The High Court · 2025

2. Heard Mr. t)eepak Bhattacharya, learned Senior Counsel' representing Mr' S' Lakshmi Kanth, learned counsel for the petitioner, and t\4s, V Uma Devi, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent.

3. Vide the inr6rugned order, the petitioner who ir'; a Judicial Officerunderthe:ornblnedA.P'stateludicialservir:e:';asitthen was,andnowbyilllor:ation,aJudicialofficeroftheTellanganaState Judiciary has beer - inflicted with a minor punishment cf "reduction to a lower stage in lris time scale of pay, by two s1:a(les, for two years without currulative effect". The said punishrrerit has been imposed after conJur:ting a detailed departmental enqr'riry wherein the petitioner had participated and availed all the opportunities of hearing that was granted.

4. The petitioner was issued a charge-sheet dated 28-O2.2O72, which subjected him to disciplinary proceedings, with three charges being leveled against him. The three charges which were leveled against the petitioner are as follows: 'ARTICLES OF CHARGE No.1: That you Sri M.Rajender, Additional Junior Civil Judge, Miryalaguda, Nalgonda district, while working as such, granted bails to the accused in the following three criminal miscellaneous petitions, immediately after the filing of the said petitions in non- bailable offences, though the concerned Assistant Public Prosecutor opposed for the same and you granted release orders, despite the fact that the accused did not furnish sureties on the said dated and thus acted in a biased manner, for extraneous consideration, which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct and unbecoming of a Judicial Officer withinthe meaning of the Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964' AR LES OF HARGE o.2: That you Sri M.Rajender, Additional Junior Civil Judge, Miryalaguda. Nalgonda district. while working as such, dismissed the Crl.M.P.No.6182/2010(Crl.No.19412010 of PS Halla) under Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act, filed by Sri K' Venkanna accused in a bailable offence, on 02-09-2010, on the ground that the offence is grave in nature and investigation is still pending but surprisingly on the next day i.e., 03-09-2010, allowed the second bail petition (Crl.M.P.No.6192/ZOLO) of the same accused recording that investigatlon is almost compketed except laying charge slrcet that you acted in a biased attitude which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct and unbecoming of a Judicial Officer within the meaning of the Rule 3 of A'P' Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964' ARCILES o F !:.ldABGE-Ne.3i That you S ri M.Rajender, Additional Junior Civir 'ludge, Miryalaguda, t\ia gonda district, while working as such, adj<;'urned the Crl.M.P.No 623412O1O (Cr.No.19412010 of PS Halla) filed by Sri K. Ramesh, ac(:rsec on 07-09-2010 to 09-09-2010 and allr:w'ed the petition on 09-C9-ilO10, keeping the accused in custody for two days i.e., on C,ll'09-2010 and 09-09-2010, though it is a b'ailable offence registerr)d r:nder Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act, detriment to 1J1,: ilterest of the accused which act of yours if proved or e:;terhlished would amount to grave miscondur::t and unbecoming ol ;r Jttdicial Officer within the meaning of thre Lule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964."

5. The enquiry was; conducted keeping in view ther principles of natural justice a rrd by giving the petitioner all opF)ortunity of defence. After ther enquiry was concluded, the Enquiry Officer submitted his encluin/ report on 29.10'2015. In the said enquiry report, the Enquiny Orficer found charge No.1 to have b+:en proved. Whereas, the other two charges are concerned, Enquiry Officer found the same ts not proved. After the enquir'1 report was submitted, the d'r;,:iplinary authority agreeing with tlre findings of the Enquiry Officr:r inflicted the petitioner with a minor punishment under Rule 9(v)(b)of the A.P. Civil Services (CC&A) Rulr:s, 1991. It is this order of pLillishment which is under challenge in the instant writ petition.

