The High Court · 2025

Order

The case of petitioners - TSGENCO is that Respondents 2 to 12 were alleged to have been working as contract labour engaged by a Contractor - M/s FABCONS, Paloncha in Kothagudem Thermal Power Station (KTPS) on the work of annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors. The State Government issued G.O.Ms.No. 41, dated 23-09-1996 prohibiting employment of contract labour in 33 categories in APSEB in exercise of powers conferred under Section 10 (l) of the contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, l97O and declaring that orders for absorption of workers would be issued by the department concerned. In terms thereof, the then APSEB issued guidelines for abolition of contract labour working in 33 categories in various generating stations

uide B.P.Ms. No. 37, dated 18-05-1997. Subsequently, further instructions were issued uide B.P.Ms. No. 260, dated L9-L2-L997 and B.P.Ms.No. 272, dated 31-12-1997.

1.2. Further, it was contended that Respond.ents, cases were also considered and they were found to be not eligible for n 2 absorption. At this stage, Writ Petition No' 26785 of 1998 was filed to declare the results of petitioners therein. This Court, by order dated 13-10-1998, disposed of the said Writ Petition directing Respondents therein to declare the results of Petitioners. Thereafter, by proceedings dated 19-Ol-1999' the claim of petitioners was rejected on the ground that they do not come under the 33 abolished categories in APSEB and they are not on rolls as on 23-09- 1996 ln terms of the orders issued in B'P' Ms' No' 37' 1.3. dated 18-5- 1gg7, B.P. Ms. No. 260, dated L9-12-1997 and B'P' Ms. No. 27'2, dated 3l-12-lgg7, certain contract labourers working in prohibited categories of employment were considered for absorption. At this stage, Writ Petition No' 61OO of 1999 and batch was filed, wherein this Court uide order dated 16-07-1999 directed Petit-ioners therein to produce evidence in support of their claim to APGENCO which was directed to rec<lnsider the case of Petitioners therein in the light of the documents produced by them. Pursuant to the said order' GENCO uide GO.Ms. No. a37lGM (HR)/ 2OOO, dated l8-O9-2oo0't:onstituted a Committee consisting of Chief Engineer/Generation' Chief Engineer/O&M, KTPS, General Manager (Administration) and J \ General Manager (HR) to examine the merits of each of the Petitioners and to decide about their entitlement for absorption. Accordingly, the said Committee conducted meetings and after examination of the documents produced, carne to the conclusion that 123 Petitioners are fullilling the conditions prescribed in B.P. Ms. No,37, dated 18-05-L997 and in respect of the remaining 64 Petitioners, came to the conclusion, as per the evidence produced, that none of the job atteniled by them as mentioned in the bona ftde certtficates and/or Field Officers report either do not fall under the purview of the prohibition categories of employment or that Petitioners have not been working as on 23-09-1996, as the case may be, herlce, they are not entitled for absorption in terms of B.P.Ms. No. 37, dated 18-O5-L997. Pursuant to the orders of this Court, the claim of Petitioners was also considered and they were issued proceedings dated O4-LO-2OO 1 rejecting their candidature duly recording that they worked in annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors, which category of job is not included in 33 abolished categories. Hence, they do not meet the pre-requisite conditions laid down in B.P. Ms. No. 37, dated 18-05- 1997. 4 Further, it was contended by petitioners that

1.4. Respondenr-s herein filed Writ Petition No. 217L9 of 2OO2. This Court, by order dated O5-O2-2OO3 disposed of the said Writ Petition permitting Petitioners therein to raise an Industrial Dispute before the tndustrial Tribunal having jurisdiction as regards their entitlement for absorption or appointment under various orders issued by GENCO. In pursuance of the same, they approached the tndustrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Warangal, which, vide Endorsement dated 2O-O8-2O03 refused to entertain the dispute on the premise that Industrial Dispute has to be referred to it by the appropriate Government under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the ActJ. Thereafter, Respondents filed wPMP No. 1207 of 2OO4 in the mentioned Writ Petition and this Court by order dated 12- 07-2OO4, directed the Tribunal to entertain the dispute raised by Respondents herein as a reference made under Section 10 (1) of the Act and adjudicate the same. The said orders were passed keeping in view of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Steel Authoritg of India Limited. o. Nqtional Unlon for Woter Front Workers and the order of this Court in Writ petition No. 379 of 2OOO and batch, dated 08-09-2003. 5

1.5. It was also contended that pursuant to the order dated l2-O7-2O04, the l,abour Court registered the dispute as I.D. No. 87 of 2OO4; workmen examined themselves as WWs-l to 12 and on behalf of management, MW-l was examined and Exs. W-1 to 56 were marked. The Industrial Tribunal frampd the ISStIe:-

1.6. ."",,*,['T:'[i:ffi":::":::,.:"::- ;: Til T: absorption?" Petitioners contended that misconstruing the evidence available on record, the Tribunal passed an Award directing Petitioners herein to absorb Respondents 2 to 12 into the services of APGENCO in terms of B.P. Ms. No. 37, dated 18- 5-1997, B.P. Ms. No. 260, dated 19-12-1997 and B.P. Ms. No. 272, dated 31- l2-L997. The Award is wholly misconceived and irrational. Aggrieved by the same, this Writ Petition is filed on the ground that the Labour Court failed to appreciate that, it is the specific case of the Petitioners herein that annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors is not included in 33 abolished categories. Workmen failed to produce any documentary evidence to show that annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors form part of 33 abolished 6 categories. The nature of contract awarded for annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors do not form part of the 33 categories specified in G.o. Ms. No. 41, dated 23-09-1996, B.P. Ms No. 37, dated 18-05- 1997 is issued for appointment of contract labour engaged against 33 abolished categories in generating stations. To fulhl the conditions, one should have been working in 33 abolished categbries in various generating stations and they should have been working as on issuance of G.o. Ms. No. 41, dated 23-09-1996. Since the nature of work awarded i.e. annual maintenance does not form part of 33 abolished categories, workmen are not entitled for absorption into service. The lindings of the Labour Court that Respondents workmen are working in the coal mill which is one of the 33 abolished categories is erroneous and misconceived. The annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors do not form part of the coal mill activities. It was contended that observations of the Labour Court in Para 35 and 36 are contrary to the evidence available on record and it does not support the case of workmen. In Ex. W-8, it was recorded that FABCONS works are indirectly related to 33 abolished categories. Even if such an observation is taken into 7 consideration, it cannot be termed that Respondents are working in one of the 33 abolished categories. Thus, the observations of the Tribunal are wholly out of context and do not support the stand of Respondents that they are working in one of the 33 abolished categories. Ex. W-7 was marked through WW.8. However, he failed to produce copy of the LS. Agreement. Therefore the observation made by the Tribunal at Para 37 is without any basis. It is for Respondents to prove that they were working in a contract in coal mill. In the absence of the same, the certilicate dated 2O-9-2OO9 issued at the behest of Respondents 2 to 12 cannot be treated as a valid document for determining that they are working in one of the 33 abolished categories.

