The High Court · 2025

Judgment

This Appeal Suit is filed challenging the judgment dated

26.03.2002 made in O.S.No.416 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District

2. The appellant herein is plaintiff, and respondr:nt herein IS defendant, in O.S.No.416 ol 1994. For thr: sake o[ convenience, the parlies herein are referred to as arrayed in

3. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff instituted O.S.No.416 of 1994 seeking specific performance of an Agreement of Sale dated O8.12.1993 execu ted by the defendant, concerning one acre of agricultural land located in Survey Nos.218/ | and 22lll of Sahebnagar Kalan Village, Hayathnagar Mandal. The total sale considera tion was Rs.2,50,000/ - of which Rs.S0,OOO/- was paid at the time o[ agreement and the remaining Rs.2,00,000/- was tr be paid in four scheduled installments. Clause 7 of the itgreemen t emphasized that time was of the essence, and Clause 8 2

imposed an obligation on the defendant to clear any disputes affecting ownership before execution of the sale deed.

4. At the time of agreement, litigation was already pending against defendant, including Inam Appeal No.B3/777a/93 filed by Kongara Ramulu and others challenging the grant of occupancy rights in her favor under the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 (for short 't-he Act'). The plaintiff and his brothers also initiated Case No.A/ IllS/94 under Section 32 claiming protected tenancy over the same land. The piaintiff asserted that despite being ready and willing to pay the remaining consideration, the defendant failed to resolve these disputes and attempted to alienate the land elsewhere, while demanding a higher price citing escalation in market value. In the written statement, the defendant admitted 5. execution of the agreement and receipt of the initial Rs.50,O00/ - but denied that the litigation was pending, contending that the appeal had already been dismissed and that the patta continued in her name. She contended that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the litigation and had even 3 participated in earlier revenue proceedings. Sh,: :rlso denied the plaintiff s ciaim of willingness, alleging failure to pay the balance consideration within the contractual time frame However, she stated that she was still willing trt execute the sale deed, provided the plaintiff paid the remaining Rs.2,00,000/ - with interest at 24%o per annum

6. Upon hearing both sides, the trial Court framed the following issues: 1 11 111 Whether t}re plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the agreement dated 08.12.1993; Whether the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract; Whether the defendant was entitled to tlre balance consideration .with 24% interest; lV. To what relief was the plaintiff entitled.

7. During triai, the plaintiff got himself examined as PW1 and marked Exs.Al to A7 including the agreement, payment receipts, legal notices, and order of this Court. lt was stated that Ex.A7 receipt was introduced only during 4 cross-examination and bore unexplained overwriting and substitutions of names, parentage, and iocality. It was hled belatedly on I4.O2.2OO2 i.e., the day the defendant was cross- examined. The trial Court found this document manipulated and inadmissible, viewing it as an attempt to falsely establish part performance during litigation.

8. The trial Court noted contradictions between pleadings and oral testimony, especially regarding the plaintiffs readiness and willingness, and held that the plaintiff, having entered into the agreement with full knowledge of litigation, could not rely on Clause 8 to justify non-payment, and that his failure to honor the installment schedule and fabrication of Ex. A7 undermined his claim. The trial Court rejected the relief of specifrc performance, emphasizing that such relief is discretionar5r and grounded in equity. However, invoking Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act and considering the general prayer for "other reliefs," the trial Court ordered refund of the advalce payment of Rs.50,O0O/- along with 18% per annum interest from the date of suit till realization, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Aggrieved thereby, this I 5 Appeal Suit is filed by the appellants who are defendants in the suit. 9 Heard Sri MRS.Srinivas, learned counsel for appellant, and Sri D.Jagan Mohan Reddy, learned (lounsel for respondent. 1O. Learned counsel for appellant submitte,l that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is contrary to law, unsupported by the weight of evidence, and ::nconsistent with the probabilities of the case. He further submitted that the trial Court had failed to properly appreciate the respective contentions advanced by both parties and had disregarded the evidence adduced by the appellant. He asserted that the execution of the agreement dated Og.l2.1gg3 stood admitted by the respondent, who had, in her writlen statement, agreed to execute the sale deed upon payment of 24o/o inte,rest on the sale consideration, and that the said admission reinforced the appellant's claim for a decree of specific performance.

11. Learned counsel for appellalt incessantly contended that the respondent, during her deposition, admitted the 6 existence of a pending revision before this Court concerning the issuance of the occupancy certihcate, and averred that this fact reflected that the litigalion surrounding the scheduled property had not yet been resolved, and therefore, there existed sufhcient cause for the appellant's non-compliance with Clause 8 of the agreement' He pointed out that the trial Court ought to have appreciated this impediment and granted the relief of specilic performance. He reiterated that the trial Court erred in concluding that there were discrepancies between the averments in the plaint and the evidence on record. He placed emphasis on the finding of interpolation in Ex.A7 , which evidenced payment of Rs.32,00O/-, and described the same as unjust and lacking legal justification. He submitted that the contention of appellant in respect of part-payment had been supported by documentation, and the denial of relief on this ground is unwarralted.

12. Learned counsel for appellant contended that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations, despite there being no pleading or evidence from the respondent to that effect. In addition, he averred that the f / Y 7 absence of any demand from the respondent for payment of the balance sale consideration further disproved tae allegation of non-readiness. He emphasized that the failure of appellant to pay the balance amount was directly attributable to the unresolved litigation before various authorities, arid once such impediments were cleared, the appellant remained ready and willing to complete the transaction. He lamented that the respondent had never questioned the financial capacity of appellant to pay the balance consideration, and ir-r view of the same, the refusal to grant specif,rc performance r;n irrelevant and extraneous grounds amounted to a misapplication of judicial discretion under Section 20 of tlie Specific Reiief Act. Therefore, he prayed this Court to allow this appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment.

13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent, vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for appellant, and contended that the eLgreement of sale dated Oa.12.1993 (Ex.Al) clearly stipulated, through Clause 7 , tLlat the transaction was to be concluded by 08.10. 1994, with "time being the essence of tlLe contract." However, the plaintiff issued notice on 31.08. 1994 (Ex. Aa), 8 and curiously, frled the suit for specific performance prematurely on 12.09.1994, i.e., prior to the contractual deadline. He further contended that there was no cause of action on the date of ftling, and hence, the suit was liable to be dismissed for want of jurisdictional foundation. He asserted that the statement regarding willingness to execute the sale deed was conditional, and subject to payment of balance sale consideration with 24o/o interest, and did not amount to an unequivocal admission. He reiterated that the written statement made it abundantly clear that the piaintiff had not demonstrated readiness and willingness, but was instead waiting for litigation to conclude before proceeding with payment obligations.

14. In addition, he averred that Clause 8 of the agreement referred only to potential future litigation, and not pending disputes, and that the plaintiffs attempt to invoke Clause 8 in justification of delayed performance was legally untenable. He submitted that the litigation cited did not impede execution of the sale deed and could not be used to avoid timely payment of the balance sale consideration. He further submitted that the plaintiffs conduct evinced an unwillingness to perform his

7./ ./ / 9 part of the contract, and despite pleading readir,ess, Ex' A'4, the plaint, and oral evidence, including cross-r:xamination, would show that the piaintiff was hesitant and intended to pay only after litigation was resolved. He emphasilred that the plaintiff failed to adhere to the agreed payme:rt schedule, having paid only the initial advance , but not a single instailment of the four stipulated.

15. Learned counsel for respondent reiterated that the plaintiff faiied to establish the availability of funds at any relevant time, and although certain dates were rnentioned in the plaint as instances when payment was allegedly offered, these were conspicuously absent from Ex.A4 and the oral testimony. The plaintiff, as PW 1 , admitted tllar he delayed payment due to pending litigation and adduced no proof of hnancial readiness. With respect to Ex.A7, whichL purportidly acknowledged a payment of Rs.32,0OO/-, he highlighted that the document was unpleaded and legally inadmissible. He lamented that the trial Court had recorded categorical findings of interpolation and manipulation, which dis;entitled the plaintiff from equitable relief. Further, the conduct in fabricating or altering documents undermined the plaintifi's 10 claim for specific perforrnance. He submitted that the express clause in the agreement stating that "time is the essence" reinforced the contractual expectation of timely performance, and the plaintiffs failure to pay within the stipulated period amounted to breach and rendered his claim for specihc performance unsustainable.

16. In support of the above submissions, learned counsel for respondent placed reliance on the judgments rendered in the cases of R. Shama Naik v. G. Srinivaslahr, which emphasized that readiness and willingrress under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be substantiated by consistent conduct and ltnancial proof ; Mqior General Darshan Singh v. Brij Bhushan Chaudhary2, which held that false or misleading statements in pleadings disentitle a party from equitable relief ; R. Kaadaswamy v. T.R.K. Sarrath5F, which reiterated that time can be of the essence in saie contracts and underscored that readiness and willingness must persist throughout ; Pydi Ramana v. Dawarasety 1 (2024 scc onLine 3586) ' (zozn) : scc aag 2024 sCC OnLine 3377 3 1 11, Manmadha+, which clarihed that suits filed belbre the 2018 amendment require both pleading and proof of teadiness and willingness ; U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthys, which comprehensively dealt with the evirlentiary and pleading burden under Section 16(c), emphasi:zing financial capacity and sustained intent to perform. Therefrrrt:, he prayed this Court to dismiss the appeal, stating that there are no merits in the same. 17 . Having regard to the , rival submissions ntade, and on going through the material placed on recorc, the points determined for consideration by this Court are: Whether the appellant/ plaintiff is willing to perform his part of the contract ? II Whether the appellant/ plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dated

08.12.1993 ? I II. Whether the judgment of trial Court needs any interference ? IV To what extent ? o lzoz+1 z scc sts ' lzoz:1 rr scc zzs 12 FOINT Nos,I to fV :

18. It is not in dispute that the agreement of sale (Ex. Ai) was executed between the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant, and that a sum of Rs.50,OOO/- was paid as part of the agreed consideration. The execution of Ex.A 1 and receipt of Rs.50,0OO I - h.ave been unequivocally admitted by the defendant. It is also undisputed that the balance consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- remained unpaid by the plaintiff, and the said justification stems from certain ongoing litigation involving one K. Ramulu, whom the plaintiff claims was asserting tenancy rights over the suit property. However, the record clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff entered into Ex. A 1 with fuli knowledge of this litigation. Further, Ex.A3, issued by the Joint Collector prior to the date of agreement, proves that the plaintiff was aware of the dispute. Furthermore, he admitted in cross-examination that the occupancy certificate had been granted in favor of the defendalt, and that ihe patta continued to stand in her name. That being so, Clause (g) of the agreement, which ostensibly obligated the defendant to resolve litigation, could not be invoked to shield the plaintiff from his own payment 13 obligations, especially since the litigation was ',r.ell known to him prior to execution. The clause, drafted without explicit reference to pre-existing disputes, cannot be stretched to relieve the plaintiff of timely performance.

19. On the second issue concerning re'adiness and wiilingness, the trial Court arrived at a sound finding based on the plaintiffs conduct and discrepancies between his pleadings and testimony. In the plaint, he clairned readiness to pay the remaining amount but cited the litigation as an impediment. In his cross-examination, however. he improved upon this by alleging that the defendant he rself declined execution due to Ramulu's tenancy claim. This :ontradiction, coupled with his failure to maintain the payrnent timeline under Ex. Al, reflects an absence of genuine intent to perform his obligations. There is a material improvement which leads to adverse inference accordingly. Moreover, his reliance on Ex.A7, a purported receipt for Rs.32,OO0/- allege dly issued by the defendant's husband, was wholly misplaced Ex.A7 bears overwriting and corrections with respect to the name, parentage and nativity of the payor, and its late introduction during DW. 1's cross-examination, without priol marking or \ 14 explanation for delay, casts serious doubt on its authenticity. The trial court held that such an important document, materially altered and introduced belatedly, cannot be considered reliable. The alleged subsequent payment of Rs.5,000/- to the defendant's son, is unsupported by any documentation, which further demonstrates the plaintiffs lack of credibility.

20. There are evidentiary inconsistencies surrounding Ex. A7. Originally, the receipt bore the typed name of one P. Bal Reddy, son of Mohan Reddy, a resident of Shapurnagar village, Balanagar Mandal. However, these details were subsequently struck off and replaced with the name of the plaintiff, his father's name (Ramaiah), and his alleged residence at Sahebnagar village, Hayathnagar Mandal. The plaintiff failed to provide a cogent explanation for these overwritings. Further, the original receipt may have been issued to P. Bal Reddy and was later altered to give the appearance that the plaintiff had made the payment. These material alterations which were introduced without supporting testimony or documentary clarity, rendered Ex. A7 suspect and wholly unreliable for establishing any genuine 15 financial transaction between the plaintiff and ttLe defendant's husband. The receipt appeared manipulated and was introduced to create an artihcial narrative of continued payment,.thereby, undermining the plaintiffs credibility, and that the alleged subsequent payment of Rs.5,000/- to the defendant's son, unsupported by any documentation, would further demonstrate the plaintiffls lack of credibilitv.

21. Specihc performance being an equitable rr:lief demands unblemished conduct. The principle that a party who does not approach with clean hands, especially if found to have fabricated evidence during pendency of suit, :annot claim equitable relief. In the facts of the case on hand, the plaintiffs conduct during litigation, which were marked by improvements, contradictions, and reliance on documents which would raise doubts, disquafhes him iiom seeking specific performance.

22. At this juncture, it is imperative to note that although no explicit plea for refund of sale consideration was raised under Section 22 of the Specihc Relief Act, the gr:neral prayer for "other reliefs" was sufficient to entertain a direction for I 16 refund. In the interest of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, the trial Court ordered refund of Rs.5O,000/ - with interest at 187o per annum from the date of suit till realization, and the said relief, though discretionary, was granted judiciously' Accordingly, Point Nos.I to IV are answered'

23. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that there are no illegalities or inhrmities in the impugned judgment, warranting interference o[ this Court. This Court is of the hrm view that there are no merits in this appea[, and the same is liable to be dismissed.

24. IN THE RESULT, this Appeal Suit is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaleous applications, if any pending, shall also stand clo SD/-MOHD. ISMAIL DEPUW REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To, Hvderabad. (With records) i. The Principal Senior Civil Judge, R'R District' at NT R z OieCC to Sri. M R S Sdnivas, Advocate [OPUC] ;. ;;; ci io sri D Jagan Mohan Reddv, Advocate toPUCl 4. Two CD CoPies / Nagar, *iigrofuuesr HIGH COURT DATED:1410712025 JUDGMENT + DECREE AS.No.1217 ot 2002 .::::,' iri''r' t', T$6 / /'.'. lt-': \i' - \, OISMISSING THE APPEAL SUIT b q w( IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD MONDAY, THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA APPEAL SUIT NO: 1217 OF 2002 Between: B.Sathi Reddy. S/o. Late Rami Reddy, aged about 50 years, Occ: Cultivation, R/o. Sahebnagar Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, R.R. District. ...AppellanUPlaintiff AND Hemalatha, Wo. Subhash Rao, aged about 38 years, Occ: Housewife, R/o. H. No. 5-3428, Osmangunj, Hyderabad Appeal under section 96 of C.P.C against the Judgment and Decree Dated 26.03.2002 made in O.S.No.416 of 1994 on the file of the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, R.R District, at N.T.R, Nagar, Hyderabad. ...RespondenUDefendant This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal' the Judgment and Decree of the Lower Court and the material papers in the Case and upon hearing the arguments of Sri. M R S Srinivas, Advocate for the Appellant and of Sri D Jagan Mohan Reddy, Advocate for Respondent. { This Court doth Order and Decree as follows:

1. That the Appeal Suit be and hereby is dismissed;

2. That there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal. SD/.MOHD.ISMAIL DEPUTY REGISTRAR \ \ SECTION OFFICER ( //TRUE COPY// To,

1. The Principal Senior Civil Judge, R.R District, at N.T.R. Nagar, Hyderabad. 2. Two CD Copies DL/PSL v HIGH COURT DATED:1410712025 DECREE AS.No.1217 ot 2O02 DISMISSING THE APPEAL SUIT u^