The High Court · 2025

This Petition coming on for hearing, upon perusing the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition and upon hearing the arguments of Sri K. Venumadhav, Advocate for the Petitioners and the Additional Public Prosecutor (TG/AP) on behalf of the Respondent No.1. The Court made the following Order:- THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI Criminal Petitio n No.10022 ot2O24 ORDER This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagaik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (tor short 'the BNSS') for quashment of proceedings in C.C.No.91 ot 2024 on the file of the X Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Medchal at Athivelli, Medchal Malkajgiri District.

2. I have heard Mr. K. Venumadhav, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.Jithender Rao Veeramalla, learned Additional public Prosecutor, representing the respondent No. 1-State.

3. The petitioners are arrayed as accused Nos.2 and 3 in C.C.No.9'l ol 2024 for the offences under Sections 498-A of the lndian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'the IPC') and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, 'the DP Act').. Case Facts :

4. The prosecution's case, in brief, is that the respondent No. 2/de facto complainant lodged a police report alleging commission of offences punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act. The petitioners have been arrayed as accused Nos. 2 and 3 in the report. lt is alleged that the de facto complainant I TI 2 NTR,] Crlp_10022_2024 \..-'A \ - married accused No. 1 on 22.0s.2021. subsequent to the marriage, her husband and parents-in-law ailegedly subjected her to harassment with a demand for additional dowry of Rs.1 crore. It is further alleged that, during her pregnancy, she was physically assaulted and pushed down a flight of stairs, resurting in a miscarriage. Additionaily, accused No. 1 is alleged to have maintained an extra-marital relationship, which the petitioners are accused of supporting. ln view of this continued harassment, the de facto complainant left her matrimonial home on 11.03.2022. on these grounds, it is alleged that the petitioners committecl the aforesaid offences.

5. Petitioners,submissions: Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that they have been falsely implrcated solery due to a matrimonial dispute between accused No' 1 and the de facto comptainant. lt is contended that the allegations against the petitioners are farse, vague, and bereft of specific instances of harassment or dowry demand attributable to them. rn the absence of particularised altegations or overt acts demonstrating their active involvement in cruelty, continuation of the criminal proceedings would, it is argued, amount to an abuse of the process of law. It is further submitted that the complaint dated 30.10.2023 was filed nearly 18 months after the de facto complainant had left the I I . I 3 NTR,J Crlo-LOO22 2024 matrimonial home, and only after accused No. 1 initiated proceedings before the Family Court. No plausible explanation has been provided for this delay, which, according to the petitioners, undermines the credibility of the allegations. Accordingly, the petitioners seek quashing of the proceedings. ln support of their plea, the petitioners rely on the authorities, (a) Kahkashan Kausar v- Sfafe, MANU/SC/01632O22,(b) Abhishek v' State of M.P.,2023 LawSuit (SC) 863, and (c) Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Others v. Sfate of Telangana,2O2S (3) SCC 735 and pleaded that in thesedecisions,theHon'bleSupremeCourthasheldthatcriminal proceedings initiated against relatives of the husband without specific allegations or evidence of active involvement, merely to settle scores or wreak vengeance amount to an abuse of the court's process' The Court emphasised that sweeping allegations unsupported by concrete evidence or specific details cannot form the basis for a criminal prosecution and should be quashed at the threshold' 6 Respondenfs Submissions: Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the statements of the de facto complainant and other witnesses do name the petitioners. However, it is conceded that, apart from general assertions of physical and mental harassment, no specific incidents or details are mentioned. However, it is contended that the veracity of 4 NTR,J Ctlp_10022_2024 such statements can only be assessed during the course of trial \ Accordingly, the State prays for dismissal of the petition.

8. I have perused the materials on record. Analysis: With regard to cruelty under Section 498-4 of the lPC, the provision contemplates two categories of acts, (i) any willful conduct likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb, or health, whether mental or physical; and (ii) harassment of the woman with a view to coercing her or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security, or on account of failure to meet such demand. Thus, the provision seeks to effectively safeguard a woman from both physical/mental cruelty and harassment in connection with dowry demands. Section 3 of the DP Act criminalizes both the giving and taking of dowry, whereas Section 4 of the DP Act criminalizes the act of merely demanding dowry, irrespective of whether any dowry is actually exchanged.