1.7 . It was further contended that the Labour Court failed to appreciate that Exs. W-15, 19,23,27,31,35,39, 11, 43,48 and 53 are bonafide certificates referred to in Para 18 of the award. The said documents do not support the stand of Respondents. The said certificates are with reference to L.S. Agreement No. 93196-97, dated 04-11-1996, whereas one should have been working as on 23-09-1996. Therefore, the said certilicates do not support the stand of Respondents. The \ L.,,'.,'-,. r:1..:. " . 8 Labour court in Para 23 and 24 rejected to look into the service certilicates of Respondents. Thus, there is no evidence available on record to show that Respondents were working against one of the 33 abolished categories as on 23-09-1996 which is one of the specific conditions in terms of B.p.Ms. No. 37, dated 18-o5-1997, B.P. Ms. No. 260, dated L9-L2-199T and B.p. Ms. No. 272, dated 3L-r2-lg97. Thus, there is no evidence available on record before the Labour Court to grant the relief in favour of Respondents. The observations of the Labour court at para 29 are wholly misconceived and erroneous. It is for workmen to prove that t.hey were working against the prohibited categories and working as on the date of issuance of G.o. Ms. No. 41, dated 23-9-1996. In the absence of the same, n<l relief could have been granted in favour of Respondents holding that they are working against one of the 33 abolished categories. The Labour court gravely erred in referring to Judgment in Harinqndan Prasad a. Emploger r/R To Management of Food cotporation of rndiq.t which has no application, in as much as, to claim for absorption, one should have fulfilled the conditions specified in B.P. Ms. No. 37, dated lg-s-rggr, B.p. ' lzot+17 scc t9o . -;, 9 Ms. No. 260 dated 19-12-1997 and B.P. Ms. No. 272, dated 3l-12-1997. The observations of the Labour Court at Para 42 aremisconceived and erroneous. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Steet Authoritg of India Limited casie held that there is no automatic absorption consequent on the notification under Section 10 (1) of the Contract Labour (Regutation & Abolition) Act. The only benefit they are entitled to under Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act. In terms of Para 125 (61, the benefit to be given is to give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if they are found suitable by relaxing the conditions as to the maximum age taken into consideration, the age of worker at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relax the condition as to the academic qualification other than technical qualification. Thus, the findings of the Labour Court are wholly erroneous. Similarly, the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in O.I\IGC v. Petroleum' Coal Labour Union2 has no application as the workmen claims to be engaged through a contractor but not directly working with GENCO. The observations of the Labour Court at para 46 are contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In those 2 lzors; 6scc494 10 {' \ circumstances, petitioners sought for quashing of Award in I.D.No.S7 of 2OO4, dated 2l'12'2OI5' While making the above contentions' leartted Senior 2. Counsel Sri G' Vidya Sagar representing Ms' K' Udaya Sri'n learned Standing Counsel for petitioners relied upon the following decisions' a- Reserrue Bcrnk of India u' S' Manis b. R-M. iZUiit u"Asst'-Dxecutiue Engineef c. Krishi""iigg" Jala Nigam Ltd v' Mohd Ro/is' Per contra, it was contended on behalf of 3 present counter-aff-rdavit filed by respondents that the Respondents is similar to that which arose in I'D' No' 105 of 2oo2onthefiIeofthelndustrialTribunal-cum-LabourCourt, Warangal wherein the Labour Court passed the Award dated 09-O9-2OO5 directing GENCO to absorb the services of Petitioners therein and that the said Award was confirmed by this Court in Writ Petition No'9057 of 2006 and the same was affirmed in Writ Appeal No' 37O of 2OOT and Civil Appeal No.9793 of 2010. Therefore, sought for a direction to confirm the Award clated 2l-L2-2O15 in I'D'No'87 of 2OO4' In this o '1zoos1 5 scc loo 1zooo1 1 scc 106 s lzoool 11 scc 522 l1 regard, it is stated that Petitioners in the present I.D cannot be treated on par with the Petitioners in I.D. No. 105 of 2OO2. Therefore, the Award of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Warangal in I.D.No. 105 of 2OO2 as confirmed by this court and the Hon'ble Apex court has no application to the facts of this case. Further, it was contended that Petitioners in I.D.No. 1O5 of 2OO2 and Petitioners in I.D.No.87 of 2OO4 are part of Petitioners in w.P.Nos.61OO of 1999: 6424 of1999: 1,3527 0f 1999 and 12152 0f 1998. In the said writ Petitions, a Committee was constituted regarding absorption of contract labour in the Unit of chief Engineer (oM), KTPS. The Committee uid.e its report dated 2O-12-2OOO considered merits of each of the Petitioners covered in the above Writ Petitions. In the said report, 1O4 Petitioners covered in writ Petition No. 6100 of 1999; three Petitioners in writ Petition No. 6424 of 1999: eight Petitioners in Writ Petition No.13527 of 1999 and Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 12152 of 1998 were held to hve fulfilled the conditions specified in B.P.Ms.No.37, dated 18-o5-1997: B.P.Ms.No.260, dated lg-12-L997 and B.P.Ms.No.272, dated 3l-12-lgg7. The report of the said Committee was forwarded to the Head Office of the then A.P.GENCO. [n the said report, C : : i I I I t ; t2 a \ Petitioners in I.D.No. 1O5 of 2OO2 were found to be eligible. However, Petitioners in I.D.No.S7 of 2OO4 were fotrnd to be not eligible for absorption. The said report was forwarded to the Head Office. The Head Office of A.P.GENCO uide Memo dated O1-10-2001 deleted the names of Petitioners in I.D.No. 1O5 of 2OO2 on the premise that they were not working on the cut-off date i.e. 23-Og-tgg6. Aggrieved by deletion of 'their names at the Head Office, Petitioners in I.D.No. 105 of 2OO2 raised Industrial Dispute. Since their names are found at the first instance and later being removed, the Labour Cotrrt interfered with the decision of the Head Office and passed an Award directing to absorb them in terms of the recommenclations of the First Committee. Thus, the same was confirmed by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court, whereas in respect of Petitioners in I.D.No.87 of 2OO4, their names were not recommended in the First Committee report dated 2O-12-2OOO or in the subsequent Memo dated 01-10-2001. Tht:refore, there cannot be any comparison with Petitioners in I.D.No.S7 of 2OO4 and I.D.No.105 of 2OO2. Thus, according to respondents, Writ Petition is misconceived and is liable to be rejected. l3 4 While contending as above, respondents relied on the following decisrons a. Isutarlal Mohanlal Thakkor u. Paschim GuJarat Vij b. Harjinder Singh a. htnjab State Warehousing Compang Ltd6 CorporatlonT. c. Sged Yakoob u. I(S. Ro,dhrl,krishnans d.. I{1lS Ro;m o. Bangalore Metropolitan T?anspott Corporatione. e. Sitcel Authoritg of Indta Ltd a. Nationa.l Union Waterfront Workerslo

5. Heard Sri P. Sridhar Rao, learned counsel for Respondents 2 to 12 and perused the record.

6. Whether Award in I.D.No.87 of 2OO4 dated

21.12.2O15 requires any interference by this Court.

7. The Tribunal, while proceeding with I.D.No.87 of 2OO4 had recorded the point for consideration as "whether petitioners (respondents) were working in KTPS in any one of the 33 abolished categories and are entitled for absorption and while deciding the matter in favour of resirondents, the Tribunal observed as under: '

18. The petitioners/ WWsl to 1 1 spoke of their case on the pobt attd ftled xerox copies of - u lzot+16 scc 434 ' lzoroy 3 scc 192 8 RIR tg6+ sc 4TT n lzors; 12 scc 39 'o 1zoot1 7 scc 1 i I I I ; t4 t (1) bona ftde certificates said to haue been prepared by the officials of tle KTPS, Exs. Wl5. W|9, W23, W27, W31, W35, W39, WL1, W43, W48, W53: (2) certifiu.te dated 2O.9.2OOO alorq with a lbt of workers witlt their bio data,, said to ltuue been issued bg thE Managing Partner of M/s FAB CONS ard countersigrted bg the oJficials of the KTPS, Ex.W7 (3) seruice certificates said to haue been issued bg their contractor, Dxs.W16 and W17, W20 and W21, W24 and W25, W28 and. W29, W32 ani W33, W36 and W37, W40 and W41, W12 and W12A. W44 and W45, W49 arut WSO and W54 and W55.

19. As per the counter anL as per th.e euidene of the KTPS diubton.al Engineer V. Muralikrislna, MWI, the departmental oJficials of the APGENCO/ AI'SEB prepared the bona Jide certiftcates of the petitioners based on auailable records. In the cross-exarninatiort, MWI admitted that the bonafide ertificates were prepared on the basis of the attendanrce regbter, wage register and. mustei rolls. It is not the case o.f the respondents that the bona fide certificates are not in their custodg. Somehou,, the petitioners obtained copies of the bona frde certifi.cates and filed then. And tle said doatments were admitted in eui.dence uithout ang objection from tlrc responclents. It is not the case of the respondents thctt Exs.WlS, W19.' W23. W27, W31 , W35, W39, Wl 1 , W43, W48, W53 are not copies of the bona fide certiftcates in their custodg.

20. It ts thtt cose of the respondents, and the copies of the bonn fide certificates _filed ba the petitioners also show, that the petitioners u)ere employed in the KTPS through M,/ s FAB CONS, Palorrcha, against contract agreement and were attertding to anrruaL maintenance of uapour fans. and u)orrn conuegors in the Boiler Area as on 23.9.1996.

21. Ex.W7 was admitted in through WW8. V.Pottabhi Ramaiah, WW8, deposed that he was working a.s a contractor in tlrc KTPS from 1987 and that he issued Ex.W7. MVtl adnitted that M/s FAB CONS qntractor utas car4fng out their works from 1987 and that the contents of Ex.W7 are true and cotrect.

22. As per Ex.W7, the petitioners u)ere engaged for ouerhauling, re<:tiftcatton and annual maintenance works of uapour fans and u)orrn conuegors under the follo wir tg ag re e me nts : (1) K2.Agreement No.27/ 1987-88 (2) K2.Agreement No.331/ 1988-89 (3) K2.Agreement No.2B7/ 1988-89 (4) K2.Agreetrnent No. 94/ 1989-90 (5) K2.Agreetment No.241/ 1989-90 (6) LS.Agreernent No.33/ 1990-91 (7) LS.Agreernent No.16/ 1990-91 (8) LS. Agreement No.171/ 1990-91 (9) LS.Agreement No.29/ 1991-92 (1O) LS.Agreerne:t No.37/ 1991-92 (11) LS.Agreernent No.47/ 1992-93 (12) LS.Agreernent No.60/ 1993-94 (13) LS.Agreement No.88/ 1994-95 (14) LS.Agreement No.64/ 1995-96 ( 1 5) LS.Agreement No. 93/ 1 996-97 (16) LS.Agreement No.11O/ 1997-98 (17) LS.Agreement No.68/ 1997-98 l5 ( 1 8) LS-Agreement No.68/ 1 999-2OOO (1 9) LS.Agreement No. 1 25/ I 999-2OOO Some of them uorked in ouerlnulirry of PC Feeders during 1987-88. Some of them are still antinuing and are executing the same Works. They had worked on 23.9.1996 and attended the complaints. TlLeir seruice particulars are mentioned again-st their names: (1)G.Lalu. Julg 1989 to till date (2) G.Kotilingam. Julg 1989 to till date (3) G.Mallalah. Julg 1989 to till date (4) S.SubrahmonAam. January 1989 to till date (5) B.Laxman. Julg 1989 to till date (6) P.Naragana. June 1993 to till date (7) V.Sreekanth June 1992 to till date (8) B.Prasad. February 199O to till date (9) J.Venkatanaragana. June 1988 to till date (1O) N.Babu Rao. 3.2-1987 to 31.12.1996 (11) N.Madhaua Rao. 1.3.1987 tD 1.10-1997

23. It i.s the euidence of WW12 that in the gear 1998 he issued seruice <:ertificates to the petitioners uhen theg uere called for interuiew, that the petitioners lost tlrc ccrtifrcotes and that he again bsrrcd seruire certifimtes to tlrc petitianers on tlrcir demand. Exs. W16 and W17, W2O and W21, W24 and W25, W28 and W29, W32 and W33, W36 and W37, W4O and W41, W12 and W12A, W44 artd W45, W49 and WSO and W54 and W55, all copi.es of th.e seruice certificates, are i-ssued bg him.

24. In the cross-examination, it was elicited from WWsl to 11 that the origutctl seruice certificates are Luith ttrcm. But th.e original seruice certiftcates were not produed. There is no explanation for non-production of the originals. Therefore, xerox capies of the seruice ertiftcates canrat be looked into.

25. WWsl to 77 claimed that they attenled to replacement of uapor bends and bunrcrs, mill dischnrge duct, erection of suffolding and fumace cleaning, ouerhaul of mill motors and fans, etc., in the Boiler Area. WW12 said he inaintained a record of the petitioners' work in PC feed.ers, uapor fans, worm conueAors and coal circuits.

26. Records pertaining to the worlcs exeanted on thi orders placed bg the K?'PS were rwt summonedfrom M/s FAB CONS. WW12 broughtonly attendance regLster and wages register for the gear 1996. He di.d not bring ang ottrcr record. In the absence of releuant reards, it is dilfiatlt to corrclude that the petitiorters Mattended to replacem.ent of uapour bends and bunrcrs, mill dbcharge duct, erection of scaffolding and furnace cleaning artd ouerhaul of mill flwtors and fans in th.e Boiler Area.

27. TLe euidence on reard shours thatfor 12 gears from 1987 onwards the KTPS got e:cecuted anrrual mainteriance works of uapour fans and worrn conueAors onlg through M/ s FAB CONS. But the respondents are descibing tlrc said work as 'not perennial', 'piece rated job', 'sporadic' and'contingent' and are antending that the utork does r..lc,t fall under any of the 33 aboti.shed categories of emplogment:

28. MWI stated in the cross-examination that tttey maintained reard of the worl;^s antarded to the contractors. He furtter stated tlLat the works autarded to the r \ l6 contractor will be throughout the gear but added that they a.re em.ergencA, periodical and once ht a year as uell. He admitted that the utork done bg the contract labour is superuised bg the AEs, the ADEs and. tle DIiEs and. that at times theg mctke suggestions. ht the re-examination, he asserted thot the period of annual tnannlenance in the KTPS is around 15 dags.

29. No rec<trd uas produced bg the respondents to slou.t that M/s FAB CONS exeanted the uorks entrusted to it onlg within 15 dags during ang atntract peiod. In the absence of such reard, the plea tlnt the work executed bg M/s FAB CO/VS through the petitiorters is nof perennial but is sporadic and contirtgent, cawot be acceptctd.

30. L is said tLLe cases of the petitioners were rejected afier corsidering the report of the Committee consbting of the CEE (O&M), KTPS, the CDE (Gen). yS. Hgderabad. the GIl (Adm), VS, Hgderabad and the GM (HR), VS, Hgderabad. As per the rejection orders dated 4.1O.2OO1, Exs. W14, Wl8, W22, W26, W3O, W34, W38, W42, W47, W52 and W56, the authoities concemed exainierl the cases of the petitioners bg uerifging all tlrc releuant records and docurnents and also ascertairred the, rnaterial and facts of the case.

31. The report of tlrc Comrnittee and the records and doanrnents allegedlg ansidered bg the authorities concernedfor considering the cases of lhe petitioners along uith others, are material documents in thb use but theg u,ere not filed bg the resportderis.

32. Xerox cctpg of a letter dated 12.7.2O0O between the CE, O&M, KTPS, Paloncha and the GM(HR), APGENCO, VS, Hgderabad, filed bg the petitioners was marked as Ex.WB.

33. It was corfiertded that Ex.W8 i-s rnt admissible in euidenoe 'an.d is rtot proued and, therefore, it ca.nrrct be looked into.

34. Ex.W8 was adrnitted in euidence through WWB taithout arry objection as regards its admissibilitg and its mode of proof. Therefore, the contention raised cannot be a<:cepted.

35. When Ex.W8 wcts confronted to him, MWI stated thnt he did not see it at ang point of tilne' and is not aware of it. h b not the case of the respondents that the oiginal of Ex.wB Ls not in their custodg. And norrc was examine-d to proue that a.spect.

36. In Iix.W8, it utas reported to the GM(HR), APGENCO, that M/s FAB CONS, I'aloncha had been working in tuorm conueaors of v and vI units tahi<-.h are part of coal milling <:ircuit tuhich transport puluerized bunkers and PC Feeders ard finallg to tlrc furnace and the works are indirectlg related to the 33 abolbhed categories.

37. MWI denied that worm conuegors and uapour fans r's a part of coal millirq. But in the fitrther cross-examination he stated that there is no nc,menclafure for each part oJ work as a department to look afier in the aal mill. In the coal mill, there will be u.torks of annual ouerhaul of the mill, replacement of b<twls, repairs to the mill drurn, arrestirtg coal powder leaks, etc. The aal nert uill be shified to boilers throultrh mill outlet pipes. The uorm conueVor trar*ports and distributes the coal am<tng the PC brtrtkers. For this, uapour fans also function ?his; is the proess for generatin.g electricitg. Euen therutise al-so, the pouer can be generated. bg buming the coal in the furnace -.-_ t7 38- From the euidence on re@rd, it is clear ttwt the petitiorters were uorking in the coal mill, which i.s one of the i3 abolbhed utegories, but they utere denied the benefit of absorPtton- 39- The grieuance of the petitioners is that a.s per the gui.delines laid down in BP is uos.\z, z6O aid 27b mang similarlg plaied uorkmen utere absorbed and, therefore, tlrcg are also entitled to the same benefit' 4o.Thepleadingandtleeuidertreoftherespondentsisthatallthecandidates ino fupt"a the"twin conditions spectfied in GO MS No.41 uere absorbed- 41. tn Hai Nandan Prasad u. Emploger I/R to Managem.ent of FCI [2014(7) SCC lgo), it is obserued: "... whereuer it ii found that similarlg situated rtorkmen are ,"g,n,i,.abgtheemplogeritselfunde.rsom,eschem,eoroth.enxi,seandthe wZrkmen in f,uestion whi lnue approacfred Industrial/l,abour Court are at par iith tlo*, direction of regulariziiion in such cases mag be legally justifred, ith"rurise,' non_reculaizad6n of tle tefi ouer workers itself would amaunt to inuidiaus'dbcrimination qua thim in suLlt cases and would be uiolatiue of Art' 14 oi tn" Constitutbn. This, tlrc Industial a!'judtntor toould..be achieuing tlrc iqi"t tU bg upholding Art. 14, rath.er than uiolating this constitutional prouision'" 42. The euidence on reqrd. shours that euen afier issuance of Go Ms No.41, the respi,ondents ontinued the petitioners a.s contract labour in the mal mill and aeiiea their legitimate right of absorption' 43. In ONGC Ltd. u. Petroleum coal Labour union (2015(5) SCALE 3531, the iorkren were appointed on term basis uide memarandum of appointment issued toeachorrcofth,eworkmenoncernedinthegearlgSSbgtheCorporatanwhg intinued their seruices for seueral gears. Thereafter, theg were denied their iigitiir:not right to be ,egilarized in-tie pennanent posts of the Corporatiort' The c6urt hetd:r,... it i" o it o, case of an unfair labour practice on the part of the Industi.al Disputes Act)' Corporation as defired under &ction 2(ra) of the A?t uhich is statutoilg pioniUtt a under Sectioi ZSf o7 ttn Act and tlrc said 'action of the corporation wooini penaltg to be imposed upon it under section 25U of tle Act." and dismissed ti afipeat igainst the jud'gment pasy! bg the High Court 9f Judicafire at Madras wntrebA tie Uign Court-dbmissed the wit appeal filed by uo c"i*"tion agains,t tne iismissal of its wit petition dnllerrying the award ji".a'bg the lr:;ustrial Tibunal, Tamil Nadu, uherein it was held that non- -*gii"*iti.n of the conerned workmen in tlrc dispute is ngt justifted and airiii"i tn" Co$oration to regularize the seruices of the ancerned uorkmen. 44. In uiew of the aboue said unfair labour practices ammitted by the respondents, iie petitioners are entitled for absorption' 45. It was contended that afier tle absorption process and_as- per.the judgment ilt SAIL case, tle APGENCO Lanceled the-proeZdings in BP-Ms Nos'37' 26O and 272. But no material was placed on record to acrept the said contention' 46. It was next contended ttnt as per the iudgment in SAIL case' th'ere is no are rat seeking automatic concept of automatb ibsorption. ifu rn"r.,or., ti"-iag*."t in sAlt ca'se is not applicable to the facts of -ryidoir.lrs A;;6ii;' tle case. 47. For the foregoing reasorTs' the point is arsutered in fauour of the petitioners and against the resPondents- -(the. l l8

48. IN THE RESULT, the petition is allowed directing the respondents to absorb the petitioners in.to the seruices of the APGENCO in terms of BP Ms Nos.37, 26O and 272 issued bg the erstwhile APSEB.

8. Before delving with the issue on hand, it is apposite to refer to the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court which declared the law as to when the orders of Industrial Tribunal can be interfered by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

8. 1. In Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakko,r's ca.se, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as Under:

15. We find the judgment and award of the Labour Court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Courl. has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the hndings of the Labour Court in its award as it is well settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its hndings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of lanv or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of jtrstice.

16. It relevant to mention that in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329 : (2OlO) 3 SCC (Civ) 3381 , with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that: (SCC p. 3a8) l9 "a9. (m1... The power of interference under [Article 227lis to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court." It was also held that: (SCC p. 347, para 491 "a9. @l High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it." Thus it is clear, that the High Court has to exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution judiciously and to further the ends of justice.

17. tn Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. [(2010) 3 SCC t92: (2OlO) 1 SCC (L&S) 11461 this Court held that: (SCC p. 205, para 2O) "2O. ... In view of the above discussion, we hold that the learned Singte Judge of the High Court comrnitted serious jurisdictional error and unjustiliably interfered with the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court with compensation of Rs 87,582 by entertaining a wholly unfounded plea that the appellant was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the Regulations."

18. The power of judicial review of the High Court has to be alluded to here to decide whether or not the High Court has erred in setting aside the judgment and order of the Labour Court. In Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 443 : (2or2l 3 SCC (Civ) 18a : QoL2l 3 SCC (Cri) 1981 this Court referred to the position held on the power of judicial review in Reid v. Secy. of State for Scotland [(1999) 2 AC 512: (1999) 2 WLR 28 : (1999) 1 All ER 481 (HL)l wherein it is stated that: (Heinzlndia (P) Ltd. case [Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC aa3 : (2Ol2l 3 SCC (Civ) 184 (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1981 , SCC pp.470-71, para 68) l**. 20 "68. .,. '.ludicial review involves a challenge to the legal validity of th,: decision. It does not allow the court of review to examine the evidence wit]l a view to forrnirlg its own view about the slrbstantial merits of the case. It may be that the tribunal ,.vhose decision is being challenged has done something which it had no lawful authority to (lo. [t may have abusecl or misused the authority which it had. It may have departed from the procedures which either by statute or at common law as a matter of fairness it ought to have observed. As regards the decision itself it may be found to be perversr:, or irrational or grossly disp::oportionate to what u,as required. Or the decision may be found to be erroneous in respect of a legal dehciency, as for example, tJrrough the absence ofevidence, or of suffrcient evidence, to support it, or through account being taken of irrelevant matter, or through a failure for any reason to take account of a relevarrt matter, or through some misconstruction of the terms of the statutory provision which tJle <lecision-maker is required to apply. But while the evidence may have to be explored in c,rder to see if the decision is vrtiated by such legal deficiencies it is perfectly clear that in case of review, as distinct from an ordinary appeal, the court ma!' not set about forming its own preferred viewof theevidence.'(Reidcase[(1999) 2AC512:(1999) 2WLR28:(t()9{)) lAllER48l (HL)l , AC pp. 541 F-s42 A)"

19. Therefore, in view of the above judgments we have to hold that the High Court has committed a grave error b1' setting aside the findings recorded on the points of dispute in the awar(l of the Labour Court. A grave miscarriage of justice has been committed against the appellant as the respondent should have accepted the birth certificate as a conclusive proof of age, the same being an entry in the public record as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and the birth certificate mentioned the appellant's date of birth as 27-6-1940, which is the documentary evidence. Therefore, there was no reason to deny him the benefit of the same, instead the respondent Boarcl prematurely terminatecl the services of the appellant by taking his date of birth as 27-6-1937 which is contrary to the facts and evidence otl record. This date of birth is highly improbable as well as impossible as the appellant's elder brother was born on 27-l-1937 as per the school leaving certificate, and there cannot be a mere 5 months' difference between the birth of his elder brother and himself. Therefore, it is apparent that the school leaving certificate cannot be relied upon by the respondent Board and instead, the birth certificate issued by BMC which is the documentary evidence should have been relied upon by the respondent. Further, the date of birth is mentioned as 27-6- 1940 in the 2t LIC insurance policy on the basis of which the premium was paid by the respondent to the Life Insurance corporation on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, it is only just and proper that the respondent should have relied on the birth certificate issued by BMC on the face of all these discrepancies as the same was issued on the order of JMFC.

8.2. Likewise, in Harjinder Singh,s case (supra), the Honble Apex Court held as under:

21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 222 of the constitution in matters like the present one, the High courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the constitution and the provisions contained in part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: "10. .-. The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and signif,rcance to the ideal of welfare State., (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines IAIR 1958 SC 923] , AIR p. 928, para 10.) 22- In Y.A. Mamarde v. Authority under the Minimum wages Act [(t972l 2 scc 1o8l , this court, while interpreting the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed: (SCC pp. 109-10) "The anxiety on the part of the society for improving the general economic condition of some of its less favoured members appears to be S',r.;'i- ... rl*+*l*"*ii:;1riu;*iiil5-"i,. :, 22 ( \ in supersession of the old principle of absolute freedom of contract and the doctrine of laissez faire and in recognition of the new principles of social welfare and common good. Prior to our Constitution this principle was advocated by the movement for liberal employmettt in civilised countries and the Act which is a pre-Constitution measure was the offspring of that movement. Under our present Constitution the State is now expressly directed to endeavour to secure to all workers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence but a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decetrt standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure. This directive principle rlf State policy being conclucive to the general interest of the nation as a whole, merely lays down the foundation for appropriate social structure in which the labour u,ill find its place of dignity, legitimately due to it in lieu of its contribution to the progress of national economic prosperity."

23. The Preamble and various articles contained in Part IV of the Constitution promote social justice so that life of evor]/ individual becomes rneaninglul and he is able to live with human dignity. The concept of social justice engrafted in the Constitution consists of diverse principles essentially for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citiznn. Social justice is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic devise to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, Dalits, tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. In other words, the aim of social justir:e is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equalitl', which is the legitimate expectation of every section of the society.

24. ln a developing society like ours which is full of unbridgeable and ever ',r,idening gaps of inequality in status and of opportunity, law is a catalyst to reach the ladder of justice. The philosophy ol'u,elfare State and social justice is amply reflected in large number of judgments of this Court, various High Courts, National and State lndustrial Tribunals involving interpretation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 23 l Factories Act, 1948; Payment of Wages Act, 1936; Minimum wages Act, 1948; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923; Employees' State lnsurance Act, 1948; Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and Shops and Commercial Establishments Act enacted by different States.

25. In Ramon Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor [(2001) 1 SCC 118 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 152 : 2OOl SCC (Cri) 3l , R.P. Sethi, J. observed that: (SCC p. 127, para 2ll "21. After independence the concept of social justice has become a part of our legal system. This concept gives meaning and significance to the democratic ways of life and of making the life dynamic. The concept of welfare State would remain in oblivion unless social justice is dispensed. Dispensation of social justice and achieving the goals set forth in the Constitution are not possible without the active, concerted and dynamic efforts made by the person concerned with the justice dispensation system."

26.In LIC v. Consumer Education and Research centre [(1995) 5 scc 4821 , K. Ramaswamy, J. observed that social justice is a device to ensure life to be meaningful and liveable with human dignity. The State is obliged to provide to workmen facilities to reach minimum standards of health, economic security and civilised living. The principle laid down by this law requires courts to ensure that a workman who has not been found guilty cannot be deprived o[ what he is entitled to get. Obviously his device then that is when a workman has been illegally deprived misconduct on the part of the employer and employer cannot possibly be permitted to deprive a person of what is due to him' -of

