Sri V.Rohith, Advocate Representing SRI v. RAVI KIRAN RAO CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No
Case Details
1. Pallerla l-axminarayana, S/o. Narsaiah, Prop.of Vijaya Sri Enterprises, H.No. 4-1-239, [\Iahaveer Road, Tower Circle,
2. Pallerla r\nil Babu,, S/o. Laxminarayana, Manager and Owner of Auto AP-15- T-2594 \/ijaya Sri Enterprises, R/o. H.No.4-1-239, Mahaveer Road, Tower Circle. 3 lM/s. Unil:ed lndia lnsurance Company Limited, The Branch Manager, H.No.2- 8-1 86, 1 "t Floor, Mukurampuram,'Karimngar. ...Respondents Counsel for the Appellant:SRl V.Rohith, Advocate, Representing SRI V.RAVI KIRAN RAO Counsel for the Respondent No.3:SRl SATISH REDDY, Advocate, representing SRI NARESH BYRAPANENI counsel for the Respondent No.1 & 2: SRI RAVINDER REDDY slNcl REDDY The Gourt macle the following: COMMON ORDER THE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL Nos.449 OF 2OO5 and 570 0F 2008 COMMON JUDGMENT: Aggrieved by order, dated 11.03.2005, in W.C.No.2 of 2OO4 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Karimnagar, the Insurance Company/ appellant filed CMA.No.449 of 2005.
2. Aggrierred by order, dated 11.03.2005, in W.C.No.2 of 2OO4 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Karimnagar, the claimant/appellant tiled CMA.No.57O of
3. CMA.Nos.44g of 2005 and 570 of 2008 arise out o[ the same order, they are being heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.
4. For convenience, facts in CMA.No.449 of 2OO5 are discussed. .t.1K..1 cno.Nos.ll9 )()05 8' 510 20(,tl 2
5. Heard Mr. M. Satish Reddy, Iearned counsel reprer;enting Mr. Naresh Byrapaneni, learned counsel for appeliant/lnsurance company and Mr. v. Rohith, learned counsel representing Mr. v. Kiran Rao, learned counsel appea ring for respondents.
6. Claimant/applicant (appellant in CMA.No.570 of 2O0B and respondent No.1 in CMA.No.449 of 2O05) claims that he's working as salesman cum auto driver for Vdayasri Enterprises. Respondent No.2 (in CMA.No.449 of 2005) i.e., Oppor;ite party No.1 (Pallerla Laxminarayana) was the proprietor, respondent No.3 (in CMA.No.449 of 2005) i.e., Oppor;ite party No.2 (Pallerla Anil Babu) was the manager. Auto bearing No.AP- l5-T-2594 was driven by the claimant/applicant, he claims he was paid a monthly wage of Rs.:2,250 l- with batta of Rs.50/- per day.
7. ,Jn 16.09.2OOO, around l2:3O p.m., when the claimant/applicant was driving the auto for sale of cosme:tics and soaps near Sapthagiri Colony, (Navatha Public School), a scooterist driving rashly and negligently, at higJh speed, carne in opposite direction, to save the (r J.4K. .l cno.Nor 119 2(t0: & 5?0 -200E J I - scooterist, he turned the auto and the auto turned upside down. The claimant/applicant sustained injuries on left l.g, chest and other parts of body. He was shifted to Narsimloo's Hospital, Karimnagar, later shifted to Yashoda Hospital, Hyderabad, he underwent treatment as inpatient from 17.o9.2000 to 08.10.2000. Rods were inserted in his left leg and surgery performed for his chest injury. Later discharged from HosPital g. commissioner (in case No.W.C.2 of 2OO4l considered the evidence of PWl , PW2, Exs.Al to A9 and Ex.Rl and concluded that claimant/applicant was entitled for a compensation (under Section 4(1Xb) of Workmen's Compensation Amendment Act, 2000), amount of Rs.89,956/-. g. The said order is under challenge in cMA.No.449 of 2005 by the Insurance ComPanY.
10. Learned counsel for appellant/Insurance Company submittecl that no evidence is adduced by the claimant/applicant to prove that he was a salesman cum JAK.,J .lna.No.\.JJ9 20()5 & i70.20r)x 4 auto clriver. It is further submitted that contrary to Ex.A4 i.e., Identitl' card, the commissioner conclud.ed claimeLnt/applicant to be a salesman cum auto driver. 1 1. I.earned counsel further submitted that Ex.Ag is a disabitity certificate produced as documentary evidence to prove the permanent partial disability at 3oo/o. (Ex.Ag is medicral certificate bearing No. lsrr | /DHH/pHB/2oog, dated 15.03.2003, issued by the District Medical Board, Distric:t Head Quarters Hospital, Karimnagar). It is submitted that the Doctor who issued the medical certific:ate is not examined. That non-exannination of Doctor who issued the certificate is fatal to the case of the claimant/applicant.
12. l,earned counsel placed reliance on paragraph Nos.15 and 16 of the Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mandaaq. Surendra Kumar a. B.A. Pq.dmanabha Rq.o and qnotherr and contended that if a mediced certificate is issued without examination, such certificates should be rejected. It is also submitted that the ' 2ot I scc oNltNE Ap g74 . .tAK..t cno.Nos.J,l9 2005 & 570 2008 5 commissioner erred in law in considering the certificate and awarding compensation.
13. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents submitted that the date of accident and injuries are not disputed. It is further submitted that generally a procedure is followed for issuance of medical certificate and the medical certificate issued by . competent Board cannot be challenged as invalid on the ground that the Doctor is not examined. It is also submitted that the District Medical Board constituted examined the injured and issued the certificate. That the certificate issued by Medical Board is usually by a team of Doctors and is considered as varid piece of evidence in eye of law. L4. [t is submitted that claimant/applicant was working as salesman-cum-auto driver, that it is common knowledge, sales man usually drive the vehicle when they go to deliver the stocks (in the present case soaps and cosmetics). It is further submitted that Ex.A9 is the driving license of the claimant/applicant marked as a document and is considered by the Commissioner. ,]AK. J .-tno.l\;tr\.tJq 2005 & 570 2()08 6
15. Learned counsel submitted that disability is estimated at 3oo/o by the District Medical Board (District Head Quarters Hospital, Karimnagar). That claimant/ appli<:ant suffered disability of "malunited EC fracture left femur with Po DHS (left) side + wasting of Musculature and limping" and the extent of permanent partial disability was estimated at 3ooh. tt is pointed out that commissioner consirlered the exhibits marked, the evidence of witnesses and rightly concluded in awarding the compensation. Hencr:, no interference is necessitated.
16. Heard learned counsels, perused the record and consi<lered the submissions. 17 - claimant/applicant was aged around 26 years at the time r>f accident, claimed to be u,orking as salesman cum auto driver. On 16.09.2000, u,hile trying to avoid a scootr:rist, the claimant/applicant while driving the auto, met 'rith accident as the auto turned upside down, sustajned injuries. He was taken to Narsimloo's Hospital, Karimnagar, where he was advised to be taken to Hyderabad. The claimant/applicant underwent treatment I JAK..I ciltu.Nos.JJ9 20()5 & 570 2008 7 AS inpatient at Yashoda Hospital, Hyderabad, from
17.O9.2O00 to 08.10.2000. It is observed from the record that rods were inserted in his left leg and operation carried out on his chest, was advised 6 months rest. Ex.A3 is a copy of medical certificate of Yashoda Super Specialty Hospital, Hyderabad.
18. Medical certificate bears MLC.No.754 of 2000, dated
24.O2.2O01 (issued by Yashoda Hospital), reflects that the claimant/applicant was treated as inpatient from
17.O9.2OOO to 08.10.2000, for grievous injuries, of fracture of pelvis intertronchanteric, fracture left diaphragmatic hemia. Ex.AS is a letter of Yashoda Hospital to the Circle Inspector, I[ Town Police Station, Karimnagar. It is stated in the letter that the claimant/applicant was discharged on
08. 10.2000 with IP.No.28106, dated L7 .O9.2OOO and MLC.No.754 of 2OOO. Ex.A6 is a certificate, it reveals that claimant/applicant was admitted in Hospital with injuries Ex.A7 is the discharge summary of Yashoda Hospital, it has the details of diagnosis, investigation and the treatment offered, condition of the patient at the time of .t.1K..t coto \os.llg 2()()5 & 5 r-l) l00x 8 discharge. Ex.AS is the medical certificate bearing No.15;771/DHH/ PHB/2003, dated 15.03.2003, of the District Medical Board (District Head Quarters Hospital, Karinrnagar), in respect of persons with disabilities who are orthopaedically handicapped. In Ex.AB, it is certified that the claimant/applicant sustained disability of "malunited EC fracture left femur with PO DHS (left) side + wasting of Musculature and limping" and the extent of permanent partie.l disability is estimated as 3ooh.
19. Contention is that medical certificate issued is vatid only, if the Doctor who issued the certificate is examined. In the: absence of examination of Doctor, certificate cannot be co:rsidered. This Court cannot accede to the contention raiseci by the learned counsel for appellant/[nsurance Company. The medical certificate is issued by a District Medical Board, a body constituted by Government.
