The High Court · 2025

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the judgment and Decree Dtd.30-06-2025 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Jayashankar Bhupalpally in AS No. 01 of 2024. lA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant interim-injunction restraining the respondent herein and the others claiming through him from ever interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioner over the suit schedule land. Counsel for the Appellant : SRl. JITHENDER RAO VEERAMALLA Counsel for the Respondent : SRI P DEVENDER The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT THE IIONOT]RABLE SMT. .IUSTICE RENI,II.,1 YARA SECONI ) APPFIAL No.384 of 2025 J UDGMENT: Hcard Sri J itherrdcr [{ao veeramalla, leanletl (]( )Llnsel for the appellant and Sri P. Dcverlder, lcamed counsel for tl ': respondent, on admission. Perusecl lhc erltit'e record.

2. -I'his Second Allpeal is prcl'erred aggrievcd by tltc .iudgment and decree darcd 30.06 1025 in A.S.No.0l of 2024 on the fl ,' .rf'the Principal District .ludge at Jar ashankar llhupalpatly ('first appellatr ('ourt'), to set asidc the same and r.estorc rhc judgmcnt and decrec tlrtcd 28.12.2023 passed in o.S.No. I 170 o1- 2022 on the file of the PrintiPal Junior Civil Judge, Jayashankar l3hupalpally ('trial Court') and there-1r grant perpetual injunction restraining cle I'e ndant/re-spondent herein frorrr inte|f'ering with peaceful possession and en.ioyment of appellant herein ',lrintiff over the suit schedule prope rt)' adme asuring Ac.l-30 guntas ir Sy'No'30/A/2 situated at chelpur Village. (ihanpur Mandal, Jayashi nl ar Bhupalpally District.

3. Initially, the aplrcllant hcrcin/ptaintilf filed suit vnr'' O.S.No.l 170 of 2022 betbr.e the trial ('ourt lbr per'petual injunction agai rst the respondent to restrain hirn ltonr intcrlerilrg rvith his peaceful possess ,rr and enjoyment of the suit schedulc propcrty. 1-hc appellant clairned to .i thc owner and ItY-.1 sA 381 l0l5 - possessor of agricultural land i.e., suit schedule property having purchased the same through simple sale deeds for valid consideration along with delivery of possession. Thereafter, the natne of the appellant was cntered in the revenue record as owner and possessor and he was issued pattedar' passbook vide patta No.835 and title deed vide No.110789 with unique No.2105440010171. The said paffedar passbook and title deed provc the lawful possession of the appellant over the suit schedule property. 'l'here was intelference by the respondent on 15.03.2015 leading to filing of the suit fbr perpctual injunction before the trial Courl.

4. The respondent opposed the said suit claim by filing wnften statement denying the case of the appellant in totality. Out of Ac. l-30 guntas of suit schedule property, the appellant 1S claiming to have purchased Ac.0-30 guntas from the respondent himself under simplc sale deed, whereas, the respondent denied executing any simple sale deed in I'avour of the appellant. Further, Ac. l-00 guntas of land is allegedly purchased from one Muthyala Kumaraswamy and the said simple sale dccd is also not produced. According to the respondent, the simple sale deeds through which the appellant clairns title from, are forged and fabricated documents and the same formed basis for issuance of pattedar passbook l-herefore, the respondent has challenged the issuance of pattedar passbook and title deed in favour of the appellant before the Revenue Divisional 2 RY,.I sA 384 2025 officer,Mulugu'at.rlvit)eprocecdingsNo.F/650/l/15,11:ted2|.04.20]t5' theRevenueDivisior.ralOftrcercancelledthepattedarpr;;bookandalso ordered rectit'ication of iltegat entries in the revenue rrr. ()rd. Since the appellant does not have the original title deed and pat"'rc ar passbook is cancelled, mere revcnue entries cannot create any intere;i' as such sought dismissal of the suit.

5. Llpon examir.ring thc evidence adduced by both thi parties orally as well as under Exs.A-l to A-t I and tixs.B-l to B-t7, the lritlcouft decreed suitwithafindinglthatinasuitfbrinjunctionsimplir:i,'orcomplicated questions of title canllot be gone into and the person, riho is not having title,butinsettledpossessionofpropertyonthedateol.:ilritisentitledto injunction even agaiust the true owner'

6. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated -:l 12'2023 by the trial cour1, the resPondent pref-er-rcd appeal vide A.S.No 0l of 2024 before the first appellate clourt. The flrst appellate court a1t, r examining the evidence on record has given reversing judgment on tw'r f;rounds' One is that the appellant herein does not have proper title doctr -nents i.e., simple sale deed allegedlv crecuted by the respondent in tavo.rr of the appellant for Ac.0-30 guntas of lanci and also simple sale deed exetrrLed by Muthyala Kumaraswamy in lavour of the appetlant for remaini .ll extent of suit 3 RY..I sA 384 2025 schedule propefty. The next ground for reversing the judgment of tl.re trial Court is suppression ofthe fact by the appellant with respect ofpurchase of paft ol thc suit schedule propefty from the respondent herein. The tlrst appellate Court held that any person who approaches the Court with unclean hands is not entitled for any relief. It is held that the appellant failed to discharge his burden and therefore, the onus of proof cannot be shifted to the respondent i.e., there is failure to prove the prima Jacie case, as such allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree by the first appellate Court, the present Second Appeal ts prefer-red raising the following substantial questions of law: A. Whether the First Appellate Court justified in law in reversing the trial Court's decree by treating the absence of title documents as 1-atal to the Appellant's case in a suit for bare injunction founded on possession, despite the settled legal position that proof of ownership is not at all pre-requisite for grant of injunction once possession is established? B. Whether the First Appellate Court justified in setting aside the Trial Court's decree in respect of the entire extent of Ac. 1-30 guntas, despite there being no dispute as to the plaintifls title and possession over Ac.l-00 guntas thereof, contrary to the settled principlc that relief cannot be denied for the admitted portion of property in possession ofthe Appellant? 7 During arguments, it is subrnitted that the trial Court has examined the evidence on record properly by confining scrutiny to the possession as 4 RY.J sA 384 2025 thesuitfiledisforinjunctionsimplicitorandthereby.]ecreedthesuit, whereas, the first appellate Court has rnisdirected itself t'v venturing into the title of appellant and the rcspondent and has reverserl trre judgment of thetrialCourtbyholdingthattheappellanthereinhast-airlctoshowpri.ma facie case of title.

8. The I{on'ble Supreme Couft of India in Ht mravathi v' V' Hombegowdarheld tl-rat IIigh courr can enrerrain a regrr 1r second appeal purely on a'substantial' question of law not even a qu::tion of law or a question of fact. Furlher, as per thejudgment of this Co'rtt in Syed Abdul Quddus v. K. Vijaya Laxmir, the Apcx Court in Gurdt'' Kaur v' Kakir heldthattheHighCourtsittinginSecondAppealCa}lnotexaminethe evidenceonceagainaSathirdtrialCourtandthepowerttrderSectionl00 CPC is very limited and it can be exercised only wt ': re a substantial question of law is raised and fetl for considcration' g. A perusal of the record shows that the appellar-l fited a suit for injunction simpticitor by clairning to be the absolute ov\ rr()r and possessor of the suit schedule propefty olAc.l-30 guntas in Sy.Nc,.i l/A,/2 situated at Chelpur Village, Ghanpur Mandal, Jayashankar BhL llrlpally District' There is a mentir:t-t about pr-rrchasing the suit schedtr 'r propefty under ' {zozs) s scc aaz 'z 2024 SCC OnLine TS 186 ' (2007) 1 scc s46 5 -: RY.J sA i84 2025 simple sale deeds. r'here is no mention about the year in which the propefty was purchased under simple sale deeds. Howcver, there is a rnention about obtaining pattedar passbook and titre deed from the Tahsildar and therefore, clairned to be in lawful possession. The pattedar passbook and title deed are issued by Tahsildar in favour of the appeilant based on the simpre sale deeds. whether the pattedar passbook and title deed can be issued on the basis of simpre sale deeds is rnatter that has to be considered by the Revenue Divisio,ar otficer. l'he Revenue Divisional Officer for his parl conducted an enquiry and cancelled the pattedar passbook issued in favour of the appeilant herein. when the dispute between the appellant and respondent arose, the suit for injunction simplicitor was filed. A part of the suit schedule propefty i.e., Ac.0_30 guntas of land is alregedry purchased by the appe,ant from the respondent himself' whereas, the respondent denies the same i.e., denied having executed simple sale deed in favour of the appellant for Ac.0-30 guntas of land' when such is the case, there is a neeti for the appellant to discrose the same. while filing suit for injunction simpricitor claiming the title of part of the suit schedule propefty from the respondent and not rnentioning the said fact in the plaint does amount to suppression of facts. Mere entries in the revenue record do not confer title when the appellant is craiming the ,..ltFrpedy as self acquircd propefiy through purchase from vendors. The 6 \ I I{Y,J s.\ 384 1025 respondent is also claiming to be in possession of the land'vliich he did not sell to the appellant. When the written statement of the rc:;pondent reveals a title dispute, an incidentat enquiry into the title is alst' recluired u'hen granting petpetual inlunction' When there is dispute rs to ownership' granting injunction simpticitor in favour of the occupant ai rinst true owner' is not sustainable. fherefore, this Court is also of the co r: idered opinion that there is suppression of lacts on thc parl of the appettar,t irr approaching the Court lor granting of injunction simplicitor' Wl cn the pattedar passbook and title deed itself are alleged to be issued on tl c basis of fbrged and fabricated documents, invariably the appellant has t.t' discharge the burden ofproving that his title is genuine' In the absenct' of such evidence and suppression about the purchase of parl of the suit rclredule propedy fiom the respondent, the same gives rise to adverse inl':re nce against the appellant.

10. The perpetual injunction is a discretionary relit: ' grarrted by the Courls. When the conduct of the plaintiff does uot insp ire confidence in the genuineness of the case presented' the Court rlay d:ny such relief' Therefore. this Cou( does not find any reason to en'r:r-ain thc present Second Appeal. The alleged substantial questions 6f lsrr :tt'e alrcady dealt with by the first appellate Courl and ansrvered properly' \ 1 RY.J sA i84 2025 I 1. [n the result, the Seconcl Appeal tS dismissed at the stage of admission confirming the judgment and decree or the first appeilate courl dated 30'06'2025 in A.S.No-01 of 2024- There shail be no order as ro costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed. SD/- A.V.S.PRASAD DEPUry REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To

1. The Principal District Judge, Jayashankar Bhupalpally 2. One CC to SRl. JITHENDER RAO VEERATMALLA Advocate [OPUC] 3. One CC to SRl. P DEVENDER Advocate [OPUC] 4. Two CD Copies ASR/PSL 8 HIGH COURT DATED:2410912025 JUDGMENT SA.No.384 ot 2025 , ,. .\) -t 1 3 0[T 2ff25 : ]i ,. ,l ,4' t il', \\ DISMISSINGTHE APPEAL 6 Ia,( \dp