Venishetty Kavitha,, Wo v. Mahesh Kumar, Age

Heard Smt. R. Madhavi Latha, learned counsel for the appellant ,rn the question of admission. Perused the record

2. The second appeal is filed aggrieved by the judgment and decree on the file of the learned I Additional District Judge at Medak confirming the judgment and decree dated 25.O4.2023 in O.S.No.73 of 2O18 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge at Medak, wherein, the suit filed by the appellant herein seeking perpetual injunction is dismissed.

3. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant herein is claiming to be owner and possessor of land in Sy.No.248l4 to an extent of ,1c.2.06% Gts., bounded by East: Residential School, West: Agr::cultural land of K. Tirupathi, North: Road, South: Agricultural land of K. Anantha Ramireddi, situated near Residential School, Medak Municipality, Medak Town and District. V/ith respect to title, the appellant submitted that originally I{. Janardhan Reddy owned the suit schedule property and then sold it to T. Satish and another through registered sale I 2 deed document No.9 of 1995, dated O3.01.1995. Thereafter, said T. Satish and another sold the suit schedule property to the appellant vide registered sale deed document No. lO23 of 1999, dated 25.1O. 1999. Ever since, the appellant is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule land. She also availed agricultural loan from Indian Bank, Medak by keeping the title deed as collateral security. The respondents are in real estate business. The said respondents r.t ithout any right or interest have interfered with the appellant's possession over the suit schedule land taking advantage of her absence near the suit schedule property. The appellant is living in Hyderabad for her childrens' education and therefore, not residing locally. The respondents approached the appellant demanding to sell the land, failing which, they would grab the same. The suit schedule property is located in a prime place in the centre of Medak. On 02.10.2018, the respondents with antisocial elements tried to dispossess the appellant and she resisted the sarne with great difficulty and filed the suit to protect herself from being dispossessed from the suit land.

4. The respondent No.2 filed written statement which is adopted by respondent No.1 as well. The case of respondents is / ./ v-2 ,t a J that the appellant does not have any land in her possession in Sy.No.24tll4 adrneasuring Ac.2.O6% Gts. The land of respondent No.2 is l<lcated on the western side of land of the appellant's land. The respondent No.2 called upon the appellant to prove her title originating from M. Janardhan Reddy and then T. Satish and another. The respondents denied making attempts to interfere ',vith the possession of the appellant and have never tried to grab the suit schedule property. The cause of action on

02.10.2018 is concocted only for the purpose of filing the suit. Further, according to respondent No.2, he owns land in Sy.No.248 /415A25 to an extent of Ac.O.08 Gts. and Sy.No.248/3lE to an extent of Ac.O.02 Gts., total of Ac.O.1O Gts. in Medak'lown bounded on East: Land of the appellant, West: 2O ft. road, l\orth: Agricultural land of C. Pochaiah and South: Agricultur,a.l land of Anantha Ram Reddy. The respondent No.2 has RoR l B and pattadar pass book and title with respect to his Ac.O.1O Gt.s of land. According to respondent No.2, the appellant with a miilafide intention to grab his land filed a false suit. Further, there is no ground for making the respondent No.1 as a party to tlee suit and his presence amounts to mis-joinder of \ 4 ( parties. The respondent No.2 is in possession of his own land and the suit lacks merits.

5. On the basis of the pteadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues:

1. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property on the date of filing of the suit?

2. Whether the defendant tried to interfere into the possession of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property?

3. Whether plaintiff is entitled for perpetual injunction against the defendant as prayed for?

4. To what relieP

6. The appellant/plaintiff got examined herself as PWl and her son as PW2. Further, she exhibited Exs.Al to A5. The respondents got examined DWs 1 and 2 and got marked Exs-Bl to B.24.

7. Upon hearing the case of both the counsels, the Trial Court made an extensive discussion about the insufficient Court fee paid to meet the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Senior Civil Court and arrived at a conclusion that said defect can be cured by directing the appellant to increase the valuation of the suit to / meet the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Senior Civil Court and then l i ; _") 5 to pay the deficit Court fee. Thereafter, the Trial Court proceeded to examirre the case of the appellant referring to the Exs.Al to A5.

8. The major lacuna found by the Trial Court with respect to the case c,f the appellant is that as per pleadings, the appellant claimed her land to be located in Sy.No.248l4 to an extent of Ac.2.O6% Gts. within specific boundaries whereas respondent No.2 clainred his land to an extent of Ac.O.10 Gts. situated in Sy.No.248l4l5A25 to an extent of Ac.O.O8 Gts. and Sy.No.248l3lV to an extent of Ac.0.O2 Gts., which is on the western sjde of land of the appellant. It is held that there is failure on the part of the appellant to prove possession over the suit .schedule property. There is a major discrepancy about the evidence of the appellant with respect to location of the suit schedule ltroperty which according to Ex.A4 MeeSeva copy of pahani for the fasli 1420, dated O2.O2.2O18 shows the survey number as 248/4-5 e9 22 whereas Exs.Al to A3 show the location of land of appellant in Sy.No.248l4.The market value certificate/Ex.A5 also shows the suit survey number as in Ex.A4 i.e., Sy.No.248 /4-5@22. There is no explanation to this \ 6 ('l discrepancy between Ex.A1 to A3 and Ex.A4 as to survey number of the suit schedule property.

9. The Trial Court entertained genuine doubt about the appellant's identity of suit schedule property.-The sarne doubt was entertained by the First Appellate Court as well. tt is held that the appellant failed to show her possession over the suit schedule property and went to the extent of entertaining doubt that the appellant may be trying to encroach the land of respondent No.2. tt is held that mere existence of title does not prove possession, more so, when the appeltant herself is claiming to be residing in Hyderabad. In that sequence of assessment of fact situation, the Trial court entertained doubt about the genuineness of cause of action on o2.lo.2ol8 as there is no supporting evidence except the self-serving oral evidence of the appellant as PWl and her son as PW2. Further, a doubt is entertained about the possession of appellant over the suit schedule property as only pahani for the fasli 1420 is filed, but, none from lggg onward.s to show the possession. It is held that except for filing the title deeds in the form of registered sale deeds, pattadar pass book, market value certificate and MeeSeva copy of pahani for the fasti L42o only, no credible evidence is / .// 7 produced':o prove possession. Consequently, the Trial Court held that there is failure to show possession over the suit schedule property, interference on 02.1O.2O18 and therefore, the relief of perpetual ;njunction is denied

10. The rsame factual findings are given by the First Appellate Court. In addition to the aforementioned findings, the First Appellate Oourt also arrived at a conclusion that when there is a boundary dispute between the appellant and respondent No.2 and there is a question about the extent of plaintiff's land of Ac.2.O6Yz ,3ts. within the boundaries stated, a simple suit for injunction is not maintainable. The First Appellate court also arrived at ;l conclusion that there was difficulty in identification of suit schLedule property within the boundaries stated by the appellant and therefore, she cannot seek equitable relief of perpetual i:rjunction. There is also reference to the discrepancy in the survey number of suit schedule land as the plaintiff is seeking perpetual injunction with respect to land in Sy.No.248l4 whereas tL.e survey numbers of land of respondent No.2 are 2481415A25 and 24813 /E As such, the First Appellate Court also dismisised the Appeal giving rise to the filing of present i i l i I I ,l ! I I I I I I I I I I i l l : 8 e) Second Appeal with proposed following substantial questions of law: I. That the learned First Appellate Court miserably failed to exercise the appellate jurisdiction in proper prospective and simply endorsed by reiterating the view of the Trial Court without considering the facts and circumstances, basing on arguments of the appellant the points raised were not addressed at all, amounts to serious jurisdictional error on the part of the First Appellate Court causing prejudice to Appellant/PlaintifL> TI That the Court below not appreciated the evidence of PW- I of the registered sale deed consisting of the boundary of the suit schedule property in fact it has observed error of the defendant boundary without there being any document, both the Courts below erred in observing the defendants not proved that they have not interfered and no such sale deed which was not submitted before the Court below? III Whether the Court below and the appellate Court the documents filed by the defendants in filing only pahanies and pattedar pass book except the same, not a single document of evidence is filed to show the boundaries of the defendant suit schedule property. That the defendant encroaching the land of the appellant herein having every possibilit5r as the appellant proved in showing her boundaries therefore the defendants interfering be proved? IV That the Court below on assumptions and surmises of the facts and without considering the evidence filed by the appellant had dismissed the suit? 9 V Whether the observation of Court below in Poona Ram Vs. Moti Ram (died) through LRs and others, 2Ol9(21 ALD 64 (SC) against the appellants herein is valid? 1 1. Among the above substantial questions of law, the question at Sl.No.t is in the nature of a question raised before a First Appellate Court and cannot be categorized as a substantial question of lau,. The question at Sl.No.II is an issue about the finding of fact given by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court about corrrmon boundary existing between the land of appellant and respo:rdent No.2 and failure on the part of the appellant to prove interference when there are concurrent findings of fact by both the 'frial Court and Appellate Court. In the absence of demonstration of perversity, this Court cannot venture to examine ttre appropriateness of findings as to existence of border dispute or failure to prove interference as a third Trial court.

12. The r;ubstantial question of law at SI.No.III is about non- filing of any document by the respondent to show a common boundary. On this aspect both the Trial Court and the First Appellate C)ourt have already given a finding that there is failure on the part of the appellant to prove interference. This Court as a c\ouct of Sr-'cond Appeal cannot venture to examine a finding of l0 F, fact and therefore, cannot consider said question. The substantial question of law at Sl.No.IV is frivolous and cannot be categorized as a substantial question of law. The substantial question of law at SI.No.V is about whether or not the application of the judgment in Poona Ram Vs. Moti Ram (died) through LRs and others, 2Ol9(2) ALD 64 (SC), is valid or not. It is for the appellant to demonstrate that there is failure on the part of the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court in proper application of the citation vis-a-vis, the facts of the present case. In the absence of any other ground, mere examination of a citation as to its applicability cannot be taken up in a Second Appeal.

13. [n view of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of India in Hemavathi v. V. Hombegowdar, only substantial questions of law can be taken into consideration in a Second Appeal filed under Section 1OO of CPC.

74. The above discussion about the facts of the case and the findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court coupled with the examination of proposed substantial questions of law show that there are no grounds to interfere with the findings of the ' lzozsl s scc 442 I, IIIt 1l Trial Cou::t and the First Appellate Court i.e. the Second Appeal lacks merits ernd is liable to be dismissed.

15. In ttre result, the Second Appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this second appeal, shall stand closed. \ //TRUE COPY// SD/- A. PRATHIMA DEPUry REGISTRAR 6 SECTION OFFICER To, 1' The r Ad'Jr- District and Sessions Judge, at Medak. (with records, if any) 2. The Senior Civil Judge, at Medak. 3. One CC to Smt. R. MJOhavi Latha, Advocate tOpUCI 4. Two CD Oopies /5)dw, .tY DL/Sa HIGH COURT DATED:27,t1112025 JUDGMENT SA.No.550 of 2025 f, n a T HE s C) o )I t 2 7 r[8 lltt * SECOND A.PPEAL DISMISSED AT THE STAGE OF ADMISSION D '\"VA