20. A certificate issued by a Medical Board is considered to be correct and genuine, unless it is pleaded and proved that the certificate is not a bonafide/genuine certificate. Medical certificate issued by a team of Doctors. constituted t .l / ,IAK, J cnu Nos.JtY 2005 & 570 2008 9 as a Board in Government Hospitals, are duly empowered to issue certificates. These certificates are accepted as valid for grant of leave or while considering the applications at the time of recruitment etc. If the contention of the lnsurance Company is accepted, this Court would be venturing into an area of a professional's subject matter, which is best decided by the professional's. This Court cannot venture to do so.
21. Claimant/applicant was admitted in Yashoda Hospital from 17.O9.2000 to 08.10.2000. Exs.A3 to A7 are marked on behalf of claimant/applicant. Ex.AS is an intimation letter to Circle Inspector. A11 these were considered not disputed nor their contents rebutted. Reliance placed on judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mandaua Surendrq. Kumqr (supra 1) is not applicable to present facts of the case, it was a case where medical certificate was issued by an Orthopaedician who was not treating the patient and he issued the disability certificate after more than 2 years of the accident. .IAK.,I cilta )\o\ Jtt) 2005 & :70 2008 l0
22. In the present case, Exs.A3 to AZ are marked. Ex.A3 is the certificate issued by the yashoda Super Specialty Hosp,ital, where the clajmant/appticant was treated for injuries. This certificate establishes the fact that clairrLant/applicant suffered grievous injuries and suffered permanent partial disability. A certificate was issued on
15.01].2003 estimating permanent partiat disability at 3oo/o hy the District Head Quarters Hospital, Karminagar, District Medical Board issued the certificate. A certificate issued by the Board is usually held to be genuine, unless the same is proved to be a false one by adducing evidence. It is not the case here. contentions raised are devoid of merits.
23. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the scher:re of the Act in Golla Rajanna and Others u. Diaisional Manager and AnotheP, held as follovvs: "10. Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the '1zotz1t scc 45 JAK..I cl;a.Nos.llg 2005 & 570 Z00S evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 3O of the Act."
24. The same view/principle is reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Fulmati Dhrqmdea Yadqu and another a. Neut India Assurqnce Co. Ltd. and dnother3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no question of law, much less a substantial one, arises for consideration.
25. With regard to the interest portion, it was submitted that interest granted @ 9o/o per annum is not in accordance with the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act.
26. In Oriento.l Insuro;nce Compang Linited a. Sibg Georgea, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, held as follows:
7. Sections 4-A(t) and (3) of the Act are as under: "4-A.Cornpensation to be paid when d.ue and penaltg for default.-(l1 Compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. (21*** 3 2023 SCC Online SC 1105 o 1zotz1l2 scc 540 .1.1K..t .nD .\:os J11) )0()i d :att 2otlJl t2 (3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act r.vithin onl month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner shall_ (a) direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amotrnt of the arrears, pay simple interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates of any scheduled bank as may be specified by the Central Government, by notification in thc Official Gazette, on the amount due; and (b) if, in his opinion, there is no justification for the delay, direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears and interest thereon, pay a further sum not exceeding fifty per cent of such amount by way of penalty: Provided that an order for the payment of penalty shall not be passed under clause-(b) without gi"i.,g . reasonable opportunity to the employer to show cause why it should not be passed. Explanation- *** (3-41***"
8. It is, thus, to be seen that sub-section (3) of Section 4-A is in two parts, separately dealing with interest and penalty in clauses .(a) and (b) respeitively. Clause (a) the levy of interest, with no option, in case of T*.: default in payment of compensation, without going into the question regarding the reasons for the dJautt. Clause (b) provides for imposition of penalty in case, in the opinion of the Commissioner, theie was no justification for the delay. Before imposing penalty, however, the Commissioner is required tJ gi"e the employer a reasonabte opportunity to show "".r".. On a plain reading of the provisions of sub_section (3) it becomes clear that payment of interest is a consequence of dcfault in payment without going into the reasons fo. the delay and it is only in case- where the delay is without justilication, the employer might also be held liable to penalty after giving him a show cause. 