The High Court · 2025

possession ol the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property' ii. It is a contest order. iii. No appeal was pret'ered challenging the said orcler' iv. 'fhe petirioners herein/defendants and their parenls intcrferir-rg the possession of the respondent/ptaintitfs over the subject "vith plopert) and disturbing their possession- Therclbre' they have lodged a cornplair,t with the Police, LMD Colorll , Thirnrnapur, rvho in ltrt'n. registered a case in Cr.No-15 of 202i They havc also furrrished a copy of the aforesaid order to the police' Thcy are not taking action stating that the dispute is civil in nature' v. By taking advantage of the same, the petitioners/def-endants and their parcnts perpetrating their illcgal activities against the respondcnts/plaintiffs by not permitting them ro enter into thc suit schcdule property fbr cultivation. Therelirre, thcy sought police aid.

6. The said application was opposed by the petitioners herein/defendants contending as follows:- i. The respondents/plaintiffs created a false storl' to datnage the reputation of the petitioners/defendants in the vil [age' t I\ 1 ii. The petitioners/defendants and their parents are doing cultivation of the said property since thirty (30) years and they are in possession of the subject property till today'. iii. They are eking out their livelihood by cultivating the said land. ir,. As father of the respondents herein /plaintiffs is not taking care of petitioners/defendants, the parents of the def'endants filed a case vide M.C.No.24 of 2021 against the respondents herein/plaintiff's father. The respondents/plaintills lodged a false cornplaint with the Police, LMD Colony, Thimmapur who in turn registered a case in Cr.No. 15 of 2021. Therelbre, there are no merits in the said application and sought to dismiss the same.

7. Vide order dated 28.03.2024, lealned I Additional Junior Ciivit Judge, Karimnagar, allowed the said I.A.No. 150 of 2022 holding that the petitioners herein/defendants violated the aforesaid order dated 06.09.2021 in l.A.No.l72 of 2021 in O.S.No.428 of 2021' The petitioners hcreirr did not file any document in support of their contcntions opposing the said application. The petitioners herein/defendants cannot violate the aforesaid order dated 06-09.2021' Therefbre, respondents/plaintiffs are entitled for police protection' With the said observations, vide impugned order dated 28.03.2024' 8 leamed trial Courl allowed I.A.No.150 of 2022 direr:ting the Station House Oflflcer. Police, LMD Colony, Thirnmapur, to provide police protection to implernent the said order dated 06.09.2021 till disposal of the suit or until furlher orders

8. As discussed supra, tl.re order dated 06.09.2021 in I.A.No.172 of 2021 in O.S.No.428 oi 202 I is a contest order and ttre saute is on consideration oi- the plcadings of the parlies and on hearing then.r. Tlrough the said order is dated 06.09.2021. the petitioners herein/de fendiurts plef'erring an appeal only in the ycar 2024, that too, along n,ith an application to condone the delay vide [.,\.No. 1345 of 2021 in CMA (SR) No.978 of 2024. The said application is pending.

9. It is tl're specific contention of the respondents herein/plaintitfs that the petitioners here in/det-endants along with their parents ir-rtertl'red rvith the possession of the resp,.rndents/plaintiff's over the suit schcclule property and tried to disturb their posscssion. Therefore, thel' have lodged a cornplaint dated 27 .09.202 1 with Police LMD Colony, 'l-hirnmapur who in tuln registered a case in Cr.No.15 of 2021 . Thel have also 1-rlcd a copy of the said l;ilst Inlormation Reporl. lf the petitioners herein/defendants aggrieved by the said order dated 06.Q9.2021 , they have to prefer an appcal. 'l'hey cannot 9 interfere with the possession of the respondents/plaintiffs over the suit schedule property. It amounts to violation of the said order. To enforce the said order, the police aid is required.

10. The petitioners hled the present revision contending that the leamed trial Court did not consider the pleadings of the parties in the present I.A.No. I 50 of 2022. The petitioners herein are joint shareholders of the suit schedule property. They afe in physical possession of the same as on the date. They are also cultivating the said land since last 30 years. Trial Court did not give any reasons while granting police aid. They have not filed any documents tn support of their case. Though a case in Cr.No.l5 of 2021 was rcgistered on the complaint lodged by respondents/plaintiffs dated 27 .09.2021 , the police have not initiated any further action. The contents ol the affidavit filed in support of the said I.A.No. 150 of 2022 lacks the grounds on which the police aid is to be granted. Trial couft missed the crucial point that the affidavit in support of police aid was on 27.04.2022, but the alleged interference was on 27.09.2021 . Without considering the said aspects, ieamed trial Court allowed the aforesaid I.A.No.l50 of 2022 and granted police aid erroneously. l0

11. Itespondents/plaintiffs filed counter contending that on consideration of the entire aspects including thc' complaint dated 27 .09.2021 , Clr.No. I 5 ol 2021 and other aspects. le arned trial Court granted police aid. There is no error in it

