Judgment · High Court · 2012

Order

These revisions are filed against the judgments passed in Criminal Appeal Nos.208, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213 and 214 of 2004 by the I Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad on 07.06.2005 respectively, confirming the conviction and sentence passed in C.C.Nos.191, 195, 193, 194, 230, 229, 198, 196, 233, 228, 231, 232, 197 and 192 of 2000 by the IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad on 29.06.2004, respectively. The Crl.R.C.M.P.No.2767 of 2012 is filed in Crl.R.C.No.932 of 2005 for receiving the documents as additional evidence in the above said Criminal Revision Case. Since the parties in all the Revision Cases are same and the issues involved are same, they are being disposed of by this common order. The revision petitioner is the accused and the respondent No.1 has filed the complaint against the revision petitioner for the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. For the sake of convenience the pleadings and the evidence pertaining to Crl.R.C.No.932 of 2005 are taken into consideration. The brief averments of the complaint are that the complainant is Ispat Industries Limited Company registered under Indian Companies Act. The accused is the regular customer and he has purchased steel for a sum of Rs.2,14,483/- under invoice No.CRM/214 for his business purpose and the same was delivered to the accused. The accused issued a cheque bearing No.173362 dt.29.07.1999 of City Union Bank Limited, M.G.Road, Secunderabad towards the cost of the steel supplied by the complainant. When the complainant presented the said cheque in the bank on

01.11.1999 for encashment, it was returned with an endorsement “exceeds arrangement” vide cheque return memo dt.02.11.1999. Thereupon the complainant got issued a legal notice dt.04.11.1999 to the accused for payment of the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. The accused received the said notice on 09.11.1999 and failed to pay the amount but issued a reply notice. The complainant in order to establish the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act in the batch of cases examined, PW.1 and got marked Exs.P1 to P14. In defence, the accused examined DW.1 and marked Exs.D1 to D11.

Basing on the said oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two months for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the accused therein has filed the Criminal Appeal No.202 of 2004 and the same was dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. Questioning the said judgment of the appellate Court, the present revision is filed. Now the point that arises for consideration is whether the appellate Court is justified in confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act against the accused therein? POINT: The senior counsel Sri C.Kodandaram appearing for the revision petitioner has pleaded that Sri V.Saibaba, who has filed the complaint on behalf of the complainant, has no authorization to file the complaint and the person, who has said to have executed GPA in favour of said V.Saibaba, has not empowered to execute the said GPA and as such the complaint filed by him is liable to be dismissed. He further pleaded that there is no enforceable debt in order to attract the provisions of Section 138 of N.I. Act and, therefore, the conviction and sentenced passed by both the trial Court and Appellate Court are liable to be set aside. As per the complaint, the complainant is represented by its Estate Manager (Marketing), Sree Veera Saibaba S/o Sree Rama Rao. The said Saibaba was examined as PW.1 and according to him, he is the power of attorney holder of the complainant company and duly authorized to represent the said company by the power of attorney dt.10.12.1999. In support of his contention he got marked Exs.P-1, P-2 and P-11 to P-14. In the cross-examination he has stated that the board gives powers to the Directors and in turn the Directors empowered certain persons to represent the company. Ex.P-2 is executed by one M.P.Sinha, on the basis of which he has filed the complaint. He admitted that the authority of said M.P.Sinha was cancelled under Ex.P-12 on 30.10.2000, as he resigned. There is a separate resolution for cancellation but it was not filed and he does not know as to who has scribed the words in hand writing in Ex.P-2. He admitted that basing on the endorsement made on Ex.P-2, he stated that his authority was cancelled on 30.10.2000. Ex.P-2 came to his possession when he presented the complaint. Again he says that he got it after 30.12.2000. He denied the suggestion the M.P. Sinha is not appointed as power of attorney at all as per Ex.P-11. The original minutes book is with the company, he can file it if required. The executant of Ex.P- 2 has got authority to create power of attorney. He denied the suggestion that he has no such power. He further stated that he does not remember the exact date of his coming into possession of the documents Exs.P-11, 13 and 14. He denied the suggestion that they have created Exs.P-11 to 14 after disposal of the discharge petition filed by the accused. Exs.P-11, 13 and 14 were received by him from the head office. He has not personally acquainted with the signature of the executants of Ex.P-14. He denied the suggestion that executant of Ex.P-14 has no authority to create power of attorney. The revision petitioner’s counsel has pleaded that the person, who has executed the GPA Ex.P-2, is not a director of the company and he has no authority to execute the said GPA in favour of PW.1. He further pleaded that the said GPA in favour of M.P. Sinha was cancelled on 30.10.2000, as such the power of attorney Ex.P-2 was also cancelled and PW.1 has no authority to file the complaint. Ex.P-2 is the power of attorney executed by M.P. Sinha in favour of PW.1, wherein M.P.Sinha claimed his authority as per the board resolution dated 30.07.1998, under which he was appointed as true and lawful attorney and by the power of attorney dt.30.07.1998 has appointed him as true and lawful attorney. Whereas the said power of attorney has further authorized to sub-delegate its power from time to time, any of the powers as mentioned in the power of attorney dt.30.07.1998 and in pursuance of the said power, he has delegated the power by the said power of attorney in favour of PW.1 for the purposes mentioned therein. Therefore, the said M.P. Sinha, who executed Ex.P-2, is claiming his authority under board resolution dated 30.07.1998. Ex.P-11 is the extracts from the minutes of the meeting of the board of directors of the complainant company held on