'lherefore, a finding to the effect that the delay in cayment of the amount due was unjustified is required :o be recorded only in case of imposition of penalty and :ro such finding is required in case of interest which is i-o be levied on default per se. !). Now, coming back to the question when does the I)ayment of compe.psdcion fall due and what would be lhe point for the commencement of interest, it may Ue rroted that neither the decision in MuLasir JAK, J cnw No\ lJ9 2U)i & 570 ?008 13 AhmedIQOOT) 2 SCC 349 : (2Oo7) 1 SCC (t&S) 6431 nor the one in Moh.d. lVasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2OO9) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 : (2OO9l 2 SCC (Cri) 9871 can be said to provide any valid guidelines because both the decisions were rendered in ignorance of earlier larger Bench decisions of this Court by which the issue was concluded. As early as in 1975 a four-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deov. Sriniuas Sabatal(t976l, I SCC 289 : 1976 SCC (t&S) 52 : AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab lC 2221directly answered the question. In paras 7 and 8 of the decision it was held and observed as follows: (Sriniuas Sabata case [(L976) I SCC 289 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 52 : AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 2221 , SCC pp. 291-921 "7. Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if 'personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out o[ and in the course of his employment'. It was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under sub-section (5) of Section 3 because of the institution of a suit in a civil court for damages, in respect of the injury, against the employer or any other person. The emploger therefore became liable to paA the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident uthich admittedlg arose out of and in the course of the emplogment. It is therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioner's order dated 6-5-1969 under Section 19. What the section provides is that if any' question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the amount or duration of the compensation it shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is therefore nothing to justifu the argument that the employer's liabilitg to paA compensation under Section 3, in respect of the injury, was suspended until after the settlement contemplated bg Section 19. The appellant utas thus liable to pag compensation as soon qs the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the appellan| and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary. 8. It was the duty of the appellant, under Section 4- A(1) of the Act, to pay the compensation at the rate provided by Section 4 as soon as the personal injury was caused to the respondent. He failed to do so. What is worse, he did not even make a provisional payment under sub-section (21 of Section 4 for, as .t.1K..1 ciltd.,\io\.t19 )0(ti & i10 20(ts l4 has been stated, he went to the extent of taking the false pleas that the respondent was a casual contractor and that the accident occurred solely because of his negligence. Then there is the further lact that he paid no heed to the respondent's persrtnal approach for obtaining the compensation. It rvill lte recalled that the respondent rvas driven to the nccessity of making an application to Commissioner for settling the claim, and even there the appellant raised a frivolous objection as to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and prevailed on the respondent to file a memorandum of agreement settling the claim for a sum which was so grossly inadr:quate that it was rejected by the Commissionei. In these facts and circumstances, we have no doubt that the Commissioner was fully justified in making an order for the payment of interest and the penalty.; (emphasis supplied) 1O. The matter once again c€rme up before this Court when by amendments introduced in the Act by Act 30 of 1995 the amount of compensation and the rate of interest ',vere increased with effect from l5-9-1995. The question arose whether the increased amount of compensation and the rate of interest would apply also to cases in which the accident took place before 1S_9_ 1995. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kerala SEB v. Valsala K. [(1999) 8 SCC 254 : 20OO SCC (L&S) 50 : AIR 1999 SC 35021 , answered the question in the negative holding, on the authority of pratap Narain Sinsh Deo [(19761 I SCC 289 : 1976 SCC (L&S] 52 : AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 2221 , that the payment of compensation fell due on the date of the accident. In pa-rzrs 1,2 and 3 of the decision this Court observed as follows: (Valsala K. case t(1999) 8 SCC 254 :2OOO SCC (L&S) 50 : AIR 1999 SC 35021 , SCC pp. 25a-5S) " l. The neat question involved in these special leave petitions is: whether the amendment of Sections 4 and 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, made by Act 3O of 1995 with effect from i5-9-1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest, would be attracted to cases where the claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident caused during the course of emplo5iment, took place prior to l5-9-1995. 2. Various High Courts in the country, while dealing with the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act have uniformly taken the view that the relevant date for determining the r ,IAK,.J ciltl.l\'os.1J9 2005 & 570 2008 15 rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of the accident. 3. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deov. Sriniuas Sabatal0976l 1 SCC 289 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 52 : AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 2221 , speaking through Shinghal, J. has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workmen by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim."
11. The Court then referred to a Fult Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v . Alaui [( 1998) I KLT 95 I ] , and approved it insofar as it followed the decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deol(1976) l SCC 289:1976 SCC (L&S) 52:AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 2221 .
