The High Court · 2025

THE IlON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUWADI SRIDEVI CFllMlNAL REVISION CASE No.67 6 ot 2025 ORDER: Petition,-.r filed this Criminal Revision Case see<ing to quash the docket orcler, dated 28.06.2025 passed in C.C.No.6274 of 2025 by the learned Chief Judicial tvlagistrate at Hyderabad.

2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Putlic Prosecutor appearing for the respondentstate. Perused the record-

3. The de faclo complainant is the sister of accused No..l . The case of the lrrosecution, in brief, is that accused No..l , a Bank employee, manipulated fixed deposit receipts created by his father, wherein the de: facto complainant was the nominee. Falsely claiming that the original FDRs were missing, he obtained duplicate FDRs from the Bank. Thereafter, he transferred the amounls of the said FDRs into the account of the petitioner-accused No.j2, who is his close associat,:.

4. Basing on the said complaint, a case in Crime No.21 9 of 2025 was registerec and investigation was taken up. After r;ompletion of investigation, c:harge sheet was filed against the accus,:d before the [\4agistrate crtncerned. The learned Magistrate has taken 'l 2 cognizance, and numbered as C.C.No .6274 ot 2025 and issued summons to the accused by docket order, dated 2g.06 2025, which reads as follows: 5 "Register as C.C.No.62t4 of 2g?7 Taken on fite for the offence !!::!?t, 11?(?), 317(2)of BNS asarnsr 41 and 42 /ssue summons to 41 and 42. Catt on 07.11.2025.,, Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of taking cognizance directing for issuance of process by the learned tVtagistrate, the petitioner has preferred this revision. learned cou nsel for

6. Submissions of the petitioner: 6.'l . There are disputes between accused No.1 and the de facto complainant, which are purely civil in nature, arising out of family issues, but the present complaint was lodged by the de facto complainant giving a criminal colour. The petitioner, a crose friend of accused No.'l , had advanced a loan of.Rs.21 ,O4,OOO!_ to accused No.'l between March and December 2023, through bank transfers and cash, supported by receipts. Out of the total amount, on 22.05.2025. On 27.052025, the petitioner's bank account was frozen, and on enquiry, he came to know about the present proceedings. Despite his name not being mentioned in the complaint or in the statements of witnesses, he has been arrayed as accused in the charge sheet, without attributing any specific rore, except stating that accused No.1 Rs.'18,50,000/- was repaid E { 3 I transferred thr> misappropriated amounts into the account of the petitioner

6.2. The learned tt/agistrate has taken cognizance' against the petitioner, without application of mind into the material on record and assigning any valid reasons. ln support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bhafti Mittal v. Cenlral Bureau of lnvestigationl and drawn attention of this Court to prrragraph Nos.45, 46 and 53, which reads thus:

45. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the r'ssle of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for procee<ling. Ihls Section relates to commencement of a crimina, procecding. lf the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (il may be the Magistrate receiving the coritplaint or to whom ,t has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e., the co,nplainl, examination of the complainant and his wllnesses if present, or repoft cf inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall rssue ,rrocess against the accused.

46. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or re'fusal of proces: and it must be judicially exercised. A person ought not to be dagged into Couft merely because a complaint hits been filed. lf a prima facie case has been made ou| the Megistrate ought 'o issue process and it cannot be refused merely becaust he thinks that it is unlikely to result in a convict:on.

53. However, the words "sufficient grounds for proceeding" appeanng in the Section are of immense impoftance. /t is lhese words tvhich amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficie,rt basls for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion ls to be slaled in the order itself. The order is liable to be scf aside if no reaso, is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case against accused, though the order need not contain detaited reasors. A fotiiori, 'elR20t5 suPREllE cotlR I g2i r 4 the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie inconect." \

6.3. Hence, he prayed to set aside the cognizance order, dated

28.06.2025 and to quash the proceedings against the petitioner

7. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the present revision is not maintainable, as the order taking cognizance and issuance of process is an interlocutory order and thus barred under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. He further submitted that there are specific allegations against the petitioner, which require a full-fledged trial to determine their veracity. The learned Magistrate has rightly taken cognizance against the petitioner, and hence, he prayed to dismiss the revision.

8. ln reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order taking cognizance and issuance of process is not an interlocutory order but falls within the category of an intermediate or quasi-final order. Therefore, the bar under Section 397(2) ot Cr'P'C' would not apply, and the present revision is maintainable. ln support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raiendra Kumar Sitaram Pande and others v' Utlam and anothef, wherein, it is held that an order directing issuance of process is not purely interlocutory in nature, but rather an t ntR 1999 SUPREMD couRT Io28 /t 5 intermediate or quasi-final order, and therefore, the bar under sub- section (2) of Section 397 would not apply. Accordirrgly, it was urged that the F,resent revision is maintainable and deserves to be considered on merits

9. As tl-e point of maintainability has been raised, lwill take up this issue first. Whether an order taking cognizance and issuance of process is an interlocutory order and therefore not revisable under the revisiorral jurisdiction is a vexed question of law which on several occasions had been the subject matter of adjudication and the presen one is one such occasion. As the answer to this question ca'ries far reaching consequences, I prefer to examine the same in detrril. '10 Learned Additionar Pubric prosecutor submits that the revision is not mai-rtainable against the order taking cognizance and issuance of summons. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that law does not bar filing of a revision against order taking cogntzance and consequential order issuing summons. He further submits that the Courts have held ilrat one can prefer revislon aga nst order taking cogrrizance and issuin3 summons as the latter is not fully an interlocutory order. 6 Y-I] 11 Before adverting to answer the same, it is expedient to go through Sections 397(1) and (2) of Cr.P.C. and to consider the intenlion of the legislation in introducing this new provision under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. in the year 1973 and also to consider the object of the said legislation. Sections 397(1)and (2) Cr'P C reads as under: "section 397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision' (1) The High Coui or any Sessions Judge may call for and 'eiamine tie record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Courl situate within its or his tocal iurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, 'teg'ality or propri"ty of any finding' sentence or order' recorded oi passeO, and ai to the regularity of any proceedings. of such inferior Court, and may, when catling for such record, direct that the execution of any ientence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record' ' Explanation.- All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial' original or appellate iurisdiction, shall be urid *h"thu, "*"rcisiig deemed to be inferiorlo the Sessions Judge for the purposes of thls sub-section and of Section 398- (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shail not 'be exeicised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (s) . ."

12. A plain readlng of the aforesaid Section makes it clear that Section 397(1) of Cr.P.C. enables the aggrieved parties to question the correctness, legality or propriety of any flnding, sentence or order recorded or passed by the inferior Court before the revisional Court i.e., the High Court or the Sessions Judge as concurrent jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court and the Sessions Judge by the Section. Now, it is significant to note that Section 397(2) ot 7 Cr.P.C. man<lates that the power of revision conferred by sub- section (1) of Section 397 of Cr.P C. shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order in any appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceeding. Therefore, express bar is created by the legislation unJer Section 397(2) of Cr P.C to entertain revision against an intr:rlocutory order

13. Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C, newly introduced tn 1973, was enacted to prevent the misuse of revisional powers by stopping frequent chalkrnges to interlocutory orders. Prior to '1 9/3, there was no bar on filirrg revisions against interlocutory orders, leading to unnecessary clelays and stalling of trial proceedings. l3ased on the Law Commission's recommendation, this sub-section imposes an express bar orr revisional Courts from entertaining revrsions under Section 397(1) of Cr.P.C. against interlocutory orders. This aims to ensure the srnooth and uninterrupted progress of trials. While interpreting whether an order is interlocutory, final, or ntermediate, Courts must cc,nsider the legislative intent behind this provision. lt is a settled princiole of statutory interpretation that provisions must be construed in line with the object and purpose of the legislation Hence, in ass,-.ssing whether an order like taking cc,gnizance or issuing summons is interlocutory or intermediate/quasi-final, the 8 interpretation must align with the goal of preventing unnecessary revisions and ensuring efficient trial proceedings

14. The Supreme Court had the occasion to consider this question in the case of Amar Nath and Others. v. State of Haryana and Others3, wherein, it has been held as follows: The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to the what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Courl- The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal serious difficulty. lt has been used in various stalules including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Coutls and other like stalutes. ln Webster's New World. Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the pafiies concerning a parlicular aspect. lt seems lo us lhat the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or aftistic sense. /[ merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature whrch do not decide or touch the impodant rights or the liabilities of the pafties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides ceiain rights of the pafties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Couft against that order, because that would be against the very object, which formed the basrs for insertion of this pafticular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning w,Inesses, adjourning cases, passlng orders for bail, calling for repofts and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may nol doubt amount to inlerlocutory ordrs against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are malters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a pafticular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. 'atRt9z7sc2t85 I ) 9 1 5. The ter m 'interlocutory order' came up for interpretation again before the Slpreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtraa, in which, it is held as follows: The majority view is based upon the distinction poink>d out in the above order within the meaning of Arlicle 134(1)(:). While Bachar/at J., said at page 695. "lt is merely a preliminary step in the trtrosecution and therefore an inlerlocutory orders." Even though there may be a scope for expressing differenl oplions apropo; the nature of the order which was under consideration in Mohan Lal's case, in our judgment, undoubteldy, an order directinf the filing of a complaint after enquiry made under a provisicn of the 1973 Code, smilar to Section 476 of the 1898 Code vill not be an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2). The order wtll be clearly revisable by the Hgh Cour7. We must, however, hasten to add that the majorily decisiorr in Mohan Lal's case treals such an order finally conclucing the enguiry stafted to find out whether a ccmplaint should oe lodged or not, taking the prosecution launched on the filing of the complaint as a separate proceeding. From t,\at point of view the matter under drscussion may not be sa,:d to be squarell covered by the decision of this Courl in Mohan Lal's case. Ytt for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in comitg to the conclusion, after due consideration, that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the pafticular proceeding, will surely be not an itterlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2). Before we conclude we may point out an obvious, almost insurmauntable, difficulty in the way of applying literally the test, laid dovn in Kuppuswami Rao s case and in holding that an order oi the kind under consideration being not a final order must necessrily be an interlocutory one. lf a complaint is dlsmlss()d under Section 203 or under Section 204(4), or the Couft f,olds the proceeding to be void or discharlles the accusec, a revision to the High Cou at the inslanco of the complaitlant or the prosecutor would be competent, otherwise it will make Secflon 398 of the new Code otiose. Does it stand to reason, then, that an accused will have no remedy to move the High C<turl in revision or invoke its inherent power far the quashing of the criminal proceeding initiated upon a cc'mplaint or othenvise and which is fit to be quashed on the fact ol itz The legislatu.e lefl the power to order furlher inquiry intact in Sect ion 398. ls it not, then, in consonance with lhe sense o; justice to leave intact the remedy of the accused to move tlrc High Coutt foi sectting aside the order adversely made aganst him tl ' AIR 1978 sc 47 10 similar circumstances and to quash the proceeding? The answer must be given in favour of the just and reasonable view expressed by us above. \

16. ln Rajendra Kumar Sitaram pande,s case (2 supra), at paragraph No.6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

6. Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should, therefore, be exercised within the four corners of Scction 397, whenever there has been miscarriage of justice in whatever manner. Under sub-section (2) of Section 397, there is a prohibition to exercise revisional jurisdiction against any interlocutory order so that inquiry or trial may proceed without any delay. But the expression 'interlocutory order' has not been defined in the Code. ln Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1978) 1 SCR 222 . (AlR 1977 SC 2185), this Coutl has hetd that the expression 'interlocutory order' in Section 397(2) has been used in a restricled sense and not in a broad or aftistic sense and merely denotes orders ol purely interim or temporary nature which do nol decide or touch the imporlant rights or liabilities of the padies and any order which substantially affects the right of lhe pafties cannot be said lo be an 'interlocutory order'. ln Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1975) 1 SCR 749 . (AlR 1978 SC 47), alhree Judge Bench of this CourT has held an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepled will conclude the pafticular proceeding cannot be held to be an inlerlocutory order. ln V.C. Shukla v. Stale (1980) 2 SCR 380r (AlR 1980 SC 962), this Court has hetd that the term 'interlocutory order' used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial and the revisional power of the High Courl or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final. This being the posilion of law, il would not be appropriate to hotd thal an order directing issuance of process is purely interlocutory and, therefore, the bar u,der sub-secfion (2) of Section 397 woutd apply. On the other hand, it must be held to be intermediate or quasi final and, therefore, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 could be exercised against the same. The High Coutt, therefore, was not justified in coming to the conclusion fhat lhe Sesslons Judge had no jurisdiction to inbiere with lhe order in view of the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code.

17. Thus, it is evident from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments that the order which affects the 11 rights of the lrarties is not an interlocutory order. The order taking cognizance arrd issuance of process against the accused persons in initiating an action which affecls/adjudicates the rights of the accused canrot be said to be an interlocutory order lnterlocutory order is an order of purely interim or temporary nature which does not decide or adjudicate the important rights or liabilities of the parties. The o'der of the Magistrate directing issuance of process is not interlocutory, it is intermediate or quasi-final, as such, it can be safely construed that the revision against the said order is maintfinable. l-hus, I hold that the present revision is nraintainable 18 As I h ave held that this revision is maintainable, now I proceed to e>lamine the issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance against the petitioner, 'ruithout application of mind into the mate.ial on record and assigning any valid reasons.

19. As seen from the cognizance order, dated 28.06.2025, it does not appear that the learned Magistrate has applied mind and nothing was mentioned in the order regarding the facts of the case, which prompted the learned Magistrate to take cogrrizance. The order of issuarrce of process is not an empty formality and it is a senous tssue lhe Court cannot take cognizance and summon the 12 accused to face criminal trial without giving any cogent reasons. The order taking cognizance though not required to be elaborate should reflect proper reasons for taking cognizance of the offence. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunit Bhafti,s case (1 supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, as in the present case also, without assigning any convincing reasons, the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance against the petitioner herein and issued summons to him.

20. Accordingly, this Criminal Revision Case is allowed, setting aside the cognizance order, dated 28.06.2025 passed in C.C.No.6274 of 2025 by the learned Chief Judiciat Magistrate at Hyderabad and the matter is remanded back to the Court of Chief Judicial t\tlagistrate at Hyderabad for fresh consideration in accordance with law, based on the evidence on record and pass a reasoned order for the purpose arriving at a finding as to whether case for taking cognizance of the alleged offences and for issuance of process against the petitioner has been made or not. lt is made clear that the learned Magistrate shall not be influenced by any observations made by this Court in this order. 13 - Pendirrg miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand SD/. A. SR AS9I$I if+'N:I.EFRRX /ITRUE COPY// SECTION O FFICER closed To, 1 . The Chitrf Judicial Magistrate' Hyderabad ' 2. The Station House Officer' Chatrinaka Police Station' Hyderabad 1 Two CCi to the Public Prosecutor' High Court for the State ot Telangana at 4. One CC to Sri Baglekar Akash Kumar' Advocate IOPUSl 5. Two CC CoPies HYderai ad [OU I 1 o. NVB HIGH COUIRT DATED:06 t1012025 ORDER CRLRC.No.676 of 2025 :::i:. S,,';. \ I rk: Y ;_. L,, a 1,,'l !:-7 i,, -i :. 7, [ ! r]ilT 206 ...- ALLOWING THE CRIMINAL REVISION CASE (- ,l^