The High Court · 2025

Order

This Writ Pctition, under Article 226 of tine ConstituLion of India, is filed sccking the following relief: "...to issue wit or order rnore particularlg one in the nature of rnandamus, declariry clause 1.4 (b) of Work Orrler No- 7600009302 deted 1411-2022, isstted bg respottclent tlo. 2, in fouour of petltiotrcr is illegal, agoinst pttbLic poLicg attd in uiolatton of Section 23 of Indian Contrect otld quash the said clause on such terms and conditions as this court deems rti and mag pctss..." 2-

tleard Sri L. Harish, learncd counsel for the petitioner and Sri tr. Madan Mohan Rao, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri P. Sri Harsha Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner, being ajoint-venture, obtained a work order from respondent No.2 vide order No.76O00093O5 dated 14.7)..2022, for drilling, excavation, Ioading, transportation, dumping, spreading, leveling, etc. of 722.1.76 LBCM of IN SII'U overburden (which includes 3.982 LBCM of top soi1,

7.715 LBCM of B,C. soil, 692.993 LBCM of hard OB and 17.486 LBCM of coal) with conventional equipment and additiona_l works, viz. , 1500 shovel hours, 500 dozer hours and 75,000 RMT drilling at Srirampur 2 PK, J W.P.No.22127 of 2024 Open Cast-l and II integrated project Srirampur area for a period of forty-eight months (four years), commencing Iiom 30.71.2022. Accordingly, as per the work ordcr, the respondent Company shal1 supply diesel for running vehicics and machinery, and as per Clause

1.a(b) of \ rork order, a f-txed rate of Rs. 143.26 per liter, as on O8.t7.2022, was quotcd for diesel, and it was also quoted that the diesel price during the contract period will rcmain thc samt: irrespectivc of an incrcase or decrease in Lhe dicsel pricc, It u'as furtller submittcd that the diesel pricc in Lhe counLry heis flr"tctuatcd and it has comc do\l'n to Rs.96/- and the respondcnts, by taking undue advantage of Clause

1.4(b), are deducting the cost of diesel supplied lrom the bill raised by the petitioner at Rs. 143.29 per 1iter. Accordingly, the differentlal amount calculated from Seplembcr, 2023 lo May, 2O24 is about Rs.3,8O,82,418.96. Learned counsel contended tha[ pctro]eum or pctroleum products,

4. which arc essential commodities, are covcred by the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Thcrefore, the respondent Company cannot perform the business of purchasing diesel from the oil companies as per the prevailing market value and supply it to thc petitioner at a higher price, i.e., Rs.143.26 per liter. Further, as per Section 3(2)(c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the Central Government is 3 PK, J W.P.No.22127 oJ 2024 empowered to control the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold. Therefore, Clause 1.4(b) of the work order No.7600009302 dated 14.17.2022 issued in favour of the petitioner by respondent No.2, is unlau'ful, forbidden by law, and is hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the said clause is against public policy. Thcrefore, lcarned counsel for the petitioner prayed this Court to pass appropriate ordcrs by setting aside Clause 1.4(b) of the Work Order No.76000O9302 dated 14.1,1.2022. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of the l-Ion'ble Apex Court in ABL International Ltd- and @ftother u. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and' otherst and Gas Authoritu oJ Indio Limited u. Indian Petrochetnicals Corporation Limited and others2.

5. On the othcr hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted lhat the petitioner hrm stood as Ll in the open market bidding cnquiry No.tr112200137 daLed 11.O7.2022, for drilling, cxcavation, loading, transportation, dumping, spreading, leveling, etc. Therefore, a contract, vide work order No.7600OO9302 dated

14.11.2022, u,as awarded to the petitioner hrm after completion of the tcnder process, and thc r'vork commenced from 30.77.2022. Further, as per Clause 1. 1. 1(e) of the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), "SCCI u,'ill t (2o04) 3 scc 553 , (2023) 3 SCC 629 4 PK, J W.l'.No.22127 of 2024 ''lt indicate esti-mated quantitA of d.iesel of O.Sg 1 LB/ BCAI for excauation of Insitu OB and d.iesel pice is fueci at Rs. j4 3.26 per ltr as on date:?9.07.2022". As per Clause 1.a(b) of the NlT, ,,Jbr m.onthlg excess consumption, the amount for excess quantitg of rl.iesel uill be recouered. at o frxed pice as prouided in the NIT (i.e. Rs. 143.26 lser rtr as on date 08-07.2022) ircespectiue of increase/ decrease oJ. diese,l pice during the contract peiod. and the same amount utill lte tttithhe|cl from nonthty bills,,.

