The High Court · 2025

THE HON'BLE SRIJUSTICE NA N RAO NA NDIKONDA T REVISIO c SEN s.20 7A ND 208of 2008 COMMON ORDER: (per the Honbte Sri lustice Narsing Rao Nandikonda) Heard Mr. Karthik Ramana puttamreddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. swaroop oorila, Iearned Speciar Government preader for State Tax for the respondent.

2. Since the issue involved and the petitioner / assessee in these two Tax Revision Cases being one and the same, they being heard together and disposed of by way of this Common Order. 3. These two Tax Revision Case are filed by the petitioner under Section 22 (r) ot the Andhra pradesh Generar sares Tax Act, tg57 (for short, the 'AGPST Act,) challenging the common order dated L7.OS.2OOB, in T.A.Nos.1448 and 7449 of 2001, passed by the learned Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra pradesh, Hyderabad (for short, the ,STAf). 4. The facts of- the case are that, the petitioner is a Government undertaking of the State of Uttar pradesh. The petitioner is a registered dealer under the provisions of A,GST Act and centrar sares Tax Act, 1956 respectively' The petitioner's assessment for the years 1g86-87 and , i l { 1r :, .l i 2 1987-1988 was completed by the Assessing Authorit,r by its order dated

26.02.1991 and 23.08.1992 respectivery revying tax < n 70yo of receipts as .taxable instead of arriving at actual value of gr rds transferred in execution of works contract and the exemptions undr: Rule 6 (2) based on books have been overrooked. chalrenging the said. der, the petitioner preferred appeals before the Appellate Deputy Cc nmissioner (CT), Hyderabad and the same were dismissed by order r ated 29.10.1993. However, when the petitioner challenged the orde r ; passed by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner before the STAT, the STAT by its order dated 17.02.1995, in T.A.Nos.51 of tgg4 and batch, order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner and remar the Assessing Authority for a fresh consideration ai opportunity to the petitioner. But the Commercial Tax rad set aside the led the matter to er providing due Officer has once again confirmed the levy vide order dated 12.03.199i1 The Commercial Tax Officer has, however, given exemption in respect of cement, steel supply and cost recovery basis to the petitioner and i- works in respect of 1986-87 only. Further, the levy o1 :orporated in the :ax is on 7oo/o of receipts instead of giving deduction at actual towards ; bour and levying a tax on balance turnover of the goods. 5' It was contended by the petitioner that he courd rot participate in the assessment as its staff were scattered at different : aces and sought time to furnish necessary details as per the direction o STAT. It is also 3 contended that the Commercial Tax Officer passed an order on the ground that limitation was going to expire by 13.03.1998. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, who dismissed the same vide order dated 13.03.2001 rejecting the contentions of the petitioner that the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer was time barred and also in violation of the principles of natural justice. Challenging the same, the petitioner again preferred an appeal before the STAT on the ground that the revised assessment order of the Commercial Tax Officer is barred by time under Section 24A of the APGST Act and also on the ground that the petitioner was not provided sufficient opportunity before passing the assessment order. But, the learned STAT, however, rejected the appeal on both the grounds by its order dated 17.05.2008 Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the orders

6. of the STAT in earlier round of appeals. were served on the State Representative on 25.06.1995, the Commercial Tax Officer ought to have passed the consequential orders in terms of Section 24A of the APGST Act a within three years from the date of service of order on the State Representative i.e., before 25.06.1998. It was also contended that the orders passed by the assessing authority dated 12.03.1998 are clearly time barred. It was also contended that the notice of the STAT in its earlier order squarely covers the issue of the petitioner and requested to 4 set aside the orders passed by the Appellate DepL t / Commissioner' However, the STAT rejected the contentions of the r:titioner by duly accepting the contention of the State Representative' ltative cannot be It is further contended by the learned counsel for he petitioner that 7. since the order of STAT was served on the Asse:r: ing AuthoritY on Commercitr Tax Officer on 13.03.1995, the order Passed bY the 12.03.1998 is within limitation and the State Repres€ considered as service on the Assessing Authority' Th€ the petitioner is that the proceedings of the Comme -' the year 1986-1987 and 1987-88 are under the APGIi Assessing Authority has determined turnover relatint; and the order of the Commercial Tax Officer is barrer petitioner understands that it is passed behind the p': under Section 24A of the Act' rrain g rievance of ial Tax Officer for ; Act, wherein the to works contract by time since the iod of Three Years It was also the contention of the learned coun:; 8. that the Commercial Tax Officer has passed the ord': after the issuance of the show cause notice and no o: to the petitioner and that if one more opportunity making the petitioner unaware by passing the orde- limitation is expiring, the petitioner bona fidely cotl rl for the Petitioner s nearlY two Years rortunity was given I is given instead of on the Pretext that I not rePresent the ---:=:: -a:=-':=' 5 matter as several employees had left and he did not have proper track of pending matters.

9. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Commercial Tax Officer has taken the additional turnover as works contract receipts without giving exemption like consumable, second sales etc. That the Commercial Tax Officer ought to have adopted the labour component based on the books of accounts of petitioner instead of 3Oo/o as per the provisions of the APGST Act or the Rules since the petitioner incurred labour charges more than 30olo. The Commercial Tax Officer has Ievied uniform rate at rate of 5olo without identifying the goods and reference to Section 64 has no bearing since the Commercial Tax Officer assessed the receipts under works contract after deducting labour and supplies of road and buildings department. In any event, the rate of tax should be 4o/o and not 57o by virtue of the G.O.Ms.No.172, dated

13.19.1986. In any case, the Commercial. Tax Officer is incorrect in levying the additional tax at 1%io for the entire year, which only can be leviable for 01.08.1996 up to 31.7.1996 @ 5%. a

10. As the assessment was originally passed on 26.02.1991, the petitioner approached the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, who in turn dismissed the appeals and when the petitioner has preferred the appeals before the STAT, who remanded back the matter to the Assessing 6 Authority for fresh consideration. In spite of the direr: ions given by the STAT, neither appeared in-person before the Assess responded for the same and he failed to produce ng Authority nor the documentary evidence in support of its contentions and the petitioner has failed to avail the opportunity given to it. Therefore, it was not ( esirable that the petitioner should not be encouraged by offering anothe- opportun ity, even on merits, the turnover pertains to the transfer of pr: rerty of goods in execution of works contract. Hence, in the absence of dc :ument evidence, the contention of the petitioner was rejected by the qppellate Deputy Com m issio ne r.

11. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner rr ntended that by order dated 77.O2.1.995; the matter was remanded bacl. to the Assessing Authority for a fresh re-assessment to be done for the t. < period 1986-87 and 1987-88. The STATT order was served on the st_, .e representative before the Tribunal on 25.02.1995 which amounts t( service on the assessing authority itself. As per language of Section ,. -A of the APGST Act, the re-assessment order is to be passed within thre l years from the , date of the service of the Tribunal order which is within

5.02.1998. The said revised orders are passed on 12.03.1995 wh< r is barred by limitation. .V 7 L2. The contention of the learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax is that the STAT dispatch records prove that the remand order was directly served on the Commercial Tax Officer via registered post on

13.03.1995, not through the state representative. It is further contended that regulation 21 does not apply as the Assessing Authority (CTO) was not the authority against whose order the appeal was preferred, hence the service on CTO was mandate, and the state representative's role was not a conduit for communication in this case. It is further contended that Section 24-A does not specify whose receipt triggers limitation. The Tribunals dispatch register confirms service on the CTO on 13.03.1995 and contended that the service on the CTO is the starting point of limitation and the order was passed on 12.03.1998 which is within time.

13. The contention of the learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax also was that as per the regulation 21, the STAT is not bound to communicate the order on the assessing authority. In the petitionert case since the assessing authority is neither "the party" nor the "state representative" nor the authority against whose order the appeal was a preferred nor the deputy commissioner nor the board of revenue, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner appeal before the tribunal was against the order passed by the Appellate Deputy commissioner, therefore, the authority against whose order the appeal was preferred was the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, not the assessing authority and the above mentioned rule and regulations show as to t ow comprehensive and sufficient the service to state representative is.

14. It was further contended that the duty of the St rte Representative is to communicate with the revisionary or assessing arr deem fit. Once the order is served on the state repres horities as he may lntative, the three year limitatlon is to be calculated from the said date lr rt and the date on which it may be served to the assessing revisionary aut r o rities.

15. Basing on the above submissions of both the cct nsel and g rounds, the following substantial question of law that arise for : )nsideration in the instant Tax Revision Cases, viz., a) Whether the order passed by the Commercial Ttr; limitation as prescribed under section 24A of tt,t the STAT remanding matter were serverj Representative on 25-02-1995? And Offlcer is beyond APGST Act since on the State b) Since the State Representative is rbpresentin ; the State, the service of order on him should be considered as late of service for the purpose of Section 24A and consequently r hether the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer on 13.03.1 )98 must be held to be barred by limitation as the due date fc - passing the re assessment order is 25.02.1998 which is three ye :rs from the date of service on State Representative ? t 9

16. On perusal of the Regulation 21, it clearly shows that the order has to be served on the authority against whose order the appeal was preferred. In the present case, admittedly the appeal was preferred against the Appellate Deputy Commissioner but not the assessing authority. Appeal was preferred against the orders of Deputy commissioner and as per the tribunal dispatch records prove the remand order was directly served on the CTO vide registered post on 13.03.1995 which is proper as per the regulation 21 of the APGST ACT

17. In view of the above regulation the contention of the petitioner that the rules and regulations show as to how comprehensive and sufficient the service to state representative is. It is the duty of the state representative to communicate with the revisionary or assessing authority as the case may be. Once the order is served on the state representative, the three year limitation is to be calculated from the said date but not the date on which it may be served to the assessing authority / revisionery authority cannot be accepted. Hence, this court is of the opinion that the service which is effected only on the revisionary authority i.e. Deputy I Commissioner only has to be treated as the proper service and which only triggers the limitation, Therefore, the revised assessment order passed on

12.03.1998 is well within time. 10

18. For the said reasons stated above, this Bencr hold that the substantial questions of law framed are answered i: favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.

19. Consequently, both the Tax Revision Petitions are iable to be and accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall alsrr stand closed. SD/- 1( SRINIVASA RAO J( rlNT REGISTRAR A //TRUE COPY// \ srqTroN oFFrcER 1- To,

1. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderrr rad. (With records)

2. Two CCs to the Special Public Prosecutor, State of Telanga Buildings, at Hyderabad (OUT)

3. One CC to SRl. KARTHIK RAMANA PUTTAMREDDY Ad" 4. One CC to Special Govt Pleader for State Tax Advocate [{) 5 Two CD Copies ra, High Court ,cate [OPUC] ,ucl a TPK/PSL f& HIGH COURT DATED: 1611012025 R it SI4 \ :'', ) l! ., ':._+ * l. rAl 2iir t , ORDER TREVC.Nos.2O7 and 208 of 2008 TAX REVISION CASES ARE DtSMtSSt:D I .6 &e