Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act (Bombay XCIX of vs DLGRR,J

the plaintiff. But, the defendants taking advantage of wrong entries made in revenue records, were trying to occupy the same due to increase of land value in the said locality. The plaintiff being in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule land continuously for the past more than l6 years to the knowledge of the defendants had perfected his right and title by way of prescription of adverse possession as such, it was just and necessary to declare the plaintiff as absolute owner and possessor of the schedule properties by way of adverse possession and to restrain the defendants from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment over the schedule land and filed the suit seeking the above reliefs.

3. The defendant Nos.l and 2 filed separate but identical written statements. They contended that the suit lands were earlier owned and possessed by Fakir Mohammed and Mumtaz Abbas Ali, who were the original pattadars. The father of the defendants was the protected tenant in respect of the land held by Fakir Mohammed and Mumtaz Abbas Ali. Their father C. Ramachandra Reddy waived his claim as tenant in favour of the pattadars by way of separate documents on 01.02.1955. Thereafter, the said pattadars i.e. Fakir Mohammed and Mumaz Abbas 5 Dt.GRR,J AS No-267 of 201 I & xobj (sR) No.6sit oJ 2ott (I.A- No-a of20t t) Ali sold the suit properties 1o the defendants. The said transaction was held by their father on thei-r behalf as such, the suit schedule properties were the absolute properties of the defendants. Therefore, the question of inheritance by way of patta or otherwise by the plaintiff would not arise. The relief of declaration was misconceived and not maintainable in the eye of law. They further contended that the question of adverse possession would not arise as the plaintiff in the other paragraphs was ctaiming to be absolute owner by way of succession to the estate of his father and therefore, the retiefofadverse possession was not available in law. The defendants being the absolule owners and possessors in respect of the said property, the question of declaring the plaintiff as absolute owner and possessor of the above said properties would not arise. They contended that during the lifetime of their father, the said lands were cultivated by their father as an agent on their behalf and after the death of their father, the said lands were cultivated by the plaintiff and their younger brother Hari Kishan Reddy on their behalf as their agents. Their possession was not with an intention to own the suit scheduleproperty.TheGovernmentofAndhraPradeshalsogranted pattadar passbooks and land ownership documents duly executed by the MRO, Maheswaram Mandal in their favour' The said lands were 6 D.-GrR'I AS No-2157 of 201t & XQbj (SR) t"o.4551 of20t I (LA- No-4 of20t I) n cultivated by the defendants through their brother as tl.rey had reposed confidence in them, but the plaintiff taking undue advantage of some of the entries in the possessory column was claiming right, title and interest over the suit schedule properties. At no point of time, neither Shiva Reddy, Ramachandra Reddy nor the plaintiff claimed the suit properties as their property. Neither the plaintiff nor their father ever declared the suit schedule propefty before the Land Reforms Tribunal claiming ownership either as pattadar or as protected tenant. The suit schedule properties were not the patta lands either of the plaintiff or their father or grandfather. The atleged entries in the revenue records did not conler any title nor legally vested right in favour of the plaintiff in any manner' The plaintiff could not set up a title against the defendants, taking advantage of the erroneous entries in the revenue records and prayed to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff.

4. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial court framed the issues as follows: D Whether the oral partition of properties pleaded by the plaintiff at para No.3 of the plaint is true and cofrect? 7 tr.aRR,t AS No-267 of 201I & xtbj (SR) No.E5 s 1 of 20 t t (t.A. No 1 of 201 t ) ii) Whether the plaintiff is possession and enjoYment the owner and is in of the plaint schedule properties since long time? iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of his right and title over the plaint Schedule properties? iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of perpetual injunction as prayed for? v). To what relief?

5. The plaintiff examined himself as PW. I and examined the neighbouring land owners of the suit schedule properties as PWs'2 and

3. Exs.Al to A29 were marked on behalf of the plaintiff. Defendant Nos. I and 2 were examined as DWs.l and 2 and Exs.Bl to B40 were marked on their behalf.

6. The trial court on considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff observing that though the oral partition of the properties pleaded by the plaintiff was true and correct to the extent of non-suit schedule properties' as the plaintiff miserably failed to prove the inclusion and allotment of the suit schedule propefty to his share in the said partition, answered issue No'1 8 Dr_cRR,J lS No.267 of20t t & X4bj (SR) No 855t of:011(t-A No.4o!2011) against him. The trial court answered issue No.2 obsen.ing that no doubt the plaintiff was in possession of the suit schedule land, but not in the capacity as the owner. The trial court answered issue No.3 observing that the plaintiff had not chaltenged the pahanies before the Revenue authorities. The plaintiff was not in possession of the suit schedule propefty continuously from the date of filing ol'the suit as such, he was not entitled to be declared as owner of the schedule property by way of adverse possession and finally ansrvered issue No.4 observing that the plaintilf was not entitled to seek equitable relief of injunction on account of suppression of material facts and on his failure to prove interference of the defendants over the schedule properties. 7 Aggrieved by the said judgrnent and decree passed by the learned I-Additional Districr Judge, Ranga Reddy District on 07 .02.201 1, the plai ntiff preferred th i s appeal.

8. The respondents also filed cross-objections contending that the finding of the trial courl in respect of issue No.2 to the extent that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit schedule land was contrary to the evidence on record and the same was liable to be set aside. 9 Dt.GRR.l AS No 267 oJ 201I & xtbj (SR) No.ssst of20I1 U.A. No.4 oI20t I)

9. Heard Sri M.V. Durga Prasad, leamed Senior Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff and Sri MVS Suresh Kumar, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Naraparaju Avaneesh, leamed counsel on record for the respondents-de lendants.

10. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff ignoring the material admissions of the defendants about the possession of the plaintiff both in pleadings and evidence. The defendants admitted the possession of the plaintiff, but stated in their pleadings that the plaintiff was in possession as their agent, the proof of which squarely would lie upon them, but they abandoned the said plea while adducing their evidence. The defendants themselves denied their own material defence of agency in view of the admitted open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the plaintiff for more than the statutory period, which was adverse to the claim for the title of the defendants. The trial court failed to see that the plaintilf was claiming both possession and title as ancestril property through father and grandfather and on the other hand, the defendants claimed title and possession directly from the pattadar taking specifrc plea that the father had surrendered his protected tenancy, but no such proceedings under \ l0 DTGRR,! AS No.267 ol20tl & XQbj (SR) No.8ss t of 201 t (IA. No.4 9! 201 1) Section 19 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act, 1950 were pleaded or filed. In view of the defendants' failure to prove the surrender, the defendants' admission of protected tenancy and possession of the father as protected tenant would support the case ofthe plaintiff and would falsifu the defendants plea of purchase from the pattadar under Exs.B2 and B20. The trial court failed to look into the documentary evidence adduced by both sides. The pahanies filed by both the plaintiff and defendants right from 1954-55 Khasra Pahani under Ex.Al5 and B15 and pahanies from 1961-1962 under Ex.A16,

8.16, Al7, B17 and A18 would show that only the plaintifls father late Ramachandra Reddy was always in possession even after the alleged sale in their favour under the alleged unregistered sale deeds Exs.B2 and B20 and thereafter, the plaintiff was in possession as evident from the pahanies under EXs.A2 to A13 and Exs.Bl0 to B13, B26to B28 and therefore, the plaintiff was entitled for both backward and forward presumption. The defendants had not made any attempt to rebut the same The trial court failed to see that the defendants' failure to prove their defence of surrender of tenancy and the admitted possession of their father was fatal to their case. The affidavits filed before the Land Reforms Tribunal about the surrender were contrary to the record and Dr CRR.J AS No.267 oI20I t & xooj (SR) No.sstt of 20lI (1.1. No.1of20l t) could not have any evidentiary value. The defendants failed to explain the possession from the beginning till the death of their father either before or after proceedings of the Land Reforms Tribunal and the sales under Exs.B4 and B22. The triat court committed serious irregularity in ignoring Exs.A24 to A29 agreements and receipts in respect ol the payments made under agreement to the pattadar by late Ramachandra Reddy which would falsiff the case of the defendants. The trial court failed to see that EXs.B2 and B20 were dated 03.03.1956. The defendant No. I was admittedty a minor by the date of execution of Ex.B2 and B20. She was aged l0 years and was a married woman, but her husband's name was not mentioned in Ex.B2 and as per Ex.A25 and Ex.B39, the plaintiff proved the date of birth of defendant No.2 as

13.05.1956. Therefore, she was not even bom by the date of Ex.B20 which was dated 03.03.1956. As such, the defendants were incapable of knowing about the transactions under Exs.B2 and B20 and therefore, they could not speak or depose about the same. They failed to lead any independent evidence by examining any person, who had knowledge about th'e transactions in 1956' The defendants did not choose to examine any elder either in the village or in the relatives to prove Exs.B2 and 820 nor the vendor or the legal heirs of the vendor. No t2 Dt.CRR,J ,15 No-267 of 20It & E5st of 20t I (t.A. No.a of 20t t) X4bj (S&) ^o a) attempts were made to prove the signatures in Exs.B2 and B20. As such, Exs.B2 and B20 remained unproved. As the age of the defendant No.2 as per Exs.A25 and B39 birth certificates was dared 13.05.1956, she was not even born by the date of Ex.B20 under which she was claiming the title. Therefore, it was impossible in the nature of things that she could purchase the suit schedule property or there could have been a sale in her favour before her birth. This itself rvould prove that the document was a bogus one. Such bogus and fraudulent documents could not have been regularized under Section 50-B o{'the Tenancy Act. As such, Ex.B22 was ex-facie liaudulent. Exs.B4 and lrJ22 or Ex.B.33 and B.34 affidavits would not disclose that the plaintilf or his father were parties to the proceedings. Exs.B33 and B34 alflilavits would not disclose that the tenancy was sought to be surrender.ed in tenns of Section 19 of the Tenancy Act and no proceedings ol the MRO were filed accepting the surrender which was mandatorv under the said section.

10.1. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellanrplaintil'f further submitted that the oral partition after the death of C. Ramachandra Reddy was admitted by the defendants in their cross-exarnination. As such, the findings of the trial couft that the plaintiff failed to prove that l3 Dr.GRA,t AS No.257 of 20t I & xtbj (SR) No.tsst oI20tt (I-A. No't o!20tt) the suit schedule property fell to his share in the said partition were contrary to record. The admitted facts would not need to be proved. The trial court failed to see that the name of the plaintiff was deleted in Exs.B9 to Bl7 pahanies without any proceedings. Further, Exs.B37 and B38 would show alteration by adding the name of the defendans' In Ex.Bl2 both patta and possessory columns were corrected. The said entries were contrary to the admissions made in the written statements of the defendants. The defendant No.2 as DW.2 hersetf admitted that the name of the plaintiff was struck off in EXs.B10, Bl2, B13, B14 to B25 and B28 at her request and on enquiry made by patwari without any proceedings as required under the Act. Therefore, such alterations were void and would have no legal effect. The trial court failed to see that the plaintiff filed Exs.AlS to A23 cist receipts showing the cist paid by his father and subsequent to the death of his father, by him as Kabjadar (possessor). No evidence was filed by the defendants to rebut the same' The trial court erroneously dismissed the suit inspite of the fact that the defendants admitted the case of the plaintiff and his possession over the suit schedule property and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramachandra Keshav Adke (dead) per LRs' and t4 D|GRRl AS Na267 of 201t & XObj (SR) io4t5l oJ20ll (I-A No.aof20tt) others v. Govind Joti Chavare and othersl on the requirements of a valid surrender of tenancy.

10.2. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon,ble Apex Court in Babu Parasu Kaikadi (dead) by LRs. v. Babu (dead) through LRs.2 wherein the judgment of the Hon,ble Apex Court in Dhondiram Tatoba Kadam v. Ramchandra Balwantrao Dubal (1994) 3 SCC 3661 delivered without noticing the earlier binding precedent of a coordinate Bench in Ramchandra Keshav Adke case (1 supra) was rendered per incuriam, as passed without considering the mandatory provisions under Sections 15 and 29 of the Tenancy Act.

10.3. He fuither relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Musunuri Saeranarayana v. Dr. Tirumala Indira Devi and Others3, wherein it was held that twin conditions are mandatory for surrender of tenancy, firstly, three months, notice in rvriting to landlord and to Special Officer about intention to surrender tenancy and secondly, satisfaction recorded by the Special Officer in the order, about the voluntary nature of surrender after due inquiry. I rgzs 1l; scc ss9 '2004 (t) scc 68r ' (2022) rl SCC 4r0 15 DT GRR,J ,15 No-21t7 oI20t t & xobj(SR) No.Esst oI201t U.A. No a 0!201t)

11. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contended that the suit was filed by the appellant-plaintiff suppressing the declaration filed by the plaintiff before the Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. In the said declaration marked under Ex.Bl, the suit schedule properties were not mentioned. The plaintiff was a party to the order of Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 marked under Ex.B 18. The said order would show that the landlord sold the suit schedule properties in favour of respondent Nos. I and 2 herein and that they were issued 50-B certificates by the Tahsildar, as such, the lands covered by the suit schedule properties stood deleted from the holding of the declarants' The plaintiff suppressed the above facts in his plaint- The plaintiff who approached the court was bound to produce all the documents which were relevant to the litigation and if he withheld vital documents to gain advantage over the other side, he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in S.P' Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs' v. Jagannath @ead) by LRs. and othersa. o tesl 1ry scc t l6 D..GRR,J AS No.267 of 20t I & x-obj (SR) no 8i5t oI20t t (t A. No.a oI201t) r) I 1.1 . Leamed Senior Counsel for the respondents further contended that the plaintif'f approached the court with a false case that the suit schedule properties fell to his share in the oral parrition among himself, his brother Hari Kishan Reddy and the legal representatives of his deceased brother, namely, Dayanand Reddy @ Shiva Reddy. But, in the light of Exs.B1, 84, B18 and,B22,the plaintiff was liabte to be non- suited for setting up a false case. He further contended that the ptaintiff having derived an advantage under the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal dated 10.04.1977 under Ex.Bl8 excluding rhe suit schedule property from his lamily holdings, was not entitled to question 50_B certificates issued to the defendant Nos.l and 2 on thc principles of "approbate and reprobate" as laid down by the Hon,ble Apex Cotrrl in Cauvery Coffee Traders, Mangalore v. Hornor Resources (International) Company Limiteds.

11.2. He further contended that the plaintiff, inspite of being aware of 50-B certificates issued to defendant Nos.l and 2 on

29.04.1976 had not chosen to question the said certificates by way of filing appeal under Section 19 of the Telangana (Tenancy and 'zor r ltoy scc lzo t7 Dt.GRR,t AS No 267 oI101I & xlbi (SR) No.tssl of20ll (I A No.|ol20tl) said certificates in the suit filed by him for declaration of title. In fact, there was no pleading in the plaint about 50-B certificates that were issued to defendant Nos.l and 2, which were to the knowledge of the plaintiff as per Ex.B18, order of the Land Reforms Tribunal' In the absence of any plea or prayer in the suit questioning 50-B certificates, it was not open to the plaintiff to question the validity of the said certificates. The possession of the plaintiff was only as an agent of defendant Nos.l and 2 and placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Others v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (dead) through LRs'6' I 1.3. He further contended that the plaintiff having set up title was not entitled to plead adverse possession as they were mutually inconsistent. Adverse possession would not commence until the claim lor titte is renounced and placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v' Government of lndia and othersT. u (zorz) s scc szo ' zool 1to; scc zze t8 Dr-CRR,l AS 5'o.267 ol 201I & X4b! (SR) No.sstt oJ:0t t (.1. No 1 oI20l t)

12. In the light of the pleadings and contentions raised by both the leamed counsel, now the points that arise for determination in this appeal are: 1 Whether the appellant-plaintiff is entitled lor the relief of declaration of title and consequential injunction as owner and possessor of the suit schedule property, as prayed for? 2 Whether the appellant-plaintiff is cntitled to claim the alternative relief of declaration of his title bv wav of adverse possession? 1 Whether the judgment of the tlial court is in accordance with law, weight of evidence or probabilities of the case or whether the same is liable to be set aside?

4. To what reliefl

13. Point No.1: Whether the appellant - plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration of title and consequential injunction as owner and possessor of the suit schedule property, as prayed for? In a suit for declaration of title, the burden heavily lies upon the plaintiff to prove his title in respect of immovable properties. The 19 DLGRR.J AS h"o.267 oJ 201I & x4bj (SR) No Essl oJ20tt U.A No-aof20ll) plaintiff is not supposed to depend upon the weakness of the case set up by the defendants.

14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Another v. Most Rev. Mar FouJose Athanasius and Others8 and also in Union of India and Others v' Vasavi Co- operative Housing society Limited and otherse hetd that in a suit for declaration, if the plaintiffs are to succeed, they must do so on the strength of their own title.

15. InNagar Palika, Jind v' Jagat Singh, Advocatero' the Hon'ble Apex Court held that: "The onus to prove title to the property in question was on the plaintiff. In a suit for ejectment based on title it was incumbent on the part of the court of appeal first to record a finding on the claim of titte to the suit land made on behall of the plaintiff. The court is bound to enquire or investigate that question first before going into any other question that may arise in a suit." "The legat position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, sAIR 1958 SC 3I 'gAIR 2014 sc 937 'o( rgqs) i scc +zo 20 Dt.GRR,J AS No.267 oI20ll & x-obj (SR) i'o Esst of20It U.A. Ro-1oI20tt) irrespective of the question whether the defendants har.e proved their case or not. We are of the view that even if the title set up by the defendants is found against, in the absence of establishment ofplaintifls own title, plaintiffrnust be non- suitcd.''

16. Section 34 ofthe Specific ReliefAct, 1963 enables a person to have his right or legal character declared by a Court of Law, and thus gets rid of the cloud about his legal character or right. The declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is in the nature of equitable relief. Such declaration is in the discretionary power ofthe Court and the discretionary power is to be exercised on sound judicial principles. It is in the discretion of the Court to grant the relief. The plaintiff has to substantially prove his rights as claimed by him. It is not sufficient if the plaintiff proves that he is entitled to the legal character or right to property. It is for him to convince the Court that the defendant had denied or interested to deny the legal character or right of the plaintiff, then only he could succeed in obtaining the declaration sought.

17. As seen from the pleadings of the plaintiff, the plaintiff took a specific stand that the suit schedule properties were his ancestral properties i.e. they were the properties of his grandfather Sri Chetkuri 2t DLGRR,J AS No.267oI20t I & x4bj (SR) No.Esst of 20t t (1.A. No.4 oJ 20tI) Shiva Reddy and after the death of Shiva Reddy, the entire estate was succeeded by his son Sri Ramachandra Reddy i.e. the father of the plaintilf and the defendants. His further case was that after the death of Ramachandra Reddy, the ProPerties were partitioned amongst the plaintiff, his brother Hari Krishna Reddy and legal heirs ofhis deceased elder brother Sri C.Dayanand Reddy and in the said partition, the suit schedule properties along with other properties fallen to his share and since then, he was in possession and enjoyment as absolute owner and possessor and his name was entered in the revenue records in the possessory column.

18. The plaintiff got examined himself as PW. I and two other neigtrboring land owners as PWs.2 and 3. He had not examined any of his lamily members in proof of the oral partition pleaded by him' He did not examine his brother or his sister-in-law, who were parties to the alleged oral partition. ln his cross-examination, he stated that he could not say the date of oral partition, but the oral partition took place in the month of April or May of 1984. He stated that his elder brother Shiva Reddy died in the year 1978 or 7979 andhis father Ramachandra Reddy died in the year 1982, April / May. He stated that apart from the suit schedule properties, some other lands were also allotted to his share in 22 Dr GRA,t AS No.267 oJ 201I & Etit ofz0l t (LA- No-a of20It) X-obj (SR) ^'o the partition, but they were not described in the plaint. I-Ie further stated that he had not made anv application either to the Mandal Revenue Officer or to any other revenue officer for mutation of lands in his name after the oral partition and stated that he had not-obtained either patta passbook or title deed for the land that fell to his share till date. He further added to the said statement that he obtained patta passbooks for the lands that fetl to his share, but the suit schedule lands were not included in the said passbooks.

19. This adrnission made by the plaintiff in his cross- examination raises a doubt about the suit schedule properties also being partitioned and that they fetl ro the share of the plaintiff, because the plaintiff admitted that apart frorn the suit schedule properties, there were also other properties that fell to his share and he obtained patta passbooks for the lands other than the suit schedule lands. He further admitted that he came to know that the revenue authorities had issued passbooks and title deeds for the plaint schedule property to the defendants. But even after that, he did not approach the revenue authorities for deletion of their names and inclusion of his name. He further stated in his cross-examination that the originat pattadars of plaint schedule property were Fakir Mohammed and Mumtaz Ali, sons 23 Dr-GRR,l AS No-267 of 201I & x4bj (sR) Na E5s t oI 20 t t (LA. No.l ol20t t ) of Mir Abbas Ali and that his father was having protected tenancy rights for the lands possessed by Fakir Mohammed and Mumtaz Ali. This admission made by the plaintiff was contrary to his pleadings that the suit schedule property was the ancestral property belonging to his grandfather and after his death, the same was succeeded by his father Ramachandra Reddy. As such, the plaintiffis not having a right by birth in the said property. Even to partition the same, he must prove that it was the absolute property of his father and that his father died intestate' There was no pleading to that effect.

20. In his further cross-examination, the plaintiff stated that he did not know as to whether his father relinquished his protected tenancy rights in favor of pattadars on 01.02. 1955 since his father was having protected tenancy rights more than the standard holding. He slated that he did not know as to whether the MRO passed orders under Section 50- B of the AP (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 on 29.04.1976 in favor of the defendants and stated that he did not know as to whether his father pursued the revenue authorities and obtained orders in favor of the defendants and denied that he was aware of passing of the orders by the MRO and the sarne was also to the knowledge of his other two brothers and father. He denied that his 24 DLGRR.J AS No.267 of 2011 & Xobj (SR) No.Esst of201t (I A. No-a oI201I) father did not challenge the transaction in favor of the defendants and his father pretty well knew about the sale transaction in favor of the defendants. He admitted that his father frled declaration under Land Ceiling Act and the certified copy of the declaration marked under Ex.B 1 would bear his signature. He admitted that he had shown the lands possessed by his family members in Ex.B 1 declaration and claimed 1/4th share each to him, to his father and to his brothers and claimed them as ancestral properties and the plaint schedule properties were not mentioned as joint lamily properties in Ex.B 1 declaration. When he was confronted with the document and asked whether his father lrled counter in C.C.No.266511175 onthe file of the Land Reforms Tribunal (South), Hyderabad, he stated that he did not know about the same. He denied that being the brother of defendants 1 and 2, he looked after the cultivation of the plaint schedule property on their behalf as their agent. But the plaintiff admitted that he and his father or his other brothers never questioned the orders of the Tribunal in C.C.Nos.2665, 2666 and 2667 I I l7 5 dated 24.06.197 7 .

21. The document filed by the defendants marked under Ex.Bl would disclose that the plaintiff himself filed a declaration under Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 declaring the 25 DT.CRR,J AS No267 of 201I & Xobj (SR) No.Essl of20II (IA No.4oI20tt) property held by him and admitted in his cross-examination that the suit schedule properties were not shown by him in the said declaration. This admission made by him belies his contention that he was the owner of the suit schedule properties. If he was the owner of the schedule properties, he would have shown the same in the declaration made under the above Act. He specifically stated in the above document on

10.04.1975 declaring that he had no other property except what he had declared.

22. Ex.B4 is the certificate issued to defendant No. I under Section 50-B of the Telangana Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 in respect of Ac. 12-0 1 guntas in Survey Nos'2 I 8, 219, 224, 225 , 226 and 227 of Kongara Khurd village and Ex.B22 is the certificate issued under Section 50-B of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 to defendant No'2 in respect of Ac. I 2-3 8 guntas in Survey Nos.222, 223, 212, 213, 216 and 217 of Kongara Khurd village. Ex.B18 is the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal dated24.06.1977 excluding the suit schedule property from the holding of the plaintiff, his father and brother Hari Krishna Reddy holding that 50-B certificates were issued to defendants 1 and 2' The plaintiff was a party to the said order. It was mentioned in para No'5 of -!- .,.... 26 D. (;RR'.I AS No-261 ol20l I & Xobj (SR) No.E55t oI2t)11(LA. No.a of201l) the said order that Survey Nos.207, 209, 212, 213, 216 to 219, 222 to 227,230 and 233 were said to be protected tenancy lands belonging to Fakir Mohammed and others, who were the owners and the declarants were said to be no more in the possession of the same and that the landlord had sold those survey numbers to Smt.Damayanthi (defendant No.2) and Savitramma (defendant No.l) and Dayanand Reddy, for which 50-B cerlificates have also been issued by the Tahsildar. Therefore the area of Ac.12-06 guntas + Ac. l2-01 guntas * Acs.l2-38 guntas shown in the said exhibits deserved to be deleted from the holdings ofthe declarants. Ex.B7 and 88 are the pattadar passbook and title deed issued to defendant No.l and Exs.B23 and 824 are the pattadar passbook and title deed issued to defendant No.2. 'Ihe plaintiff had suppressed filing of the declaration before the I-and Reforms Tribunal excluding the suit schedule property and that Section 50-B certificates were issued in favor of the defendants 1 and 2 in the plaint and approached the Court with a false case that tl.re suit schedule property fell to his share in the oral partition among hirnselt his brother Harikrishna Reddy and the legal representatives of his clder brother Dayanand Reddy @ Shiva Reddy. 27 D.,GRR,J AS No.267 of20ll & X4bj (sR) No.E t 5 t of 20 t t (t.i- No.4 of 201 t )

23. The Hon'ble Apex Court 1n S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and others (4 supra), held that "5. .. . One who comes to the court, must .come with clean- hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank loan dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of tife frnd the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegat-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person. whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court, He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of thc litigation.

6. The facts ol the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's [oss. It is a cheating intendcd to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. I{e purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed thc regislered release deed (Exhibit B- lS) in favor of Chunilat Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he hled the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behatf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar' Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is t 28 x-obj (sR) No E i'l oI )0 t I (t-A. Irt ORR,J AS No.267 of20tt a of 201 I ) ^'o.1 tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with thc observations of the I'Iigh Court thar the appcllants- defcndants could have easily produced thc ce(ilied registered copy of Exhibit B-15 and non-suited the plainrift'. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to producc a[[ the documents executed by him which are relevaht to the litigation. If hc withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guitty of playing fraud on the court as wcll as on thc opposite party."

24. In the facts of the present case also, the plaintiff had suppressed about the declaration made by him before the Land Relbrms Tribunal and issuance of Section 50-B certificates in favor of def'endants I and 2. Having derived an advantage under the or.der ol- the Land Reforms Tribunal dated 24.06.1977 under Ex.B18 cxcluding the suit schedule property frorn the family holding, he is not enritled to be declared as owner ofthe suit schedule propefties.

25. The evidence of PW.2 is to the effect that he was the neighbor to the suit schedule property. His lands in Survey Nos.272 and 274 were by the side of the suit schedule property and that the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as absolute owner and possessor and the defendants were never in possession of the suit schedule property. But, however, in his cross-examination he stated that he sold away his lands in Survey Nos.272 and 274 two years ago. 29 IN.GRR,J AS No-267 of20tt & X4bj (SR) No.Esst ol2011(t A Nol of20tt) He stated that the plaint schedule properties fell to the share of the plaintifl in the partition beh.veen the plaintiff and his brothers' He had gone through the partition deed, but could not say whether it was a registered one or not. He stated that the partition deed was in the custody of the plaintiff.

26. When the plaintiff pleaded that it was an oral partition' PW'2 stated that there was a written partition deed and the said written partition deed was in the custody of the ptaintiff' Thus, the evidence of PWs.land2iscontradictory.Ifthereisawrittenpartitiondeed'asto whytheplaintiffhadnotlrledthesamebeforetheCourtandwhether the suit schedule properties are included in it or not are the questions unansweredbytheplaintiff.Ifthesuitschedulepropertiesfelltohis share, as to why the plaintiff had not mutated his name in the revenue records as pattadar for the said properties since the date of partition and astowhyhehadnotobtainedthepattadarpassbooksortitledeedsfor these properties, when he could obtain patta passbooks for the lands that fell to his share other than these suit schedule properties' are not answered bY the Ptaintiff' 30 Dr.cRR,J AS No.267 oJ20t I & X-obj (SR) No.Esst oIzott (t A. \o.1of20t I)

27. PW.3 in his evidence stated that he was the owner and possessor of the land in Survey No.272 of Kongara Khurd "A" village and that his property was nearer to the suit schedule property and he was observing that the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property since his childhood. But in his cross-examination, he admitted that he did not know as to how the plaintif'f acquired the plaint schedule property. He stated that as the villagers used to catl the ptaint schedule land as belonged to the plaintifl, he mentioned thc same in his chief affidavit that the plaintiff was the owner of the said land, but he did not know the source of acquisition. He further stated that he did not know the details of the other lands possessed by the plaintiff, but was aware that he was having some other properties. He stated that he did not know as to how PW.l acquired the other properties

28. Thus, the evidence of PW.3 is no way useful to the plaintiff to prove his title over the suit schedule prope(y.

29. The possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property was admitted by the defendants also in their written statement, but stated that the same was in the capacity as their agent on their behatf. The case of the defendants was that thJiuit schedule properties were purchased 31 Dr.GRkJ AS No-267 of 201I & x4bj (sR) No.Esst of20l1(l-A- No.lof20II) by the defendants in their childhood through their father Sri C.Ramachandra Reddy from the pattadars Fakir Mohammed and Mumtaz Ali, sons of Mir Abbas Ali for a valid consideration in the year 1g56. Their father Sri c.Ramachandra Reddy was the protected tenant in respect of the lands owned by Fakir Mohammed and Mumtaz AIi and as Sri C.Ramachandra Reddy was holding agricultural lands more than the standard holding as required under the AP Land (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, therefore, their father relinquished his protected tenancy rights in respect of the suit schedule properties and some other properties' Thereafter, the said properties, which were retinquished by Sri C.Ramachandra Reddy, were purchased not only by the defendants, but the plaintiff also purchased some of his lands' Therefore, the plaintiff, their father, nor grandfather were not having any right, title or interest in the suit schedule properties and the suit schedule properties were their absolute properties.

30. The defendants in proof of their contention had examined themselvesasDws.land2andgotmarkedExs.BltoB40.Ex.B2is theagreementofsaleandEx.B3isitstranslation.Ex.B3_translation would disclose that the land owners Fakir Mohammed and Mumtaz Ali hadexecutedthesaiddocument.TheystatedthatChetkuri 32 Dt.CRR,l oI20l1 & X4bj (SR) No.855t oI20l I (1.A. No.a of20l t) ^"0-267 AS Ramachandra Reddy, the father of the plaintiff and defendants was the protected tenant of their lands and in view of their request, the above named Reddy waived his claim as tenant in their favor through a separate document executed on 01.02.1955 and they agreed to sell the same to Smt.Savitramma (defendant No.1), D/o.Lachamma, for a sale consideration of Rs.333-5-6l- and received half of the sale consideration amount in cash in lump sum and.handed over free and vacant possession of the aforesaid lands in Survey Nos.218, 219,224,225,226 and 227 admeasuring Ac.l2-01 guntas to the said Savitramma (defendant No.l). In a similar manner, they also executed Ex.B20 agreement of sale in favor of defendant No.2. Ex.B21 is its translation. 3 [. Leamcd Senior Counsel for the appellant - plaintiff contended that the surrender of the tenancy by Sri C.Ramachandra Reddy in favor of the landlords was not in accordance with Section 19 of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. The above documents under Exs.B2 and B20 were brought into existence. They could not have been validated under Section 50-B of the Tenancv Act after 31.03.1972 and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramchandra Keshav Adke (dead) by LRs. and others v. Govind Joti Chavare and others (1 supra), wherein it was held that: 'J D..GRR,J AS No,267 o! 201I & X-Obj (SR) No.r 5 t I of 201 I (l-/t' No l oI Z0l I) "A surrender of tenancy by a tenant in order to be valid and effective must fulfill these requirements: Firstly, it must be in writing; Secondly, it must be verificd before the mamlatdar; thirdly, while making such verification the mamlatdar must satisfi himself in regard to two things, namely, (a) that the tenant understands the nature and conpequences of the surrender, and (b) that it is voluntary, and fourthly, the mamlatdar must endorse his finding as to such satisfaction upon the document of surrender. The language of Section 5(3)(b) and Rule 2-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agdculturat Lands Act, 1948 was absolute' explicit and peremptory. The words "provided that" read with words "shall be", repeatedly used in Section 5(3)(b), make the termination of tenancy by surrender entirely subject to the imperative conditions laid down in the proviso. This proviso throws a benevolent ring of protection around tenants lt is designed to protect a tenant on two fronts against two types of dangers - one against possible coercion, undue influence and trickery proceeding from the tandlord, and the other against thc tenant's own ignorance, improvidence and attitude of helpless self-resignation stemming from his weaker position in the tenant-landlord relationshiP. Thus, the imperative language, the beneficent purpose and impodance of these provisions for efficacious implementation of the general scheme of the Act, all unerringly lead to the conclusion that they were intended to be mandatory' Neglect of any of these statutory requisites would be fatal' Disobedience of even one of these mandates would render the surrender invalid and ineffectual- 34 Dr.GRA,l lts No-267 of20t t & xQhj (SR) No.Esst of20Il (t.A. No.1 of20tt) On I'acts, the requirement as to the recording of its satisfaction by the authority in the manner prescribed by the rule, was the substance of the matter and not an empty formality. In the absence of the requisite endorsement, therefore- it cannot be said that therc has been even a substantial compliance with the statul ory requirements. Wherc a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, thc thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. Intcntion of the legislature to prohibit the veriftcation of the surrender in a manncr other than the one prcscribed, is implicd in thesc pror,,isions. Failure 1o comply with these mandatory provisions, therefore. had vitiated thc surrender and rendered it nonest for the purpose of Section 5(3)(b)."

32. Leamed Senior Counsel for the appellant further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Babu Parasu Kaikadi (dead) by LRs. v. Babu (dead) through LRs. (2 supra), wherein it was held that: "6. Section 29 of the Act, as noticed hereinbefore, postulates taking over of possession by the landlord from the tenant only in accordance with procedure prescribed therefor. In the event, the surrender made by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant in favor of the respondent is found to be invalid; thc possession thereof obtained by the later pursuant to or in furtherance thereof shall also be invalid. In such an event, although the landlord takes physical possession of the land. the right to possess the same. remains with the tcnant. He could 35 Dt.GRR,l AS NL267 of 201I & XQbi (SR) No.ttst of2ot t (t-A. Ndt of Nt I) recover possession of the said land in accordance with law Thc said Act is a beneficent statute. It should be construed in favor of the tenant and against the landlord. The protection given to the tenant in terms of the said Act must be given full effect So construed, the expression possession' would also include right of possession. The view which we have taken is fortified by the decisions of this Court in Ramchandra Keshav Adke (dead) by Lrs & Ors' v, Govind Joti Chavare & Ors.' [1975] I SCC 559; Bhagwant Pundalik & Anr. v' Kishan Ganpat Bharaskal & Ors., [1971] I SCC 15 and in Atrdul Ajij Shaikh Jumma & Anr. v. Dashrath Indas Nhavi & Ors'' AIR (1987) SC 1626 and thus the consistent view had been that the surrender by the tenant for being legal must be in confomrity with the provisions contained in Sections 15 and 29 of the Act.

7. In Ram Chandra Keshav Adke (supra) the question arosc for consideration was whether the alleged surrender by the tenant was valid. This Court after interpreting Section 5 (3) (b) and Rule 2-A was of the view that the amendment was brought with a view to protecting the tenant on two fronts against two types of danger - one against possible coercion' undue influence and trickery proceedings from the landlord and other against the tenant's own ignorance, improvidence and attitude of helpless self- resignation stemming fiom his weaker the tenant-landlord relationship and' position in therefore, Sections 15 and 29 are mandatory in nature and any departure from this would make the surrender invalid' It was also held that the imperative language, the beneficent purpose and importance of these provisions for ellicacious implementation of the general scheme of the Act; - all unerringly lead to the conclusion that they were intended to be i 36 I,LGRR,J AS 110-267 of20ll & xobj (SR) No.85st of 20t t (1.A. No-4of20t t) mandatory. Neglect of any of these statutory requisites would be fatal. Disobedience of even one of these mandates would render the surrender invalid and ineffectual and thc consequence of the violation of the mandatory provisions namely Sections 15 and 29 would bc that the surrender would be rendered nonest for the purpose of Section 5(3)(b) and Rule 2-A.

13. The teamed Judges although touched upon the question as rcgards obtaining legal possession, unfortunately failed* to notice the mandatory provisions of Sections l5 & 29 of the Act. Once it is held that the provisions of Scctions 15 &29 are 'nrandatory, it goes withoul saying that posscssiou obtained by the landlord in violation of such mandatory provisions would bc illegat. A Statute, as is wcll known, must be read in its entiret)'. The expression "Dispossession" having regard to the text and context of the Act cannot be given its natural meaning. 'Ihe High Court arrived at a finding of fact that the appellant herein had satisfied all the requirements as contaiued in Section 32 (1-B) ofthe Act. The l{igh Court, however. relying on or on the basis of the decision of this Court in Dhondiram Totoba Kadamv. Ramchandra Balwantrao Dubal l(1994) 3 SCC 3661, dismissed the appeal of the appellant. 'l'he Iligh Court, as noticed hereinbefore, however, felt that the question raiscd is of great general importance.

18. Furthermore, this Court, while rendering judgment in Dhondiram Totoba Kadam (supra), rvas bound by its earlier decision of Co-ordinate Bench in Ramchandra Keshav Adke (supra). We are bound to follow the earlier judgment which is precisely on the point in preference to the later judgment which has been rendered without adequate argument 37 Dt GRA,I AS No.257 of 2011 & Xobj (S R) No tssl of 2ot , (1. /- No.t oJ 201 I ) at the bar and also without reference to the mandatory provisions ofthe Act.

22. In view of our findings that the decision in Dhondiram Totoba Kadam (supra) had been rendered per incuriam and did not create a binding precedent, the judgment of the High Court having been rested solely thereon cannot be sustained' It is set aside accordingly. For the aforementioned reasons, the appeal deserves to be a[[owed. The appeal is allowed accordingly, judgment under challenge is set aside' There shall be no order as to costs."

33. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Musunuri Satyanarayana v. Dr.Tirumala Indira Devi and others (3 supra), wherein it was held that: "40, An identical view was expressed by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, in Madhao Tatya Sonar v' Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal Nagpur & Ors [1969 SCC Online Bom 100 : 1970 Mah LJ 99ll white interpreting provisions of Sections 20 arrd 16 Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act (Bombay XCIX of 1958). Again, later, in Ramchandra Keshav Adke & Ors vs Govind Joti Chavare (1975) I SCC 5591, the primacy' and imperative nature of such provisions was underlined, by this Court in the follouing terms: "12. It witl be seen fiom a combined reading of these provisions that a surrender of tenancy by a tenant in 38 DLGRR,J AS No.267 oI20l I & x0bj (SR) No.65tl oI20t t (t A No.l ol20tt) order to be valid and effective must fulfill these requirements: (1) I1 must be in writing. (2) [t must be verified belore the Mamlatdar. (3) Whilc making such verification the Mamlatdar must satisfy himsclf in regard to two things, namely, (a) that the tenant undcrstands the nature and consequenccs of the. surrender. and (b) that it is voluntary. (4). The Mamlatdar must cndorse his finding as to such satisfaction upon the document of surrender. ++t

24. Next point to be considered is. what is thc consequence of noncompliance with this mantlatory procedurc'l

25. A century ago, in Taylor v. Taylor (t875 LR I ChD 426). Jassel M. R. adopted the rulc that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a ccrtain way. the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that othcr methods of performancc are necessarily forbidden. This rule has stood the tcst of tirne. [t was applied by the Privy Council, in Nazir Ahnred v Empcror (AIR 1936 P. C. 253) and later bv this Court in several cases (Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya_Pradesh [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1098: Deep Chand v State of Rajasthan|962) S.C.l{. 662), to a Magistrate making a record undcr Scctions 164 md 364 of the Codc of Criminal Proccdure. 1898. This rule squarely applies "where, indeed, the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated i[ the command to do the thing in a particular mamer did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other.(Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, I ith Edn.. 39 Dt.GRRl tS No 267 of 20l t & xtbl (SR) No.E5st of 201 t (t.A. No.4 of 20 I I ) pp,362-363). The rule will be attracted with full force in the present case because non-verification of the surrender in the requisite manner would frustrate the very purpose of this provision. Intention of the legislature to prohibit the verification ofthe surrender in a manner other than the one prescribed, is implied in these provisions. Failure to comply with these mandatory provisions, therefore, had vitiated the surrender and rendered it nonest. . ."

34. But, however, the protected tenant Ramachandra Reddy never questioned the sale transactions entered by the defendants nor laised any claim as a protected tenant during his lifetime. The counter filed by him in C.C.No.266511175 before the Land Reforms Tribunal (South), Hyderabad, marked under Ex.B19 on the other hand would disclose that he stated that: "8. Further, the declarant is not concemed with Survey Nos.207, 2O9, 212, 213. 216, 21'7, 222, 223, 218, 219, 224' 225,226 and 227 situated at Kongara Khurd village and 50-R certificate was issued in the names of Dayanand Reddy, Savitramma and DamaYanthamma."

35. Thus, he stated that he was not concemed with the above lands and admitted about the 50-B certificates issued in the names of defendants I and 2. Thus, the protected tenant Ramachandra Reddy never raised any objection for the sale of the said properties' as he was 40 Dr.GRR,l AS No.267 of 20) I & X4bj (SR) No 85st o!201t (t.A. No 4 of20tI) holding more than the ceiling limit and he himself got the properties purchased in the name of the defendants, none other than his daughters with a view to retain the properties in his family.

36. Ex.B5, the Faisal Patti, reflected the transactions entered by the paftadars Fakir Mohammt:d and Mumtaz Ali. As per the above document, Fakir Mohammed and Mumtaz Ali also alienated Survey Nos.2l0, 2ll, 253, 259, 260, 261 and 262 apart from the suit schedule properties i.e. Survey Nos.212, 213,216,217, 2lB, 219, 222,223, 224, 225,226 and,227. In Ex.B6, which was also Faisal patti for the year 1985-86, the purchases made by the defendants were shown and the purchase of Suruey Nos.2 10, 2ll, 253, 259, 260 and 26 I in rhe name of the plaintiff i.e. C.Madhav Reddy, S/o.Ramachandra Reddy. was also shown which would disclose that, not only the defendants but the plaintiff also purchased the protected tenancy lands from Fakir Mohammed and Mumtaz Ali and obtained sale certificates regularizing the said sale. In Exs.B5 and 86, the sale certificate numbers obtained under Exs.B4 and 822 were also recorded, which would disclose that the plaintiff was well within his knowledge with regard to the purchases made by the defendants by 1985-86 itself as per the Faisal patti of the said years. But surprisingly, the plaintiff had pleaded in his plaint that 4l Dt.GRR,t AS No 25, of20ll tk xQbj (SR) No.85 s t of 20 t I (IA Nat oI 20 t t ) he came to know about the entry of the names of the defendants in the revenue records only when he approached the MRO, Maheshwaram Mandal after the interference by the defendants through their respective sons on 17.09.2005.

37. In Ex.B1 declaration made by the plaintiff with regard to the lands held by him and his family under AP Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, the schedule properties in Survey Nos.2 1 2, 213, 21 6, 21 7, 2 | 8, 2l g, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226 and 227 w ere not shown either as ancestral properties or lands held by Ramachandra Reddy as a protected tenant. But, he declared the purchase of lands by himaspertheentriesinExs.B5and86.Ifatallthesuitschedule properties were the properties of Sri C' Ramachandra Reddy and held by him as a protected tenant, certainly the plaintiff would have declared the said properties as family properties. Survey Nos'210, 2ll' 253' 259' 260,261 and262 were shown as purchases made by him' He had shown the other properties of the family'

38.UnderExs.B33andB34,thedocumentstyledasaffidavit filed by Ramachandra Reddy, he submitted that his daughters Smt.Damayanthamma and Savitramma applied for validation of sale of 42 DTGRR,J AS No267 of20Il & X4bj (SR) io. E 5s t oI 20 t t (t-A. No-l oI 20 t t ) lands in Survey Nos.212, 213, 216,217, 218,, 219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226 and 227 situn;ted at Kongara Khurd village under Section 50-B of the Tenancy and Ceiling on Agricultural Lands Holding Act, and he had no objection for validation of the sale. If at all, C.Ramachandra Reddy had not relinquished his protected tenancy rights certainly he would not have any occasion to give such an affidavit before the revenue authorities.

39. Further Exs.B35 and 836 are the applications made by the defendants dated 14.12.1966 for grant of 50-B certificate. The said certificates were received by the plaintiff himself on 26.05.1976 as per the endorsement made on them. The same would disclose that the plaintiff himself received the validation of sale certificate ttnder Section 50-B of the Act on behalf of the defendants. The names of thc defendants were entered in the revenue records as pattadars and it was never questioned by Ramachandra Reddy or the plaintiff. Admittedly, the plaintiff had not pleaded about the invalidity o1-the surrender of protected tenancy rights by his father Ramachandra Reddy under Section 19 of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. No rejoinder was filed by the plaintiff when the defendants filed their written statement pleading about the same. No issue was framed and no evidence rvas led by the 43 D.-CRR-l AS No 26, oI20lI & x4bj (SR) No.r5Jt oI20t I (1.A. h"o.1 of20t t) plaintiff in support of the said plea. As such, the contention raised by the leamed Senior counsel for the appellant - plaintiff with regard to the invalidity of surrender of protected tenancy rights by the protected tenant as required under Section 19 of Tenancy and Ag:icultural Lands Act' would not stand to ground, as the protected tenant never raised such objection during his lifetime and never challenged the 50-B certificates issued in favor of his daughters. As such, the objection raised by the leamed counsel for the appellant - plaintiff fails'

40. Leamed Senior Counsel for the respondents - defendants relied upon the judgment of the Hon'bte Apex Court in M/s'Cauvery Coffee Traders, Mangalore v. M/S.Hornor Resources ([nternational) Company Limited (5 supra) on the aspect that the plaintiff, who had taken the advantage under the order ofthe Land Reforms Tribunal, is not entitled to question the 50-B certificates issued to the defendants on the principles of approbate and reprobate' In the above judgment' the Hon'bleApexCourtbyplacingrelianceuponitsearlierjudgment'held "33. In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, AIR 1993 SC 352, this Court has observed as under:- "10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine 44 D.-GRR,l AS tio-267 of201l & Es s t of 20 t I (1.A. No.4 of 20 t t ) X-Obj (SR) ^o of election which postulates that no pafty can zrccept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is ralid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then tum round and say it is void. for thc purpose of seouring some other advantage."

34. A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot and cold". "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effcot otr hirn of such contract or conveyance or order. This rulc is applied to do equity, howcver, it must not be applied in a tnanncr as kl violate the principles of right and good consciencc. (Vide: Nagubai Ammal& Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593r C.I.T. Vs. MR. P. Firm Maur, AIR 1965 SC 1216; Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service' Amravati & Ors., AII{ 1969 SC 329; P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti. AIR 1998 SC 2979; Babu llam v. Indrapal Singh, AIR 1998 SC 3021; Chairman and MD, NTPC Ltd. v. Reshmi (-'onstructions, Builders & Contractors, AIR 2004 SC ll30: Ramesh Chandra Sankla& Ors. v. Vikram Cement & Ors,, AIR 2009 SC 713; and Pradeep Oil Corporation v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., (201 l) 5 SCC 270).

35. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppels - the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine of estoppel by cleclion is one of the species of estoppels in pais (or equitablc estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be 45 Dt GRR,! AS No.267 ol 201 I & xtbj (SR) No.rsst oI20tI (I A. No.4 ol20tt) precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had." 4l . The principle stated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above case is aptly applicable to the facts of this case. The plaintiff cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold or approbate and reprobate after taking advantage under the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal' As such, he is not entitled to question the 50-B certificates issued to the defendants 1 and2.

42. As such, point No.l is answered holding that the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief of declaration of title and consequential injunction as owner and possessor of the suk schedule properties, as prayed by him.

43. Point No.2: Whether the appellant - plaintiff is entitled to claim the alternative relief of declaration of his title by way of adverse Possession? The plaintiff pleaded that he was in long and continuous possession of the suit schedule properties for more than 16 years and perfecte d his title by way of PrescriPtion by adverse possession. To seek 46 D. cRR,t AS Na267 of20lI & X1bj (SR) \'o.85iI o!2011 (t a No-! oI20ll) title by way of adverse possession, one has to establish that he has been in continuous uninterrupted possession of property for more than 12 years to the knowledge of the true owner. He must atso assert hostile title to the knowledge of the true owner. The plea of adverse possession itself pre-suggests that he was admitting the ownership of the adverse party over the suit schedule properties. Except the bald statement that he was in continuous possession for more than 16 years and perlected his titte by way of adverse possession, nothing was pleaded by the ptaintiff as to when he came into possession of the propefty, when his attitude became hostile to the knowledge of the true owner nol established any overt acts to show that he squatted over the property u,,ith an intention to claim prescriptive title by adverse possession.

44. The plaintiff hled Exs.Al to A13 pahani patrikas to prove his possession. Exs.Al to A13 pahanies would show that the names of the defendants 1 and 2 were recorded in the pattadar colunrn and in some of the pahanies i.e. Ex.A3 the pahani for the year 2000-01. tl.re column of possessor was recorded as "nil" and in the pahani for the year 1999- 2000, the name of the plaintiff was struck off and in the pahani for the year 1998-99 and 1992-93, the name ofhis younger brother Harikrishna Reddy was also shown as in possession of the suit schedule properties. 47 Dt.GRR.J AS No.267 of 201I & X4bj (SR) No.tsst ol 20l I (L1. No a o! 20t 1)

45. Thus Exs.Al - A13 would not show the continuous uninterrupted possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule properties. The plaintiff had not challenged the act of the revenue authorities when his name was rounded off by them' Exs'B3O and 83 I and the pahani patrikas filed by the defendants for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06 would establish that the defendants were shown as pattadars and possessors of the suit schedule properties. The said entries were never questioned by the plaintiff nor he led any evidence to disprove the same.

46. Leamed Senior Counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v' Government of India and Others (7 supra), wherein it was held that: "l1. In the eye of law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion Non- use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when anothcr person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile titte in denial of the title of true owner' It is a well- settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is 'nec vi, nec clam' necprecario', that is, peaceful, open and continuous' The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in 48 DTGRR,J AS No.262 ol201l & xobj (sR) No.6s5t ofzqt t (I-A. No.4 oI20I t) extent to show that their possession is adverse to the truc owncr. Il must start with a wrongful dispossossion of thc rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusivc, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (See: S M Karim v. Bibi Sakinal [AIR 1964 SC 1254], Parsinni v. Sukhi[(i993) 4 SCC 375 and D.N.Venkatarayappa v. Stiite of Karnataka, 10997) 7 SCC 567). Physical fact of exclusive possession and Ihe animus possidendi to hold as owrer in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of lact and lau'. Thcreforc, a person who claims adverse possession should shou (a) on what date he came into possession. (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of posscssion was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession rvas open and undisturbed. A person plcading advcrse posscssion has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights ol' truc ou,ner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. (Dr. Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma (1996) 8 SCCl28).

12. A Plaintiff filing a title suit should be very clear about the