30.07.1998, under which the board has resolved that the power of attorney issued in favour of Mr.Vinod Garg, President for Kalmeshwar Works be and is hereby revoked and that Mr.P.K.Saraogi, President & Secretary, Mr.M.P.Sinha, Director-in-Charge (Kalmeshwar Works), Mr.B.L.Biyani, General Manager (Commercial), Mr.Rajendra Sharda, Dy. General Manager (Accounts) and Mr.L.K.Poddar, Joint Secretary be and hereby authorized severally to take all necessary action in this regard and to forward the aforesaid resolution certified to be true copy to all the concerned authorities for their information and record. Therefore, under the said board resolution the said M.P. Sinha is claiming his authority as power of attorney holder of the said complainant company. Ex.P-12 is the power of attorney executed by one Vivek Sett in favour of M.P. Sinha on

30.07.1998 and as per the endorsement made therein the said power of attorney was cancelled at the board meeting dt.30.10.2000 and the said fact was also admitted by PW.1 but he could not say, who has made the said endorsement on Ex.P-12. Ex.P-13 is the extract of the minutes of the board meeting of the complainant company held on 28.06.1997, under which the company’s Board of Directors resolved to issue power of attorney in favour of Mr.C.Mamuty, Mr.A.K.Sureka and Mr.A.K.Mathur as per the respective draft power of attorney placed before the meeting and resolved further that A.C.Chakrabortti, Mr.A.C.Mukherji, Mr.D.N.Shukla, Mr.M.N.Kampani, Directors, Mr.P.K.Mittal, Vice Chairman & Managing Director, Mr.V.K.Mittal, Joint Managing Director, Mr.D.K.Chatterjee, Director-Technical, Mr.V.S.Bapna, Director-in-Charge (Steel Plant) and Mr.Vivek Sett, Director-Finance be and are hereby authorized severally to sign and execute the said power of attorneys in favour of Mr.C.Mamuty, Mr.A.K.Sureka and Mr.A.K.Mathur and the common seal of the company be affixed, if required, in the presence of any one of the aforesaid Directors, who sign the same as token thereof. Therefore, as per the said resolution, the company has resolved to execute the power of attorneys in favour of Mr.A.K.Sureka, Mr.A.K.Mathur and Vivek Sett is authorized to sign and execute the power of attorneys in their favour. In pursuance of the board resolution A.K.Sureka has executed Ex.P-14 power of attorney in favour of PW.1 on 01.10.2000. Therefore, as per Ex.P-14, PW.1 was authorized by A.K.Sureka to represent the company w.e.f. 01.10.2000. The revision petitioner’s counsel has pleaded that PW.1 has no valid authorization to file the complaint even under the above said documents referred to. He relied upon a decision rendered in State Bank of Travancore v. M/s Kingston Computers (I) P. Ltd. , wherein the Apex [1] Court has held as under: “the respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K.Shukla was appointed as a Director of the company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the company to file suit against the appellant and authorized Shri Ashok K.Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K.Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K.Shukla to authorize another person to file suit on behalf of the company.” The next decision relied upon by the revision petitioner’s counsel is rendered in Dale & Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd., and another v. P.K.Prathapan and others [2] , wherein the Apex Court has held that “a company is a juristic person and it acts through its Directors who are collectively referred to as the Board of Directors. An individual Director has no power to act on behalf of a company of which he is a Director unless by some resolution of the Board of Directors of the company, specific power is given to him/her. Whatever decisions are taken regarding running the affairs of the company, they are taken by the Board of Directors. The Directors of companies have been variously described as agents, trustees or representatives, but one thing is certain that the Directors act on behalf of a company in a fiduciary capacity and their acts and deeds have to be exercised for the benefit of the company.” In Satish & Co. v. S.R. Traders and Ors. , the Single Judge of this [3] Court has held that “the complaint filed by the Company represented by its manager who is not authorized to file the complaint, held the complaint is not maintainable. Subsequent authorization in favour of the manager will not revive the prosecution.” In Nayagam Lourd Prakash v. Standard Chartered Bank, Sec’bad and another , the Single Judge of this Court has held that “the complaint [4] filed by the Manager of the Company on an authorization given under a deed of power of attorney by one person by name F.D. Irani is authorized by the payee Bank to empower the complainant to file the complaint, and in the circumstances, held, the complaint is not filed by authorized person and hence liable to be quashed.” In Sri Balaji Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Samudra Ropes Pvt. Ltd. & [5] Ors. , the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court that, “want of authority of a person is not a mere irregularity but fundamental defect which makes complaint itself not maintainable under Section 142 (a) of N.I. Act.” In Entertainment Society of Goa v. Ritza Wine Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. [6] , the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court has held that “the complaint was filed by the CEO of the company but there is no resolution authorizing to file the complaint. Hence, the complainant is not authorized and the complaint is liable to be dismissed.” Basing on the above said decisions, the revision petitioner’s counsel contends that the