Further, the Hon,ble Supreme Court in M.K.prasatl vs Act, the Court has to keep in mind that discr.etion under the section

Counsel for the petrtioner: SRI A VENKATESH REpRESENTTNG Ms. A. TEJASWT Counsel for the Respondents: SRI D V SEETHARAM MURTH' RE,RESEN.fING SRI P ROY REDDY The Court made the following: ORDER HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY IA .No.3 of 2024 In CRP.No .2793 of 2024 ORDER: This application is filed seeking to condone the delay of 1268 dals in fiting the CRP against the order dated 15'122020 passed by Principal Senior Civil Judge, L'B'Nagar at Ranga Reddy District in IA.No. I 104 of 2018 in OS'No'494 of l99l '

2. Lcarned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is daughter of respondent No'6 herein, who is defendant No.6 in the sr-rit; that lespondent No'6 died on 18'05'2007' but the impugned order was passed against him on 15 '12'2020 that the petitionet was not a pafiy either to the suit or to the application in IA.No. ll04 ol 2018, as such, notice was not served on her and consequently, she was not aware of passing of the impugned order and only when the petitioner went to Police Station with regard to enquiry on the complaint made by her regarding interference of respondent No. I over the suit schedule propefty, she came to know about the lacts of fiting of the suit, passing of the decree therein ancl the impugned order and as sttch, the delay occuned in 2 LNA J IA.No.l oJ2024 ot CRP.No.27% of20t4 - approaching this Court, which is neither wilful nor wanton an,l prayed to condone the delay. 3. Learne<l counsel lbr r_espondent No. I opposed thr: application and subrnitted that thc petitioner except stating that she came to know about passing of thc decree in the suit and the impugned orde. only recently, did not give the specific date when she came to know o1- the said f.act and has not produced any material to subs tantiate her case fbr condonation of delay and as such, the application is tiable to be dismissed. 4. This C_.ourt thoroughly gone rhrough thc afficlavit filed in supporl of the application and lound that the petitioner except stating that during enquiry in the police Station regarding the complaint given by her, she came to know about the passing of the decree in the suir and also the impugned order, she has failed to give any details ar; to the dare ol her giving complaint to rhe police and the date when she carne to knorv about passing of the decree in the suit and the impugned order. However, as regards the aspect of condonation of deJay, the judgment of the Hon,bre Supreme court .) LNA, J IA.N,.3 oI2024 in CRP.No.2793 of2024 in N.Bstakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthyt is relevant to be taken note of, wherein at paras 9 and 10, it is held as hereunder: "9. lt is axiontcttic tlrul condonation of delay is a matter of tliscretion of rhe Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act tloes nttt say that such discretion can be exercised only tf the tlelay is toithin a certain limit Length of delay is no motter. acceptability of the explanation is the onf' criteriort. Sometimes delay of shortest range ma1, be uncontlonable clue to wdnt of acceptable explanaliort. vlrcrcas in certain other cases delay of ver1, Long range cutt be condoned as the expldnation thereof is stttisfaclorl' Once the Court accepts the erplanation cts sufJicient it is the result of positive etercise of tliscretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdictbn, w ess lhe exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable gt ounds or arbilrary or perverse' But it is a c!ffircnt matler when the first Court refuses to conclone lhc delay ln such cases, ihe superior court u,ould be .free to consicler lhe cause shown for the delalt aJresh arul it is open to such superior Court to come to its ov'n Jintling even untrammeled by the conclusiort of the ktver Courl'

10. The reason.[or sttch a different stance is thus: The primarlt Junclion of a court is to adiudicate the clispule behveen the parties and to advance substantial juslice. Time limit -fixed for approaching the Court in ' (1998) 7 scc 123 4 I,YA, J Ll.No.J.,f2L2t i LRP.NL279t oJ 2021 different situations is ttot hecause ort tlrc es:1tir1: of such litne a bad cause woultl trctnsfornt inlo ct gootl couse ,,

5. causr:,, In thr: said.iudgrnent, the Hon,ble Supre,ie Court held that Rules of limjtation are not meant to destroy the rights of partir:s. They arc mezrnt to see that par.ties do not resort to dilatory tactir:s, but seek their.remedy promptly; that the u,ords ..suflficient under Sectiorr 5 of the Lirnitation Act should r.cceive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial .justice. Supi-eme Coutt also observed that it ntust be rcntenrbered that in every case of ,Celay there can be some Iapse on thc part of litigart concemed. 'lhat alone is not enough to tum down his plea and shut the door against him at the threshold. lf the explanation does nol smack of malzL fides or it is not put tbrth as paft of a dilatory strategy, the Cc,urt must show utmost consideration to the suitor. 6. Hon,b.e .l_he Further, the Hon,ble Supreme Court in M.K.prasatl Vs. P.Arumugantr, h"ld thrt in constr.uing Section 5 of_thc Limitation Act, the Court has to keep in mind that discr.etion under the section has to be exercised to advance substantial justice. .l.he Courl has a discretion to condone or refuse to conclone the delal,as is evident frorn the words.,ma1, be admitted,,used in the Section. 2 2oo1 Arn scw 2.810 ) I,NA' J IA.No.3 oI2021in CRP.No.27% of 2024 l. In the light of the above ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in N.Balakrishno's case (cited supra) and M.K.Prastd's case (cited supra) and for the foregoing reasons and also keeping in view the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, as valuable rights of the parties are involved in the immovable property this Courl deems it desirable to condone the delay, however, by imposition of costs on the petitioner.

8. Accordingly, this application is allowed, subject to payment of costs of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees 'fen thousand only) payable to respondent No. t/plaintiff ivithin a period of two weeks from the date ofreceipt of a copy o I this order. SD/- A.PRATHIMA DEPUTY REGISTRAR 6 //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To, '1. The Principal Senior Civil Judge, LB Nagar, Ranga Reddy District 2- One CC to Sri A Tejaswr, Advocate IOPUC] 3. One CC to Sri P Roy Reddy, Advocate [OPUC] 4. Two CD Copies ABK/PSL HIGH COURT DATED: 1Ot1Ot2OzS ORDER l.A.No.3 ol 2024 ln/And CRP.No.2793 of 2t)24 ,'i';, i, t) --_._':::-: -- "., t.,r .; r.1r-.:'11-.. ().- - (;rj lh /'\o. 2 B o[T 2t,25 i- '. \:,'/ -\ \i: ALLOWING THE CI1P WITH COSTS b ..1 q (- i{ l0