12. The decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo [(1976) l SCC 289 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 52 : AIR 1976 SC 222 : t9T6 Lab IC 2221was by a four-Judge Bench and in Valsala K.l(r999l, 8 SCC 254 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 50 : AIR 1999 SC 35021 by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. Both the decisions were, thus, fully binding on the Court in Mubasir Ahmed[(2oo7l 2 SCC 349 : (2OOZ) 1 SCC (L&S) 6431 and Mohd.. Nasfr [(2009) 6 SCC 2BO : (2009) 2 SCC (Civl 877 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 9871 , each of which was heard by two Judges. But the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo l(L9Z6l I SCC 289 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 52 : AIR 1976 SC 222 : t9T6 Lab rC 2221 andVabala K. [(1999) 8 SCC 2S4 : 2O0O SCC (L&S) 50 : AIR 1999 SC 35021 were not brought to the notice of the Court in the two later decisions in Mubasir Ahmed[(2oo7l 2 SCC 349 : (2oo7l 1 SCC (L&S) 6431 and Mohd. Nasirl{200g) 6 SCC 28O : (2OO9) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 : (2oo9) 2 SCC (Cri) 9871 .
13. In the light of the decisions in pratap Narain Singh Deo [(1976l, 1 SCC 289 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 52 : AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 2221and Valsala K.l(L999) B SCC 254 : 2OOO SCC (L&S) 50 : AIR 1999 SC 3SO2l , it is not open to contend that the payment of compensation would fall due only after the Commissioner's order or with reference to the date on which the clairn application is made. The decisions in Mubo.sir .lAK..t (ntd.)io\ .tJ9 20t)5 & 510 20(),\ t6 Ahmed U2oo7) 2 SCC 349 : (2oo7) 1 SCC (L&S) 6431 and Mohd .lVasir [(2009) 6 SCC 2BO : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 : (2OO9) 2 SCC (Cri) 9871 insofar as they took a contrary view to the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain SinghDeo[{19761 i SCC 289:1976 SCC (t&S) 52: AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 2221 and Valsala K. [(19991 B SCC 254 :2000 SCC (L&S) 50 : AIR 1999 SC 35021 do not express the correct view and do not make binding prccedents." t1,7. The Honble Apex Court held that payment of (:ompensation would fall due from the date of the accident €Lnd interest vrrould fall due one month from the date of €rccident. 2',8. Section (A)(3)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act r:lakes it clear that the employer in addition to the amount cf arrears, shall pay simple interest @ L2%o per annum or at such higher rate not exceeding the lending rates of any schedule bank as specified by. the Central Government by r otification in the Official Gazette on the amount due. In other u,'ords, any amount due has to be paid with an irrterest (D 12% per annum one month from the date of the accident, compensation a\ /arded is to be paid from the date of accident. If it is not paid within one month from the date of accident, intere st @ l2o/o per annum is to be paid. This is t -r-Ar JAK. J ciro.Nos.J19 2t)05 d' 570 200x t7 in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and judgments of the Honble Apex Court.
29. As observed from the record, interest @ 9o/o per annum was awarded on the compensation amount granted by the Commissioner, apparently not in consonance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Having considered the entire factual matrix of the case, this Court is of the vier,v that interest is to be paid @ l2o/o per annum from the date, the interest falls due, till the date the amount is realized. The applicant is at liberty to make a representation before the appropriate authority for the amount due, if any, to be paid with interest @ l2%o per annum instead of interest @ 9o/o per annum. On receipt of such representation, the authorities shall calculate and pay the amount i.e., interest amount @ l2oh per annum instead of intere st @ 9o/o per annum, for the period during which the interest is liable to be paid. On the aspect of compensation awarded, this Court is not inclined to disturb the findings of the Commissioner. \ JAK..I cnta..\os.lJg 2005 & 510 20()tt r8 - 30. considering the entire factual matrix of the case, this court is not inclined to interfere with the order, dated
11.03.2005, passed in W.C.No.2 of 2OO4. CMA.No.449 of 2005; is devoid of merits. C.M.A.No.449 of 2005 tails and is acco::dingly dismissed. cMA.No.S7o of 2oog is partly allor;r'ed to the extent of interest as held supra. No order as to costs. Misceilaneous applications pending, if &fly, shalt stan<l closed SD/. K. SRINIVASA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPYII CTION OFFICER To, 1' The corrmissioner for workmen's Compensation & Assistaht Commissioner ^ qf Labour-, Karimnagar. 2. ONC CC tO SRI NARESH BYBAIAryENI AdVOCAIC [OPUC] 3. one CC lo SRt v. RAVI KrRAN RAo Ail;;;i"-iopuct 4. one cc ro sRr RAVTNDEn ne o-oi slirciRE6oy, Advocate topucl r 5. Two CD ()opies fl* -AV ,il/ NVB/Sa HIGH COIJRT I E i0910612025 ES o I a. , 0 6 ilAB 2o2ri I c, L '}A.: :H Ec. COMMON ORDER CMA.NoS.449 of 2005 AND 570 OF 2008 DISMISSING THE GMA.No.449 OF 2005 AND LOWING THE CMA.No.570 OF 2008 0,n 1 b )