Board by its resolution authorize one of its Directors to execute the power of attorney empowering him to delegate his powers to any other person and to execute a general power of attorney to act on behalf of the company. He further pleaded that, in the present case, M.P. Sinha, who has executed Ex.P-2 in favour of PW.1, is not a Director of the company and he was not properly authorized to delegate the power to PW.1 to represent the complainant company. He further pleaded that subsequent authorization will not validate the complaint filed by PW.1. In K.S.Ramachander Rao v. State of A.P. and another , the Full [7] Bench of this Court has held that “the filing of the complaint for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act by the power of attorney of payee or holder in due course of dishonoured cheque, is maintainable. The prosecution launched at the instance of power of attorney tantamounts to institution of complaint by payee or holder in due course as ‘person aggrieved’. He can also be examined on behalf of the complainant to find out if there is prima facie case against the accused.” In Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand [8] , wherein it was held “that the complainant must be a corporeal person who is capable of making physical presence in the Court. Its corollary is that even if a complaint is made in the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the Court and it is that natural person who is looked upon, for all practical purposes, to be the complainant in the case. In other words, when the complainant is a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as de facto complainant to represent the former in the Court proceedings and further held that the provisions of Section 256 of Cr.P.C. are applicable even the complainant is a company or any other juristic person.” In M/s M.M.T.C. Ltd. and another v. M/s Medchal Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and another , the Apex Court has held that “the only [9] eligibility criterion prescribed by Section 142 of N.I. Act is that the complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act must be by the payee or the holder in due course of said cheque. This criterion is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the appellant Company, who is the payee of the cheque. Merely because complaint is signed and presented by a person, who is neither as authorized agent nor a person empowered under the Articles of Association or by any resolution of the Board to do so is no ground to quash the complaint. It is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the Court for sending any other person to represent the company in the Court. Thus, even presuming, that initially there was no authority, still the Company can, at any stage, rectify that defect. At a subsequent stage the Company can send a person who is competent to represent the company.” In Waterbase Limited v. K.Ravindra and another , the Single [10] Judge has observed as under: “In the instant case, the complainant who is P.W.1, as already noticed has been associated with the credit transactions of the company. He was the person who gave the notice referring to various transactions and he was the person who got the authorization from the Chief Executive of the company. No doubt there is nothing on record to show that the Chief Executive has got authorization to authorize P.W.1 to represent the company, but going into this question amounts to going into the root of the issue. But it can safely be inferred that he has the implied authorization to act on behalf of the company and after all he represented the company only to safeguard it’s interest i.e. his acts are not to the prejudice of the company, but on the contrary they are for the benefit of the company. Most importantly the Board of the appellant-Company never expressly or impliedly, disrobed P.W.1 from the capacity of the Assistant Manager – Credit Control of the company, nor has disowned his acts representing the Company. Therefore, a comprehensive look at the whole circumstances would only go to show that P.W.1 had definite authorization to represent the company. It further observed that Section 196 of the Indian Contract Act provides for ratification of the acts of the agent. In the present case the company never expressly objected to the acts of PW.1, such silence on the part of the company amounts to implied ratification or consent.” In view of the above said decisions, it has to be examined whether in the present case, PW.1 has got proper authority to represent the complainant company. In the present case, PW.1 claiming his authority under Ex.P-2. Ex.P-2 is the power of attorney executed by M.P. Sinha in favour of PW.1, claiming his authority under the Board resolution dt.30.07.1998 and also power of attorney dated 30.07.1998. Ex.P-11 is the minutes of the Board meeting dated 30.07.1998. Ex.P-12 is the power of attorney dt.30.07.1998 executed in favour of said M.P. Sinha in pursuance of the Board resolution Ex.P-11 dated 30.07.1998 by Vivek Sett. As per the written endorsement made on Ex.P-11, the said power of attorney was cancelled at the Board meeting dated 30.10.2000. PW.1 also admitted the said fact and according to him, since the said M.P. Sinha has resigned as a Director, the power of attorney was cancelled. Admittedly, the complaint was filed on 24.12.1999. The power of attorney executed in favour of M.P. Sinha. Ex.P-12 was cancelled on 30.12.2000. Thus, by the date of filing of the complaint M.P. Sinha has not got the power of attorney to represent the company in pursuance of Ex.P-12, and the said M.P. Sinha has executed the power of attorney Ex.P-2 in favour of PW.1 on

10.12.1999. Thus, by the date of filing complaint on 24.12.1999, PW.1 has got valid power of attorney Ex.P-2 executed by M.P.Sinha to represent the complainant company. By Board resolution Ex.P-13 Vivek Sett, Director (Finance) is authorized to sign and execute the power of attorneys in favour of Mr.C.Mamuty, Mr.A.K.Sureka and Mr.A.K.Mathur. A.K.Sureka has executed the general power of attorney Ex.P-14 in favour of PW.1 on

01.10.2000. The said A.K. Sureka got the authority as per Board resolution Ex.P-13. Thus, PW.1 has got the authority to represent the company validly. The revision petitioner’s counsel contends that M.P. Sinha is not a Director as on the date of filing of the complaint, as such any power of attorney executed by him in favour of PW.1 is only a scrap of paper. In support of his contention, he relied upon Ex.D-2, which is annual return of the complainant company dt.01.11.2001. In Ex.D-2, the name of M.P. Sinha is not shown as a Director of the said company. The revision petitioner’s counsel also relied upon Ex.D-3, which is resolution made by the complainant company, which shows the names of the Board of Directors, President and Secretary of the complainant company. In Ex.D-3 the name of M.P.Sinha was not found place as Director. The said Ex.D-3 was dated 31.08.2000. As per the admission made by PW.1, M.P. Sinha’s power of attorney was cancelled on 30.10.2000 by the Board resolution as he retired from the Directorship but there is no evidence on record to show as to when the said M.P. Sinha has resigned from the post of Director. The said Ex.D-3 is two months prior to the cancellation of GPA Ex.P-12. Therefore, he must have resigned from the Directorship even before Ex.D-

#3. Ex.D-2 is a document dated 01.11.2001. By that date, he has already resigned from the Directorship of the company, as such the non- mentioning of the name of M.P. Sinha in Exs.D-2 and D-3 do not establish that he was not a Director as on the date of execution of Ex.P-2 dt.10.12.1999 or Ex.P-12 dt.30.07.1998. Thus, under Ex.P-12, M.P. Sinha has got authority to represent the company and to delegate his powers to any other person and in pursuance of the same, he has executed Ex.P-2, the power of attorney in favour of PW.1 on 10.12.1999. Even though the power of attorney executed in favour of M.P. Sinha was cancelled on

30.10.2000 under Ex.P-14, A.K. Sureka has already executed a power of attorney in favour of PW.1 on 01.10.2000. Therefore, as on the date of filing of the complaint i.e. on 24.12.1999 and subsequently during the continuation of the proceedings, PW.1 has got the authority to represent the complainant company. Thus, the decisions referred by the revision petitioner’s counsel i.e. 1) State Bank of Travancore v. M/s Kingston Computers (I) P. Ltd., 2) Dale & Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd., and another v. P.K.Prathapan and others, 3) Satish & Co. v. S.R. Traders and Ors., 4) Nayagam Lourd Prakash v. Standard Chartered Bank, Sec’bad and another, 5) Sri Balaji Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Samudra Ropes Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 6) Entertainment Society of Goa v. Ritza Wine Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., are not helpful to show that PW.1 has no authority to represent the complainant company. As such the appellate Court has rightly held that PW.1 has got the authority to represent the company. The next contention of the revision petitioner’s counsel is that there is no legally enforceable debt as on the date of issuance of cheque by the accused in favour of the complainant. The revision petitioner has relied upon the evidence of PW.1 and pleaded that PW.1 has not produced the account books maintained by the complainant company to show that there is an enforceable debt as on the date of issuance of the cheque Ex.P-4 and by non-production of the accounts books an adverse inference was drawn against the complainant company. PW.1 in his cross-examination has admitted that their company maintains accounts and the purchases made by the accused along with the payment made there for are reflected in such accounts and he is the incharge of the accounts. There is a ledger account covering the particulars connected to all these cases. The said accounts are not filed in Court. He denied the suggestion that they have not produced the accounts since it discloses their liability to the accused in respect of the alleged discounts. According to DW.1, as per the terms and conditions orally agreed, it has been stated that the accused will place blank cheques signed with them towards security and after dispatch of the goods ordered, if there is any balance to be paid only after his instructions they will have to be filled up and presented the same for encashment. It was further agreed that the complainant company will give the following discounts on every purchase:

#1. Quantity discount at Rs.200/- per metric ton;

#2. Cash discount at Rs.400/- per metric ton;

#3. Defective material will either be replaced or appropriated against the value; and

#4. Weightment shortage will be credited in his account. According to him, they maintained true and correct accounts in the regular course of business and trade and the same are duly audited from time to time. He filed extract of the true statement of account duly certified by the Chartered Accountant. As per the said account ending by September, 1999, there is a debit balance of Rs.1,49,682/-. Therefore, he is not due any amount to the complainant company and the complainant company has to pay him the said amount of Rs.1,49,682/-. He further stated that the cheques in question were deposited towards security, which are blank and he has not issued any instructions to fill up the blanks and as on the date of presentation of the said cheques, he was not due any amounts to the complainant company and, therefore, he has not committed any offence due to its dishonour and in his further chief examination he has stated that they used to make the payment by their two firms and also through the cheques of third parties by endorsing in favour of the complainant. As they were making bulk purchases and as he is a single man, he could not check the account entry to entry and day to day basis. In the cross- examination he admitted that except the statement of account, he did not file any other ledger account. He admitted that they used to make payments by way of DDs or cheques. He admitted that he has not filed any bank statement showing the payments to the complainant company. He denied the suggestion that the documents are prepared only to escape their liability. Therefore, according to the revision petitioner, the said cheque Ex.P-4 was issued as a security for due payment of the amount in blank and if any amount is due as per the instructions of the accused, the said cheques are to be filled up by the complainant company and presented it for collection and there is no due amount as on the date of filing of the complaint. PW.1 has stated in his evidence that after dishonour of the cheque, they have issued a legal notice on 04.11.1999 calling upon the accused to pay the amount of Rs.2,14,483/- covered by the dishonoured cheque within 15 days and the said notice was received by the respondent- accused but he did not make the payment. The reply given by the accused is marked as Ex.P-10. In Ex.P-10 the accused has admitted that the material was purchased from them vide purchase orders bearing Nos.GSC/67/99-00 dt.09.07.1999 and GSC/70/99-00 dt.13.07.1999 subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein. Having accepted the terms and conditions as per their purchaser orders, the complainant has supplied the material under various invoices. As per the regular business practice between both the parties, and terms and conditions of purchase orders, which were accepted by the complainant company, the accused is entitled for a quantity discount @ Rs.200/- per metric tonne of material purchased and he further pleaded that unless the discount amount is settled the transaction between the parties would not be completed and the complainant company presented the cheques without settling the discounted amount. Therefore, in Ex.P-10 the accused has admitted about the receipt of the material as per the purchase orders dt.

09.07.1999 and 13.07.1999 and he only claimed that they are entitled for quantity discount of Rs.200/- per metric tonne and without settling for such quantity discount, he cannot be said to be due the amount to the complainant company. No plea was taken in the said reply Ex.P-10 with regard to issuance of cheque as security making the payment of the entire amount under the purchase orders or they are entitled for an amount of Rs.1,49,682/- as per the account maintained by them. It is the specific case of the complainant that for the amount due for the material supplied under the invoice Ex.P-3 the cheque was issued and the supply of material under Ex.P-3 was admitted by the accused in the reply notice Ex.P-10, but only claimed quantity discount at Rs.200/- per metric ton. The cheque was also issued for the amount mentioned in Ex.P-3 invoice. When the accused has not disputed about the amount payable under the invoice and having admitted that the said material under the invoice was received by them, there is no necessity for the complainant company to produce their account books to establish the amount due by the accused to them. Therefore, the non-production of the account books by the complainant company will not disprove the amount due as on the date of complaint in view of the admission made by the accused in Ex.P-

#10. Thus, from the evidence of PW.1, the initial burden, which is on the complainant company, was discharged and the burden shifts on the accused to rebut the legal presumption available to the complainant under Section 139 of the N.I. Act that the said cheque was not issued in discharge of any legally enforceable debt. DW.1 has relied upon the statement of account maintained by them i.e. Ex.D-1 to show that they have paid the entire amount and the complainant company is liable to pay Rs.1,49,682/- to them and according to them, they used to make the payment through demand drafts, cheques of the third parties and Ex.D-1 also reflects regarding the said payments and also about the discounts given to the accused. As already observed above, the contentions raised by the revision petitioner were not taken in Ex.P-10, the reply notice, given for the legal notice issued by the complainant company after dishonour of the cheque, the said pleas are not available to the revision petitioner at this stage. The revision petitioner’s counsel has filed Crl.R.C.M.P.No. 2767 of 2012 for receiving of the documents as additional evidence to establish the fact that they have made the payment to the complainant company. In view of the fact that the said plea of payment of the amount due to the complainant was not taken in Ex.P-10, as discussed above, and the said plea is not available to them, the question of producing any document as additional evidence at this stage does not arise. Thus, the question whether the documents can be received as additional evidence in the revision or not is left open. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to produce any additional evidence at this stage in the absence of any pleading in the reply notice Ex.P-10. Hence, the said petition is dismissed. Thus, the complainant company could establish from the evidence of PW.1 and Ex.P-1 that the said cheque Ex.P-4 was issued for the amount due under invoice Ex.P-3. Thus, the said cheque was issued towards legally enforceable debt. Hence, the appellate Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the said disputed cheque was issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt. The concurrent findings recorded by both the trial Court and the appellate Court do not warrant any interference in this revision. Hence, all the revision cases are devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed. In the result, all the above Criminal Revision Cases and the Crl.R.C.M.P.No.2767 of 2012 are dismissed. JUSTICE P. DURGA PRASAD _______________________ Date: 21-12-2012 Note: Issue CC by 24.12.2012. B/o MR THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE P. DURGA PRASAD CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NOs.932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944 and 945 of 2005 And Crl.R.C.M.P.No. 2767 of 2012 Date: 21-12-2012 MR [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] (2011) 11 SCC 524 AIR 2005 SC 1624=(2005)1 SCC 212 1997 (6) ALD 195 2000 (2) ALD (Crl.) 731 (AP) III (2011) BC 89 I (2012) BC 367 2005 (2) ALD 572 (FB) (1998) 1 SCC 687 AIR 2002 SC 182 [10] 2002 (1) ALD (Crl.) 689 (AP)