9. The petitioners are the parents of accused No. 1 and the parents-in-law of respondent No. 2/de facto complainant. The fact of marriage and the parties' relationship is not in dispute ln the police report dated 3O.1O.2023, the de facto complainant alleged that, on the second day of the marriage, the petitioners herein along with Kranthi 7 ? 5 NTR,J Crlp_10022_2024 Yadav and chaithanya, tortured her for Rs.1 crore dowry and instigated her husband to quarrerwith and physically assault her. 10- ln her statement before the investigating agency, respondent .No. 2/de facto complainant further stated that, for the past two-and-a- half years, her husband and his family members had continuously abused and assaulted her to extract additional dowry. she also alleged that, sometime after the marriage, the petitioners, together with the other accused, harassed her both physically and mentally, saying that if her husband had married someone else, they would have received at least Rs.2 crores in dowry. Further when she informed the petitioners about her husband's alleged extra-marital affairs, they reportedly told her she had no right to speak on the matter. she further alleged that petitioner No. 1, on the second day of the marriage, quarreled with her parents, attempted to assault her father, and, within the household, frequently abused her. lt was also alleged that petitioner No. 1 once entered her bedroom while she was changing clothes. According to the de facto complainant, the harassment began as early as the date of the engagement, when the petitioners expressed dissatisfaction with the dowry amount. she alleged that petitioner No. 2, described as "money-minded," persistenfly demanded additional dowry, abused her in filthy language, and spoke ill of her to neighbours. The complainant further claimed that petitioner No. 2 could not bear the 6 NTR,J Ctlp.1oo2z_2024 news of her pregnancy and, by quarrelling with her husband, provoked him to abandon her.

11. The statements of other witnesses, namely the complainant's parents, reiterated these allegations in their entirety. Based on these assertions, the prosecution filed a charge sheet for offences punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act. The trial court took cognizance of the case under the same provisions.

12. A holistic reading of the statements indicates that the petitioners are alleged to have subjected the de facto complainant to both mental and physical cruelty in connection with demands for additional dowry.

13. ln this context, it is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the aspect of mental cruelty in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh - (2007) 4 SCC 51 1 in para 101 has observed as under: "'101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances cif human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of 'mental cruelty'. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustrve. (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantty clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. 4i 7 NTR,] Cilp_10021_2024 (iii) Mere coldness or rack of affection cannot amount to cruerty, frequent rudeness of ranguage, peturance of manner, indifference and negrect FCA- 150-2008 may reach such a degree that it makes the married rife for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruerty is a state of mind, The feering of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mentalcruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiriating treatment carcurated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actuaily affecting physicar and mentat hearth of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resurtant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) sustained reprehensibre conduct, studied negrect, indifference or totar departure from the normar standard of conjugar kindness causing injury to mental hearth or deriving sadistic preasure can arso amount to mentar cruetty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jearousy, serfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotionar upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mentalcruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married tife which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years wiil not amount to cruelty. The ifl_conduct must be persistent for a fairry rengthy period, where the rerationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremery difficurt to rive with the other pafty any longer, may amount to mentalcruelty. (xi) lf a husband submits himserf for an operation of stErirization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowredge of his wife and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medicar reason or without the consent or knowredge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. U NTR,J Crtp_LOO22_2024 (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for consiclerable period without there being any physicar incapacity or varid reason may amount to mentalcruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a regar tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marrrage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. rn such like situations, it may lead to mentalcruelty.

14. ln Achin Gupta v. Sfafe of Haryana, (202s) 3 scc 756, whire considering the nature of allegations in matrimonial disputes,. the Hon'ble supreme court emphasized that courts must evaluate all quarrels and incidents within the specific context of each case to determine what constitutes 'cruelty.' Such determination must be made with due regard to the physical and mental condition of the parties, their individual character, and their social status.

15. The court cautioned that adopting an .unduty technical or hypersensitive approach in assessing marital discord coulcl prove detrimental to the very institution of marriage. rt observed that not every act or conduct in married life which causes annoyance to the other spouse can be categorized as cruelty. ordinary and trivial irritations, disagreements, and quarrels, common to the day{o-day life of most .g- i '.'.r ,' :;^i.. .: * ,.- ., -i,-..- r 9 NTR,] Glp_10022_2024 I married couples do not, by themselves, amount to cruelty. The proper test, as clarified, is not merely whether the conduct would be regarded as cruel by a reasonable person or one of average sensibilities in general, but whether, in the specific circumstances of the case, such conduct had the effect of causing cruelty to the aggrieved spouse.

16. Further, in Geddam Jhansi v. state of retangana, 2025 scc Online SC 263, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraphs 32 and 34 of the judgment, held as follows: "32. we have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic violence, there may be a tendency to impticate 17 other members of the family who do not come to the rescue of the complaihant or remain mute spectators to any alleged incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean that such domestic disputes should be given the colour of criminality.

34. For a matrimonial relationship which is founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to make a partner to hurl allegations of domestic violence and harassment against the other partner, would normally not happen at the spur of the moment and such acrimonious relationship would develop only in course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmination of a series of acts which turns, othenrise an amicable relationship, into a fractured one. Thus, in such cases involving allegations of ,/' vttu_tuut2_2u24 domestic viorence or harassment, there wourd normalry be a series of offending acts, which wourd be required to be spert out b,y the comprainant against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminar proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general a'egation of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants 35' We are, thus, of the view that in criminar cases rerating to domestic viorence, the compraints and charges should be specific, as far as possibre, as against each and every member of the famiry who are ar:cused of such offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by indiscriminately dragging alr the members of the famiry. There may be situations where some of the fami/y members or reratives may turn a brind eye to the viorence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any herping hand to the victim, which does not necessariry mean that they are arso perpetrators of domestic vioience, unress the circumstances crearry indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence, impricating a' such reratives without making specific aregations and attributing offending acts to them and 1g proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were compricit and had activery coraborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, wourd amount to abuse of the process of law 36' our observations' however, shoutd not be generarised to mean that reratives cannot be brought under the purview of the aforesaid penar provisions when they have activery participated in inflicting cruerty on the daughter-in-ra,victim. what needs to be assessed is *n"tn", "r.r, '-allegations are genuine with specific criminar role assigned to such members '' ',:: :?" 11 NTR,J Crlp_t00zz Z02q of the family or whether it is merely a spill over and side-effect of a matrimonial discord and allegations made by an emotionally disturbed person."

17. ln the instant case, though the petitioners are named, the allegations are largely general in nature, without specific instances attributing individual overt acts to them, except broad references to harassment'since the second day of marriage' and during a prolonged period thereafter. The law laid down in Kahkashan Kausar (supra) and Dara Lakshmi Narayana (supra) cautions against allowing prosecutions to proceed on the basis of omnibus allegations against all family members without concrete particulars. ln Achin Gupta (supra), the Supreme Court observed that not every matrimonial discord constitutes "cruelty," and that courts must consider the background, physical and mental condition, and social status of the parties, avoiding an unduly hypersensitive approach. Similarly, in Geddam Jhansi (supra), the court underscored that allegations must disclose ingredients of the offence in clear terms before subjecting the accused to criminal trial.

18. Additionally, the present complaint was lodged after an unexplained delay of approximately 18 months, following the complainant's departure from the matrimonial home and after initiation gf Family Court proceedings by accused No. '1. Such delay, in the \- t ( l I \ \ 72 NTR,J c/-tp_t0022-2024 absence of cogent expranatiop, rrl?y cast doubt on the veracity of the ailegations, particurarry when they are vague and racking in particurars. 19' rn view of the above, and apprying the regar principres raid down in the cited precedents, I am of the considered opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners, in the absence of specific and substantiated aregations of cruerty or dowry demand direcry attributabre to them, wourd amount to an abuse of the process of law

20. For the foregoing reasons, the criminar petition deserves to be, and is hereby, arowed. The proceedings in c.c. No. gl of 20240n the fire of the X Additionar Metroporitan Magistrate, Medchar at Athiveri, Medchar Markajgiri District, insofar as they rerate to the petitioners/accused Nos. 2 and 3, are hereby quashed. p-ending misce'aneous apprications, if any,sha, stand crosed. s K. //TRUE COPYII / SECTION OFFICER / To, 1- The X Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Medchal 2. The Station House Officer, Alwal P.S., Cyberabad Commiss ronerate

3. Two CCs to Hyderabad the Public Prosecutor [our] 4- One CC to Sri K. Venumadhav, Advocate tOpUCl s. Two CD Copies , High Court for the State of Telangana, ,b YC/eh HIGH COURT DATE i13t08t2025 D t / ORDER CRLP.No.10022 ot 2024 i4 ,t,(' [3 ti[ lffi () * O,:,r i)6l C.! * ALLOWING THE CRLP q 1\