The High Court · 2025

Mr.Vijhay Ii Punna, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellants. Mr.Srikanth Hariharan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. JUDGMENT: (Per Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)

1. Ttre Writ Appeal arises out of order dated O4.O2.2O25 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.293O of 2025 filed by the respondent/r,vrit petitioner.

2. The Writ Petition was filed by the respondent for a Writ of Mandarnus for setting aside the order dated 14.1I.2024 passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court at Hyderabad in \ I.A.Noq.1 and 2 of 2024 in EPF Appeal No.43 of 2024 filed by the 2 respondsnt respondent/writpetitioner. #:_,#_::,, The EpF Appear was preferred by the chalrenging the order dated 0g.0g.2024 passed by the Regionar provident Fund commissioner. filed I'A'Nos' 1 and 2 0f 2024 seeking waiver of the pre_deposit condition and arso for sta5z of operation of the order dated O8.O8.2O24 passed by rh "r Lne Regional Provident Fund commissioner. The respondent 3' The appe'ants craim to be aggrieved by the impugned order dated 04'02'2025 by rvhich the order dated 74.77.2024passed by the apperant No.3-presiding officer, Industrial Tribuna-l_cum_ Labour court' Hyderabad, was partry modified and the writ petitioner was directed to rernit l$%o ofthe determined amount under section 7A of The Emproyees, provident Misce,aneous provisions Act, tg52 (1g52Act) within four weeks from the date of the order. The respondent N No.3 herein) was arso directed expeditiously as possible till disposal of the EpF Appeal. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the respondent/writ petitioner have argued on the - w6quu ufl rne maintainability of the Writ Appeal. '3 (the apperant to dispose of the EpF Appeal as Funds and I 3 MB,J & GPK,J Wa_829_2025

5. Leerned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner has urged that the appellants, who are Statutory Authorities under th,e 1952 Act, cannot maintain the present Appeal.

6. we have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties ernd considered the import of the order passed by the appellan': No.3 dated 14.11 .2024 which led to filing of the writ Petition rvhich in turn culminated in the impugned order. 7 - we first need to clarify the facts rvhich are relevant to the issue of rnaintainability. (i) The r;r'rit petitioner is the 'Employer' of an Establishment as defined rlnder section 2(e) of the 1952 Act. proceedings lr,ere initiated against the writ petitioner under section 7 A by way of a notice d;rted 25.05.2022 determining the dues payable by the writ petit-ioner for the period from April,'2021 to November,2o2l and wages amounting to Rs.1,34,961/- as balance payable by the writ petitioner. Appellant No.1/The Regional provident Fund commisr;ioner under section 7A of the 19s2 Act determined that the writ petitioner/Employer should pay the balance amount of Rs.52,5r,686/- for the specified period uide an order dated 08.o8.2024. The Regional provident Fund. commissioner \ ' nn-*' 4 MB,J & GF. Wa_829_2O2'- directed the writ petitioner/Employer of the Establishment to pay the aforesaid amount within 15 days from receipt of the order. (i0 The writ petitioner challenged the said order dated

08.08.2024 before the respondent No.3 by way of an Appeal i.e., EPF Appe.al No.43 of 2024 under Section Z-t of the 1952 Act. In the said appeal, the writ petitioner filed I.A.Nos.l and 2 for waiver of the pre-deposit condition under section 7-o and also for stay of the operation of the order dated o8.o8.2o24 till disposal of the Appeal. The appellant No.3 herein disposed of the said IAs by an order dated t4.11.2O24 holding that the Appeal would be admitted subject to remittance of 3ooh of the determined amount under section 7A of the 1952 Act within six weeks upon submission on record of the proof of remittance. The operation of the order dated 08.08.2024 was directed to be suspended till disposal of the EPF Appeal on compliance with the pre-deposit condition. (iii) The respondent/writ petitioner approached the High court against order dated 14.11.2024. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge permitted the respondent/writ petitioner to remit l5o/o of the determined amount under section 7A of the 1952 Act before the appellant No.3 within four weeks from the date of the order. II "t 5 MB,J & GPK,J Wa-829-2025 B. Thr: Court is informed that the respondent/writ petitioner has alreztdy deposited 15% of the determined amount before the appellan': No.3 as directed by the learned Single Judge.