6. It was further submitted that five hrms participated in the open enquiry and quoted thc excavation rate, whercin, thc petitioner lirm quoted the bid after thorough vcrification of tr're Ni'r' and stood as L1 bidder. The diesel price fixed at Rs.143.29 pcr liter was the currcnt rate in the market as on the date of NIT published, i.e., 08.07.2O22, and this rate will be applicablc for the entire contract period of four years irrespective of an increase or a decrcasc in the dicsel price. As such, lhe petitioner is stopped from rcvising thc issue after long period of and the tcrms commencement of contract of contract find the particulars unless mutrrally agreed and moclificd b,z supplemcntary agreement in writing. It was further submitted that the respondent Company is deducing the diesel priccs at Rs. 143.26 per liter as per Clauses 1 . 1. 1(e) and 1.4(b) of NIT/work order, for exccss consumption than the awarded diesel eligibility onty. t 5 PK, J W.P.No.22127 of 2024

7. It was further submitted that the respondent Company is not undertaking an), business with die sel supply and the Company is supplying the diesel to thc offloading firm as per the eligibility for the excavated quantity o[ OB, accorcling to the norms specified in the NIT and work order. Further, the cost of diesel is only being recovered at the specified rate for lhe excess quantity of diesel consumed only and the cost of diesel is not being recovered if the Iirm consumes diesel within ! the specified limiL as per the cubic meter of OB removed. It was also suLrmitted that the respondeut Company is not selling diesel to any firm but is only recovering the cost of diesel for excess consumption with respect to the OB removal as per the NIT/work order, for which, the ltrm had also agreed while submitting its tender, and after issue of a letter of intent, it cntered into an agreement u,ith the respondent company'

8. It was further submitted that Clause f . i4 of the work order dated

14.11.2022 provides for dispute resolution. According to this Clause, the petitioner firm has to first approach the Mine Management Committee for settlement of disputes, and if the dispute is not resolved, the lirm is supposed to approach the Civil Court for redressal of its grievarce. However, withoul hrst availing either of the said remedies, the petitioner hrm has approached this Court. Hence, the present writ petrtion is not maintainable as the same arises out of a contractual I 6 PK, .] w.P.No.22I27 oJ 2024 obligation. Therefore, it was prayed to clismiss the prt:sent writ petition. Reliance has been placed on the following decisions ol the I,Ion,ble Apex Court t. Orissa State Financial Corporation u and otherf, Narsingh Ch. Nagak

1.fi IU U UT Numa.ligarh ReJinery Ltd.. o. Daelitn Industrio.I Co. Ltd.a, Ra.jasthan State Industria.I Deuelopment and Corporation and q.nother a. Diannond & Gem Corporation Limited and. anothers, Joshi Technologies Interndtiona.I INC. u. Union of Ind.ia and. others6, Bharat Coking Coo.l Limited. and. others o. AMR Deu prabhq. and. othersT, Inaestmeftt Deuelopment Union of India and others u. N. Mutt gesant and. othersl, Judgment of a Division Bcnch of this Court in W.A.No.651 of 2022 dated 13. lO .2022, vlll, Order oI this Court in W.P.No.30770 of 2022 clatr:d 13.O9.2022. 9 This Court has taken note of thc rival subn-rissrons macle by the learned counsel for the respective parties and lterused the matcrial available on record 3 (2003) 4 \2007) s (2013) 6 (2015) 7 (2O2O) I (2022) 10 scc 261 8 SCC 466 5 SCC 47O 7 SCC 72a 16 SCC 759 2 SCC 25 7 PK, J W.P.No.22127 of 2024

10. Admittedly, the respondent Company published a Notice Inviting Tender No.tr1 12200 137 dated 17.07.2022, for the purpose of drilling, excavalion, loading, transportation, dumping, spreading, leveling, etc. at Srirampur Upen ('asl. I and ll projects, for a period of lour years. In rcsponse, as many as fivc firms participated in the tcnder process, and the petitioner, a joint-venture entity, was declared as L1 bidder ar-rd was awarded the contract vide Work Order No.760O0O9302 dated

14.11.2022. The.,vork, admittedly, commenced from 30- 11.2022.

11. The dispute in the present writ petition revolves around the validity of Clause 1.4(b) of Work Order No.7600OO9302 dated

14.11.2022, which stipulates that the pricc of diesel shall be fixed at Rs. 143.26 per liter as on 08. 17.2022, for the excess qualtity of diesel consumed, irrespective of any fluctuation in the market rate. The said t lau se reads as under: " 1.4 SUPPLY OF DIESEL b. For monthly excess consumption, the amount for excess quartity of diesel will be recovered at a fixed price as provided in the order (i.e., Rs.143.23 per Liter as on date on 8.O7.2022) irrespective of increasc/ decrease of diesel price during the contract period and Lhe same amount will be withheld from monthly bills."

12. It is also relevant to refer to Clause 1.1.1 (e) of the Work Order dated 14.11.2O22, wherein, the respondent Company has categorically t 1 PK, J W.P.No.22127 of 2024 provided the quantity of diesel to be supplied to the petitioner for undertaking the contracted u,ork. The said Clause is extracted hereunder: " I , TtrCI{NICAL TtrRMS AND CONDITIONS 1.1 SCOPtr OF WORKAND WORK COMPLtrTION SCHtrDULtr e. SCCL will provide awarded quantity of diesel of O.Sg1 Lts/BCM for cxcavation of in-situ OB. Thc dit:scl price is Rs. 143.26 per Ltr as on date of 8.07 .2022."

13. As per Clause 1.a(b), the respondent Company is bound to rccovcr the amount lrom the monthly bills of the pelitioner only lor thc consumption of diesel, over and above the awarc{e d quantir}, at Rs.143.23 pcr liter, which was the price prevailing in the market as on O4.O7.2022. Tl-re said clausc was also incorporated in the Notice Inviting Tender dated i l.O7 .2022. Thus, the pctitioncr and the other bidders had thc option either to accept or reject the r_ender terms. ,I.he petitioner has voluntarily participated in the tendcr l)rocess, submitted its bid, and after bcing declared as L1 bidder, entererl into thc corlLract with the respondent Company, where, Clausc 1 .4 u,as incorporated without aly objections. As per the work order, the work commenced from 30. 1,7.2022, and the petitioner performed the u,orks, submrtted its Ltills, and accepted the payments. However, at no point of time, the petitioner appears to have disputed the terms of contract, and now, only 9 PK, J W.P.No.22127 of 2024 alter almost eighteen mon th of executing the contract, the present writ pctition has been filed, contending that the said clause is contrary to public policy and the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Having chosen r., volunlar'ly bid, succeed, artd execule the conlra(ted work, the petitioner cannot now object the said Clause. 'lhe principle of approbate and reprobate squarely applies to the instant case.

14. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Rajasthan State Industrial Deuelopment and Inuestment Corpordtiott (supra), particularly addressed the interpretation of contractual terms, the doclrine of estoppel, and the limits of judicial intervention in contractual matters. The relevanL observations are extracted hercunder: (approbate rcprobate) "1. Approbate and reprobate

15. A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot blorv cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of such contract, or conveyzrnce, or order upon himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate thc principles of what is right and of good conscience. [Vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [AIR 1956 SC 593] , CITv. V. MR. P. Firun Muar IAIR 1965 SC 1216] , Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement l(2OO8) 14 SCC 58 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 706 : AIR 2009 SC 713] , Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD l(201L) 5 SCC 27O:(2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 712 : AIR 2011 SC 18691 , Cauuery Coffee Traders v. Horrtor Resources (lnternational) Co. Ltd. [(20l7l 10 SCC 420 : l2o72j 3 SCC (Civ) 6851 a;rd V. Chandrasekaran v. II I I I t I I I i I ! t lt r.r, .I i i I I I 10 PK, J W P. No.2212/ oJ 2024 Administratiue Offtcer l(2O 12) 12 SCC i33 136 : .JT (2o 12) 9 SC 2601 .l l2o131 2 SCC (Civ) lll. Contrq.ctual d.isputes and Writ Jurisdiction 19. There can bc rro dispulc 1o thc selllccl legal proposrlron that matters / dispuLes rclating to contract .rrrl,o, b" agitated nor terms of the contract can be enforced through u,rit jurisdiction undcr Article 226 of tine Constitutior-r. Thus, the writ court cannot bc a forum to seck any relief based on terrns arrd conditions incorporated in the agreement b) Lhe parties. [Yide BareiLlg Deuelopment Authorttg v. Ajai pal S,,rgh l( 1989) 2 SCC 1 16 : AIR 1989 SC 10761 and State of Lr.p. v. Bt-idgc & Roof Co. (tndiu) r,tcl. [(1996) 6 SCC 22 : ArR 1096 SC 3s 15] i 20. In Kerctla SDB v. Kuien D. Kalathit [(2000) 6 SCC 293 : AIR 2OO0 SC 25731 this Court held that a writ cannot lie to rcsolve a disputed question of fact, particularly ro i.tterpret rhc disputed terms of a contract observing as under : IISCC pp. 29a-99, paras 10 11) " 10. . . . Tlne interpretation and impiementation cf a ciause in a contract cannot be the subject matter of a writ petition. ... If a term of a contract is violated, orclinarily thc remcdy rs not the writ petition under Articl,r 226. Wc are also unable to agrec with the observations ol the High CouIt thal the contractor was seeking enforce:Ient of a statuLory contrac[. .... I l. ... The contract between the parties is in the realm of private lanv. It is not a statutory contract_ The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms a;td conclitions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition undcr Article 226 of rf:e Constitution of India. That is a mattcr for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. ... The contractrtr should have rclegatcd to other remedies.,, lV. Interpretation o.f the terms of contract 23. A party cannot claim anything more than wl-rat is covcred by the terms of contract, for the reason that contract is a tralsaction between the two parties ar-rd has been cntered il1to with open eyes and understanrling the na[ure of contracL. Thus, contract being a creature of al agreemcnt ifetween two or morc pajties, has to be interpreted giving literal mcariings 11 PK, J W.P.No.22127 of 2024 f;t I I : t ; unless, Lhere is some ambiguily therein. The contract is to be interpreted giving the actual meaning to the words contained in the contract and it is not permissible for the court to make a new contract, however reasonable, if the parties have not made it themselves- lt is to be interpreLed in such a way that its terms may not be varied. The contract has to be interpreted without any outside aid. The terms of the contiact have to be construed strictly without altering the nature of the contract, as it may affect the interest of either of the parties adversely. lVrde Llruited India Insuraruce Co. Ltd- v. Harchand Rai Chandan Lal l(2ooal 8 SCC 644 : AIR 2004 SC 47941 and Polgmat India (P) Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. l(2OO5l 9 SCC 174 : AIR 2O0s sc 2861 l" 1 5. ln N, Murugesan (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court categorically emphasized thaL an individual cannot selectively acccpt benefils from a decision for a signihcant period and then challenge its terms u'hen it no longer suits them. Essentially, a party is prevented from approbating and reprobating, by accepting an advantageous part ol a transaction u,hrle simultaneously rejecting a disadvantageous part. i6. Further, the instant case arises out of a contract ald interpretation of its clauses. This Court and the Hon'ble Apcx Court have been consistently holding that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable and the inlerpretation ald implementation of clauses of a contract cannot be the subject matter of a writ petition.

17. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Joshi Technologies lflterflationd.I INC. (supra), : I i r I l I l L2 PK, J w L'.No.22127 af 2021 wherein, it was categorically held that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articlc 226 of the constitution of India cannor ordinarily be invoked to enforcc purcly private contractual rights againsr the Sttrte or its instmmentalities. It was also held that intervention in a contractual dispute is justificd if the contract involves a pubric law element. such as violation of a fundamental right or clear arbitrariness, beyoncl a mere breach of contract. The releva'rt portior-r of the said d,:cision is cxtracted hercundcr "68. The Court thereafter summarised the lcgal position in tl-rc following manner : (ABL Intemational Ltd.. "o-r, I1:ZOO+1 : SCC 5531 , SCC pp. 572, par-as 27-28) "27. b-rorn thc above drscussion of ours, following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition: (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as agalnst a State or an insLrumentality of a State arisiug out of a contractu:r-L obligation is rnaintainabie_ (b) Mcrely because some disputed questions of facts arise for consideration, sanc carnot be a ground to refuse to cntertaln a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A u,rit petition involving a consequential relief of monetarl, claim is also mainlcinable_ 28- However, while entertaining an objection as to Lhe maintainability o[ a writ petition under Article 226 rf thc Constitution of India, thc court should beer in rnind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenarlr in nature arrd is not timited by any oLher provisions of the Constitution. The High Ctourt having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertarn or not-to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. lSee lmtAyoa Cotpn. v. Registrar of Trade trfarks [(1998i8 SCC 1] .) And this plenary right of tne Uign Couft to l'""r. n f.".ogotru" 13 PK, J W.P.No.22127 of 2024 writ will not norma.lly Lre exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid ard legitimate rcasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction."

