The High Court · 2025

Counsel for the App,: llant: SRI M.V.RAMA RAO, SC FOR TSLPRB Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI M.SURENDER RAO, Sr. COUNSEL, REP. FOR SRI SRINIVASA RAO MADIRAJU Counsel for the ResFucndent No.2 to 5: GP FOR SERVICES (l{OME) The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT THE HON'BLE THE CHIET'JUSTICE SRI APARESH KT'MAR SINGH AND THE HON'BLE SRI JI'STICE G.M. MOHII]DDIN WRIT APPEAL No.l1O4 of 2025 JUDGMENT: This Writ Appeal is hled by the State Level Police Recruitment Board, assailing the common order dated

13.O2.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge W.P.No.40400 of 2018 and W.P.No.SaO of 2020. Bv the said order, the learned Single Judge allorrved the writ petitions filed by the respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as the Writ Petitioner') and directed the appellant and respondent Nos.2 to 5 herein (hereinafter 'respondents' in the writ petition) to appoint the writ petitioner as a Stipendiary Cadet Trainee (SCT) Sub-lnspector (Civil) and to send him for training in the next trarnlng camp.

2. Heard learned Standing Counsel for the Appellant-Board; the learned Government Pleader for Services (Home) for the respondents in the writ petition; and Sri M.Surender Rao, learned Senior counsel for the writ petitioner at considerable length and perused the material on record, including the pleadings and the precedents cited.

3. The factual matrix, in the present case, is that the writ petitioner was provisionally selected for the post of SCT Reserve Sub-Inspector (APSP) pursuant to a notification l -l Rc.No.931/R&TlRect.l /2011, dated 03.1 1.201 1. His selection was cancelled uide Rc.No.63/Rectt.lGeol.l l'2014 dated 26.11.2014 on the ground of his alleged involvenrent in three criminal cases. It is an admitted fact that the writ petitioner was acquitted in all these cases, the last of which was in 2OO7, i.e., well before the issuance of the recruitment notification in 2O 1 1 . The core dispute revolves around the writ petitioner's initial non-disclosure and subsequent disclosure of these antecedents in the attestation forms and the appellant Board's consequent rejection of his candidature, deeming him unsuitable for police service.

4. The learned Single Judge, after a thorough an:rlysis of the facts and the law, particularly the guidelines laid clown by the Supreme Cotrn in Autar Singh a. Union of Indiat, concludt:d that: b) a) The earlier acquittals of the writ petitioner, one of which was a clean acquittal on merits and the other on benefit of doubt due to the prosecution's failure to prove the charges wiped the slate clean. The initial non-disclosure was a 'bono fide mistake' and an inaclvertent omission, made under the bono .fide belief th;rt the acquittal rendered the disclosure already closed r'ases unnecessary. The same was promptllr rectified by the writ petitioner q,ithin a month b1, submitting a fresh attestation form containing full and I ruthful rlisclosure. ' 1zo rrrl s scc +7 I c) The appellants failed to apply the nuanced principles of Autar Singlnb case (supra), which mandate a case-by- case analysis considering the nature of the offence, the age of the candidate at the time of the incident, and the nature of the acquittal. d) The writ petitioner was similarly situated to other candidates who were appointed. Therefore, the petitioner was entitled to the same treatment in the matter of regularization.

5. The appellant Board, in this appeal, has raised several grounds, contending that: (i) The learned Single Judge erred in not giving due weightage to the opinion of the specially constituted Screening Committee, which found the petitioner unsuitable. (ii) The initial suppression of information, even if later corrected, demonstrated a lack of integriqr. (iii) The offences involved, including one under Section 379 IPC (theft), involve moral turpitude. (iv) Directing appointment after such a long lapse of time (since the 20 1 I notification) creates administrative issues concerning seniority and vacancies.

6. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ pelitioner supported the order of the learned Single Judge and contended that the order of the learned Single Judge was a well reasoned order which did not warrant any interference by this Court. { { -

7. We have considered the respective submissions made; and we find rro merit in this appeal. We find that the learned Single Judge's order is not only legally sustainable but is also just and equit;lble.

8. We aftlr:n the order passed by the learned Single Judge lor the follo',r'ing compelling reasons: I. Misapplicatiorr of Avtar Si h's Guidelin,:: s:

9. [t is t() be noted that the action of the appellant Board reflects a mer:hanical and perfunctory exercise of discretion reclucing the r:xamination required of it to a mere procedural formality. The action of the appellant-Board is in clear contravention ,,,f the spirit and ratio laid down by ltre Honble Supreme Courl in the case of Autar Slngh (supra). The judgment in Avtar Stzgh (supra) does not enunciate an absolute rule of disqualification upon non-disclosure of antecedents; rather, it confers upon the employer a discretionary power to be exercised judiciously, keeping in view the totality ol tl-re facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant para lor consideration is as under:

38.4.3- If tzcquittal had alreadg been recorded in o case inuoluing ntoral turpitude or offence of heinous/ seious nature, on technical ground and it is not a ca-se of clean acquitta| orbenefit of reasonable doubt has been giten, the emploqer mtLA consider all releuont facts auailable. as to antecedents, and moy take appropiate decision as to the continuance of the employee. / 5 1(). In the present case, the Screening Committee as well as the appellant Board have failed to apply the above principle in its true perspective. Their decision reflects an undue and rigid focus on the initial omission in disclosure, while completely disregarding relevant mitigating circumstances namely, i) the writ petitioner's prompt and voluntary rectification by submitting a corrected attestation form; ii) h,is bona fide belief that the prior acquittal dispensed with the requirement of disclosure; iii) his young age at the time of the incidents (17 and 21 years); and iv) the fact that such acquittal had attained finality long before his entry into public service. Therefore, such selective consideration of facts and omission to weigh the attendant circumstances constitutes a clear instance of non- application of mind and failure to exercise the statutory discretion in a fair, reasonable, and judicious manner, thereby vitiating the impugned decision. II. Nature of Ac uittal and Offences:

11. It is also pertinent to note that the attempt of the appellant Board to portray the writ petitioner as possessing a "criminal mentality" on the basis of cases that culminated in acquittal is misconceived and legally untenable. An acquittal, in the eyes of law, amounts to a formal declaration of innocence, and once such acquittal has attained hnality, it cannot be used as a stigma or as a ground to infer adverse antecedents. The \ 6 - contention a(lvanced by the appellants that the acquittal was not "honourable" or 'clean" is a distinction without legal consequence in the present context, particularly when the prosecution had failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is the requirement in law. III Justifrcation for issuance of a positive Mandam.us

12. This (lourt, in considering the submission made by the learned Stancling Counsel for the appellant-Board that even if the rejection $ere to be found unsustainable, the proper course would be to direct the authorities to "consider" the writ petitioner's case afresh, is of the view that as the background and the record of this litigation reveals a persistent pattern of non-complianc,) and obstinacy on the part of the appellant authorities.

13. It is evi<lent that the writ petitioner's case had already been remitted once for reconsideration by this Court uide interim order dated 03.11.2008 in W.P.No.4040O of 2O18. Pursuant therero, since the appellants undertook a superficial and mechanical exercise, culminating in another rejection urde Memo dated O 1 .03.20 I 9. In our view, directing another round of "consideration" would serve no mealingful purpose- In circumstances rlhere the authority has demonstrated a closed mind qnd a rnechanical approach, and where the writ petitioner'5 en titlement is clearly established on facts and in f ( 7 law, issuance of a positive mandamus directing appointment becomes necessary to secure the ends ofjustice. IV. lapse S f!14qq qEd 4,{qinistrative Conve nie nce :

14. In respect of the contention advanced by the appellant Roard that the recruitment notification of 2O 1 I has become stale or incapable of implementation on account of lapse of time, it is to be noted that such a plea appears to be one of necessity and not ol substance. Further, the delay in the present case is not attributable to the writ petitioner, who has been diligently pursuing his legal remedies against an unwarranted cancellation of his selection. The appellants cannot be permitted to take advantage of the delay occasioned by their own actions and the pendency ofjudicial proceedings.

15. Since the issue relating to the availability of a vacancy, or the necessity of creating a supernumerary post, is purely administrative in nature, it is incumbent upon the appellant authorities to take appropriate steps to ensure compliance with the directions issued by this Court.

16. While we uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge in its entirety, we deem it appropriate to modify the operative portion of the order to bring clarity and ensure seamless implementation. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 13.02.2025 directed the appellants to "appoint petitioner as Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Sub-lnspector (Civil)" I I and further direcrccl the respondents to "send petitioner for training in rhe next training camp." The sequence of "appointment" lollowed by "training" is the standard procedure for such posls. The training is an integral part of the appointment process for a Stipendiary Cadet Trainee . Therefore, to avoid anv ambiguiry or lurther needless controversy, we modily the djre.:tion as undcr "The appelkrnts are directed lo issue an appointnlent order to the Wnr Petitioner, M. Kamalakar, for the post of Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Sub-Inspector (Citil), and consequentll.y, send him to the next auailable training batch for the scricl post subject to fulfilment of other necessary conditions b17 the utrit petitioner." t7. With tl-re above modification, the Writ Appeal is disposed The impugrcd common order of the learned Stngle Judge, as modihed herrrin above, stands conhrmed. There s;hall be no order as to cost:i As zr seq rl:1, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closccl To, \ //TRUE COPY// -.,. \ sol- MoHD. rsMArL \ hepurv REGrsr-r*AR \ \ \,.__=--- \ \ sEcroN oFFrcER '/

1. The Principal Se,rretary to Government, Hom Hyderabad, State of Telang ana-22. epartment, Secretariat,

2. The Chairman, State Level Police Recruitment Board, Hyderabad 500001. 3. The Director Genercl of Police, Telangana State, Hyderabad 4. The Commissioner of Police, Warangal. 5. The Deputy lnspector of General of Police, Warangal Range, Warangal. 6. One CC to SRI IV.\'.RAMA RAO, SC FOR TSLPRB [OPUC] 7. One CC to SRI SRINIVASA RAO MADIRAJU, Advocate IOPUC] 8. Two CCs to GP 'OR SERVICES (HOME), High Court for the State of Telangana at Hydetabad [OUT]

9. Two CD Copies BSR I HIGH COUR] DATED: 31t.lttt2}2i JUDGMENT WA.No.1 104 of 2O2S ( oB 1HE S ) a) _) \1. tltlBvE t- a DISPOSING OF I-HE WRIT APPEAL, WITHOUT COSTS (\7 N- A t\