27.1n 70s, 80s and early 90s, the courts repeatedly negated the doctrine of laissez faire and the theory of hire and fire. In his treatise: Democracy, Equality and Freedom, Justice Mathew wrote: "The original concept of employment was that of master and servant. It was therefore held that a court will not specifically enforce a contract of employment. The law has adhered to the age-old rule that an employer may dismiss the employee at will. Certainly, an employee can 24 i .\ never expect to be completely free to do what he likes to tlo' He must face the prospect of discharge for failing or refusing to do his work in accordancewithhisemployer,sdirections.Suchcontrolbytheemployer over the employee is fundamental to the employment relatronship' But there are innumerable facets of the employee's life that have iittle or no relevance to the employment relationship and over which the employer shouldnotbeallowedtoexercisecontrol.Itisnodoubtdifficulttodraw a line between reasonable demands of an employer and those which are unreasonable as having no relation to the employment itsell" The rule that an employer can arbitrarily discharge an employee 'with or without regardtotheactuatingmotiveisarulesettledbeyonddorrbt.Butthe rulebecamesettledatatimewhenthewords.master'and.serwant'r.vere taken more literally than they are now and when' as in t:arly Roman Law, the rights of the servant' like the rights of any other menrber of the household, were not his own' but those of his paterfetmilias' The overtonesol.thisancientdoctrinearediscernibleinthejuclicialopinion which rationalised the employer's absolute right to discharge the employee. Such a philosophy of the employer's dominrtln over his employee may have been in tune with the rustic simplicily of bygone days. But that philosophy is incompatible with these days of large' impersonal, corporate employers' The conditions have now vastly changedanditisdifficulttoregardthecontractofempltlymentwith Iarge-scale i-nd'ustries and government enterprises conductr:d by bodies which are created under special statutes as mere contract of personal service. Where large number' of people are unemployecl and it is extremely difficult to lind employment, an employee who is discharged fromservicemighthavetoremainwithoutmeansofsubsjst.encefora considerably long time and damages in the shape of wages for a certain period may not be an adequate compensation to the emplo-yee for non- employment. In other words' damages would be a poor srlbstitute for reinstatement. The traditional rule has survived because of the Sustenanceitreceivedfromthelawofcontracts.Fromthecontractual principleofmutualityofobligation,itwasreasonedthatiftheemployee : I I i ) 25 ) can quit his job at will, then so too must the employer have the right to terminate the relationship for urny or no reason. And there are a number of cases. in which even contracts for permanent employment i.e. for indefinite terms, have been held unenforceable on the ground that they lack mutuality of obligation. But these cases demonstrate that mutuality is a high-sounding phrase of little use as an analytical tool and it would seem clear that mutuality of obligation is not an inexorable requirement and that lack of mutuality is simply, as memy courts have come to recognise, an imperfect way of referring to the real obstacle to enforcing any kind of contractual limitation on the employer's right of discharge i.e. lack of consideration. If there is anything in contiact law which seems likely to advance the present inquiry, it is the growing tendency to protect individuals from contracts of adhesion firom overreaching terms often found in standard forms of contract used by large commercial establishments. Judicial disfavour of contracts of adhesion has been said to reflect the assumed need to protect the weaker contracting part against the harshness of the common law and the abuses of freedom of contract. The same philosophy seems to provide an appropriate answer to the argument, which still seems to have some vitality, that the servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered to him."

28. In Govt. Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa 1([979t, 1 SCC 477 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 391 , the employer invoked the theory of hire and fire by contending that the respondent's appointment was purely temporary and his service could be terminated at any time in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment which he had voluntarily accepted. While rejecting this plea as wholly misconceived, the Court observed: (SCC p. 486, para25l "25. ... It is borrowed from the archaic common law concept that employment was a matter between the master and servant only. In the first place, this rule in its original absolute form is not applicable to government servants. Secondly, even with regard to private employment, 26 a r\ much of it has passed into the fossils of time. This rulc held the lield at the time when the master and servant were taken more literaly than they art: now and when, as in early Roman raw, the rights of the servant, Iike the rights of any other member of the househord, u.ere not his own, but those of his paterfamilias.'The overtones of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the Anglo-American jurisprudence of the l gth century and the first half of the 20th century, which rationalisecr the emprover,s absolute right to discharge the employee. ,Such a philosophy,, as pointed out by K.K. Mathew, J. (vide his treatise: Democracy, Equarity and Fret:dom, p. 326), bf the employer,s dominion over his emplovee may have been in tune with the rustic simpricity of bygone days. But that philosophy is incompatibre with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers.,To bring it in tune with vastll,changed and changing socio-economic conditions and mores of the dav, much of this old' antiquated and unjust doctrine has been erod.d by judicial decisions and legislation, particurarly in its apprication to persons in public employment, to whom the constitutional protection of Articles 14, l5' 16 and 3r r is ava,abre- The argument is therefore overruled., 29. The doctrine of laissez faire was again rejected Laboratories (t) Ltd. v. presiding Officer [(1984) 1 SCC I : (L&S) 421 , in the following words: (SCC p. 9, para l2l 1984 SCC in Glaxo "12' In the days of laissez faire when industrial reration was governed by the harsh weighted law of hire and fire the nanagement rvas the supreme master, the relationship being referabre to contract betrveen unequals and the action of the management treated armost sacrosanct. The developing notions of social justice and tire expanding horizon of socio-economic justice necessitated statutory protection to the unequal partner in the industry, namery, those who invest brood and flesh against those who bring in capital. Moving from the days when whim of the employer was suprema lex, the Act took a modest step to compel by statute the emproyer to prescribe minimum conditions of service subject to which employment is given. The Act was e,acted as its long title shows to require employers in industrial establishments to 27 define with suff,rcient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them. The movement was from status to contract, the contract being not left to be negotiated by two unequal persons but statutorily imposed. If this socially beneficial Act was enacted for ameliorating the conditions of the weaker partner, conditions of service prescribed thereunder must receive such interpretation as to advance the intendment underlying the Act and defeat the mischief."

30. Of late, there has been a visible shift in the courts' approach in dealing with the cases involving the interpretation of social welfare legislations. The attractive mantras of globalisation and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d'etre of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganised workers. In large number of cases like the present one, relief has been denied to the employees falling in the category of workmen, who are illegally retrenched from service by creating by-lanes and side-lanes in the jurisprudence developed by this Court in three decades. The stock plea raised by the public employer in such cases is that the initial employment/engagement of the workman/employee was contrar5r to some or the other statute or that reinstatement of the workman will put unbearable burden on the financial health of the establishment. The courts have readily accepted such plea unmindful of the accountability of the wrong doer and indirectly punished the tiny beneficiary of the wrong ignoring the fact that he may have coniinued in the employment for years together and that micro wages earned by him may be the only source of his livelihood.

8.3. ln Sged Yakoob's caste (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: u

7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been :!,{:-"-. &t'rt rr:..:. .. :..."-.::j":'i -:+&Ed:iir. 28 <l (- frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting (lrrors otjurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunit)', be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposefl to principles of natural .justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not enritled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessaril-v means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of tht: appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the recorcl can tre corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, hgvvever grave it may app(lar to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording ttre said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarl-r', it a tinding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can bg corrected bl, a writ of certiorari. In clealing with this category of cases, however, we must ahvays bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction <>f the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the Surisdiction 29 conferred on the High courts under Articte 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimatety exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v' Syed Ahmad Ishaque [(1955) I SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath Bora v. commissioner of Hitls Division and Appeals Assam [(1958) SCR 12401 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar singh [AIR 1960 SC 11681

8.4. In .I(VS Ram's ca'sle (suprQ, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: 1O. In the writ petition, while setting aside the award of the Labour court, the learned Single Judge placed reliance upon the judgment of this court passed in Punjab water Supply sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan [Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan, {2oo7r 9 SCC86:(2oo7|2SCC(L&S)66slandalsoanotherjudgmentofthe High court and observed that a person who practices fraud for securing employment cannot perpetuate on the ground of delay and the learned Single Judge faulted the t abour Court for exercising discretion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and interfering with the punishment of dismissal from service. In our considered view, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the constitution of India, the High court can interfere with the order of the tribunal, only, when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In our view, when the Labour court has exercised its discretion keeping in view the facts of the case and the cases of similarly situated workmen, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court' ll.InSyedYakoobv.K.S.Radhakrishnan[SyedYakoobv.K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 4771 , the constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functibns under the Motor 30 a r Vehicles Act, 1939. Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench, Gajendragirdkar, J. observed as under : (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7l u7. ... A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcl-ing errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunitl' to be heard to the party affected by the or{er, or where the procedure ardopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. 'lhere is, hor,r,ever, no doubt that the jurisdir;tion to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the cotirt exercising it is not enl itled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result o[ the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it ma.\, appear to be. [n regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneousb- refused to admit admissiblc and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidencr: which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarlr,, if a linding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned frnding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drarvn from the said hnding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated 3r before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised."

12.ln Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. Uswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd., (2OL4l 6 SCC 434 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 2911 , it was held as under : (SCC pp. 440-41, paras 15-16) "15. We f,rnd the judgment and award of the Labour Court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the frndings of the Labour Court in its award as it is well-settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well-reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice.

16. It in Shalini Shyam relevant to mention that Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2O10) 8 SCC 329 : (2OlO) 3 SCC (Civ) 3381 , with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that : (SCC p. 3a8) '49. (m) ... The power of interference under [Article 2271is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.' 32 t r It was also held that : (SCC p. 347, para 491 '49. (cl High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintenclence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the or<lers of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act aS a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it."'

13. Emphasising that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 andlor 227 of the Constitution of India, the courts are to keep in view the goals set out in the Preamble and in Part IV of 'the Constitution while construing social u,elfare legislations, in Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. [Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., (2010) 3 SCC 192: (2OlO) 1 SCC (1,&S) 11461 , this Court has held as under: (SCC p.2O5, para 21) "2 1. Belbre concluding, rve consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 andlor 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Coutts are duty- bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which manctate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion o[ welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: '10. ... The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.' ,-,. Y 33 (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines [State of Mysore v- Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 9231 , AIR p. 928, para 10.)'

14. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed by the I-abour Court suffers from any such flaws. while interfering with the award of t]le Labour court, the High Court did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment [K.v.s. Ram v. BangalorQ Metropolitan Transport corpn., writ Appeal No. 390 of 2008, decided on 3-9-2012 (KAR)I cannot be sustained' g. From the above enunciation of law, what is clear is that High Court cannot exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution as Appellate Court or re-appreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points and the same is permissible only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record thereby leading to interference of this Court to the Award passed by the Labour Court. Further, in regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding and also if a finding of fact is 34 ; (. based on rro evidence, that would be regarded as an effort of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Further, the High Court should also bear in mind that the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding.' The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from thc said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court.

10. The examination of the Tribunal wit-h respect to evidence adduced more particularly the evidence adduced by WW8 through Ex.W8 as to the fact that respondents had been working in worm conveyors of V and VI Unit which are part of coal mitling circuit which transport pulverized bunkers and PC Feeders and Iinally to the furnace and the works are indirectly related to ll3 abolished categories. Further, the Tribunal in its explicit terms at Paras 36 to 38 observed that the evidence on record clearly established that respondents were working in the coal mill which is one of the 33 abolished categories but they 35 were denied the benefit of absorption in terms of BP.No.37 dated 1g.5. lgg7, BP.Ms.No .260 dated 19. L2.1997 and BP Ms-No-272 dated 31.12.L997 (Exs-W2 to W4). This court also finds concurrence with the view 1 1. expressed by the Tribunal regarding the similarly-placed workmen being absorbed in terms of BP Ms.Nos.37, 260 and 272 by relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble.Apex Court at Paras 41 and 43 of the Tribunal's order. Now coming to the decisions relied upon by the 12. petitioners more particularly s. Mani's cclfe (supra); R.M. yellatti,s cds;e (supra) and Krishna Bhagga Jala Nigam Ltd..rs case, all these decisions speak about the law with respect to burden of proof to be always be rested on workmen who is claiming service benefits. There is no difficulty and quarrel with the said proposition of law as enunciated by the Honble Supreme Court. In the instant case, workmen have \ \ discharged their burden of proof by adducing evidence and the Tribunal felt such evidence adduced by respondents as adequacy or sufliciency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding is within th:e - I I 36 a n exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as such the said points cannot be agitated again by petitioners before writ court.

13. Therefore, viewed from any angle, this Court is loath to accept the contentions of petitioners for reasons aforementioned and feels that the Award of the Labour Court does not require any interference as the same is without any serious error of law or the lindings recorded suffer from error apparent on record as such High Court cannot exercise its powers under Article 226 of the constitution as Appellate Court or re-appreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points.

14. In the result, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

15. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed. / l //TRUE COPYII Sd/.K.BHAVANI SWAMY ASSISTANT REGISTRAR G SECTION OFFICER To,

1. The Registrar, tndustrial Tribunal-cum-Labour court, warangal. 2. One CC to SMT.K.UDAYA SRl, Advocate' [OPUC] 3. One CC to SRI P.SRIDHAR RAO, Advocate. [OPUC] 4. Two CCs to GP FOR LABOUR, High Court for the State of Telangana. [OUT] 5. Two CD Copies. BSK PMK V HIGH COURT DATED t1511012025 ORDER WP.No.33722 of 2A16 ,-trti ,\ i'4 ( (, 20rou6p * ,,ATCHEO * q(' t- I (' DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS @