the Court declinec the petitioner,s prayer for stay of the arbitration proceeding ar r rcquested the parties to explore Hyderabad or New Delhi as an r ternative venue for the closing Hearing. The interim order records hat the issue of maintainability shall be decided upon hearing of al. he parties. Conclusion:

40. Thus, the Court does not find any rationalc i r thc pctitioner invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Ar t :Ic 226 of the Constitution by jettisoning the staLutory remedl z uailablc to the petitioner. The Court accordingly finds the rou r taken by the petitioner to be without any basis and contrary Lo t rr- lqr6 O.,., well as the law settled on the subject. This is certai: ,\, r,rot a rare or exccptional case where the impugned proceclural Orc :r No.15 dated 15.19.2025 is worthy of intervention. The proccd r ral Order also does not suffer from manifest perwersity. 4I W.P.No.3O363 of 2O2S is accordingly dismisse,l on the ground of maintainability along with all connected app i :ations interim order dated 07.IO.2O2S stands vacated. The I a 19 I

42. The Court does not wish to entcr into thc other controversies raised by the parties, including whether the petitioner is attempting to derail the Arbitration since the order is restricted only to the aspect of maintainability. SD/_C. DEEpIKA A SISTANT REGTSTRAR /ffRUE COPY// SECTTON OFFICER JUSTT CE MOUSHUMI One fair copy to THE HON'BLE THE HONOURABLE BHATTACHARYA (For His LordshiP's Kind Perusal) AND THE HONOURABLE SRt LUdiTCC GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR SRI JUSTICE K. SARATH (For His LordshiP's Kind Perusal) { To,

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6. Two CD CoPies BM HIGH COURT DATED:2011112025 ORDER WP.No.30363 of 2025 2,, ,/1 ,1'f S i.q ; 1: (].: ,,) liDt"[M * (;pAt Ct\\ 'r ): C) r's 4i. DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS