The High Court · 2025

Smt.B Vujaya @ Vijaya. W/o Dr.B Mohan Murthy. aged about 51 years. Occ. Business. R/o H. No.16-2-83618,12, LIC Colony, Saidabad, Hyderabad. ...Petitioner/Petitioner/Plaintiff AND Alturi Samatha, W/o Atluri Radha Krishna. aged about 50 years Occ. Doctor, R/o. Flat No.306, Turquoise Block, My Home Jew-el. Madinaguda. Hyderabad - 500 049. Represented by GPA- P.Kodanda Ramaiah, S/o Subbaiah. Ri o Flat No.712. Turquoise Block, My Home Jewel, Madinaguda. Hyderabad - 500 049. ...RespondenURespondenUDefendant lA NO: 1 OF 2024-. Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings in OS No.631 of 20'19 on the file of the XVll Additional Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Courts. Hyderabad, pending disposal of the above CRP. CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 2679 OF 2024 : Petition Under Article 227 of the constitution of lndia against the Order dated 07-08-2024 Passed in 1.A.No.771 ol 2024 in O S.No 631 of 2019 on the file of the Court of the XVll Additional Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad. Between: Smt.B.Vujaya @ Vijaya, Wo. Dr.B.Mohan Murthy, aged about 51 years, Occ Business, R/o. H. No.16-2-83618.12, LIC Colony, Saidabad, Hyderabad. AND Atluri Samatha, W/o. Atluri Radha Krishna, aged about 50 years, Occ. Doctor, R/o. Flat No.306, Turquoise Block, My Home Jewel, Madinaguda, Hyderabad - 500 049. Represented by GPA- P.Kodanda Ramaiah, S/o. Subbaiah, R/o. Flat No.712, Turquoise Block, My Home Jewel. Madinaguda, Hyderabad - 500 049. ...Petitioner/Petitioner/Plaintiff ... Res pondenURes pondenUDefend ant lA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court rnay be pleased to Grant Stay of all further proceedings in O.S.No.631 of 2019 on the file of the XVll Additional Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad, pending disposal of the above C.R.P. Counsel for the Petitioner in all the CRPS : Sri Y.Koteswar Rao Counsel for the Respondent in all the CRPS : Sri G.Vasantha Rayudu The Court made the following : COMMON ORDER THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.2676.2678 and 2679 of2024 COMMON ORDEII: Heard Sri Y. Koteswara Rao, leamed counsel for the petitioner and Sri G. Vasantha Rayudu, leamed counsel fbr the respondent. Perused the entire record.

2. These Civil Revision Petitions are filed aggrieved by the common disrrissal order datcd 07.0t.i.1024 in I.A.Nos.769,770 and 771 ol 2024 in O.S.No.63 I ol20l9 on the lllc ot'the XVII Additional Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, [{yderabad, ('trial Court') by the petitioner/plaintiff.

3. The petitioner/ptaintifi' filed suit for specific performance ol agreement of sale fbr purchase of shares. -l'he petitioner paid an amount of Rs.3,10,000/- as advance vrrlc checlue No.00000 I, dated 04. 11.2018 drawn on HDFC Bank Limited, Nirmal Branch. The respondent encashed the said cheque through her bank i.e., State Bank of- India, Triveni Complex, Abids, Flycicrabad. The petitioncr was ready and willing to pay balance consideration of Rs.9,i0,000/-. However, the respondent tailed to receive the said amount and theretbre, suit tbr specific perfbrmance was filed. The evidence of the petitioner concluded and evidcnce of D.W. l, who is father of respondent, is recorded. D.W. I denied rcceiving of Rs.3,10,0001 by I I RY.J CIIP 1676 2.678 & 2679 2024 - way of cheque No.000001, dated 04. ll.20l8 and thctefore, in order to prove the payrnent of part consideration I.A.No.769 <tl- 2024 to reopen the suit to receivc documents, I.A.No.770 of 2024 to recaive copy o1- the transaction acknowledged by the bank and I.A.No.77l ctl 2024 to summon the branch manager/authorized official ol HDFC Bank. Nirmal, as rvitness to mark the documents submitted were filed. The said I.,\s. rvere dismissed by the trial Couft vide impugned cornuron ordcr dated 07.08.2024 Aggrieved by the said common order, the present Cir il ltevision l)etitions are pref'erred.

4. ln grounds of revision, it is pleaded that there is f-ailure to see that I.As. have been flled to receive crucial documents antl to exarnine the witness for proper adjudication of the case. whereas. the trial Courl has erroneously exlracted the cross-exarnination of the plaintif'f and disrrissed the LAs. under revision. There is failure on the part of the trial ('ourt in assessing the strength of the petitions belbre relying upon the cross- examination of the P.W.1. P.W.2, who is husband ot'tlre' petitioner, has deposed that advance payment was made to tlre respondent, but the sarne is denied by D.W. l. The trial Court did not consider the cvidence of P.W.2 in the common order as to payment of Rs.3,10,000/-. It is denied that there is need to examine the Bank Manager, HDFC Bank, Nirnral. and produce the cheque through which amount has been paid. Ilence, prayed to set aside 2 RY.J c'RP 2676 2678 & 2679 2024 the impugned common order by allowing the C.R.Ps. and also consequently, allow the I.As. under revision.

5. During the argumcnts, learned counscl lbr the revision petitioner submitted that the trial Court erroneously came to the conclusion that the petitioner's case to reopcn thc lnatter to reccir.e the bank transaction showing the digital image ol chequc No.000001, dated 04. I1.2018 and lrequently asked question of Chequc 'l'runcation System (CTS) was not fited during the recording ol cvidcnce ol thc petitioner and the same is sought to be received at the fag-end when the evidence is closed and matter is posted for arguments. Fuflher, an erroneous observation is made that there are no pleadings with respect to cheque transaction in the plaint. In that context, reference is made to paragraph No.3 of the plaint wherein therc is categorical pteading about cntering into sharc purchase agreement Cated 08.09.2018 by paying an amounl of Rs.--i,10,000/- through cheuqe bearing No.000001, dated 04. 11.2018 drawn on HDFC Bank, Nirmal Branch. [t is wrongly also observed that no reason is given lor not filing the documents in the Court befbre tl're suit was posted for arguments. Lastly, it is also erroneously held by the trial Cou( that receiving the said document is sought at belated stage permitting the same would aid the petitioner to fill up the lacunae in the case 3 \-- -- .'l - RY.J CRP 2676_1678_& _7679 20).4

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Suprerne Clourt in K.K.Velusamy v. N. Palanisamyr, w'herein it is held as under: "6. The trial court, by order dated 9-9-2009, dismissed thc said applications. The trial court held that as the evidencc of both the parties was concluded and the arguments had also been heard in part, the applications were intcndetl only to delay thc matter. The revision petitions filed by thc appellant challenging the said orders, were dismissed by thc High Court bv a common orcler dated 7 -4-2010, reiterating the rcasons assigncd by the triai court. The said order is challenged in these appeals bl special leave. 'Ihe only question that arises for consideration is whether the applications fbr reopening/recalling ought to havc bcen allow ed. 'fhe amended provisions of the Code contemplate and 12. expect a trial court to hear the arguments imnrediately after the completion of evidence and then proceed to j udgment. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have an express provision for reopening the evidence to examine a fresh u'itness or for rccalling an1, rvitness for further examination. llut if thcrc is a time gap bctween the completion of evidence and hearing of the arguments, for whatsoever reason,, and if in that interregnum, a party comes across some evitlence which he could not lay his hands on earlier, or some evidence in regard to the conduct or action of the other parlv comes into existence, the court may in exercise of its inherent powcr under Secfion 151 of the Code, permit the production ofsuch evidencc if it is relevant and necessary in tht' interest of justice, subject to such terms as the court ma"- tlecm fit to impose. I-1. The leamed counsel for the respondent contended that once arguments are commenced, there could be rro reopening of evidence or recalling of any witness. This content ion is raised bl extending the convention that once arguments arc corcluded and thc case is reserved lor judgment, the courl rvill not ctrt!.t-tain an\ '2011 atR scw 2296 4 7 RY..I ( Rl, 2676 2678 & 2679 2024 interlocutory application for any kind of rclicf. The nced for the court to act in a manner to achieve the ends oljustice (subject to the need to cornply with the law) does not end when arguments are heard and judgment is reser-v'ed. II'there is abuse of the process of the court, or if interests ofjusticc rcquire the court to do something or take note of something, thc discretion to do those things does not disappear merely because the arguments are heard, either fulty or partly. The convention that no application should be entertained once the trial or hearing is concluded and the case is reserved for judgment is a sound rule, but not a straidacket formula. There can always bc exceptions in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. to meet the ends of .iustice and to prevent abuse of process o['court, subject to the Iimitation recognised with reference to exercise of power under Section 15 I of the Code. Be that as it may. In this case, the applications were made before the conclusion ol the arguments.