9. As stated above, the appellant No.l is the Authority under section 7 A of the 1952 Act-cum-Regional Provident l.'und Commisr;ioner; the appellant No.2 is the Enforcement Officer and the appellant No.3 is the Presiding Officer of the Central Governrrrent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court

10. Se,:tion 7-I(ll of the 1952 Act provides for a person aggrieveri by a notification issued by the Central Government, or an orde;: passed by the Central Government or any Authority under section 1 (4), proviso to section 1(3), or section 3, or section 7A(1), or section 78 [except an order rejecting an applicat.on for review referred to in section 78(5)1, or section 7C, or section 14B, to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal against such order. Section 7-I(2) provides that every appeal under sub- section (1) therein shall be filed in such form and manner, within such tinre and along with such fees, as may be prescribed.

11. Se,ction 7-O of the 1952 Act provides for 'deposit of amount due, orr filing appeal'. The Section bars a Tribunal from entertai:ring any appeal filed by an Employer unless the \ I 6 MB,J & G\ Wa_829_2O2;-. Employer deposits with it sevenly-five per cent of the amount due from hirn as determined by an officer referred to in section 7A. The proulrso to section 7_O is to the follor,ving effect: ,,provided that the T recorded ;;;;,,ffi'fr:,:"::na! may, ror reasons to be d"p."i;; ,l"X'J,1'lf;f; #:ll;:I ;;;.'ilI' j-o,.,, to be 12' It is crear from the above that the Tribunar is author ized to reduce or entirely waive the pre-deposit condition under section 7-O of the lg12 Act by recording the r -- -"'6 Lrre reason for such waiverf reduction in writing.

13. (the appellant No.3) by t from TSyo to 3Oo/o of ingle Judge further In the present case, the Tribunal order dated l4.ll .2024, reduced the amoun the determined amount. The learned S reduced the amount from 3O%o to t9%o. 14. The Regional provident Fund Commissioner, Enforcement officer and the presiding officer of the Tribunal are before us craiming to be aggrieved by the order passed by the Iearned Single Judge.

15. The appellant No.1 was the au dated OB.OB.2O24 holding that the (Employer) shoutd subject-matter of Pay Rs.52,S 7,6g6/ _ the responde nt/writ thority who passed the order respondent/writ petitioner This order was petitioner,s challenge I 7 MB,J & GPK,J Wa_829-2025 before the Tribunal. Hence, the appellant No.l has no nexus with tht: order passed by the learned Single Judge, which admittec.ly, only adjudicated on the aspect of the pre-deposit condition for filing of an appeal under section 7-O of the 1952 Act read with the proviso thereto.

16. The proceedings dated 25.05.2022 issued by the appellant No.1 mention that the Enforcement Officer (appellant No.2 herein) t:onducted an inspection.in respect of the Establishment of the writ petitioner. Thus, the Enforcement Officer/the appellant No.2 is several steps removed from the order passed by the learned Single Judge which only decided on the quantum of pre-deposit. 17" The appellant No.3 is the Presiding Officer who passed the order on 14.11 .2024 in I.A.Nos.l and of 2024 in EPF Appeal .2 No.43 of 2024 filed by the respondent/writ petitioner holding that the respondent/writ petitioner is entitled to remit 3oo/o of the determined amount under section 7-o of the 1952 Act and that the admission of the Appeal would be subject to the respondent/writ petitioner remitting 3oo/o of the determined amount rvithin six weeks from the date of the order. The learned Single ,Judge further reduced this amount to IS% of the dqtermined amount. B MB,J & GF. Wa_829_2O2:, 18' The learned standing counsel appearing for the apperants submits that the apperants are statutory Authorities and are aggrieved by the order of the learned singre Judge since the power to reduce the pre_deposit amount onl5, rests with the Statutory Authority under section 7-o ofthe 1g52 Act. counser further submits that the appeilants are before this court since the differential amount of r*,/owourd translate to .loss for the said Authorities. tt is arso submitted that pre_deposit is mandatory under section 7-o of the 1g52 Act. counsel places two decisions of the supreme court in Tirupatisleels u. shubh Industriar componentl and Tecnimont (p) Ltd. u. state of punjabz to urge that the writ court cannot interfere with the mandate of pre-deposit for filing of an appeal under section 7-o. of revenue,

19. We are unable to accept the stand taken on behalf of the appellants. We have already held that none of the three appellants can claim to be parties aggrieved, as unalerstood in v/rit jurisprudence, from the order of the learned single Judge. The apperants are statutory Authorities under the 1g52 Act and hence any contention of individuar or corective grievance against reduction of the pre-deposit amount payable by the Emproyer is totally untenable and without basis. ' lzozzl 7 scc 42g ' (2027) 72 SCC 477 ,, t I ,j ,.i :: i 1', ; 9 MB,J & GPK,J Wa_829-2025

20. Thr: argument of 'loss of revenue' is vague and without any clarity as to who will suffer the l5o/o differential loss as a consequ(:nce of the impugned order. We could have understood if the employees of the establishment were the bearers of the loss or any of the appellant/Officer in his/her personal capacity. However, the appellants, being quasi-judicial authorities, cannot claim arly personal injury caused by the reduction of the quantunr of pre-deposit.

21. We' also deem it fit to refer to some of the grounds taken by the appellants for filing of the Writ Appeal.

22. The grounds include violation of the 'Legislative Scheme and discipline of the 1952 Act', absence of evidence of financial hardship and ignoring binding precedents on the mandatory nature of pre-deposit. The appellants have also taken the ground of reduction of the pre-deposit as a 'dangerous precedent'. The primary ground is that the Tribunal rightly exercised its discreticn in reducing the pre-deposit amount to 3oyo.

23. The grounds are wholly superfluous and distanced from the issue at. hand. The alleged violation of statutory discipline, presumzrbly under section 7-O of the 7952 Act (Ground-V) is misconceived since the proviso to section T-o authorizes the a \ i0 MB,J & Gr Wa_829-2O2- . Tribunal not only to reduce the pre-deposit amount but to waive it altogether. Hence, the argument of the so called discipline of section 7-o is contrary to the proviso itself. Section 7-o also does not require the appellants to prove financial hardship for the reduction or waiver of the pre-deposit amount. Hence, Ground-Vl is also without any statutory basis.

24. The 'Binding precedent' relied upon by the appellants (Ground-VII) is equally misconceived.

25. Tirupati sfeels (supra) involved the issue as to whether the requrement under section 19 of the Micro, small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (,MSMED Act,) with respect to the pre-deposit of rso/o of the awarded amount is mandatory. The Supreme court held that the requirement of pre-deposit under section 19 of the MSMED Act is mandatory and cannot be circumvented. Notably, unlike section 7-O of the lg12 Act, section 19 of the MSMED Act does not contain any proviso for reducing or waiving the requirement of making a pre-deposit of 75o/o by a buyer under the MSMED Act. Hence, Tirupati Sfeels (supra) would have no application to the facts of the present case. Tecnimont (P) Ltd. (supra) pertained to the inherent powers of appellate Court/authority to grant interim protection against imposition of the condition of pre-deposit of 2S%o of total amount III i i i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I / 11 MB,J & GPK,J Wa_829-2025 under section 62(5) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005, for hearing of an appeal on merits. The said issue is wholly different from that- in the present matter.

26. None of the decisions cited by the Counsel for the appellanl.s relate to the 1952 Act and are, in any event, irrelevant to the ir;sue of maintainability. The decisions cited by the appellants are certainly not binding precedents.

27. Further, the appellants are delegatees of the Central Government for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the 1952 Act. In other u,ords, the appellants can only act on behalf o1' the Central Government and not otherwise. The appellants, on the strength of being delegatees for discharging the functions of the Central Government, cannot claim an automatir: entitlement to challenge the order passed by the learned Single Judge without any express power conferred by the Statute Ln that regard. The appellants are quasi-judicial authoritie:s and must act as an impartial Tribunal under the 1952 Act. The appellants must also establish a specific grievance or dissatisfaction caused as a result of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. \ I2 MB,J & Gr. Wa_829_2O2-

28. In essence, to be categorized, as an 'aggrieved party', the appellants' interests must have been adversely affected by the adjudication and they must show that the appellants, in their individual capacities, have been deprived of a right by way of the said adjudication. In the present case, the appellants cannot step into the shoes of a party to the dispute since none of the appellants are a party to the /is: Regional Prouident Fund Commissioner u. EmploAees Prouident Funds Appellate Tribunals. This finding rvas affirmed in Regional Prouid.ent Fund. Commissioner u. Emplogees Prouident Fund Appellate Tribunala.

29. The appellants, particularly the appellant No.3, seek to defend their own orders in the present Appeal. It is something akin to an Arbitrator filing an appeal under section 37 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in the Appeal Court challenging interference of the section 34 Court in the Award passed by the Arbitrator.

30. Hou,ever, the most fundamental point is that section 7-O of the 1.952 Act contains a mandate for the Employer to deposit 75o/o of the amount due from the Employer at the time of filing of the Appeal as determined by an Officer referred to in section 7A. - \ 'MaNu/wa/o7tl/2oL4 o runruu/o/r77812023 Iai 13 MB,J & GPK,J Wa-829-2025 The proviso to section 7-O relaxes and, in fact, does away with -? the manlate altogether by authorizing the Tribunal to waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under section 7-O

31. A plain conStruction of section 7 -O entails that the pre-deposit can be waived or reduced only where the reasons for such wa-ver f reduction which recorded in writing.

32. In the present case, the relevant paragraph (paragraph 8) of the ordr:r dated 14.11 .2024 (in challenge before the learned Single Judge) simply records that the appellant has not made out a case f<rr complete waiver of the pre-deposit condition and that the Appeal is admitted subject to remittance of 3Ooh of the determined amount within six weeks upon proof of remittance. Paragraph 8 of the said order does not contain even a solitary \ reason lbr remittance of 3Oo/o as required under the proviso to section 't-O of the 1952 Act.

33. In the absence of even a basic compliance of section 7-O of the 19512 Act, the appellants cannot interpret the power to reduce or waive the pre-deposit as being within their exclusive domain or that the Writ Court cannot tinker rvith such discretion. In other words, the appellants are disentitled from relying on the rigour of r.t MB,J & Wa_829_2oz_ section 7-o of the 1952 Act having fa,ed to compry with the discipline of the said provision themselves. 34. The above reasons cornpel the Court to hold that the Appear shourd be dismissed on the ground of maintainab,ity. The appe'ants cannot craim to be parties aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the learned i o4.o2.2o2s or maintain the under the 1g52 Act. singre Judge on Appeal as statutory Authorities ^:^:^:":** ., .:.. ....3S W.A.No.B 29 of 2L2l,along with al ,.,slrr .ri^* j . -o vvrLrr d'u connected applications, he 4o orde.r as"to costs. I i I t I t I one rair copy to rHE //TRUE COPYII ,=B?'#?[Bil?[t-. 6 SECTION OFFICER JUS,cE *,rous |HIS,I3T::..E ", il;;, :il;1,g"j:;j, "J::{':: ";:,:. HA R YA (For His Lordship;; ?i;;;Ilrrf rH E H o N To, i BM BS 9V 'T,,'JT# "& I ____ HIGH COURT DATED :1gt12t2O2S JUDGII,IENT WA.Nrr.829 of 202i t 1 HE 3TA 0 6 ttB 2126 ( o C) * DISIUIS;SING THE WRIT APPEAL WITHoUT-COSTS --. -- ,/ .z*. d"'