The High Court · 2025

Judgment

'--..E!r o THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE M.G. PRITN)ARSINI I.A.No.1 of 2o.24 In/And A.S.No.479 OF 2o23 JUDGMENT:

The prescnt Appeal is directed by appellant/defendant No.2 against the judgment and decree (hereinafter will be referred as 'impugned judgment') dated 14.O7 .2023 in O.S.No.39 of 2022 (Old O.S.No.7 of 2018), on the file of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Narayanpet (hereinafter will be referred as 'trial CourtJ, whereby the suit for parfition was preliminarily decreed.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter are referred to as they were arrayed before the trial Court. The brief facts of the casc are that Plainciff Nos. 1 to 4 f-rled 3. the main suit vide O.S.No.7/2O18 on the file of II Additional District Court (FTC) Mahabubnagar against defendant Nos'1 to 3 seeking partition of the suit schedule properties' Subsequently the case was renumbered as O.S.No'39 of 2022 on the file of learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Narayanpet. The contentions of the plaintiffs as can be seen from the plaint averments in O.S.No.39 of 2022 are as under: 2 a) piainriff Nos.l to 4 and defendant No.3, who are the daughters and defendant No.2, who is the son, are the children of defendan t No. I and deceased Katrapaty Manemma. The father of defendant No.l by name Sai Reddy acquired Sl.No. 1 to 8 of suit A, schedule of properties and after his demise defendant No.1 succeeded those properties and by that time plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4, defendant Nos.2 and 3 were already born, as such, they are coparceners of the suit schedule lands. Sl. No.9 of suit ,A,schedule plots were acquired in the name of Katrpally Manemma, who died intestate leaving behind her, plaintiff Nos. I ro 4 and defendant Nos. I to 3 as her lelgal heirs as per Section 15 of Hindu Succession Act. The plaintiffs and defendants are equal land and Sl.No. i0 of .B,schedule share holders. b) AII the suit schedule ProPerties are the joint family properties of the plaintiffs and defendants and thev are possession of the same withou t bounds rn jornt any partition by metes and Plaintiffs and defendanr No.3 are married but their possession over the suit schedule premises is constructive possession along with defendant Nos. 1 and 2. c) Defendant No.l having attained the age of more than 75 3 years on several occasions was prepared to settle the suit schedule properties but at the instance of defendant No.2, no steps were taken for division of suit schedule properties. On 2a.12.2017 when the plaintiffs demanded for partition, defendant Nos.l and 2 did not agreed to effect partilion of the suit schedule properties, hence, this suit.

4. In reply to the above plaint averments, defendant No.3 failed to contest the suit despite receipt of summons from the Court and on the other hand, defendant Nos. I and 2 hled their joint written statement. The brief averments of written statement filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are as under: a) Sl. Nos. I to 4, 6 to 9 of suit A' schedule lands and other landed properties at Jaklair and Katevpally villages of Makthal Mandal are self acquired properties of defendant No. t having purchased the same from B. Buchja Reddy. Hence, defendant No.1 has got absolute rights and exclusive ownership over the said properties. Neither plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 nor defendant Nos.2 and 3 have got any share in Sl. Nos. I to 4, 6 to 9 of suit 'A' schedule lands. Defendant No.2 dug borewells and installed electricity motors with his own earnings, as such, the plaintiffs and defendant No.3 have no right or share in the suit 'C' t' schedule property 4 b) Smt. Katrapallv Manemma is the absolute owner of Sl.No.S of suit A' schedule property and item No.lO of suit iB, schedule plot, as such, plaintiff Nos. I to 4 and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are nothing to do with the said land and house plot. Smt. Manemma purchased Sl.No. 10 of suit 'B' schedule property through registcred sale deed bearing document No.83l l2OO2 dated 26.06.2002 [rorn her father by name V. Venkat Ram Redcly and joint paternal uncle by name Anantha Rejdy. schedule Similarly, Smt. Manemma purchased Sl. No.5 of suit A' property. Smt. Manemma executed Will Deed in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of St. No.S of suit ,A, scheclule property and Sl.No. 10 of suit ,E}, schedule property and after her demise, both the properties have become exclusive properties of defendant No.2. Plaintiff Nos.l to 4 and defendant No.3, who got married and living at their respective in_laws places, are not coparceners and they are not in possession of any of the suit schedule properties. c) During the life time of defendant No. l, plaintifl Nos. 1 to 4 and defendant Nos.2 and 3 have no right or any claim lor share in SI. Nos. I to 4, 6 to 9 of suit A, scheclule lands. The suit a ) schedule properties are neither ancestral properties nor joint family properties as alleged by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs never approached and demanded for partition on 28.12.2017, as such there is no cause of action for frling the suit. Thus, prayed to dismiss the suit.

5. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues:

1. Whether the suit schedule properties are antrstral properties and consequentlg, whether tle plointiffs .are entitled for preliminary d.ecree of partition for tlrcir alleged share as praged for?

2. To uhat relief

6. On behalf of plaintiffs, PWs I to 3 were examined and got marked Exs. Ai to A7. On behalf of defendants, DWs 1 to 4 were examined and got marked Exs.Bl to 814. At the instance of defendant Nos. 1 and 2, plaintiff Nos,2 and 4 were examined as CWs I and 2. The trial Court on appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, preliminarily decreed the suit by dividing suit A' to 'C' schedule properties into seven equal shares by metes and bounds and allotted four of such shares in favour of the plaintiffs and three of such remaining shares in favour of defendant Nos.l to 3. Aggrieved by the same, the k_ 6 defendant No.2 filed the present appeal to set aside the judgment and decree

7. Heard Sri M. Saroj Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri J. Prabhakar, learned Senior Counsel representing Smt. Kanumuri Kalyani, learned counsel on record for the respondent Nos.1 to 4 and perused the record including the grounds of Appeal.

8. Thc contention of the learned counsel for the defen(ant No.2 is that though Will Deed under Ex.B2 executed b1, Smt. Manemma i.e., mother of plaintiffs in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of properties stood in her name is proved by examining the attestors of Will Deed through DWs 3 and 4, whose evidence is constant ancl sufficient to prove the Will Deed, the Court below failed to appreciate the same. It is further contended that during the life time of K. Narsi Reddy i.e., father of the Appellant, he executed a Will Deed under Ex.B3 again after the decree, again the father of the appellant executed another Will Deed dated 31.07 .2023 in favour of the appellant bequeathing the property fell as per decree or court order. The father of the appellant died on 20.Oa.2023 and after the demise of appellant's father, the defenclant No.2 succeeded the property acquired by 7

9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon the following decisions in support of his contentions with regard to removal of suspicious circumstances involved in a Will Deed to consider it as a valid document. a) In Gurdial Kaur and others v. Kartar Kaur and othersl the Honourable Supreme Court observed that the law is well settled that if there is suspicious circumstance about tl.e execution of the will, it is the duty of the person seeking declaration about the validity of the will to dispel such suspicious circumstances. If a Will being registered and having regard to the other circumstances, is accepted to be a genuine, the mere fact that the Will is a registered witl it will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicions regarding the validity of the Will where suspicions exist. The broad statement by witness that he had witnessed the testator admitting execution of the will was not sufficient to dispel suspicions regarding due execution and attestation of the will. It was specihcally held that registration of the Will by itself was not sufficient to remove the suspicion. Where the propounder was unable to dispel the I (1998) 4 Supreme Court Cases 384 t 8 surrounded the question of of the Will, no letters of suspicious circumstances which valid exe<:ution and attestation adminrstratron in favour of the propounder coulcl be granted. b) In Mathai Samuel and others v. Eapen Eapen lcleadf by Lrs and others2 the Honourable Supreme Court observed that the essential quality of a testamentary disposition is ambulatoriness of revocability during the execuhnt,s Iife time and such a document is dependent upon the execuhnt,s death for its vigour.and effect. c) In Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Anrit Kaur and others3 Honouraitle Apex Court observed that the tme question consideration is whether the eviclence led by f the Will is such as to satisg/ the consciencc was duly executed by the testator and uniess the party which arises for the propoundcr o of the court that the Will lt is impossi ble which sets up explanation of rhe making of the Wil.l. to reach such satisfaition thc Will offers a cogent suspicious clrcumstances and convincing surrounding thc d) In Murthy aud others v. C. Saradambal aad othersa the r## t.T'iiif :I; i i,i*i iii -l 9 Honourable Supreme Court that merely because Will was a registered one , it would not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the Will need not be complied with. In Shivakumar and others v. Sharanabasappa and otherss the Honourable Supreme Court observed that mere proof of the document in accordance with the requirements of Section 68 of the Evidence Act is not final and conclusive for acceptance of a document as a Will. It was further observed that when suspicious circumstances exist and the suspicions have not been removed, the document in question cannot be accepted as a Will. e) In State of Andhra Pradesh through Principal Secretary and others v. Pratap Karan and others6 the Honourable Supreme Court observed that the khasra pahani is a document of title has been proved beyond doubt.

10. There is absolutely no doubt with regard to the principles laid down in the above said decisions. However, it is to be observed that the above principles of law will come into picture only when the executor of Will Deeds has authority to deal with the properties, which were included in the Will Deeds. If the l2O2l) I I Supremc Court Cases 277 6 (2016) 2 Supreme Court Cases 82 l0 suit schedule properties are self acquired properties of defendant No. I , then certainly defendant No.1 is at liberez to execute any deed to transfer the properties standing in his name in favour of others. But it is the vehement contention of the ptaintitfs that the suit schedule properties are ancestral properties and Will Deeds cannot be executed in respect of such properties, n,hich are liable to be partitioned. Thus, the question that needs to be adjudicated at this juncture is whether the suit schedule properties are ancestral properties of plaintifls & delcndants or self acquired properties of defendant No.1. I I. One of thc grounds raised by the defendant No.2 in the grounds of appcal is that the oral evidence of pWs I to 3 and documentary r:vidence under Exs.A1 to A7 is not supporting the contention of thc plainr.iffs that the suit schedule properties are ancestral properties. It is further pleaded that the documents more particularlv Exs.AI and A2 i.e., Khasra pahani for the year 1954-55 pertaining the suit lands discloses the name of one Buccha Rcdcly and Nagamma as pattadar of suit lands in Jaklair Village and the name of Turkapally Hussain,s name as pattadar of lands in Katrapally Village; the name of Sai Reddy rr?., grandfather of plain tiffs as claimed by the plaintiffs is not I shown as pattadar of suit lands

12. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that the suit schedule properties having been acquired by defendant No l through succession and since there was no partition earlier, they are entitled to have the properties parlitioned amongst the parties. In the written arguments, the plaintiffs have hled the family tree, which discloses that Sanjeeva Reddy has two children i.e., daughter (Ammakka) and son (Buccha Reddy)' Ammakka has a daughter by name Narasamma, who'got married to Sai Reddy, who is the father of defendant No 1' Narasamma and Narsi Reddy gave birth to two sons by name Kista Reddy and Narsi Reddy. Admittedly, the defendant No' I stated to have got the properties from Buccha Reddy.

13. A properry can be ancestral property' if the same is inherited either from a paternal ancestor or maternal grandfather. A property inherited by a male Hindu lrom his father, grandfather or great grandfather is ancestral property' The children, grandchildren and the great-grandchildren of the person inheriting such property acquire an interest in it by birth. Daughters are eligible to get a share in their parents' ancestral property. Thus, a maternal grandchild has a share in t2 the property. Therefore, it is clear that if the property was inherited by the maternal grandmother from their ancestors, it ts considered as ancestral properfv. Ancestral property rights apply equally to both paternal and maternal property. Grandchildren, incruding those through the maternar line, may have a claim if their mother has inherited or has a vested right in the ancestral property If the property was acquired by the maternal grandmother, t hey have full ownersh ip and can distribute ir to anyone they choose through a will or gift deed. If they pass a\a.ay intestate, the property shall be divided among their legal heirs accordi ng to the Hindu Succession Act. 14. As per the evidence of the defendant No. I as DWl, he alleged to have purchased the land from private sales but did not filc the saicl private sale documents before the Court and that he did not even file an.y document related to the mutation of suit lands in his name. As seen from the documentary evidence, the namt: of defendant No. 1 was shown as occupier of the land in Khasr:r pahani lor the year 1954_19.55 marked as Exs'Al and A2 and. by that year the age of defendant No. 1 would have becn 12 years and thereby it cannot be expected of a minor boy aged 12 ycars to acquire the properties without having any sourcc of incomc, more particularly to purchase t\ l3 immovable properties admeasuring into acres. Except contending in the written statement that he has got the properties from B. Buccha Reddy, the defendant No. I has not explained as to what is the mode of acquiring the said properties. The defendant No.l did not even explain as to when he alleged to have purchased the said lands from Buccha Reddy and through which mode the consideration was alleged to have been received by Buccha Reddy from the defendant No.1 for sale of the said properties to defendant No. 1 .

15. Dwl admitted in his cross examination dated 27.11.2022 that his paternal grandmother is Ammakka. However, DWI in his cross examination dated O6.01.2O23 deposed that Ammakka is his maternal grandmother. DWl deposed that he does not know the name of his paternal grandfather. DWI pleaded ignorance as to whether Buchi Reddy is the son of Sanjeeva Reddy and also denied to a suggestion that Buccha Reddy is the brother of Ammakka. DW1 further deposed that he is not aware Buchi Reddy, S/o. Snajeeva Reddy is the original pattadar of suit schedule lands as per Khasra Pahani. However, DWI admitted that as per Ex.A1 Buchi Reddy is the son of Sanjeeva Reddy. These admissions on the part of DWI disclose that he intends to suppress his relationship with the original owner LI*.. T4 Buccha Redcly, who is none other than the brol.her of maternal grandmother of defendant No. 1

16. [t is thc contention of the defendants that since DWI was indebted to t hird parties, he alienated the suit schedule lands to DW2. Though DWI pleaded that he has filed documents showing his liabilities towards third parties, no documentar5r evidence is placed before this Court to establish the same.

17. It is the specific evidence of DW2 that his father bequeathed his selfacquired properties, which are suit schedule lands, by way of Will Dated 13.05.2015 to him in the presence of Sri G. Sagzanarayana Reddy and Sri p. Madhusudhan Reddy. A perusal of cntire written statement does not disclose the Will Deed dated 13.OS.2O15 alleged to have been executed by the defendant No. I in favour of defendant No.2 in respect ol suit schedule properties. It is settled law that in the absence of any pleading, any zlmount of evidence cannot be entertained. Thus, Ex.E}3 has no evidenti:rry value.

18. DW2 deposed that since the suit lands are setf acquired properties of his father and also to keep his name and to preserve his properties, he purchased the said properties by obtaining loan :rnd selling his wife,s gold ornaments vide sale -) l5 deed bearing document Nos'3012/2O20, 301ll2O2O and 23l2O2O under Exs.B4 to 86'

19. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the suit proceedings, Sale Deeds under EXs'B4 to 86 were executed and it attracts 'doctrine of lis pendens' as per Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Further, this action on the part of defendantsinexecutingsaledeedsduringthependencyofthe suit is appearing to be their motive to defeat the rights of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule properties'

20. Moreover, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, the alleged dates on which the consideration was paid, is not appearing in the said sale deeds' The defendant No.2 is admittedly leading his livelihood by doing government job and it is difficult for a government servant to procure such a huge sum of money in cash at a time' The consideration was not paid in cheque or bank transfer' As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, when there is already a WillDeedinfavourofdefendantNo'2bydefendantNo'1'there is absolutely no necessity for defendant No' 1 to execute registered sale deed in respect of the same properties' Thus' these transactions are appearing to be sham' bogus and created 16 for the purpose of defeating the rights of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule properties

21. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that there 'was no necessity lor the defendant No.l to sell the properties that too to defendant No.2. If at all the defendant No.1 was in need of money for his treatment, which expenses the defendant Nos. I and 2 cannot afford, defendant No. 1 ought to have sold the said properties to third parries rather than selling them to defendant No.2, who allegedly facing difhculty in meeting the medical expenses of his father and also to meet the school expenses of his children.

22. DWl in his evidence deposed that prior to the suit and subsequent there to he has been staying alone in the village, collecting the lease amounts, which would clearly show that he was on his ou,n and not depending on defendanl. No.2, who deposed that he was taking care of DWl. Even DW2 admitted in his evidencc that after the death of his mother, DWl was living alone. The evidence of DWs I and, 2 is not corroborating with each others r:vidence.

23. In the written statement the defendants pleaded that item Nos. 1 to 4, 6 to 9 of suit A, schedule lands and other landed t7 property at Jaklair Village and Katrevpally Village are self acquired properties of defendant No.1 having got the same from B. Buccha Reddy. DW1 also reiterated the same in his chief I L examination affidavit. But the defendant No.2, who was examined as DW2, deposed in his chief examination that item Nos. 1 to 4, 6 Lo 9 of suit A' schedule lands are self acquired properties of his father from one B. Bucha Reddy, Smt. Nagamma and Turka Hussain Saheb. Thus, the DW2 has improvised the version of his father by adding the names of Smt. Nagamma and Turka Hussain Saheb apart from the name of B. Buccha Reddy as the absolute owners of the above said lands.

24. It is further contention of the learned counsel for the defendant No.2 that the trial Court erred in observing that the defendants did not choose to file any document to show that the suit lands of 'A'schedule were purchased from Bucha Reddy or any other third person ald since the plaintiffs have discharged their burden to prove the suit properties as ancestral properties, the burden shifts on defendants to prove as their self acquired properties. It is further contended that the plaintiffs have to prove the case on their own rather than qtepending upon the weakness o[ the defendants. It is also l8 submitted by t.he learned counsel for the defendants that there is no presumption of treating the suit schedule properties are joint family properties.

25. In a suit for partition, all parties with an interest in the property are considered necessary parties, and the court treats them as interested stakeholders in determining the rights and liabilities ovcr [he suit schedule properties. Thus, every interested party is deemed to be a plaintiff. In Adiveppa and others v. Bhimappa and anotherT, the Honourable Supreine Court emphasized that there is a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship, and estate. The undivided joint family is the normal characteristic of a Hindu family and presumption is that the members of th<: lamily are living in a statc of jointness, unless contrary is proved. Hence, any member asserting that certain properties are self-acquired bears the burden of proving such a claim. In the absence of any evidence on behalf of defendants, it woutd draw an inference that the propcrties as joint family properties. In t.he present case, the defendants claimed that the suit schedule properties are self acquired properties of defendant No. 1 but failed to 7 AIR 2017 Supreme (t()rrrr 4465 l9 establish the same. The defendants did not even establish as to how defendant No. 1 acquired or secured those properties. In view of the principle laid down in the above said decision, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs are depending upon the weakness of the defendants but in fact even the defendants failed to establish their own case to substantiate that the suit schedule properties are self acquired properties of defendant No. 1.

26. The learned trial Court observed in the impugned judgment that the plaintiffs have established that item Nos. 1 to 9 of suit "A" schedule lands are ancestral properties of plaintiffs and defendant No- 1 acquired the said properties from his maternal grandmother, his father and therefore, the plaintiffs have equal right over the item Nos. I to 9 of suit schedule lands on part with the son i.e., defendant No.2. However, it is to be seen that Smt.Katrepelly Manemma i.e., mother of defendant No.2 alleged to have purchased item No. 10 of 'B' schedule property i.e., house plot under registered sale deed bearing document No.831/2OO2 dated 26.06.2O02 under Ex'A7 from her father Sri Venkatrama Reddy and her junior paternal uncle Sri Anantha Reddy and it is her absolute property. Similarly, Smt. Katrepelly Manemma purchased item No.5 of suit 'A' I 20 schedule property and thereafter she executed Witl Deed under Ex.B2 in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of item No.5 of suit 'A' schedule property and item No. 10 of Tl' schedule property. PW3, who is thc husband of plaintiff No.4, deposcd that major part of the suit schedule lands are ancestral properties of defendant No.l and part of the suit schedule properties purchased b1' late Smt. K. Manemma. The learned Trial Court failed to consider this part of evidence of pW3 in arriving to a conclusion that item No.5 of suit A'schedule property and item No.10 of 'B'schedule property are the self acquired properties of mother of defenclant No.2 i.e., Smt. K. Manemma.

27. During the pendency of the present appeal, the respondents/ plaintiffs flled I.A.No.1 of 2024 for receiving additional document ie., pahani for the year 2Ol9-2O by invoking Order XLI Rule 27 read with Section l5l of the Code of Civil Procedure. The reason assigned by the plaintiffs for filing the additional document at this appellate stage is that they have made an application for issuance of certified copy of pahanies for the lands in Sy.No.477 from the year 2OlZ 20 18 to 2023 2024 and the same were furnished to them on 2I.11.2024. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the certified copy o[ the pahani for the year 2OlZ as against J.- l sy.No.477 reflect the name of their mother as pattedar and possessor and the pahani for the year 2O19-2O2O in respect of Sy.No.477 would reflect the name of their father as pattedar and possessor and mutation was carried out on 20.08.2019. It is also contended that the said document, which is necessary and proper for just decision of the case, was not within their knowledge at the time of trial and also when the suit was decreed.

28. The purpose of filing the said additional documcnt is that the plaintiffs would like to falsi$r the statement of the defendants as to the execution of Will Deed by mother of the plaintiffs. But in the counter to the above said petition, the defendants contended that their mother died in th.e year 2077 by leaving Will Deed dated 13.05.2015 and the plaintiffs have hled suit in the year 2018 after coming to know about the Will Deed with false allegations. It is further contended by the defendants that mere stray entry in the pahani for the year 20 19-2O2O in the name of father as pattadar and possessor does not confer any title and it would not falsify the execution of Will Deed by the mother. It is further argued that the petition is filed at belated stage with an intention to delay the disposal of the Appeal and that additional document is not relevant in --- 22 adjudicating the dispute and thus, prayed to dismiss the interlocutory application.

29. Admittcdly the suit was filed in the year 20 18 and the document whrch the plaintiffs are intending to file in this Appeal pertains to the year 2O19-2O2O. Thus, the possibiliry ol filing the said document at the relevant point of time was very remote. The plaintifls have established that they were unable to produce the evidence despite due diligence as the said evidence was not within thcir knowledge. However, the evidence lhat is b€ing introduced at this stage is appearing to be not relevant to the issue in thc present case because PW3, who is one of the witnesses t:xam ined on behalf of plaintiff, categorically deposed that part of the suit schedule properties purchased by late Smt. K. Mancmmlr. The said aspect was mentioned by the defendan ts in their written statement apart from asserting that she also (:xccuted Will Deed in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of those properties. There is no clarity as to how the introduction o1' additional evidence i.e., pahanis would falsify the aspect of Smt. Malemma executing Will Deed in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of part of suit schedule properties. A Will Deed cxists in perpetuity and is valid for time immemorial even alter th(' dcath of the testator and there is no bar on its enforcement. The beneficiary in whose name the will is written I gets an indefinite right to get it executed anytime after the death 23 of the testator as the will remains valid for time immemorial. Thus, it is not mandatory that a Will Deed should be acted upon immediately after the death of testator. Merely because mutation in respect of the above said properties was effected on

20.Oa.2Ol9 in the name of father and mother of defendant No.2, it cannot falsify the statement as to the execution of Will Deed by Smt. K. Manemma in favour of delendant No.2. Thup, it appears that no useful purpose would be served by allowing the additional evidence that is sought to be introduced by the plaintiffs in the present Appeal. Hence, I.A.No.1 of 2024 is liable to be dismissed.

30. Since, item No.5 of suit A' schedule property and item No.10 of Ti' schedule property are self acquired properties of Smt. K. Manemma, she is at liberty to deal with the said properties as per her whims and fancies Subsequently, Smt.Katrepelly Manemma passed away on

07.06.2016 and thereby the defendant No.2 has succeeded to the above said properties by way of Ex.B2 prior to the hling of the suit. The defendants have also clearly mentioned about the execution of Will Deed by mother of defendanr No.2 and it is amply 24 supportcd b1 trx.82. Therefore, it is clear that item Nos. 5 and 10 of the suit schedule properties i.e., Ac.02.8O guntas of land and open plot admeasuring 660 square yards are the exclusive propertics of mother of the defendant Nos.2 and 3 and ptaintiffs and shc has exccuted registered Ex.B2 Will Deed in respect of the said propert.ies in the name of defendant No.2.

31. It rs thc specihc contention of the defendants that since thc suit schcdule properties are self acquired properties of delendant No. l, the plaintiffs cannot claim for partition of ihe said propertic.s during the life time of defendant No. 1. The Iearned counsel lo r the plaintiffs submitted that since defendant No.1 passcd ar\r,a-y on 20.O8.2023, the maintainabiliry of the suit cannot bc raisecl now on the aspect of hling the suit during the life time of defcnrlant No. l.

32. In vier.t, o[ the above discussion, this Court is of the considered vieu, that the plaintiffs could establish that except item No.5 o[ sr-rrt 'A' schedule property and item No.10 of ,8, schedule propcrty, all t_he suit schedule properties in the suit are ance stral pro;terties of plaintiffs, defendant Nos.2 and 3 and thus, they are li;rble to be partitioned and on the other hand, the defendants failed to establish that the suit schedule l 25 properties are the self acquired properties of defendant No. 1. Though the trial Court held that all the suit schedule properties are ancestral properties of plaintiffs, defendant Nos.2 and 3, in view of the discussion in the above paragraph, item No.5 of suit A' schedule property and item No.iO of 'B' schedule property .a-re required to be excluded from the .from the purview of suit schedule properties that are liable to be partitioned in this case. Therefore, the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court is Iiable to be modified to the above extent.

33. In the result, this Appeal is partly aliowed by modifying judgment and decree dated 14.07.2023 in O.S.No.39 of 2022 (OId O.S.No.7 of 2O18) passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Narayanpet oniy to the extent of excluding item No.5 of suit A' schedule property and item No.10 of 'B' schedule property i.e., Ac.O2.SO guntas of land and open plot admeasuring 66O square yards from the purview of suit schedule properties that are liable to be partitioned in this case. The remaining part of the impugned judgment holds good. Further, I.A.No. I of 2024 is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed 26 //TRUE COPYII sd/- K. sRf JOIN xEri+[t3 S T'ON OFFICER Princi CC toSri M S CC CD Pai Distri ct Judge at Na to Smt Kanumuri K alya Copies aroi Redd Y,Advoca te [O Ni, AdVocate loPucj (w P ith reco rds, if any) UCJ To,

1. The 2.. One 3. One 4. Two vH/eh , I HIGH COURT DATED: 1010112025 ,a'"--'.: 1 :i r r'1 I i. $[ t'rt-$ I I I B? \r."r, "'-- JUDGMENT+DECREE lA NO: 1 OF 2024 IN/AND AS.No.479 of 2023 PARTLY ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND DISMISSING THE IA WITHOUT COSTS 6 .b { IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENry FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE M.G.PRIYADARSINI APPEAL SUIT NO: 479 OF 2023 Between: Katrapally S Government District AND atvabhaskar Reddv, S/o K.Narsi Reddy. Age Ehployee, R/o J;klair village, Maktal Mandal. 52yrs, Occ Narayanpet ...APPELLANT/DEFENDANT 2 1 2 4 6 6 Pakanati Renukamma, Wo P.Anantha Reddy, D/o Katrapally Narsi Reddy, age 57yrs, Occ Agriculture, R/o Vinjamur village, Koilkonda Mandal, Mahabubnagar District. Kotholla Devendramma @ Nirmalamma Wo K.Narayan Reddy, Dio Katrapally Narsi Reddy, AgE 55yrs, Occ Agriculture, R/o Waddevat village, tvlakthal Mandal, Narayanpet District. Gopidi Soubhagya Laxmi, Wo G.Venkat Reddy, D/o Katrapally Narsi Reddy, ag<i 53yrs, Occ- Agriculture, R/o Mudhol village, Sedam Taluq, Karnataka state. Pasula Sarala Devi, Wo P. Satyanarayana Reddy, D/o Katrapally Narsi Reddy, age 51yrs, Occ Agriculture, R/o Jaklair village, Makthal Mandal, Narayanpet Diskict ...RES'.NDENT'/'LATNTTFF Katrapally Narsi Reddy, S/o K.Sai Reddy, Age 80yrs, Occ fgr.1c^u!lq1e. R/9 Jaklair viilage, Maktal [4andal, Narayanpet District. (Died on 2010812023 and LRs are - already on record as AppellanVPlaintiff No.2 and Respondents/Defendants no.1 to 4 and 6) Koduru Bharathi @ Chandana, Wo K. Krishna Reddy, D/o K Narsi Reddy, age 49yrs, Occ Anganwadi Teacher, R/o Kotakadira village, Mahabubnagar Mandal and District. ...RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS No. 1 & 3 Appeal filed under section 96 of CPC against the.iudgment and decree 1410712023 on O.S.No. 39 ot 2022 (Old O S.No.7 of 2018 on the file of ll Additional District Court, (FTC), Mahabubnagar) on the file of the Court of the Principal District Judge at Narayanpet. This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the Court below and the material papers in the case and upon hearing the arguments of sri M. saroj Reddy, Advocate for the appellant and sri J. Prabhakar, senior counsel representing smt. Kanumuri Kalyani, Advocate for the Respondents 1 to 4 and none appeared for Respondents 5 and 6 either in person or by Advocate. This Court doth Order and Decree as follows

1. That the Appeal Suit be and hereby is parfly afiowed by modifying judgment and decree dared 14.07.2023 in o.s.No. 39 of 2022 (ord o.s.No. 7 of 2018) passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Narayanpet; 2. Thar the extent of excruding item No. 5 of suit 'A' schedule property and item No. 10 of 'B' schedule property i.s., Ac.02.g0 guntas of land and open plot admeasuring 660 square yards are excruded from the purview of suit schedule properties to be partitioned in this case;

3. That save as aforesaid, the decree of the Lower Tribunar qfral stand confirmed in all other aspects; and

4. That there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal. //TRUE COPY// The Principal District Judoe at Narayanpet Two CD Cbpies To, VII 1 2 o -n Sd/- K. SRINIVASA RAO O]NT REGISTRAR ECTION OFFICER /I HIGH COURT DATED: 1010112025 DEGREE AS.No.479 of 2023 PARTLY ALLOW!NG THE APPEAL AND DISMISSING THE IA WITHOUT COSTS 0