12. In the light olthe afbresaid f'acts, it is relevant to note that the petitioners hcrein/det-endants at'e restrained by way of an order dated 06.09.2021 in I.A.No.l72 ol 2021 in O.S.No.428 of 202 I by leamed I Additional Junior CiviI Judge at Karimnagar, fi-om interfering with the possession of the respondents/plaintitfs over tlre suit schedule property. In the said order, leamed trial Court gave a specific finding that respondents herein/plaintiffs are in possession of the subject propefty and they are entitled lor injunction. I-eamcd trial Court also considered triple point tbrmula while granting temporal) injunction i.c. prima .facie case. balance of cottvenience and irreparable loss. tf the pctitioners are aggrieved by tlte said order, they have to prefer.an appeal.'I'hough the said order is dated 06.09.2021, they have pref-erred an appeal only in the year 2024 that too, along with an application to condone delay. The said application is pending. Therefore, they' cannot claim that they are in possession of the propert), and they cultivating the same since last 30 years. ,,! 11 Therefore, during subsistence of the said injunction order, the petitioners herein cannot interfere with the possession of the respondents herein/plaintiffs over the suit schedule property. It arnounts to violation of the said order.

13. Even in the present revision, it is the specific contention of the petitioners hereirVdefendants that they are joint shareholders of the suit schedule property, they are in phySical possession of the same and cultivating the same since last 30 years. The said contentions of the pctitioners herein are contrary to the order dated 06'09.202 I in I.A.No.l72 of 2021 in O.S.No.428 of 2021 and the findings therein. On the complaint dated 21 .01.2021, the Police LMD Colony, 1'lrirnmapur, have already registered a case in Cr.No.l5 of 2021 against the petitioners herein/defendants herein. Therefore, the petitioners cannot disturb the possession of the respondents herein/plaintiff's over the suit schedule property and they cannot violate the order dated 06.09.2021 . If the petitioners herein/defendants interfere with the possession of the respondents/plaintiffs over the suit schedule propefty violating the order dated 06.09.2021, the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled for police aid. There is no other option to them. They have also todged a complaint in the Police l2 station, but the Police are not taking any action on the said complaint stating that the dispute is civil in nature. Therefore. they have f-rled I.A.No.l50 of 2021 undel Section l5l of CPC seeking police aid' On consideration of the entire aspects, leamed trial Court vide impugned order dated 28.0i.2(\24, learned trial Court granted police aid to the respondents/plaintilfs and directed the Station Housc Officcr, Police LMD Colon;-. 'l'himrnapur, to provide police aid to the respondents/plaintifli in order to implernent the ordel dated

06.0g.2021 in I.A.No.172 of 2021 in O.S.No,428 ol'2021 'l-here is no error in it.

14. It is relevant to note that this Court catne across sevcral revision petitions/writ petitions filed by parties seeking police aid alleging violation of ex parle ad interirn injunction, decree and .iudgment restraining the defendalrts liorn intertt'rin;3 rvith the possession of the plaintifl.s, execution orders etc. l-hcrcfbre, i feel it appropriate to give more insights on the lssue o1- consicleration of applications filed seeking police aid and also precedential histow' l3 PRECEDENTIAL HISTORY

15. In Satyanarayan Tiwari v. SHO!, Division Bench of erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, held that temporary injunction granted by trial Court was confirmed by the High Court' Yet the pafty who suft-ered the injunction was alleged to have violated the said order and police aid rvas sought by filing of a wlit petition' The same was dismissed by the tearned Single Judge, but however reversed by the Division Bench, holding that there was no such bar for granting police aid in writ jurisdiction. But the Division Bench considering the facts, allowed the writ appeal and granted police aid to the plaintitl therein. The Division Bench categorically held that High Courl is having power under Article 226 of Constitution of India to grant police aid. t 6. ln Rayapati Audemma vs. Pothineni Narasimham vs' P. Narasimham2, the erstwhile Iligh Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the trial Court granted temporary injunction pending disposal of the suit and the plaintiffs hled an application seeking police aid atleging violation of the said older and for implementation of the said ' AIR Iq82 Ap]q4 (DB) 'z AIR t 97l AP 5i l4 temporary ordcr. The Division Bcnch in Satyanaral'an Tirvari (supra), on examination of the scope of Order 39 Rule 2(3) of CPC, hetd that the civil Court in exercise of its inhercnt power under Section l5l o1'CPC, can grant police aid in lavour ol-the plaintitfs and against the def-endants rvho suffered injunction. Hov etrr, nov, Order 39 Rule 2(3)of CPC is omitted by Act 104 of 1976, Section 86(w.e./. l- 2- l977). In Meera Chauhan v. Harsh Bishnoi], I)ivision Bench of Apex Court reiterated the said ordcr. .

17. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralala, A tl.rree Judge Bench of the Apex Court in paragraph No. l8 specifically held with regard to inherent jurisdiction to grant tcmporary injunction and the same is as follows:- I 8- Thcrc is di1l'erencc of opinion bctrvccn the I Iigh Court iru tltis poirtt. Ottc vie\a' is Lhat ir Courl. cannot issuc an order of tenrporarJ iniLrrrction if Lhe circumstanccs do not l'all rvithin thc provisions ol'Order XXXIX of the Code: Varadacharlu v. Narsimha ('harlu (l). Covindarajultr r. hrperial Bank ol' India (2). Karuppal'ya v. Ponnusu'ami (.i). MurLucsa Mudali r,. Angamuthu i\ludali (4) and Subranranian \'. Seetararna (5 ). I h-- other \,ie\\' is that a (lourt can issue an interim injunction under circrLnslances which arc not covercd by Ordcr XXXIX ol'thc Code, if tlrc Coun is ol ol.rinion that the intcrcsts ofjustice rcquirc thc issuc of such interim injurctiotr: Dhaneshrvar \ath v. Ghanshyam Dhar (6), Firm Bichcliha [(am r'. Finn Baldeo Sahai (7), Bhagat Singh v. jagbir Sawhney (8) and Chinese Tannery owners' Association y. Makhan Lal (9). We arc o1' opinion that the lattcr view is corrcct and that the Courts have inhercnt jtrrisdiction to issue ' (2007) 12 scc 201 ' AIR (1962) sct 321 l5 temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions ol' O.XXXIX. Code of Civil Prq:edure. There is no such exprcssion in s. 94 which expressly prcllibits the issue of a temporary iniunction in circumstances not covered by O. XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code. It is well-settled that thc pr-ovisions ol thc Code arc uot exhaustive lirr the simple reason that the I-cgislature is incapable ol contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequcntly for provicling the procedure lor them. The effect o1'the exprcssion 'if it is so prcscribcd' is only this that when the rules prescribc thc circumstances in u4rich tlic temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is rlot to use its inherent powcrs to make the nccessary ordcrs in the interests o['.iustice. but is mcrely to see whether the circumslances of the case bring it rvithin the prescribed rule. if the provisions ol's. 94 ',r'erc not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the excrcise of its inherent jurisdiction. No part!' has a right to insist ou the Court's cxercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its'inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it ahsolutell necessar) for thc ends of-iustice to do so. it is in the incidence of thc exercise of tlic porvcr of thc Court to issue temporan injunction that the provisions of s. 94 of the Code have thcir effect and not in taking arvay the right of the Court to exercise its inheront pou'cr.

18. The 3 Judge Bench lurther hetd that civil Court has power under Section I5 I ol CPC to grant police aid lor implernentation of injunction granted f'avour of the plaintilT and prevent abuse of process, but the civil Courts must exercise the said power under Section l5 I of Cr.P.C. only in exceptional circumstances for which the Code lays down no procedut'e. When the pa(ies violate order of injunction or stay order or act in violation of the said order, the Court can, by exercising its inherent power, put back the parties in the same position as they stood prior to issttance olthe injunction order or give appropriate direction to the police authority to render aid to the 16 aggrieved paflies fbr the due and proper implementation ol thc orders passed in the sr,rit and also order police protection tbr irnplementation ol- such order. When in the event of utter violation ol'tlre iujttnction order, the parry forcibly dispossess the other, the (lourt can order restoration of possession to the palty wronged.

19. In P.R.Muralidharan v. Swamy Dharmananda Thecrtha Padars, the Apex Court hetd that the suit filed bl the plaintill'fbr perpetual in.iunction was dismissed and l.re llled a rvrit petition fbr police protection. The Division Bench of High Court went into the question as to \vhether the plaintiff s,as entitled to hold the posscssion lor the purpose of issuing a proper direction with regarcl r.o police aid. The Apex Courl l.reld that when rights of the pafties arr'not decidecl b1' the trial Couft. blanket protection cannot be granted. 'l'he Aper Ciourt had an occasi<)n to consider whether a High Court trrrclel Articlc 226 o1- the Constitution of India could grant the reliel o1- l)olice protection It furlher held that in a given case, a person may be cntitled to police protection having regard to the threat perception to his lifb and Iibertl or for protection of rights declared by a decree or order passcd by a civil court, and if Cburt is satisfied that the authorities have failed to '(2006) 4 SCC', 50 r t7 perfonn their duties. It held that there would be no such entitlement for protection ofthe writ petitioner's rights in question (to property or to an office and discharging of certain functions) when the writ petitioner's rights to do so are open to question as manifested by the pleadings themselves. It held that disputed questions of fact cannot be gone into in a writ proceeding and that the jurisdiction of a civiI court being wide and plenary, the High Coufi cannot grant such a relief in a writ proceedings, it held:-

17. A writ pctition under the guise ol'seeking a writ of mandamus directing thc police authorities to give protection to a writ petitioner, cannot be madc a forum for adjudicating on civil right. It is one thing to approach the High Court, for issuanoe of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner, was deliberately llouting that decrcc or ordcr and in spite of the petitioner applying lor it, or that the police authorities arc not giving him thc ncedcd protection in terms of the decree or order passed by a court with jurisdiction. But, it is quitc another thing to scck a writ of mandamus directing protection in rcspect of propcrty, status or right u,hich remains to be adjudicatcd upon and u,hen such an adjudication can only bc got done in a properly instituted civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a u'rit petitioner to approach thc High Court under Article 226 of thc Constitution secking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to protcct his claimed possession of a properly without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil Court. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted by the I{igh Court. The wide r8 jurisdiction under Arlicle 226of the Constitution u'ould rcmatn effective and meaningful onl-v when it is exercised prudentl,'- and in approprialc situations.

19. r\ r,r,rit tbr 'potice protection' so-called, has only a lirnitcd scope. as. rvhen the Coufi is approached for plotcction ol rights declared b1' a decree or by an order passcd by a cir il Corut. It camot be extendcd to cases rvhcre rights have interlocutor) stage in an unarnbiguous manrler. and then too, in furtherance ol thc dccree or order. 20 In Polavarapuru Nagamani v. Paruchuri Koteshwar Rao6, Division Benclr of crstwhile High Courl of Andhra Pradesh held that the trial Cour.t granted interim injunction, defendants filed counter to dismiss the said injunction petition. The trial Court modified the order passed clarifying that the plaintiffs shall not prevent delendants h'om canying out agricultural operations. Later defendants ti[,:d an IA for police protection allcging that standing crop \r'as destrol od by plaintills and police aid rvas granted subsequently. On exatnination ol tacts o1'the said case, the Division Bench held that in an application fbr police aid under Arlicle 226 of the Constitution of India cannot bL' filed i1' the order of interim injunction is violated, Order XXI Rule 32 was to be invoked when there was a violation of an ad-interim injunction or temporary injunction order. Thus, the Division Bench took a different o (20 to) 2 ALD ,11 t9 view to the view taken by earlier Division Bench in Satyanarayana Tiwari and the Apex Court in P.R.Muralidharan (supra). 2l . The Division Bench further held that it has noticed that number of suits for injunctions (classitied as title suits) in all the Courts is on increase. It is not without truth to sav that more often than not frivolous suits of injunction are filed only to bring the defendants around the ptaintifls vierv and accept some via-media an angcment to avoid long drawn, expensive and til're consuming proceedings in the Courts, during which the delendants r'vould not be able to enjoy the property with peace. In all such cases, ordinarily, urgent motion is moved before the civil Court, an order of ex-parte injunction is obtained and waiting for a period of fortnight or so, immediately application is moved under Section l5l of CPC seeking police protection ')) For the guidance of all the civil Coufts, the Apex Court held and laid down certain parameters which are as under:- (i) When the allegations are madc by thc party obtaining att order of injunction, that the said ordcr has bcen vtolalcd. an applreation secking police protection would not Iie. 1'he aggrieved party has to necessarily file execution petition under Order-XXI l{ule 32 or an 20 application under Order-XXXIX Rule 2-A of CI'C ;ecking attachmelrt and/or arrest of thc violator for contcmpt of tltc (lourl' (ii) When a petition is filed sceking policc protection' slrcthcr ot not to c\crcisc of pouer undcr section 94 [e] or Section l5l ol CI)C, the lacts allcgcd or pleaded. att order lbr police protcctiolr canttot hc l)itsscd in lt roulittr'ntcmcr' (iii) Il an applicatior.r is lilcd by the person obtaining ad-interittr injunction allcging that therc is a threat of brcach, disobcdience or violarion ol'the ordcr of initrnction. subject to proof, the coutl has pou,er to order police proteclion imposing necessary cttttditiotrs nttt to interll'r c *ith thc lifc and libenl'. and riglrts of tlrc c'ppositc party. (iv) 'l'hc standard ol' prool required in the case ol' threat ol disobedicncc ol iniunction or alleged breach,. Disohcclience or violation o1'an order of iniunction should be very high and it should bc in bcnvccn the standard of beyond reasonablc doubt and a stanclar rl of balance on prtlbabilities Be it noted. as held bv Suprenre ('out1 irr (lhotlu l{np1 1r { Irv25[[ Gulati (2001) 7 S(](' -510 and Anil llatan Sark:rr r'. Ilirak (ihosh, (2002) 4 SC('ll' in all cases ol'contcmpt the plea should bc proved applying thc very high stanilard ol'proofand not lllcrc affidavits or self-serving statelnents ol'the part-v seeking thc interventiotl of the Court."

23. In J. Jagannath Rcddy vs. Laxmi DeviT a leamed Single Judge of erstr.,"'hite IIigh Court of A,ndhra Pradesh held that temporary injunction obtained by the plaintiff was vacated and appeal prct-crred by the plaintilT was pending. During pendency of the said appeal, ' 1998 (t) frt-D451 2l defendants sought for police aid under Section 151 of C.P.C. Thus, the Division Bench held that grant of police aid under Section 151 of CPC to the delendant to protect his possession would be arbitrary and it was to be dealt with under Order 2l Rule 32 or under Contempt ol Couns Act. I'urther, the entry of the police into the affairs of the parlies after the approach to the civil Couft was alien to the civil [arv. Il there was a finding as to the possession of the property and a complaint was made to the effect that some other persons were trying to trespass into the property or committing any oflence in that behall' possibly the police would take action in accordance with law.

24. In D.Tulja Devi v. Margam Shankars Division Bench ol erstrvhile High Court ol Andhra Pradesh held that a suit lor perpetual injunction was decreed. The ptaintiffs filed an Execution Petition lbr execution ol the said judgment and decree. In E.P., they filed an lnterlocutory Application under Section l5l of CPC seeking police aid. The Division Bench held that EP filed under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC seeking perpetual injunction cannot be disposed granting police aid. * 1zo ro; z al-o z:: 22

25. In Sangu Brahmam v. SHOe erstwhile Iligh Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the plaintifls obtained decrec lbr per?etual injunction. 'lhc defbndants wcre unsuccessful in appeals as well as second appeals. Though the possession was found to be r.r'ith the petitioners, opposite pafties stafted interfering with thi: possession Therefore, thcy approached the Station House Officel of the local police station to protcct their possession but in vair-r. Thoretbre, thel' filed writ pctition seeking a direction to the police firr extending necessary help to the petitioners therein. The I{igh Courr allowed the writ petition and directed the police to extend necessary help to protect possession ol the plaintiff over the subject propefty therein. The High Court held that in the said case, the plaintiffs got their rights adjudicated by a civil Court, the controversy is only to thc steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the same. Therefore, in the said circumstances. this Court held that rhe High Court can grant police aid and a direction to the police to provide aid invoking its extra ordinary power undel Article 226 of the Constitution of India. '(zoos) : aLo Gu -. 23

26. ln Bijiga Paparao v. Jonnalagadda Srinivasa Rao"" erstwhile High court of Andhra Pradesh held that the trial court granted temporary iniunction, it was a contest order' Therefore' plaintilfs filed a petition under Section 151 of CPC seeking police aid for protection of the said order. The trial Court granted police aid' On examination olthe said facts, the High Court confirmed the said order of the trial Courl in granting police aid.

27. In HPCL vs. Govt.of A.P.rr, erstwhile High Couft ol Andhra Pradesh held that injunction was granted in f'avour of HPCL' which was violated by respondents/defendants' Therefbre, on examination of the said facts, the High Court granted police aid in Favour of HPCL under Article 226 of the Constitution of India'

28. ln Gampala Anthaiah v, Kasarla Venkat Reddy'l erstwhile High court of Andhra Pradesh held that an ad interint injunction granted by triat Court was made absolute as it was not chailenged by defendants and rvas subsisting. During subsistence of the said interim injunction, plaintiff filed an application before the trial court seeking police aid alleging interference by the det-endants { 2015i i\LD l7l '' (2r)l5) 2 ALT 5e '' (20 t4) 2 ALD 28 r 24 into the peacclul possession ol the plaintiffs over thc suit schedule property. The said application was allowed by the trial Court and granted police aid. The Division Bench held that 3t1 order of temporary injunction has to be obeyed by the pa(ies to it and q'hen the plaintilf cor.rrplains that the defbndant is comrnittir-rg breach of the said order and seeks policc protection, the Courl is undcr arr obligation to accord such protection. Unlcss this is done, the rule o1'law rvill not prevail and .iudicial orders would not be elfectively irrplernented. Granting of suc:h orders would uphold the dignity and eflectiveness of the judiciary.

29. In B.Chandrasekhar Reddy v. Nagaraju Yadavr3 erstwhile lligh Court ol Anclhra Pradesh held thar the trial (lourt granted interirrr iniunction to protect damaging of the cluarly b1' the respondents in I.A. until disposal of the suit. Trial Court also granted police aid. 'l-hc def'endants filed revision challengir.rg tlrc said order. On examination of the lhcts, the High Courl held that the trial Courl is right in granting police aid in t-avour of the plaintiffs. '' (zo l3) 2 At.tl ozo 25

30. ln Ganuboina Venkateswara Rao v. Pakalapati Basavaiahra erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the defendants violated temporary injunction granted by trial court and on the application filed by the plaintiffs, trial Court granted police aid lor the purpose of implementation of the said order- The said order granting police aid to the plaintiff was under challenge. On examination ol the facts. the Division Bench held that the trial court is right in granting protection to the plaintilf for implementation of the said order. 3 l. In Vangetti Bal Reddy v. Karagani Balaiahrs, erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the trial Court granted an interirn injunction in favour of the ptaintiffs. The defendants filed written statetnent in the suit resisting the claim of the petitionets/pla intiff's. The suit rvas decreed. Subsequently, defendants filed a petition under Order 9 Rute 13 oICPC and got the ex parte decree set aside and the suit was restored to file and temporary inj unction granted by the trial Court was subsisting. Despite the ad interirn injunction against the defendants, they attempted to violate the order. Therefore, the plaintiffs sought grant of police aid. On the " (2009) i ALD 692 '5 (2o D) 6 ALD to4 26 application filed by the plaintifls, trial Court grar.rted police aid. I-he same was challenged. The High Court conhrmed the order passed by the trial Court in granting police aid.

32. ln Yarlagunta Bhaskar Rao v. Bommaji Danam'6, erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the trial Cotrrt granted ad interirn injunction, police aid was sought alleging violation of t[.re said injunction and the trial Court granted policc aid. On challenge, the Iligh Courr held that a parly who obtained tetrtporary injunction ordels, and is complaining of violation of such orders. ntay file not only an execution petition under C)rder XXI Rule -]2 CPC or an application under Order XXXIX Rute 2-A ol CPC seeking attachment and/or arrest ol the violator under Contempt o1- Oourts Act, but also an application seeking police protection under Scction l5l CPC from the Civil Court

33. In Goti Kota Reddy v. Goli Rajagopala ReddyrT, erstwhile l-Iigh Court of Andhra Pradesh held that civil (]oirrt cannot ref'er the matter of implementation of a decree lor pcrpetual injunction to police, as it rvilI be the negation of the right of thc ju<lgrnent debtor available under Order XXI CPC, and that the executing Court, without In (2014) 2 ALT 3 r9 '' (2ooo) 6 ALD 449 27 deciding the application hled under Rule 32 of Order 21 CPC, cannot refer the matter to police for implementation of the decree.

34. In P. Shankar Rao v. Smt. B.Susheelars, erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that confirming the order granting police aid by the trial Court, held that mere fact that the action could be taken against either party for flouting the injunction under Order 39 Rule 2-A or under the Contempt ol Courrs Act. does not come in the way of the Court taking all necessary steps for ensuring obedience of the injunction order. I'he Court need not wait till the injunction is breached. [n a fit case, the Couft can undoubtedly direct police aid as a preventive measure. This Power though not expressly conferred, is a power incidental or arrcillary to the exercise ol'the power to grant injunction pending the suit.

35. In Khaja Shoukat Ali v. Khairunnissa Begumre erstwhile High Court ol Andhra Pradesh held that a decree for injunction was passed by the trial Courl and it was conltrmed by the first and second appellate Courts. Thereafter, the defendants filed a suit against the plaintiffs seeking declaration ol title and for perpetual injunction in respect of the very same property. The plaintiffs in the earlier suit '' 12ooo1z eLt' 6oo '' (2005) 6 Ar-'r 7 to 28 sought police aid. The defendants in the earlier suit and plaintiffs in the second Suit, challenged the order granting police aid by the trial Court. The Dir ision.Bench confrrmed the order granting police aid to the plaintills in the first suit.

36. In N.K.Leasing constructions Ltd. V. Sugan Chand Sankla20, Neetha Chintawar v. Bodugam Gopizr err;trvhile I{igh Court of Andhra Pradesh confirmed the order grarrted b1' the trial Court grallting police aid lor protection ol- interirn injunction grantcd in t'avour o1-the plaintiff's to protect their possession.

37. In N.Korpagam v. P.Deivanaiammalr2. the trial Court granted ex parte interim injunction order in favour o1'the plaintiff. Thcreafter, thc same was made absolr-rte. The plaintifl sought lbr police aid and the same was allowed. In revision, the Madras I [igh Court confirmed the order granted by the trial Coun. In K.K. Veluswamy v. N.Palanisamy2s, the Division Bench ol- Apex Court reiterated the said principle. 'n 1zo to; 6 aLo o2 '' (too6) 5 ALD b9j 't nlR 2ool Midirs :u tq " (zolt) tt scc uz-; 29

38. In A. Bharathi v. State of Telangana2a, the combined High Court at Hyderabad for the State ofTelangana and the State ofA-ndhra Pradesh, held that the possession of the plaintiff was confirmed by trial Court, High Court and the Apex Court. Plaintiff submitted representations to police with a request to provide police aid for implementation of the same and also alleged that the defendants are interfering with their possession over the suit schedule property in violation of the aforesaid orders. The police did not act upon the same. 'Iherefore, the plaintiffs filed Writ Petition and leamed Single Judge, of this Court directed the police to provide police aid to the plaintiff for implementation of the said order. The same was confirmed by the Division Bench.

39. In Ghouse Nlohiuddin Ali v. M/s Muslim Educational Social and Cultural Organization", Diuision Bench of this Court, heid that High Courl is having power to grant police aid to implement the injunction orders granted by civil Coutl

40. In Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited vs. The Station House Officer, Madhapur P.S.Hyderabad26 A Division Bench of erstwhile \ \ 'o 20 l7 (1) ALD 503 '.t zozt le'1 eto e9e 'u zoto (t) aLo 696 (og) 30 High Court of Andhra Pradesh, while dealing with a matter arose under SARFAE,SI Act, placing reliance on the principle laid down in Meera Chauhan (supra), considered power of the civil Court to direct police officers to provide assistance in the execution of orders ot decree. The Division Bench in paragraph No.43 held as follows:-

43. The power of the civil Court to direct policc offlcels to rendcr assistance is ucll recognized. Whcn pafties violate orders rtf initurction r.rr sta)'. the Coult can, by exercising its inhcrent power. put back tlre pafiics in thc same positiou as they stood prior to issuance of thc injtrnction ordcr or give appropriate dircction to the police authorities to render aid to the aggrieved pafiies for thc due and proper implementatiou o[ thc ordcrs passed in thc suit, and also order polioc protectiou for implenrcnLation of such an order (Meera Chauhan v. Harsh Bishnoi , (2007) 12 SCC 20 I ) 41 . This Courl in Kuruma Vanaja v. State of 'f elangana2T, directed the police to extend police protection to implcrnent the injunction order granted by the Special Assistant Agr:nt and Sub Divisional Magistrate (Mobile Couft) at Bhadrachalam.

42. Erstr.vhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Y.Chandraiah @ Y.Chandrn Reddy v. Commissioner of Police, Cvberabad' Rangareddy District, Hyderabad2s, referring to decision of the Apcx Courl in P.R.Muralidharan (supra), held that a r.r'rit is maintainable ':7 202 I scc onLine TS 607 t' 2006 scao4line AP t l4E 31 on a complaint that a pafty had not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner or when a parfy was deliberately flouting the decree or order and the police authorities were not providing him the required protection in terms of the decree or order, passed by a Court having jurisdiction.

43. In Satish Mutually Aided Co-op. Housing Society Limited v. State of Telangana2e, a Division Bench of this Court hetd that once there is an order of injunction and there is direction to provide police aid for implementation of the prohibitory injunction for any dispossession of them, police are bound to provide aid.

44. Thatti Narsimha Rao vs. State of Telanganas0, this Court held that on receipt of an application or rcpresentation by the Police authorities for grant of police protection and il it is lbund that respondenVs are violating injunction order, necessary police protection shall be given to the petitioner/s in implernenting injunction order.

45. In Satyanarayan Lakshminarayan Hegde v. lVlallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumalerr, wherein the Apex Court elucidated the t'2019 scc online TS 2783 rl 2022 scc online TS 2384 '' A\rR.Ir6o sc 137 32 scope of I{ish Court's jurisdiction under Aflicle 226 ol' tlie Constitution ol India. The Court emphasized that the I Iigh Court possesses wide powers to issue directions and orders to ensure justice between parties and to enfbrce law of the land.

46. In Kabbakula Padma vs. State of Telanganat'. trial .ou,-t granted an ex parte interim injunction, plaintiff alleged that the same was violated by the defendant. Plaintiff approachcd High Court seeking police lid. l-eamed Single Judge, held that tlie plaintilf is not entitled lbr police aid. Plaintifl- preferred intra-corrrl appcal under Clause I 5 ol Lctters Patent. Division Bench dismissed the said appeal holding that plaintiff is not entitled to enforce an ex pafle ad-interim injunctior.r. Hou,cver, Division Bench granted liberty to the plaintifl- to avail alternativc renredies available to him COURT VIEW

47. fhc sr:rn and substance of the aforesaid .iudgmenls is that Civil Courts have power to grant police aid when there is allegation of violation of injunction granted by trial Court. But the civil Courts have to exercise the said power in rarest of rare cases and with great circumspection and caution t'2o:J 1t; et-L zos 1'

48. In the tight of the same, the following parameters are laid down for filing and considering applications filed seeking police aid:- On the allegation of violation of ex parte ad-interim injunction granted by the trial Court, the plaintilf has to approach trial Court seeking police aid by filing an application under Section 151 of CPC.

11. The trial Court shall examine the facts of the said case and decide the said application. If the defendants files counter opposing interim injunction application, the trial Court shall decide the said I.A. first and thereafter an application filed by plaintiffs seeking police aid. Trial Coud cannot decide application flted seeking police aid first and thereafter petition filed seeking injunction. I[. The trial Court shall consider all the assenions made by the parties in the petition and counters seeking police aid IV On trial Court granting temporary injunction on contest, if no appeal IS preferred against the said order, on confirming prima facie case and possession, the plaintifl' has to file an application under Section 151 of CPC seeking police aid. It is always advisable and proper to 34 lrlc an application before the trial Court seeking police aid instead of submitting representation 1_o the police sceking aid and filing writ petition alleging non- consideration of the said representation. The' same r.vill avoid interf'erence of police in civil matters, without an order of civil Court I l' an appeal is pref-erred challenging thc order granted by thc trial Court and during pendency olthe said appea[, il thcrc is violation of the said temporarv injunction. plaintiff shall file an application before the appellate ('ourt seeking police aid. vl. Plaintiff shall file an application seeking a direction to thc Station Ilouse Officer ofj urisdictional Police Station to provide police aid. Plaintilf cannot seek a direction to Supcrintendent ol Police, or Deputy Superintendent o1' Police etc., to provide police aid unless there are erccptional circumstances. In case of trial Court decreeing the suit Iiled by plaintifl' secking perpetual injunction, no appeal IS prefen'ed ageinst . the said .iudgment and decree and it attained 35 finality, on establishin g prima Jacie case and possessron of the plaintiff, if there is violation of the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff can tile EP and also an application in the said EP seeking police aid. v l On decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff seeking perpetual injunction, defendant filing the appeal challenging the said judgment and decree, and if there is violation of the said injunction decree during the pendency of the appeal, plaintilf can file an application before the appellate Court seeking police aid or file an Execution Petition in the event there is no order ofstay. In the event, the suit filed by the plaintilf for perpetual injunction is dismissed and the plaintiff prefers an appeal chaltenging the said judgment and the plaintiff .decree, may seek an injunction from the appellate Court, ar-rd in case of its violation, may also seek police aid fiorn the appellate Court. x The party can also hle an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A of CPC seeking punishment of defendants on the allegation of violation of the injunction order granted' ./ xl. xtl. i6 'l rial Court cannot grant police aid suo-ntottt. In Ch.Veeramma v. Mahaboob Subhanirr, the erstwhile High Courr of Andhra Pradesh held that the telm stalzr.! qiro' is undoubtedly a term of ambiguity and gives rise to doubt. lt implies the existirrg state of things at any given point of time. The phrase 'slalu.s quo' has been derived from 'slatzrs quo ante bellunt'. \'ide Bharat ('oking coal Limitcd vs. State of Bihar-1987 (Suppll 3 SCC 394; Satyabrata Bisrvas vs. Kalvan Kumar Kishku 1994(2) SCC 266. It was held that status quo shall be specified by the Court before ordering the same. Such au-rbiguous orders ol directing the parties to maintain the s/ala.r quo without specilying what the .\lolu.\ cluo was at the given point of tirne, would lead to lurrher cornplications. It is expedient thc'refore not to pass such ambiguous orders. 'l-rial Court shall consider the said principle while passir-rg status quo order. Without speciling rvho is in possession of the property, it is not advisable to grant rr toot1tyALT36r, status quo order and it will avoid misuse of status quo order and multiplicity of litigation. xiii. Even the defendant can file an application seeking injunction against the plaintiff, on obtaining the same, the defendant can seek police aid for alleged violation of injunction order granted by the court. In Kalabharati Advertising vs. Hemanth Vimalnath Narichania and othersra, the Apex Courl held rhat no litigant can derive any benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a Court of law as the interim order alrvays merges into final order to be passed in the case and if the case ls ultimately disrnissed,, the interim order stands nullif-Led automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by gefting an interim order and thereafter blame the Court. The fact that case is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, or party withdrew the writ petition, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim 'Actus curiae neminem gravabit' which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no r' 201t) (9) scc 437 )6 one, becomes applicable in such a case. ln such a situation, the Courl is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Thus, any undeserved or unf-air advantage gained by invoking the j urisdiction of the Clourt must be neutralized, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a pafiy by the delayed action of the Court. It was fulther held that the fbrum of the rvrit Court cannot be used for the purpose of giving interim relief as the only and the hnal relief to any litigant, If the Court comes . to the conclusion that the matter requires adjudication by sorne other appropriate fbrum and relegates the said pafty to that tbrum, it should not grant any interim relief in favour of such litigant for an interegnum period till the said pafiy approaches the alternative forum and obtains interim relief-. An order of withdrawal of a suit does not amount to a decree ofthe Court, which can be executed. 39 It is not permissible for a party to file a writ petition obtaining ceftain orders during the pendency of the petition and withdraw the same without getting proper adjudication of the issue involved therein and insists that the benefits of the interim orders or consequential orders passed in pursuance of the interim order passed by the writ Court would continue. The benefit of the interim relief automatically gets withdrawn/neutralized on withdrawal of the said petition. In such a case, concept of restitution becomes applicable, otherwise the party can continue to get benefit of the interim order even after losing the case in the Court. The Court should also pass order expressly neutralizing the effect of all consequential orders passed in pursuance of the interim order passed by the Court. Such express directions may be necessary to check the rising trend among the litigants to secure the relief as an interim measul'e and then avoid adj udication on merits. Thus, the said analogy is also applicable to the suit proceedings and other proceedings before the trial Court. 40 Therefore, trial Couns shall consider the aforesaid principle laid dou,n by Apex Court u,lrile dealing with petitions filed seeking police aid. xv. The abcive rnentioned parameters ar.e only iilustrative and not exhaustive. There may be many more situations to scek police aid. The parties and the Courts shall consider the contentions, circumstances under w)rich party sought police aid and decide the same in accordance with the settled legal principles discussed supra and also in valious other judgrnents rendercd bv constitutional Courts whicli are holding the field.

49. In the resu.lt, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shalt stand closed. //TRUE COPY// Sd/- M. NAGAMANI REGISTRAR ON OFFICER One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice K. Lakshman (For His Lordships kind Perusal) To, 1 2 4 b 7 The lAdditional Junior Civil Judge, Karimnagar 11 LR Copies The Under Secretary, Union of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi The Secretary, Advocates Association Library, High Court for the State of Telangana, High Court Buildings at Hyderabad One CC to SRI B JAGADISH, Advocate [OPUC] One CC to SRI R DAYAKAR, Advocate [OPUC] Two CD Copies QS /^L HIGH COURT DATED:091OG12025 l 1 F, E S,-4 rr* {:.c i"i ,e 2O AUE zffi ORDER " CRP.No.2536 ot 2024 DISMISSING THE C.R.P.