69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetarl claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court would not exercise such a discretion:

69.1. The Court rnay not examine the issue unless the action has srrme public law characler altached to il.

69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlernent of dispute is provided in thc contract, the High Court would refusc to exercise iLs discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relcgate the party to the said mode of settlcment, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.

69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature ald require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4. Money claims per se particularly contractual obligations are normally not to except in exceptional circumstances. arising out of be entertained 7O.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidancc of obligation voluntarily incuri'ed. 7O.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obli gation- Occurrence of commercial diffrculty, inconvenience or hardstiip in perforrnance of the conditions agreed to in the contracL can provide no justifrcation in not comp\ring with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work oul lhe licence 7 t ; 1,4 PK, J W.P.No.22127 a[ 2-024 if he hnds it profitable to do so : ard he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he hnds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his brrsiness. 7O.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such brcach may. sue for specihc performance of the contract. if contract is caprrble of being specifically performed. Otherwisc, the party rnay sue lor damages. 7O.8. If the contract between private party ald the State /instrumcnlality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a privatc law and there is no clcment of public law, the normal course for the aggnevcd party, is to invoirc the remedics provided under ordinary crvil lar.v rathcr than erpl>roaching the High Court under Articlc 226 of tine Constitution of India and inr.oking its extraordinary juri sdiction. 7O.9. Thc distinction between public law ar-rd private law elemenl in the contract u;ith the State is getting blurred. IJowever, it has not been totally obliterated ar:d where the matter falls purely in privatc field of contracL, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private lzLw rights and remedies would dcpend on the factual matrix of each case and the distrnction between the public law remcdics ald private law field, cannot be demarcatcd with precisron. In fact, each case has to be examined. on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a palticular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public larv element, then the matter can bc examined by the High Court in writ peti[ons under Article 226 of thc Constitution of India tc see whether action of the State and/or instr-umcntality or agency of the State is farr, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration ald irrelevant factors have not gonc into the dccision making process or that the dr:cision is not a-rbitrary. 7O.1O. Mere reasonable or lcgitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a dislinr:t enforceable right, bul failure to consider and give due weight to it may render thc decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principlc o[ non-arbilrariness. 15 PK, J w.P.No.22127 of 2024

70.1 1. The scope ofjudicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes."

18. Further, in Bharat Coking Coal Limited. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court provided a significant ruling on the limited scope of judicial review in tender proccsses and contractual matters. The Honble Court madc the following observations: "(I) Maintainabilitg o;f writ petition

28. The scope of judicial review in tenders has been explored in-depth in a catena o[ cases. It is settled that constitutiona] courts are concerned only with lardulness of a decision, and not its soundness. lcentral Coalfields Ltd. v. SLLSML (Joint Venture Consortium), l2O 16l a SCC 622 : (20761 a SCC (Civ) LO6; Slemens Aktiengeselischaft & Siemens Ltd. v. DMRC, (2014) IL SCC 2881 Phrased differently, the courts ought not to sit in appeal over dccisions of executive authorities or instrurnentalities. Plausible decisions need not be overturned, and latitude ought to be gralted to the State in exercise of executive power so that the constitutional separation of powers is not encroached upon. [Air India Ltd. v. Cochin Intemational AirporT Ltd., (2OOO\ 2 SCC 617] However, allegations of illegatity, irrationality and procedural impropriety would be enough grounds for courts to assume jurisdiction and rernedy such ills. This is especially true given our unique domestic circumstances, which have demonstrated the need for judicial intervention nurrrerous times. Hence, it would only be the decision-making process which would be the subject of judicial enquiry, arrd not the end result (save as may be necessary to guide determination of the former)-

29. This position of law has been succinctly summed up in Tata CelLular v . Union of Indta lTata Cellutar v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 6511 , where it was farnously opined that: (SCC pp. 677-7a, pxa77l t 16 PK, J W.P.No.22t 27 of 2024 " 77. ... Therefore, it is not lor the court to cietermine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment ol that policy is fair. It is onLr,. concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case. to casc. Shortly put, the grounds upon u.hich an administrative action is subjeci to conirol by judicial review can be classihed as under: (t) Illeqality: This means the decision-m:rl<er must understand correctly thc law that regulates his decisior.r making power and must give effect tolt. Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury [.,lssoclatecT q4 . Proutncictl Hcture Houses Ltr1. v. WerlnZsbtirg Coryn.. (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)l unrcasonableness. ( iir) Procedural impropriety.,,