6. Learned Sen or rlounsel appearing for the petitionei'contended that, it is a case n'here the petitioner was subjected tcr charge-sheet in a short period of being inducted into judicial servke' As such' being a raw junior in the service, there appears to be some order which have been passed by the petitioner which was sheer lack of experience, but was without any mala frde intention or any extraneous considerations. It was also the contention of the learned senior counsel that the orders so passed by the petitioner was on the judicial side which are always revisable and appealable, and the act on the part of the petitioner therefore cannot be said to be a misconduct under the service law and even the Public Prosecutor appearing in the said case had not objected the passing of the order whichhasbeenconsideredaSamisconductbythepetitioner.

7. It was also contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings on a compliant received by post aM in the course of the departmental enquiry, it was found that the complaint was sent inafictitiousnameanduponverification,therewasnosuchperson in the said name practicing as an Advocate and the departmental enquiry therefore ought to had been dropped at that stage itself'

8. It was further contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the order which has been passed by the petitioner I PageT of Ll and which is said to lrc a misconduct, was not a mis;cOnduct, but was only an act rlf procedural lapse or a minor irregularity which does not warrant disciplinary proceeding. g. Lastly, it wal; :ontended by the learned Senior crlurrsel for the petitioner that th,: CourL may take a liberal view considering the order having beerr oassed on account of lack of experience being a raw junior and th<: :etitioner may be discharged of charrgle No'1 and the impugned purrishment may be set aside which ha:; caused a permanent dent tn the petitioner as his promotions have been delayed for a conr;iderable period of time, because of tre effect of said punishment, and his batch mates have got prornctions much ahead of him whir:h i:s giving rise to too much strain and pressure upon the petitione:-

10. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent contended that a flare perusal of the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry offir:r:r would clearly give an indication ol'tl"re fact that charge No.1 leverlr:d against the petitioner has been r:onclusively proved. The order wl-rich was passed by the petitioner tvas not one which could be r:xpected by any Judicial Officer, at any level, howsoever young cr howsoever senior in the service- ,

11. Learned Standing Counsel for the respondent fufther contended that the enquiry report itself clearly indicates that the order passed by the petitioner was one which was not within the powers vested with the Magistrate under the provisions of Cr.P.C., and therefore, it was per se an illegal act on the part of the petitioner. L2. It was further contended that the punishment of "reduction to a lower stage in his time scale of pay, by two stages, for two years" without cumulative effect is only a minor punishment, which according to the learned Standing Counsel is an indication that the respondent has taken a lenient view towards the petitioner for his act and also considering the length of service that he had put in and the fact that he was a junior level Officer. Nonetheless, the learned Standing Counsel brought to the notice of the Court that it also cannot be presumed that the petitioner is not young or raw in the service, as his appointment is that of 2008 and the charge-sheet is one which was issued on 28.O2.20L2 i.e. almost after four years, by which time there is sufficient training and experience which a ludicial Officer.. gets. Therefore, the petitioner does not get an advantage, nor cErl.l b,e argue that he was a raw junior ilt that point of time.

13. It was also the contention of the learned Standirrg Counsel for the respondent [l at having inflicted the petitioner with a minor punishment bv t,akinq a lenient view and the charges lraving been proved, there is harrdly any scope left for this Court to interfere with considering the tactual matrix of the case. L4. It was coni:r:nded by the learned Senior Courrsel for the petitioner that irr case of a disciplinary proceeding, the scope of interference is not on the decision that the employer'/ disciplinary authority has take:rr, but the process in which the decisirrn has been arrived at. Howeve:r, according to the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent, rreither is the case of the petitioner of ttre impugned order being passr:rl n'ithout jurisdiction, nor had he raisr-,d a ground of the proceedinlls being in violation of the principlel; of natural justice. It is als,c rrot the case of the petitioner that i:hr,l findings in the enquiry reporl or the findings given by the disciplinerry authority to be in any marner perverse findings. In the absence'cf all these, the scope of interli:rence for the High Court under Art cl,:t 226 of the Constitution of India is not available and the writ petition therefore deserves to be rejected.

15. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, it would be relevant at this juncture to refer to the objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent so far as the scope of interference in a disciplinary proceeding, particularly in cases involving imposition of only a minor punishment, and the scope of interference in a proceeding where the impugned order of punishment has been passed after a detailed departmental enquiry where the delinquent has been afforded all the opportunity of defence.

16. Before we delve into the judicial precedents, it is also trite at this juncture to hold that the objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent seems to be an admitted factual matri.x so far as (a) the order not being without jurisdiction, (b) there is also no ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, and (c) there is also no contention of the impugned order and the enquiry repott being on a perverse finding contrary to the evidence on record. L7. The decisirr,^ rendered by the Hon'ble Supremer Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of Indial is cons;idered as a landmark judgr.rrent which established fundamental prlnciples regarding the :;cope of judicial interference in departmental inquiries. 16s [-]6rrr'b|l Supreme Court.held that Courts; should not interfere with disr:iplinary proceedings unless the findings of the inquiry are baserl on no evidence, there is a violation of statutory provisions, the firrdings are so perverse that no reasorable person could have reacht:,J to such conclusion and the penalty imposed is disproportionate tc, the proven misconduct. The role of the Court / Tribunal is only to ensure that the decision-making prrocess is fair, lawful, and is arnit,,:d at by following the principles of nal:ural justice. In paragraph Nos..l 2 and 13, it has been held as under: "12. ludicial rr:vie w is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manne, in which the decision is made. Power of iudicial revlew is nl,r lnt to ensure that the individual recr:ivr:s fair treatment a.( not to ensure that the conclusion vrhir:h the authority re.rr:lres is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an irrrlr- iry is conducted on charges of misconcuc: by a public servar t, the Courtfl-ribunal is concerned to determine whether rhe irquiry was held by a competent officer or rarhether rules of natu'31 justice are complied with. Whether the find,ngs or conclusions ;r -rr b;:sed on some evidence, the authority en[rusted with the p,c wer to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, powr,:r and authority to -.:rch a finding of fact or conclusion. But that ftnding must be bas.c on some evidence. Neither the technical rrtles of '1ts951 s scc t+9 Page L2 of L7 (' Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Courtf[ribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The CouGflribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violatircn of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Courtffribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence afe not relevant...........

18. A similar view has also been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Moni Shankar v. Union of India2 wherein in paragraph No.17, it has been held as under: "17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principhs of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom, Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles........." ' (zooa) l scc +a+

19. Again in thr: car;e of State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak3, in paragraph No.14 it was held as under: *14......It is rtcw rtrell settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under \rticle 226, do not interfere with the quartum of punishment unles; there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment irrroosed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unle:;s; slrocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected tc jt dicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no rea:;rl1s whatsoever have been indicated as to v/hy the punishment w;:s considered disproportionate. Failure trl give reasons amoL nl-s to denial of justice. The mere statement tlrat it is disproportio n;rr r: would not suffice."

20. The afores;ar {1 prrinsiplss have been reiterated in a catena of decisions, such il,;: a) State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwayaa (see paragr:ph No.7); b) Union of India vs. P. Gunasekarans (see paragraph Nos.13 and 14); c) State of ](arrrataka vs. N. Gaganraj6 (see paragraph No.11); anc d) Union of ltndia vs. Biswanath BhattactrarjeeT (see paragraph ltll.1z to 22) ' lzooay z scc sso o lzotty + scc s8a '12ots1 z scc oto ' 1zozo1 : scc +z: '1zozz; t: scc rzs PaEe L4 ot L7 (l

21. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion of dealing with a similar question of law in the case of Ex- Const/Mukesh Kumar Raigar vs. Union of India8 wherein in paragraph Nos. 13, 14 and 15 it has been held as under:

13. The Constitution Bench, in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra fstate of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, 1962 SCC Online SC 106 : AIR 1963 SC 7791 had observed way back in 1963 that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226, A three-Judge Bench in B.C. Chaturvedi v. lJnion of India lB.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 801 had also held that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on the charges of misconduct by a public servant, the court or tribunal would be concerned only to the extent of determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the rules of natural justice and statutory rules were complied with. L4. ln om Kumar v. lJnion of India lOm Kumar v . Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 10391 this Court had also after considering the Wedne$ury lAssociated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (194a) 1 KB 223 (CA)l Principles and the doctrine of proportionality held that th€ question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority, and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Admiflistrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or the the well-kngwn principles known other of as Wednesbury fAssociated Provincial Picture Houses t (zozg) tt scc rsg Ltd. v. Wednes'5t.ry Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)l Prin<:iples, namely. whetl r: - the order was contrary to law, or wtrether relevant factors; rvere not considered, or whether irrelevanl: factors were considereT o' whether the decision was one whic:h no reasonable per!;,r1 ciluld have taken. three-Judge Bench 'n SBI v. Ajai Niumar 15. Again, a Srivastava lSil t . A.iai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC tli12 : (2OZl) I SCC (L&S) 4571 circumscribing the power of jtrdicial review by the (:rl1st itutiona I courts held as under : (SCC pp. 626- 27, paras 24 8i illl) *24. It ii!; thus settled that the power of judic:ial review,, rrf the constitutional courts, iS an evaluatio,n of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure f;airness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquerrt if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribang the mode ol' enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based onr no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be suchL as no reasionable percon would have ever reached or where: th,e conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority' are pervr,'rse or suffer from patent error on ther face of record or based on no evidence at all,. a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of juolicia! review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reas<inableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.

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28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere wath the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mata fides or perwersity i.e. where therc is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. "

22. In light of the legal principles established in a series of decisions by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in the aforementioned judgment, and further realfirmed in a recent decision of the High Court of lharkhand in the case of Aiay Kumar vs. Union of Indiae. The High Court of Jharkhand held that judicial intervention in departmental proceedings, especially when minor penalties are involved, should be limited. It further emphasized that such intervention is justifled only in specific.circumstances where there is a clear violation of statutory provisions, where the findings of the inquiry are unsupported by evidence, or where the conclusions are manifestly perverse. e (20241 scc onLine.lhar 177 PaBe 17 of u

23. Keeping in \/ e\ r all the aforesaid judicial precedents of the recent past, by rryh ch the law now stands settled, we find no strong case has been macie r)ut by the petitioner in the instant case calling for an interferenr:r: to the impugned order of minor punishment passed by the resp,:nrlent in the factual circumstances of the case.

24. Hence, thel writ. petition deserves to be and s accordingly rejected.

25. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pendincl if any, shall stand closed. Hourever, there shall be no order as to costs. //TRUE COPY// SD/- P.Ch. NAGABHUSHAMBA DEPU'rY REGTSTRAR ^ .. SEC'I'ION OFFICER One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice AM KOSHY (f:or His Lordships Kind Perusal) AND One Fair Copy to the' Hon'ble Sri Justice NARSING RAO Nl\NDIKONDA (t:or His Lordships Kind Perusal) To

1. 11 LR Copies. 2. The Under Se,:rr:tary, Union of lndia Ministry of Law, Justice an,J Company Affairs, New De,lri. Buildings, Hyd e,rabad.

3. The Secretary 1el3ngsn, Advocates Association Library, Hir3h Court 4. One CC to SRI 5i.Lr\KSHMI KANTH, Advocate [OPUC] 5. One CC to M/s; /.LMA DEVI, SC FOR HC TAP [OPUC] 6. Two CD Copies; PSK. GJP cH?- HIGH COUR]- DATED:26l0itl202i ORDER WP.No.2390ti of 2O1Z I I 1 aE ST4 r€ )( 3 0 t,'AY ZII25 r$( z 5 J )/_ * \ i:O -==---' REJECTING 'T'HE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT C:OS.I-S LHK e.obll>i