Mohammed Nazeeruddin and three others v. The State of Telangana, rep. by its Public

Order

This Crirninal Petition has been filect under Section 4a2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ig73 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') by the petitioners, who were arrayed as accused N9".1 to 4, seeking to quash the proceeclirrgs in S.C. Sp1.No.227 of 2Ct22 on the file of the Special Sessions Judge for 'lrial of sc/sr (PoA) Act cases-ctrrn-Additional Sessions Judge court at Nargonda (hereinafter: referred to

2. Heard Mr.Tarun G. Reddy, learned r:ounsel for the petitioners, Mr.M.vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, appearing on beharf of respondent No.1- \ \ \ \. 2 State and Mr.K.Buchi Babl. , learned corlnsel, representing Mr.Polakatla Babu Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

3. Brief facts of the case:

3. 1 . On 02 .O9 .2022 , respondent No.2 lodged a written complaint at Kodad Town Police Station, wherein he stated the Governrnent had alienated a vacant land adrneasuring 24O square yards in Sy. No.360 of Tharnarabandapalern Village, Kodad Town, in the year 1998, under the quota for poor scheduled caste artists. Since then, he has been in peaceful possession of the said land and had constmcted a srnall room with stone boundaries and on 09.06.2022 at about 14:30 hours, petitioner Nos.l to 4 herein, crirninally trespassed into his land, picked up a quarrel with hirn, abused hirn in derogatory caste-based filthy language, and threa.tened hirn witlr dire conseqlrences. Further on 1a.O6.2O22, while he was working at the said land, the police of Kodad Town took him to the station, where the Circle Inspector of Police and Sub-Inspector of Police instructed hirn not to enter the land r.rntil further orders. During the night of the sarne d.y, the petitioners allegedly damaged his room, fencing, and J construction rnaterials and caused loss 1-o a tune of Rs.2,OO,OOO/-. Basing on the above said conrplaint, Crime No.32O of 2022 was registered on O2.O9 .2022 for the offences punishable under Sections 448, 427, 5O4 and 506 r/w 34 of the tndian Penal Code, 1860 (for short'the IPC) and Sections 3(1)(r)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SCs/STs (POA) Arnendment Act, 20 15 (for short 'the t\ct'). The Investigatir-r.g Officer after conducting investigation filed final report for the offences under Sections +27, 5O4 and 506 r/rn,3z[ of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Act.

4. Subrnissions of learned corrnsel for the petitioners:

4.L l-earned counsel submitted that the petitioners krave not cornrnitted any offence and they harr€, not abused respondent. No.2 in the name of his caste and he has falsely irnplicated the petitioners as accused Nos.1 to 4 with an intent.ion to resolve the civil disputt:s, which are pending between hirn and accused No.1 and others before civil Court. He further subrnitted that even :r.ccording to the cornplainl-, the alleged offence has tal:en place orr

09.06.2022 and 18.06.2022, whereas, respondent No.2 lodged tLre complaint on O2.O9.2O22 after' lapse of rnore \ \ \ \ 4 than two rnonths, without giving any reasons for the said delay. He also submitted that even according to the allegations rnade in the complaint and charge sheet, the ingredients for the offences levelled against the petitioners do not attract. 4-2 He further submitted that accused No.1 is owner and possessor of the land admeasuring O- 10 guntas in Sy.No.36l, O-21 guntas in Sy.No.364, 145 square yards in Sy.No.36O, 399 square yards in Sy.No.364, 242.66 square yards in Sy.No.361/A along witkr open house plots bearing Nos.6-14 and 7-LL2 in Kodad Mandal and the sarne were acquired through various registered Sale Deeds. When respondent No.2 and two others are trying to interfere with the said property, petitioner No.1 had filed suit in O.S. No.156 of 2022 before the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kodad against them for grant of perpetual injunction, restraining them from interfering with tLre suit schedule property. Along with the said surit, petitioner No.l filed I.A.No.79 of 2022 for grant of ad interirn injunction and the learned Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kodad was pleased to grant ad interim injunction oo 26.07 .2022 and the sarrre was extended frorn tirne to time. Flowever, the said I.A. --.---_-+^ 5 was disrnissed on 10.1 1.2025 and the rnain suit is pending.

4.3 He also subrnitted that respondent lrlo.2 clairning rights over the property to an extent of 24O square yards covered by Sy.No.36O basing upon the allegeC assignrnent patta, dated Oi.O1.1998, said to have been issued by the then Manctal Revenue Officer, Kodad. On t8.1O.2022, the Mandal Rr:v'enue Officer, Kodad Mandal altcr conducting enquiry, surbmitted a report to the Sr.b-Div. sionai Poiice Officer, Ko<lad, wherein it is stated that i-hr: assignrnent patta was not granted in favour of respondent No.2 and the said lancl is, covered with bushes. Hence, resltondent No.2 is not having any right to clairn the said property- To resolve thr: civil dispute, which is pending between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 ra-nd others, respondent No.2 filed the present cornplair-rt by giving different colour', though the nature of allegations levelled in the complaint is purely civil in nature.

4.4 He further submitted that even according to the allegations rnade in the complaint and in the c:harge sheet, the alleged allegations of abusing respondent No.2 in the rrarne of his caste were not in the public view and \ t \ \ 6 i' ': respondent No.2 has not specifically rnentioned in the complaint that there are any other member of public at the tirne of incident in tkre scene of offence, except LW.2, who is son of LW.1, and LWs.3 & 4, who are close friends of LW.2. Therefore, the ingredients for the offence under Sections 3(1)(r)(s) do not attract.

4.5 He further subrnitted that the ingredients for other offences under Sections 427, 5O4 and 506 of IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the Act are also not rnade out on the ground that respondent No.2 is not having any right over the property and basing upon the alleged assignment patta, he is trying to interfere with the possession of petitioner No.1, especially Tahsildar in his report, dated

18.1O.2022, specifically stated that no patta was granted in favour of respondent No.2. Therefore, no question arises of there being any acts of rnischief being undertaken by the petitioners, as there was no property or stmcture belonging to respondent No.2, which can be darnaged by the petitioners. Hence, tLre ingredients for the offences rrnder Sections 427, 5O4 and 506 of IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the Act are also not attract and therefore, continuation of the proceedings against tkre petitioners is 7 ciear abuse of process of law and the same is liable to be quashed.

4.6 In support of his contentions, he r-elied upon the following judgments/orders of the Hon'lcle Apex Court and this Court; i) Hitesh Verrna v. State of Uttaraktrand and anottrerll ii) Pradnya Pradeep l(enkare and anotl.er v. State of Matrarashtra2; iiil Parayitarn Anand Sharma v. The State of Telangana and another (Order dated 23.LO.2O25 passed by this Court in Crirninal Petition No.6444 of 2ol231; iw) State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others3; v) Salib alias Stralu alias Salirn v" State of U.p. and othersa; vi) Pararnjeet Batra v. State of Uttaraktrand and otherss; vii) Naresh I{urnar and another v. State of t (2020) 10 scc 7 r0 , 2005(3) SCC Ont.inc Bombay 574 3 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335 | 42023 SCCOnline scg+7 1 s (2013) 11 SCC 673 .: i i I t I \ 8 ) I{arnataka and another6l viii| Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and anotherT; ix| Indian Oil Corporation w. NEPC India Lirnited and otherssl x) Motrarnrned Azhar I(han v. State of Telangana (Order dated L2.Oa.2O25 passed by this Court in Criminal Petition No.4927 of 2o251.

5. Subrnission of learned counsel for respondent No.2:

5.1 Per corttra, learned cotrnsel for respondent No.2 subrnitted that respondent No-2 is owner and possessor of the property to an extent of O-O2 guntas equivalent to 24O square yards covered by Sy.No.36O situated at Tharnrnarabandapalem, Kodad Mandal and the same was acquired through assignrnent patta granted by the then Mandal Revenue Officer, Kodad, uide No.B/7O /L998, dated O1.O1.1998 and since then he has been in possession and enjoyrnent of the said land and constructed one srrlall roorn with rock bourndaries. Wtren petitioner No.l is trying to interfere with the said property, respondent No.2 had filed,__ 62024 SCC Online SC 268 7 (2019) 14SCC.2O7 8 [2006) 6 scc 736 9 a srrit irr O.S. No.248 of 2022, on the file of l.he Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kodad., for grant of perpet.riil injunction restraining him f,rorn interfering with the said property. Along vvith thc said suit, he also filed I.A. No.133 of 2022 for grant o1l acl- interim injunction, wherein the said Court granted ad-ir-rlerirr injunction order in his favour and the sarrre is continuing till date. When petitioner No.1 without having any rnanner of right over the said property is trying to trespass upotl the sarrre, respondent No.2 obstructed hirn. At that stage, petitioners/accused No.l to 4 have abused hirn in the narrre of his caste by using filthy language. -fhere are specific allegations levelled against the petitioners in the complaint to attract the ingredients for the offences levelled against them. The Investigating Officer after- recording the staternents of LWs.1 to 6 f-rled a final report, wherein the role of each pt:titioner was specifically mentioned. The above said in.cident has occurred in the public view. Hence, the ingredients for the offences under Sections 3(l)(r)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Act and other offenc'es under Sections 427, 5O4 and 506 of IPC are attracted against the petitioners.

5.2 He furtkrer subrnitted that the injunction order t '---! \ \ l0 granted in favour of petitioner No.1, dated 26.07.2022, irr I.A.No.79 of 2022, subsequently vacated and the said application was disrnissed on 10.11.2025, and he is not having any right to clairn tLre property of respondent No.2. He further submitted that the alleged report, dated

18.1O. 2022 submitted by the Tahsildar, Kodad Mandal, to the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Kodad, is not binding Lrpon respondent No.2 on the ground that he submitted the said report without issuing any notice or opportunity to respondent No.2 behind his back. Even according to the said report, the land covered by Sy.No.36O is a Government land. Hence, petitioner No.l is not having any right to claim the property covered by Sy.No.36O. The petitioners have raised several disputed facts in the present Criminal petition and the sarne have to be adjurdicated and decided by the trial Court after full-fledged trial. Hence, the Criminal Petition filed by the petitioners is liable to be dismissed. Analysis:

6. Having considered the rival subrnissions made by the respective parties and after perusal of the rnaterial available on record, it reveals ttrat petitioner No.1 is 1l clairning righrts o\rer the property i.e. land adn:r<:asuring O- 10 guntas in Sy. No.36 1 , O-21 guntas in S5'.lYo -364, 145 square yar<1s in Sy.No.36O, 399 square yards in Sy.No.364, 242 squaro yards in Sy.No.36L / A alons rx,ith open krouse plots bearing Nos.6-14, 7-ll2 in Kodad Manda1 stating that he prrrchased the same from various docurnents. Wkrereas respondent No.2 is claiming right-s over the property to an extent of O-O2 guntas eqrrivalent to 24O square yzrrcls covered by Sy.No.36O situated at Thammarabandapalem, Kodad Mandal p\rrsLrant to the Assignmenl- Patta Certificate, dated O1.O1.199[J, issued by the then Mir-ndal Revenue Officer, Kodad.

7. The record reveals that petitioner No.l filed suit in O.S.No. I 56 of 2022 against respondent No.2 and two others for grant of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants therein frorn interfering with the :;uit schedule property. Flven according to bothr the parties, thre property clairned by respondent No.2 was also included in the suit schedule pr-operty as itern Nos.3 and 5. In the said suit, learned Additional Junior Civil Judge, Korlzrd, initially granted interirn injunction in I.A.No.79 ,lf 2022 on

26.07 .2022 and subsequently, vacated tht: same and \ \ \ t 12 dismissed the said application in I.A.No.79 of 2022 on ,r__)

10.11 .2025.

8. The record further reveals that respondent No.2 had also fiied suit in O.S.No.24B of 2C,22 on the file of the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kodad, against petitioner No.1 for grant of perpetual injunction restraining hirn frorn interfering with the property i.e. House site to an extent of O-O2 guntas equivalent to 242 square yards in Sy.No.36O, situated at Tarnmarabandapalem Revenue Village, Kodad Mandal, Suryapet District, wherein ad-interim injunction order was granted in I.A.No.133 of 2022. According to the learned counsel for respondent No.2, the said ad interirn injunction order is still subsisting.

9. The core contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Tahsildar, Kodad Mandal in his report, dated 18.1O.2O22, stated that no assignrnent patta was granted in favourr of respondent No.2 and there are rro constmctions in the said property claimed by respondent No.2 and the same was covered with bushes and trees. Hence, respondent No.2 is not having arry right to clairn the property basing r- pon alleged. assignment patta, d.ated. O1.O1.1998. Whereas the case of respondent No.2 is that '-i I t t3 the then Tahsildar, Kodad Mandal subrnitted a report to the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Kodad on 1 8. 1 O.2O22 without issuing any notice to hirn and the said report is not binding upon hirn. Even according to tkre said report of the then Tahsildar, the land covered by Sy.No.36O is a Government land and petitioner No. 1 is not having any right to clairn the property covered by Sy.No.360. Whether petitioner No.1 is traving right over the prope;:ty covered by Sy.No.36O and wLrether, basing on the report subrnitted by the Tahsildar, dated 18.06.2022, respondent No.2 is not having any right to clairn the property based on the assignment patta, dated O 1.O 1. 1998; and whether the report, dated 18.1O.2022, of the Tahsildar, Kodad Mandal is binding upon respondent No.2 or not, this Court is not inclined to deal with the above said aspects jn the present Crirninal petition on the ground that the suit filed by the petitioner No.1 in O.S. No.156 of 2022 and the sr- it filed by respondent No.2 in O.S.No.248 of 2022 are perrding before the competent civil Court. The parties have to establish their possession over their properties by adducing necessary evidence under law. Especially the scope of the Crirninal Petition is very limited.

4.. t\ 14 10 Even according to the allegations made in the complaint, the alleged incidents were occurred on

09.06-2022 and L8.O6.2O22. However, respondent No.2 has lodged the cornplaint after iapse of rrrore than two months from the date of alleged incident and respondent No.2 has not given any specific reasons for the said delay 1 1. It is relevant to rnention that in Hasrnukhlal D. Vora v. State of Tarnil Nadue, the Hon'ble Apex Court rn hile referring the judgment in Bijoy Singh v. State of Biharro held that inordinate and unexplained delay if not reasonably explained can be fatal to the case of prosecution.

72. The record further reveals that as per the cornplaint, the alleged allegation of abusing respondent No.2 was took place in the land covered by Sy.No.36O as clairned by respondent No.2. It is not the case of respondent No.2 that there was any member of the public at the tirne of incident in the said place, except LW.2, who is none other than his son, and LWs.3 and 4, who are close friends of LW.2. Taking into consideration the allegations made in the e (2022) 15 SCC 164 to (2002)9sccr47 t5 cornplaint and the charge sheet, it reveals tlrat the basic ingredient that the words uttered "in any place within public vie\ r" is not rnade out.

13. In Hitesh Verma supra, the Hon'ble Suprerne Court held that where the alleged abusive words were uttered inside a private premises with no public present, the mandatory requirernent of "public view" is not satisfied, and further: observed that allegations ari.sir-rg or-rt of a. property or possession dispute already pencling before civil courts do not, by themselves, attract the pror,isions of the Act urnless the abuse is shown to be solely on the ground of caste- Sirnilarly, in Pradnya Pradeep Kenkare sttpra, the Bornbay High Court held that an offence uncler Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act is not made out where rhe FIR does not allege that the pr-rrported insrrlt occurred "within public vie'w," and clarified that this ingredient requires both a place accessible to the putrlic and the presence of rnernbers of the public who could see or hear the alleged act.

14. In Sandhya Dwivedi w. State of U.P. and anotherll supra, the Allahabad High Court observecl that for an rt2025 SCC Online A11 1512 \ \ \ 16 offence under the SC/ST Act to be rnade out, the alleged insult must be caste-specific, intentional, and made in a place within public view. Since the a1leged. caste-based. abuses occurred inside the accused's house, in the presence of the complainant's wife and brother-in-law who could not be treated. as members of the public the essential ingredient of "public view" was missing. The Court also found that the dispute appeared. to arise frorn institutional rrranagernent issues rather than caste anirnosity. Accordingly, it quashed the proceedings under Sections 3(1)(Dha) and 3(2)(va) of tkre SC/ ST Act against the applicant while aliowing the trial to proceed for the remaining IPC offences.

15. In Ramesh Chandra Vaishya supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ ST Act to be made orrt, the alleged insult must be caste-specific, intentional, and made in a. place within public view. Since the alleged. abuse occurred in a private setting without reference to caste or public presence, the essential ingredients of the offence were rnissing. Finding rao credible evidence even for the IPC charges under Sections 323 and 5O4, the Court quashed ttre criminal proceedings as a.n abuse of process. ,/1/ l7

16. The above rnentioned principles rlre squarely applicable to the present case, as the cornplaint does not disclose that the arleged caste-based insults; on o9.o6.2022 were rnade in any place "within public view" and the essential ingredient is not made out to attract the provisions <>f the Act.

17. In Salib supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Co rrt held that when an accursed seeks quashing of an lrlFl or crirninal proceedings under section 482 cr.P.c or Artir:lc 226 of the constitutiore on the gror-nd ttrat the prosecurtion is frivolous, vexatiorls, or motivated by personerl vengeance, the court nlrst adopt a careful and penetr:rting approach. It ernphasised that complainants driven by ulte;:-ior motives may draft FIRs in a rnanner that superficially satisfies the ingredients of the alleged offences, and therefcrre the court cannot confine itself to the averrnents in the FIR alone. Instead, it must also consider the srrrrounding circurnstances, the sequence of events, and rnaterials collected during investigation, including fzrctor-s such as the frling of rnultiple FIRs, to deterrnine wLrether the crirninal lavy is being misused. Applying these principles, the Hon'ble suprerne court set aside the I{igh court,s order and quashed the crirninal proceedings arising frorn \ l8 FIR No. 175 of 2022 dated 11-O8-2O22, holding that the case reflected abuse of process. The principle laid down in the above judgernent is fully applicable to the present case, as the FIR appears to krave been lodged in the backdrop of a civil dispute, suggesting a possible rnotive of vengeance that reqrrires the Court to scrutinize the attending circumstances beyond the bare allegations.

18. In Paramjeet Batra supra, the Hon'bie Supreme Court held that the High Court rnust exercise its inherent powers rrnder Section 4A2 Cr.P.C sparingly, but should not hesitate to quash crirninal proceedings when a dispute that is essentially civil in nature is given a crirninal colour, particularly when a civil remedy is already available and invoked. This principle was reaffirrned in Naresh Kumar supra, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that proceedings of a civil character should not be allowed to rnasquerade as crirninal cases. Further, the Hon'ble Suprerne Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P.12 held that the crirninal process cannot be used as a tool of harassrnent, and in Usha Chakraborty v. State of I[est BengaFa reiterated that civil disputes clothed as crirninal tz (2021) t4 scc626 t3 2023 SCC Online SC 90 t9 offences can be qr-rashed under Section 4a2 to prevent abuse of 1:rocess

19. tt is settled law that the nrere pende,ncy of a civil dispute does not, by itself, bar the filing of a criminaf complaint. provided the allegations genurinel-y disclose the essential ingredients of the penal offences. However, applying the principles laid down in the above said judgrnent, it is evident that the present- ()ase does not satisfy thc statutory ingredients of the offences alleged, and the dispute between the parties is essentially civil in nature. Wlren a civil dispute is rnerely clothed in a crirninal" garb without attracting the core elements trf tLre offence, continuation of the criminal proceedings amounts to an abuse of process and warrants quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

20. In Vikram Johar supra, the Hon'ble Suprerne Court clarified that offences under Sections 5O3, 5O4 and 506 IPC require strict satisfaction of their essential ingredients. Crirninal intirnidation und.er Sections 5O3/5O6 dernands a threat made with the intention to cause alarm, and rnere abusive language d.oes not rneet this requirernent. Similarly, &S reiterated. from Fiona Shrikhande v. State of \ \L \ t 20 Maharashtral4, Section 5O4 is attracted only when an intentional insult is of such gravity that it is likely to provoke a breach of peace. Referring to Manik Taneja v. State of Karnatakals, the Hon'ble Suprerne Court held that even strong or abusive remarks, including those posted on social media; d.o not constitute criminal intirnidation in the absence of material showing an intention to cause al.arm. In the present case, the allegations do not disclose any such intention or elements required under Sections 5O4 and 506 IPC, and therefore the ingredients of crirninal intimidation are not rnade out.

21. In Indian Oil Corporation supra, ttle Hori'lcle Supreme Court clarified that "rnischief' under Section 425 IPC requires a clear intention or knowledge of cau.sing wrongfr-rl loss, coupled with destmction or alteration of property that diminishes its value or utility. The Hon'lcle Supreme Court ernphasised that ownership is irrelevant mischief rnay be committed even against one's own property if the statutory ingredients are ftrlfilled. Conversely, in Mohammad Azhar Khan supra, the High Coqrt of 'lelangana held that rvhere ttre d.ispute between the parties is essentially civil in nature r+ (1013) t4scc44 rs i2015) 7 scc 423 2l and possession is already recognised by a civil court through an injunction, allegations of trespass or darnage to property czrnnot sustain criminal charges under Sections 447 or 421' IPC. Applying threse principles t() the case on hand, it. is observed that in the absence of any rnaterial showing interrtional destrtrction or alteration of property causing wrongful loss, the essential ingredients of the offence of mischief under Section 425 IPC a.re not rnade out ir-r the present case.

22. In Inder Mohan Goswarni supra, the Flor-r'ble Supreme Court helC that though the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC are wide, they rnust be exercised sparingly and with caution. The Court otrserved that crirninal prosecution should not be used as a rneans of harassment, private vendetta, or to pressurize ttre accused and quastring is justified only wtren clearly rvarranted by law and pt'ecedent.

23. It is ,already stated sr. pra, the entire allegations made in tkre cornplaint are in respect of property disputes, pending between respondent No.2 and petitioner No.1, especially they filed two civil suits i.e. O.S.Nos.156 of 2022 filed by petitioner No.l and O.S.no.248 of 2022 filed by \ .\ i ( I l 22 respondent No.2, which are pending before the competent civil Court.

24. ln Bhajan Lo.l supra, the Hon1cie Suprerrre Court, after reviewing the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C and earlier precedents on the exercise of inherent powers under Section 4a2 Cr.P.C and extraordinar5r jurisdiction under Article 226, identified illustrative categories of cases in which courts rnay justifiably intervene to prevent abuse of process or to secrtre the ends of justice. These include situations where: (i) even accepting the FIR or complaint at face value, no offence is disclosed; (ii) the F-lR and accompanying rnaterial do not reveal a cogrrizable offence warranting police investigation; (iii) r- ncontroverted allegations and supporting rnaterial fail to establish any offence; (iv) the allegations disclose only a non-cognizable offence, attracting the bar under Section 155(2) Cr.P.C; (") the accusations are absurd or inherently irnprobable; (vi) there exists a legal bar to the proceedings or an efficacious statutory rernedy is availa-ble; and (vii) the proceedings are tainted with rnala fides or instituted rnaliciously to wreak vengeance or settle personal scores. I I I 23

25. In vierv of the settled principles laid d.orvn in Bhajan Lal supra, the present case sqr-rarely falls within the categories warranting interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Even assuming the allegations at face value, the essential ir:,gredients of the offences alleged ilre not made out; the dispute is predominantly civil in nature; and the attending circurnstances indicate that the crirninal process has been invoked inappropriately.

26. Por the foregoing reasons as well as lhe principles laid down in the above mentioned judgments supra, this Court is (lf considered view that contingation of the proceedings in S.C. Spl.No.227 of 2022 against the petitioners wor.rld arnounts to abuse of process of law and it is a fit c:tse to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Section 482 of cr.P.c. to quash the proceedings against the petitioners and liable to be quashed.

27. Irr the result, the crirninal Petition is allowed. The proceedings in S.c. Spl.No.227 of 2022 on the frle of the Special Sessions Judge for Triar of scs/ srs (poA) Act cases-cum-Additional Sessions Judge court at Nargonda, against the petitioners are hereby quashed. It is made clear thrat any of the observations rnade in this order are \ / ( 24 only confined for the purpose of deciding this case As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if &oy, pending in tlris petition stand closed. SD/- U.SUDHA ASSISTANT REGISTRAR 6 SECTION OFFICER //TRUE COPY// ONE FAIR COPY T.9 T!.IE HONOUR+ELE SRI JUSTICE J SREENIVAS RAO (For His Lordship tina Feru;;ii---.,' To, l,-) I I I cum Additionar sessions iJoge c;;rt ;iilrrgono"

1. The Special Sessions Judqe for Trial of SC/ST (poey Act Cases 2. 11 LR Copies 3 l[:,r1:fl,T*.8:ffi,!r", Union of tndia Ministry of Law, Justice and Company :$[1i;ii"Jexr],,Ufl tliff,Hglff ,f;:""ifi1"r:,.J3:T,Highcourtrorthe 5. The station Hiuse omJer, potic" strtio:n, r"iri'i"wn, suryapet District. 6. Two ccs to the puBlrc pnosecuToR, Hig-h c"rrt at Hyderabad. (oUT) 7. One CC to SRt TARUN C. n-e DDV Advocate tOpUCl 8. Two CD Copies J lr8 TPK/NVB HIGH COURT DATED i2811112425 q 3 $E1 S Ii '3 0t[ ?t?1 C) * '-.lr'.1t1 !-''A ?: ORDER CRLP.No.11745 of 2423 CRIMINAL PETITION IS ALLOWED a a{