Telangana Municipal Employees Association, Hyderabad rep.,by its President Tahj Mohan Reddy v. The Driector of; Municipal Administration, A.P., Hyderabad and two others

(per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ramesh Ranganathan) Aggrieved by the order in O.A.No.3468 of 2004 dated

6.10.2005, to the extent the A.P.A.T held that the petitioner – Association had no locus standi to get impleaded in O.A.No.3468 of 2004, the present writ petition is filed. The petitioner seeks a consequential direction that the Association be declared as being entitled to be impleaded as a party respondent in W.P.No.22597 of 2005 filed by the 3rd respondent herein. Facts in brief are that O.A.No.3468 of 2004 was filed by the 3rd respondent herein seeking to have the order of suspension passed against him by the 2nd respondent, vide proceedings dated

19.6.2004, set aside. The Tribunal, while dismissing O.A.3468/2004 by order dated 6.10.2005, held thus: “………..The Telangana Municipal Employees Association, Hyderabad, represented by its President, has filed M.A.1541/2005 and VMA 399/05 seeking impleadment in the present O.A. The subject matter of this O.A. is an order of suspension. The official respondents have exercised their power and placed the applicant under suspension. The proposed party respondent is the Employees Association. As the lis is between the applicant and the unofficial respondent, the Employees Association has no locus standi to get impleaded in the matter of Original Application and contest the claim of the applicant. According to the provisions of Administrative Tribunals Act, the aggrieved person alone can file an application before this Tribunal, complaining violation of any conditions of service. It would be difficult for them as to how, any cause is available for the Applicants Association with respect to placing the applicant under suspension.

The official respondents have taken enough care to see that the enquiry is conducted. In view of the provisions contained in Administrative Tribunal Act, relaxing the fresh Rules of locus standi does not arise. Therefore, Telangana Municipal Employees Association has no locus standi to contest an order of suspension, passed against the applicant. M.A. and VMA are therefore rejected…….” The Tribunal, however, having regard to the allegations that the 3rd respondent herein had secured employment by making false representation which amounted to gross misconduct, held that no interference against the order of suspension was called for and accordingly dismissed the O.A. Aggrieved by the order passed in O.A.3468 of 2004, the 3rd respondent herein filed W.P.No.22597 of 2005 and this Court, by order in W.P.M.P.28914 of 2005 dated 26.10.2005, suspended the impugned order of suspension. The petitioner – association contends that since the grave charges leveled against the third respondent require an enquiry to be conducted, it was for the 3rd respondent to face the enquiry and prove his innocence, and that the order placing him under suspension pending enquiry was legal and valid.

Petitioner contends the observations of the A.P.A.T association had no locus standi to get impleaded in the O.A. is erroneous and illegal, as the consequence of continuing the 3rd respondent in service had resulted in denial of the legitimate claims of members association, appointed/promoted as a junior assistant.

Sri J.R.Manohara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that in matters where grave and serious allegations of misconduct are made and an employee is placed under suspension, the employees association, whose paramount interest is in ensuring integrity of public servants and purity of public administration, are also entitled to an opportunity of being heard. Learned counsel would place reliance on two judgments of the Full Bench of this Court in G.Malakonda Reddy v. Andhra Bank Officers Union [1] a n d P.V.S.V. Prasada Rao v. Andhra University [2] , in this regard. Learned Government Pleader for Services would contend that the petitioner association is not an aggrieved person in such individual disputes of suspension pending enquiry and as such does not have locus standi. He would submit that even if the petitioner association is said to have acted in public interest, no union can file a public interest litigation in service matters.

Learned Government Pleader would rely on Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitender Kumar Mishra [3] . In G.Malakonda Reddy1 the Full Bench of this Court held thus:

……..There is no manner of doubt, however, that the two petitioners who have claimed to be Associations of individuals are not recognized as a legal entity or a juristic person except in so far as individual interests of the members of the two Associations/Unions are concerned. They are neither registered as a Society under any enactment or a Statute, nor are recognized as such by any competent authority under any Statute. Since, however, learned single Judge has observed that individuals who have constituted the Employees’ Union have complained of adverse effect upon their promotional avenues on account of such alteration in the Date of Birth, which according to them, has been done illegally, we see no ground to hold that because the two writ petitioners – respondents have not satisfied the norm of a juristic person and thus of a legal entity in the capacity of Association of individuals or that they do not have locus standi……..

In P.V.S.V.Prasad Rao2, the Full Bench held thus: “………..The dominant object of PIL is to ensure observance of provisions of constitution or law so as to advance the cause of the community or disadvantage groups by permitting any person acting bona fide to knock at the doors of the Court.

In Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P. (JT 2001 (4) SC 506), it was observed that,

in every case filed in public interest the Court can exercise writ jurisdiction at the instance of third party only when it is shown that legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and a determined class of persons by reasons of disability of social backwardness is unable to approach the Court for relief

. Can this principle be extended to service jurisprudence as well? In Court’s considered opinion, in an appropriate case, PIL jurisdiction can be used to check the arbitrary exercise of appointing power in the field of public employment, guaranteed by Constitution of India to all citizens. Any arbitrary discharge of public functions in relation to public employment would negate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. When such complaint is made, may be by unconcerned persons, the Court cannot be gobbed down by technical rules of locus standi……” In G.Malakonda Reddy1, the learned single judge of this Court had observed that individuals who were members of the union had complained of an adverse effect upon their promotional avenues on account of appellant’s illegal continuation in service.

In view of the said observation of the learned single Judge, the Full Bench saw no ground to non-suit the union or to hold that they did not have locus standi merely because they did not satisfy the requirement of a normal juristic person or that of a legal entity in their capacity of an association of individuals. In P.V.S.V. Prasada Rao2, a Full Bench of this Court held that in an appropriate case public interest litigation jurisdiction could be extended to service jurisprudence to check arbitrary exercise of the appointing power in the field of public employment, guaranteed by the Constitution to all citizens, since any arbitrary discharge of public functions in relation to public employment, resulted in negation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India and when such complaints were filed, even if they be by unconcerned persons, Courts ought not to be bogged down by technical rules of locus standi. In P.V.S.V.Prasada Rao2 the questions which arose consideration before the Full Bench were:

Whether the principles of reservation have to be applied in each department, treating it as Unit or group wise?

Whether the posts reserved for respective categories have to be notified right at the time of the selection process is initiated or not?

Whether the University is justified in appointing and filling in more number of vacancies than notified?

Whether the University is justified in filling up anticipated vacancies?

Whether the University is justified in considering the candidates who acquired the qualifications later than the last date for submission of applications?

Whether the University is justified in appointing candidates who do not possess the qualifications necessary for the posts?

Whether the University is justified in interfering with the merit ranking assigned by selection committee without recording any reasons?

Whether the University is justified in selecting and appointing candidates to a different post, than the one for which they were subjected to selections?

Whether the University is justified in approving the selections, which lack objectivity? The aforesaid issues, which arose for consideration before the Full Bench, related to direct recruitment and the illegal action of the University in not only giving a go by to the rule of reservation but also in filling up posts contrary to the very notification issued by them. The matter which arose for consideration before the Full Bench was not an individual grievance relating to the suspension of an employee pending enquiry. The judgment of the Full Bench of this Court has therefore no application to the facts of the present case. In Dr.Duryodhan Sahu3 the Supreme Court held thus: “………The constitution of Administrative Tribunals was necessitated because of the large pendency of cases relating to service matters in various courts in the country. It was expected that the setting up of Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively in service matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the courts but also provide to the persons covered by the Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances.