The High Court · 2025

Counsgl for the Petitio4er : SRI RAJASHEKAR THALLAPALLY Counsel for tfie Respoqdents; GP tqR HqME The Court made the following: ORDER THE HON'BLE SRI.IUSTICE PULLA KARTHIK WRIT PETITION No.29122 OF 2019 ORDER: This Writ Petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India is filed seeking the following relief: '...to issue a wit, order or direction more particularlg one in the ndture of Wit of Mondamus to call for the reards relating to cLrnrge memo i-ssued in Memorandum No.A6/PR/ 11/2015, dated 19.05.2016 bg the 7"t respondent i-s illegal, arbitrary and uiolatiue of Article 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution of Indio and contrary to the orders of Hon'ble Apex Court and this Hon'ble Court and set aside the same on the ground of departmental enquiry and ciminal cose on same set of facts and also delag and latches u-tith a consequential direction to the respondents to consider the claim of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Head Constable (Ciuil) along tuith others u.tith all conseEtentiol benefits and pass..."

2. Heard Sri Rajashekar Tallapally, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Home for the respondents. Perused the materia-l available on record.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed as Police Constable (Civil) on

07.09.1993 in Medak District and while, he was working at Ramayampet Police Station, he \,vas suspended from duty on

09.0i.2009. Subsequently, ofl 04.04.2009, a case in Crime No.83 of 2009 on the file of Ramayampet Police Station, was registered against the petitioner for the offence alleged under 2 PK,J \Jt 1 29122 2OI9 Sections 353. 341, 504 ard 510 of Indian Penal Cor1e, 1860' After filing rti charge sheet, the case was nurn bered as C.C.No.33B of 2OO9 on the file of learned Judicial lVl.agistratq of First Class iSpecial Mobile) at Medak. However, d uring the pendencv of above criminal case, the petitioner was reinstated into service ott 04 .06.20 1O and the disciplinary pr' rceedings initiated agairLst him were dropped uide ptoceedinr3s, dated 04 l05.OB.2O1.'2. The trial Court, after conductrng trial, acquitted the petitioner from the criminal case uide j rldgment, dated 03.7(t .2012 and the said order becarle fina1. Thereafter, respondent No.1 issued impugned charSle memo, dated 19.05 2'.016 oo the ground that the petiti,rner was involved in Crime No.83 of 2009. lt is further submitted that the said chalg;e memo was issued nearly seven years after the registration ol crime. The facts and evidence in impugned charge memo. dated 19.05.2016 and C.C.No.338 o1 2009 on the file of lea,:ned Judicial Magistrate of First Clasl; (Special Mobile) at Medak are one and the same. Since tht' criminal charges and the departmental charges are identical and that the evidence js also same, the departmental proceedings are liable to be set aside on this ground alone. Further, the issue .i. 3 PK,J wp-29r22-2019 was relating to the incident occurred on 03.04.2009 and the charge memo was issued on 19.05.2016 i.e., after long lapse of seven years. Further, as per G.O.Ms.No.679, dated

01.11.2008, enquiry in simple cases should be completed within three months and in complicated cases within six months and as per Rule 2O of TSCS (CCA) Rules, 1991, time is fixed in every stage of enquiry to complete it as per the schedule fixed. However, the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner have not been frnalized so far. Therefore, learned counsel prays this Court to set aside the impugned charge memo No.A6lPR/il/2015, dated

19.05.2016. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.M.Tank a. Sto:te of GuJaratl, order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.2826 of 2013, daled 26.04.2013 and order, dated 06.72.2024 passed by this Court in W.P.No.7020 of 2023.

4. Per contra, learned Government Pleader for the respondents submits that while the petitioner was working at Ramayampet Police Station, he was suspended from service I 2006 (5) SCC 446 4 PK,J 'n p 29122 2Ol9 uide proceedings, dated 09.O1.2009 on the alleged Sgound of misconduct anrd he was reinstated into duty on 04,06.2010. After conducting departmental enquiry, the charges leveled against the petitioner were not proved. Therefore, the charges leveled against the petitioner were dropped ulde prc,ceedings, dated 04/05 Oa.2OI2. It is further submitted that curing the period of suspension, a case in Crime No.83 of 2Ot)9, dated O4.O4.2OO9, on the file of Ramayampet Police Stz'Ltion was registered against the petitioner. After filing of charge sheet, the said crime r,r,as numbered as C.C.No.33B of 2O()9 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Special Mobile) at Medak. During the trial, PWs.3, 4, 5 and 6 did not support the prosecution and thereby turned hostile. Therefore, tht: trial Cotxt uide judgment, dated O3.10.2012, acquitted the petitioner on benefit of doubt. It is further submitted that the trial Court has acquitted the petitioner only on the sround of benefit of doubt, hence, this does not mean that ther petitioner did not commit the crime. ln fact, as he committed the offence, the criminal case \.\,'as regt.stered by the concerned Police. Therefore, basing on the evidence collected aga.inst the petitioner, the then Superint,:ndent of \ ,.t$atfi. 5 PK,J Wp 29122 2019 Police, Medak, issued impugned charge memo, dated

19.05.2016, to the petitioner calling fo,r-. explanation. Pursuant to same, the petitioner has submitted his explanation and the same is pending consideration. Further, there is no prohibition under law to proceed departmentally even though the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case. Therefore, learned Government Pleader prays this Court to dismiss the Writ Petition.

5. This Court has taken note of the submissions made by learned counsel for the respective parties.

6. A perusal of the record discloses that the petitioner, while working at Ramayampet Police Station, was suspended from duty on 09.01.2009 on the alleged ground of misconduct and he was reinstated into duty on 04.06.20|0. However, the charges leveled against the petitioner were dropped uide proceedings, dated O4/O5.OB.2O|2. It is undisputed that during the period of suspension, a case in Crime No.83 of 2009, dated O4.O4.2OO9, on the frle of Ramayampet Police Station, was registered against the petitioner. After filing of charge sheet, the said case was numbered as C.C.No.338 of I I l i I 6 PK,J W t 29122 2019 2009 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Special Mobile) at Medak arrd after completion of trial, the trial Court has acquitted the petitioner uide judgment, dated 03.1O.2012. Subsequently, after lapse -of seven years, respondent Nio.1 issued impugned charge memo, dated

19.05.2016 orl the ground that the petitioner u'as involved in Crime No.83 of 2OO9.

7. Here, il. is pertinent to note that the impugnr:d charge memo, dated 19.05.2016 was issued on the ".-s sr:t of facts as that of criminal case in Crime No.83 of 2009, r'r'trerein the petitioner was acquitted from the said case uide j udgment, dated 03.10.'.2012 and the very initiation of dep artmental proceedings is on the basis of registration of crim:na1 case. Further, the Flon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal a, The State of Rajasthan2, has held as follows: Ho',{,ever, if the charges in the departmental enquiry i nd the "12. crimrnal cotlrt are identical or similar, ald if the evidence, u-i nesses and crrcunstances are one and the same, then the matter acc uires a different dil-,rension. If the court in judicial review concludes t 1at the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full considerzrtion of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserabll' f:riled to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant red ress in 2 2024 SCC Onl ine SC 2594 ( I ;, 7 PK,J Wp_29122 2019 certain circumstances. The court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the frndings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts.

23. It is very clear that relevant and material evidence being, the deposition of PW-S/Raj Singh; the marksheet of 8e class of the appellant [enclosed to the chargesheetl and the original marksheet independently marked as Ex. D3 by the defence have been completely left out in the discussion and consideration. Inference has been drawn about the proof of the charges by igrroring crucial, relevant and material evidence which had come on record. The evidence of PW-s Raj Singh and the marksheet and the original marksheet marked as Ex.D-3, were materials having a direct bearing on the charge. The Disciplinary Authority has merely reiterated the reasoning in the enquiry report. Equally so are the frndings of the appellate authority. It is well settled that if the findings of the disciplinary authorities are arrived at after ignoring the relevant material the court in judicial review can interfere. It is only to satisfy ourselves to this extent, that we have scrutinized the material to see as to what was reflected in the record. We are satisfled that the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated ard deserve to be quashed,

24. In this scenario, we are inclined to accept the explanation given by the appellant that overwriting in the application form was only due to correction of an inadvertent error. As long as the original 8ft standard marksheet reflected his date of birth as 21.04.1972 and there is no correction or manipulation in that document, the appellant cannot be penalized. Effect of Acquittal in the Crimiaal Prgceeding - Question No.2

25. With this above background, if u.e examine the criminal proceedings the following factual position emerges. The very same witnesses, who were exafirined in the depafimental enquiry were exauriled in the criminal tr.ia1. Jagdish Chandra, Bhawani Singh, Shravan Lal, Raj Singh and Karan Sharma were examined as PW2, PW3, PW6, PW9 and PW13 respectively at the criminal trial. Apart 8 PK,J -t p 29122 2Ot9 from them, (iight other witnesses were also examined. Thc gra ramen of the charge in the criminal case was that the appellar:t had submitted an application for recruitment along with his mar rsheet and he, by rnaking alteration in his date of birth to reflect thr, same as 24.04.1')'72 in place ol 21.04.7974 and obtained recruitrient to the post of Constable. Though the Trial Court convictr,d the appellant under Section 420 of IPC, the Appellate C-ourt recortled the follou.ing cru.cial hndings while acquitting the appellant: "... Mainly the present case was based on the documents -o this effect rvhellrer the date of birth of accused is 2l.o4.let72 or 21.O4.1,971. Exh. P-3 is original Markssheet, in which, the ,late of birth of acr:used has been shown as 21,.O4.1972 and same hrrs also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prose,rution. Whatever .he documents have been produced before the Court regardirrg the date of birth of 21.04.1974 are either thc letiers of Principal ,x are Duplicate T.C. or Marksheets. Neith,)r the prosecutiorr has produced aly such original documents n the Subordinale Court to this effect that when the admission fr)rm of accused rvas fillcd, what date of birth was mentioned by the ar:cused in it, u4rat \ as the date of birth in Roll Register of School, u,h.rt date of birth vva,; mentioned by accused in the Examination F, rrm of Secondary, and nor after brining the original records licm the concerned "ritnesses, same were got proved in the evidence. Lr these circumstar-- ces, this fact becomes doubtful that date of b,rth of accusecl was 21.04.1974, and accused is entitled to rece ve it's benelit. In the considered opinion of this Court, the convictior made by the I-d. Slubordinate Court merely on the basis of oral evirlences and letters or duplicate documents, is not just and propcr. It is justifiable 1o acquit the accused. Resultanth,, on the basis of aforesaid consideration, the I resent appeal hlcd 'ry the Appellant/Accused is liable to be allorved."

26. W|l.at is important to notice is that the Appellate Judge has clearly recorded that in the document Exh. P-3-original marksheet of the 8n standard, the date of birth was clearly shown as 21.O,1.1972 9 PK,J wp-29122_20t9 and the other documents produced by the prosecution were either letters or a duplicate marksheet. No doubt, the Appellate Judge says that it becomes doubtful whether the date of birth was 21..04.1974 and that the accused was entitled to receive its benefit. However, what we are supposed to see is the substance of the jud8:rnent. A reading of the entire judgment clearly indicates that the appellant was acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and after noticing that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge.

27. Expressions like 'benefrt of doubt" and "honorably acquitted", used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminolory. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Exh. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21.04.1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses exarnined on behalf of the pros€cution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used.

28. We are satisfied that the findings of the appellate judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, "not proved" - in fact the charge even stood "disproved" by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be "disproved" when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a pmdent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be "not proved" when it is neither "proved" nor "di sproved".

29. We are additionally satished that in the teeth of the finding of the appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders 10 PK,J v p 291222019 passed the|eon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, rvitnesses; and circumstanr:r:s ulere all the same. This is a case where in exer':ise of our discretion, u,e quash the orders of the disciplinary authoriry and the appella tr: authority as allowing them to stand will be r'Lnjust, unfail and ,ropressive. This case is very similar to the situaticn that arose in G.M. Tdnk (supra). 8, Further, the Division Bench of the erstwhile HIgh Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in APSR?C u. Venkatapathie, has held as under: "4. Ct altenging the order of the learned single Judge, tLe RTC has filed tl ir; u,rit appeal. We frnd no merit in the appeal inspite o[ the persuasion of the learned Counsel for the appellant RT(l we have alrearl..' pointed out as to what charge was framed n the discipirnarl enquiry against the petitioner. It has to be noted that the charge $ as not for the substantive act of having caused dr rath of the u,ife. The charge was only that petitioner was involve,l in a criminal cas,: and the said ilvolvement had resulted in framit Lg of a criminal crrsie for offence under Section 3O2 of the lPC. Tbe argument c,f the learned Counsel for the appellant is that in co rrse of the enqui{ the petitioner had himself stated that death of his wife was rcsult of his delinquency. It is argued that in vie\\' )f this admission ,J the petitioner the disciplinary authority was just fied in accepting tir. same and Court cannot reappreciate the evidcn( e. We fail to und( rstand as to how the statement of petitioner \\'as r( levant in the insiant case. The charge was only for involvemen- in a criminal case resulting in instituting of a criminal case agail st the petitioner. As soon as the criminal case itself was found to be untenable ir Court of law, the very basis of the charge rvas kl tocked out. The <:harge should have been quashed as and u'hcn the criminal case ended in acquittal. Involvement in a crjminzrl case which rvas not tenable in Court of law can hardly amount :o any 3 1999 (4) ALD 3() (DB) i. !ttt!.': ;;t* . . I I 11 PK,J wp-29 t22_2019 delinquency. It cannot be disputed that the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold disciplinary enquiry on the same charge as is before a Crimina-l Court because the scope of disciplinary enquiry and criminal trial is different. But, where the charge in the disciplinary enquiry is necessarily dependent on the result of the criminal case if the criminal case itself ends in favour of the delinquent, the charge in the disciplinary enquiry will become unsustairiable one. In the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the charge lramed against the petitioner ald having regard to the result of the criminal case, we have no manner of doubt that the learned single Judge was right in allowing the petitioner's claim."

9. Coming to the case on hand, the impugned charge memo, dated 19.05.2016, was issued to the petitioner on the ground that he was involved in a criminal case, which was I I admittedly and ultimately ended in acquittal uide judgrnent dated O3.LO.2OI2 passed by the leamed Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Special Mobile) at Medak, in C.C.No.33B of

2009. Further, the witnesses cited in criminal case as well as 1n departmental proceedings are one and the sarne. Moreover, the impugned charge memo was issued on

19.05.2016 for the incident happened on 03.04.2009 i.e., after delay of nearly seven years. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Honlcle Apex Court in the above referred judgments, the impugned order is not sustainable under law arrd is therefore liable to be set aside. -*\ I 12 PK,J w ) 29122.2019

10. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed settrng aside the impugnerl charge memo No.A6/PR/ l1l20ll';, dated

19.05.2016 issued to the petitioner by respondent Nc.1. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand"; closed' There shail be no order as to costs. I To, 1 2 ? 4 5 6 7 //TRUE COPY// SD/.T. TIRUMALA DEVI NtP:rI REgrsrBAB-7 j u secrroru oFFrcER I The Superintendent of Police, Medak District. The Deputy lnspector General of Police, Nizamabad Range, l\.|izamabad. The Director General of Police, Government of Telangana, Lakdikapool, Hyderabad. The Principal Secretary, Home Department, Secretariat, Stat'l of Telangana, Hyderabad One CC to SRI RAJASHEKAR THALLAPALLY, Advocatq [C)PUC] Two CCs to GP FOR HOME, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad [OUT] Two CD Copies. BSK BS ff: HIGH COURT DATED:0710212025 l it - i ,). r 10 i,rj il2i E t c€spa-r CHf.() ORDER WP.No.29122 of 2019 ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS lol+ L6