30. But merely because the accusations madc arc. against Lhe State or its instmmentalities docs not mean that ,,rn aggrieved person can bypass establishcd civil adludicatory pr-ocesses atrd directly seek writ relief. In determining *t "tn". to exercise their discretion, the writ courts ought not only conhne themselves to the identity of the opposiG party but also to the nature of the dispute and of the reliei prayed for. Thus, although _every v!.rong has a remcdy, d.p"rrdirrg upon the nature of the wrong there rvould be diifercnt rcdress." -forums

19. In Nutnaligarh ReJinery Ltd. (supra), the Honble Apex Court held as follows (limited scope of judicial rcview)

12. DIC vide letter dated 25-11-1995 pointed our to NRL that contract price consisted of CIF vatue, cost cf design ald engineering and supervision and other inciclcntal costs and requested for break-up of costs, so that DIC may not pay customs duty on the total contract price when suc:h duty was payable on CIF value by the owner. Thercfore, thc irmendment not being carried out by NRL, DIC could not avarl necessar5. concession in customs duty. Therefore, they claimerl under this head a sum Of Rs 1.65 crores and the sarne rvas tccepted by the majority of the arbitrators. The majority took the view that 17 PK, J W.P.No.22127 of 2024 DIC had to unnecessarily pay the customs duty on service portion of the price consideration ald as such allowed the claim. As against this, Justice M.M. Dutt in rninority took a contrary view and held that NRL was not responsible for framing of such agreement and it rvas held that it was the fault of DIC and as such the clairn was turned down. However, it was observed that DIC could justify and claim the said amount from the Customs Department but NRL could not be held responsible for the extra duty paid by DIC. The District Judge agreed with the minority awand. However, the Division Bench of the High Court reversed the finding ancl approved the view taken by the maj ority of the arbitrators- We have heard learned qqqngel for the parties and find that it dcpends upon the framins of the tems of the asreement. if DIC would have been visilant then the uded the service charges, like desiqn engineerin g, etc. [t was their dutv to have excluded the service charges but thev have not properlv framed the contract arrd thev cannot insist on amendmen t of the contract. If all the services were subjecl-ed to dutv which they could have seqreqated the sarne but since they did not do this, therefore they could not claim the beneht No direction could be qiven to the contractin{: party to amend their asreement It is a mutual afiair of the contracting partv. The view taken bv the Hish dly, it was Court does not ap possible for NRL to amend the agreement as the sarne already been rcgistered with the Customs Authorities Reserve Bank of India. Hence, DIC is not entitled to aforesand arnount of Rs 1-65 crores under this head. pear to be correct. Secon y could have excl (CLaim of Rs 1.65 crores under this heod not olloued.l (Emphasis supplied)

20. In Orissc State Financial Corporation (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed: "6. Thc said order is under challenge in this appeal. On a plain reading of the impugned order it is manifest that the High Court while considering the writ petition filed by the owner of the vehicle for quashing of the notlce of auction-sale and for othcr consequential reliefs has passed order drawing up a fresh contract between the parties and has issued certain further directions in the matter; the Corporation has been directed to I t \ -,rti &€atsail&3:- 'r r..-,. :,:.t&.:*l!r, ...,,rt1!$ . ...''it.',ii:..t 18 PK, .I W.P.No 22127 of 2024 : advance a fresh loarr to the writ petitioner to enable him to purchase a new truck; to enter into agreement for realization of the balance loan amount in accordance with lavz; to write oll thc remaining anount of Rs 16,5OO and to order warving of the interest till date etc. The order, to say the lcast, rv:rs beyond the scope of the writ petition u,hich was being cons dered by the High Court and beyond rhc lurisdiction ol lh(. Court in a contractual matter. No doubt, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Line Constitutlon thc ftigh Court has wide power to pass appropriate order and issue proper direction as necessar). in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest ofjustice. But that is not to sav that the High Court can ignore the scope of the writ petition ar-rd nature of the dispute and enter the hekl pertaining tcr contractual obligations betr,r,een the partics alcl issue such directions annulling thc existing contract and introducinl. a fresh contract in its place.,' 2I. The Division Bcnch of rhis Courr, in its .judgment 73.1O.2022 in W.A.No.65 I of 2022, categorically held Lhar thc interpretation of the terms arrd conditions of a contract may not be permitted under Article 226 of the constitution ol lndia. 'lhe relevant portion of the said judgment is extractcd hereunder: "9. lt is a settled proposition that disputes relating to interpretaLion of the terms and conditions of Ei (lontract may not be permitted to be agitated in a petition undr:r Article 226 of the Constitution of India. h-r Kerala State Electricity Board r,,. Kurien E. Kzrlathir Supreme Court held that this is a matter lbr adjudication by a civil Court or in arbitration if such arbitration is provided in the contract. 10. This position has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bharat Coking CoaJ Limited v. AMR Dev prabha2 whet-ein Supreme Court has categorically held that writs are impermissible when the allegation is solell. wi,h regard to violation of a contractual right or duty. A pcrson seeking wril relief should satisfy the Court that the right hc is sceking is one in public law and not merely contractual.,, 'L-- i a . ' ; i I II t ! i I I I 19 PK, J W.P No.22127 of 2O24

22. Coming to the decisions rclied on by the petitioner, the same are I clcarly distinguishable on facts, and thus, are of no avail to the petitioner.

23. In the foregoing discussion, this Court frnds no merit in the present wril pelition and lhe same is, thereforc, liable to be dismissed.

21. Further, it is also relevant to note that this Court, while dealing with a matter of similar nature in W.P.No.3O77O of 2022, dismissed the said writ petition vide order dated 13.09.2022, however, granted liberty to Lhe petitioner thercin to approach the compctent Civil Court. The relevant portion of the said order is also extracted hereunder: "13. In the considered opinion of this Court, the dispute in the instant case falls in the realm of civil law jurisdiction A bare reading of few clauses of the conlract would not be suflrcient to determine nature of contract and interpret the disputed terms and conditions of the contract. It is an established pnnciple of law that entire terms of the contract have to be read to understard intenlion of the parties and for interpreting terms of the contract. It is not within the purview of the writ jurisdiction to decide whether equivalent rate is basic rate (Rs.84.16 per litre) or market rate in the context of assertions made by thc respondents in its counter and submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing for the SCCL. The contention of the rcspondents is that basic rate was indicated in the tabulated column under clause 1.2(el of the order which is only for the purpose of arriving at tota-l value of the contract. That due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, there was stecp increase in the price of diesel; the petitioner was aware of the changed circumstances; at no point of time, the petitioner has raised objection; the invoice rate of diesel is charged only for the excess consumption and if the petitioner is able to meei lhe targets with the optimutn consumption of diesel, only Rs.84. 16 per litre will be charged. i & ;r l t, I I I , I ,. 20 I'K, J w. P.No.22.127 ol 2024

14. It is borne out_from Ltre record that thr: petitioner has invoked dispute resolutron mechanism p.orlia"a ,r,a". Clause 1.14 of the order. At three levels, Lhe lrie.r,lnce ot the '""r...!i - petitioner was heard, a,d there *"." i.,.titr".^tior" -i, -i" between the petitioner and the SCCL authoriii"" .rot tfr" case of the petitioner that there ale mala fi.des on it e part of the respondents and that the petitioner rj" ,,rut t_r",oa. fnr", it cannot be held that there werc ar-ry violation of pinciples of natural iustice and the respondenis acted ir_r an arbitrary manner. Thc petitioner having availecl thc remedy providecl under the Dispute Redressal Committee as per clatise 1 . t + of the order, ought to have approached the civil Cou|t as thcre *",:oTIr1.*. disputed questions of facts involvcd in this case ano rurtlrer lt requires interpretation or tcrms ar.rd conditions o[ the contract. The relief if ar.ry grar-r ted ro tt_r.- p"t,ii,rr_r". ,,,iff have financial implications on the responcler.r ts ' ru .,rrrrg i,-rto sevcra-l r:rores o[ Iapees. The market / invoicc .ut" ,i al.""t i" a31ana9a by the respondents only for the exccss consumplroll of diesel by the petitioner. So far as suppl-v of-ai"."f fu. ,n" lotified quantity, the rate charged Uy'ifr. ,""p._a.rrt" i" Rs.84.16 per litre irrespective of"thc markct olii"') irr.i,,,, price. In the opinion of this Courr. derailed Jj;"i='"i i";;_ 'in"."of and conditions of the contract and interpretril,., i" -.ai" required to reach a conclusion that the equirral.lrf ." p.r. clause 1.4.b of the order is basic rate of n.iS+.tO p".lit.". fn. dispute in ABL International Limited,s .o"" 1Silp.. ,1 r,"u" entertained by, the Apex CourL by coming to . rrrcre 1s t1o arnrtlgulty ln the terms of the policy (Sec paragraph No.53). The contention ol contra profere,rL.*irl. put-torth by the learned counsel for the petitioirer will har,.c to tJ.',rrr"ia"."a only when the Court deciding the dispute .o-,,"' ,n ,tr" conclusion that there are two possible ir,t..p."trii,rr_r" fn" sajd judgment is not relevant in ihe instant ""'". l,_, ,,i"r," of ,n" observations of this Court in the preceding prr.g.opfr" ,n., ,t,. matter involves disputed quesLions fact in"tcrpretation of terms of the contract which do not come wittrin t'fLe realm of wrrt jurisdiction. It is nobody,s case that -.ia C";;i doe" ,rot have jurisdiction to entertain contractual clisputes. The border line is discretion of the Court. The writ Cor]rt woukl exercise discretion in contractual matters kceping in mird it.," f".to." like availability of alternate remedy, e_-ristence ol dtsputeci questions of fact, compiedty of dispute, interprelatrons of terms of contract, ttre contract bcing private i., natu, e- arra ,.r., public larv element is involved etc. "or_ri.l,-rior,, .-and 2l PK, J w P.No.22127 of 2024

15. The subject contract is a private contract As noted above, there is no allegation of mala ftdes on the paJt of the respondents and thc respondents have adhered to the dispute redressaL mechanism under the contract' Furthcr, the insiant case is not a case of simple nature and the resolution thereof requires detailed analysis and interpretation of terms of the contract; oral and documentary evidence id'required to be adduced by the parties, rvhich, normaliy, is the domain of civil law Courts. [See: Kerala State Electricity Board's case (Supra 3) and Joshi iechnologres International INC's case (Supra 4)l' Thus, exercise ot jurisdiction under Article 226 ol lhe Constitution is not warranted. Thcre arc no merits in the present writ petition."

25. In the instant case, as pcr Clause 1 14.3 of the Work Order dated

14.ll-2022, any dispute arising oul of the contract, including issues related to its interpretation, pcrformance, breach, or termination, which is not settled through negotiations, must be resolved by ftling a case before a civil court having competent pecuniary al1d territorial jurisdiction, or before the civil court at Bhadradri-Kothagudem District. .

1. 14 SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1.14.3 Civrl Court In the evcnt of any questiorr, disPute or dilfercnce arising under the terms and conditions or interpretation of the terms of, or in connection with Purchase Order/ Contract/Agreement (except as to any matter the decision of rvhich is speciatly provided for by these conditions), or the p€rformance of any of the obligations of SCCL and the contractor hereunder or relerred to herein, including an issue or dispute as to breach or termination of this contract or as to any claim in ioto, in equity or pursuant to any statute ("Dispute") is not settled through negotrations, the respective parties car seek remcdy through 'CIVI' COURT' having competent pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction or at competent court in Bhadradri Kothagudem district and not by Arbitration. { 7?, PK. .] W.P.No 22127 of 2A24 No dispute shall bc referred to Arbitration olher than ct,il arr, _",raa courts. No dispute shall be entertain in any form pcrtainiug to contract cxcept hcrein abou" m"ntiorred ; '-- *. "r,a-or,

26. Since the petitioner has not availed this rerncdl, and has directl1. approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not inciined to entertain the present writ petition and the same is liabte to bc dismissed

27. Accordingly, thc Writ petition is dismissed. I{orvever, the petitioner is aL liberty to approach the competent Cruil Court as pcr Clause 1.14.3 of the Work Order No.76OOO093OS dated 14. It.2_022. lor redressal of 1ts grievance, if it so desires_ Misccllaneou s applications, if any, pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed. No costs //TRUE COPY// SD/.V.KAVITHA DEPUW REGISTRAR SEC ON OFFICER One CC to SRI L.HARISH, Advocate [OPUC] One CC to SRI P.SRI HARSHA REDDY, SC FOR SCCL [OPUC] Two CD Copies s To, 1 2 3 BSR LS HIGH COURT DATED:1910612025 f ORDER WP.No.22127 of 2024 () ( Si, e o * 28 AUE 2ffi "ti,l '4 r c !i'i L-) DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION, , I WITHOUT COSTS ,{p