16. We may add a word of caution. The power under Scction 151 or Order 18 Rule l7 of thc Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so uscd, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. But where the application is found to be bona fide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier rvas for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercisc its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does so, it should ensure that the process does no1 become a protracting tactic. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate fbr the delay. Secondly, the court should take up and complete thc case with in a llxed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly. if the application is fbund to be mischievous, or fl'ivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs. ll'the application is allowed and the evidence is pernritted and ultirnately the court t-rnds that evidence was not genuine or relevant and did not warrant the reopening of the case rccalling the witnesses, it can be madc a ground lbr awarding exernplary costs apart ti'orr ordering prosecution il it involl'es I'abrication of cvidence. Il the parly had an opporlunitl, to produce such 5 \.-*I - RY..I cRP 2676. 2678_&_2679 )024 evidence earlier but did not do so or if the evidence already led is clear and unarr-rbiguous, or if it cornes to the conclusion that the object of the application is merely to protract the proceedings, thc court should reject the application. If the evidence sought to be produced is an electronic record, the court may also listen to the recording befbre granting or rejecting the application.

18. In this case, we are satisfied that in the interests of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of court, the trial court ought to have considered whether it was necessary to reopen the evidence and if so, in what manner and to what extent further evidence should be permitted in exercisc of its power undcr Section l5l of the Code. The court ought to have also considered whether it should straightway recall PW I and P\\r 2 and permit the appellant to confront the said recorded evidence to the said witnesses or whether it should first receivc such evidence by requiring its proof of its authenticiry and only then permit it to be confronted to thc rvitnesses (PW I and PW 2). 19. In vicw of the above, these appeals are allorved in part. The orders of the High Court and the trial court dismissing IA No. 216 of 2009 under Section l5l of the Code are set aside. l'he orders are affirmed in regard to the dismissal of IA No. 217 of 2009 under Order 18 Rule l7 of the Code. l-hc trial cour-t shall now consider IA No. 216 of 2009 attesh in accordance with law."

7. In response, leamed counsel for the respondent subrnitted that thc present Civil Revision Petitions as well as the I.As. under revision are tilcd with sole intention to delay the disposal of the suit. Leamed counsel firr the respondent relerred to copy of the plaint, wherein list of documents clearly show that the bank statement of the petitioner is filed. -[he said bank staternent contains realization of cheque and the sante has not been disputed. There is no denial of cheque transaction b1 the respondent. 6 I --7 RY..I cRP 2676 2678 & 2679_2024 According to the leamed counsel for the respondent, there is no challenge and dispute with respect to cheque issued by the petitioner for an amount of Rs.3,10,000/- and the same is proven by marking of the bank statement by the petitioner and therefore, there is no cause of action tbr summoning the Bank Manager to prove the cheque. It is further submitted that the entire evidence is recorded and the matter is posted for arguments and the present petitions are filed only to delay the proceedings.

8. In reply, leamed counsel for the petitioner submitted that in a civil suit the burden of proof is always on the plaintiff. The burden is on the petitioner to prove the execution of the share purchase agreement and payment ofpart of the sale consideration. It is absolutely necessary lor the petitioner to summon the Bank Manager to prove the realization of the cheque. It is also submitted that during the course of trial, when the evidence of the petitioner and her husband was recorded, the cheque was not available as the same was handed over to the respondent and the samc was submitted to the bank for realization. The original cheque is with the bank and the said document was not available for marking at the time of recording the evidence of the petitioner. Further, only when D.W.l denied execution of cheuqe and payment of part of sale consideration, the I.As. tunder revision were filed. It is submitted that in order to substantiate the 7 r- RY.J cRP 2676 2678 & 2619 2021 case irrespective of the stage of fial in a suit, opportunity should be given to the petitioner to lead evidence as held in K.K.Velusamy (cited supra).

9. A perusal of the record shows that the petitioner has pleaded about I cheque transaction at paragraph No.3 of the plaint and therefore, there is an erroneous observation by the trial Court about absence of pleadings about the cheque. Further. there is also emoneous observation by the trial Courl about the failurc to llle the document at the relevant point of time since the cheque was ne\er rvith the petitioner to file it, while recording his side ol- evidence. The rcason staled tbr inability to file document before the matter is posted Ibr argurlcnts is also erroneous as the cheuqe was submitted til bank and bank is in custody of the cheque.

10. Bc that as it rrray. though, the observations made bv the trial Court are eroneous the rc is a need to examine whether the petitioner is entitled to summon the Bank Manager and receive the cheque and to reopen the case to prove his case fbr spccific performance. This Court is not inclined to venture into evi(lence deposed by the petitioner as P.W. I which shows clearly lack of knou'ledge about the execution ofshare purchase agreelnent with the respondent. -l'he said evidence shows that the petitioner was not directly involved in the transaction. Be that as it may, thc very facturn ol' rnarking ol bank statcment as exhibit would prove the issuunce of cheqr.re, - RY.J cRP 2676 ?678 & 1679 2024 which is submitted to the bank, as well as its realization. Once bank staternent of the petitioner is marked and the same is not disputcd, there would be no need to summon the Bank Manager for receiving the digital irnage ot'the cheque and to reopen the case for marking of said document or confionting the said cheque to D.W.1 irrespective of the fact that D.W. I denied issuance of the cheque by petitioner. The documentary evidence nrarked in thc form of bank statement by P.W. I would have greater evidentiarv value then the oral denial of D.W. l. Therelbre. there is no need to surrrron the Bank Manager and no need to receive the digitat inta-ee ol chcclue No.000001, dated 04.11.2018. As such, though the observations of the trial Coufi are erroneous, there is no error in denial of relief to the petitioner. The revision petitions lack merit and the same are liable to be disnrissed. I l. In the result, the Civil Revision Petitions are all dismissed by conlirming thc impugned comrron order dated 07.08.2024 passed by the rrial Courr in I.A.Nos.769 to77l of 2024in O.S.No.63 I of'2019. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pcnding shall stand closed. SD/. N SRIHARI REGISTRAR P I //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To, '1 The x\/ll A.lrlitaonal Senior Civil Judqe. CitV Civil Courts, Hyderabad 2 3 4 SI, S VS/P One CC to Sri Y.Koteswar Rao, Advocate [OPUC] One CC to Sri G.Vasantha Rayudu, Advocate [OPUC] Two CD Copies {k HIGH COURT DATED:25,t1012025 COMMON ORDER CRP.Nos.2676 2678,2679 OF 2024 .i ,') \ r^_v '\- \,{\ ,+ ,-,:t ) ,// ',.-.-;7 DISMISSING ALL THE CRPS @!h',.