The High Court · 2025

Counsel for the Respondents: Mr S.RAVI, Senior Counsel Representing M/s. R.S. ASSOCIATES The Court nrade the following: ORDER crp_370t_2O25 PSK,J THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY N ORDER: The present Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 29A(41 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated 24.03.2025 in Arbitration O.P.No.l72 of 2023 passed by the XXIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, at Hyderabad (for short, 'the impugned order'f -

2. Heard Mr. G. Pavan Kumar, lea-rned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. S. Ravi, learned Senior Counsel representing M/s.R.S. Associates, learned counsel for the respondents.

3. Vide the impugned order, the Trial Court allowed the above A.O.P. by granting extension of period of (08) months from the date of order for completion of arbitral proceedings by the learned Arbitrator subject to payment of costs of Rs.S,OOO/- payable to the District Legal Services Authority.

4. The above A.O.P. was filed by respondent No.1 under Section 2gA(41 of the Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section 151 of civil Procedure code, 1908 praying the Trial court crp_3701_2025 PSK,J to pass arl order directing respondent No.2-Arbitral rribunal to extend thr: period of arbitration proceedings in Arbitration case No- 1 of 2019 for a further period of one year from the date of order by duly se tting aside the impugned proceedings dated 16.0 l.2o2L whereby t.:re arbitration proceedings stood terminated between the petitioner and the respondent from 31. 1 2.2O2A. 5 The operative portion of the impugned order is reproduced as under, viz., "2r' The arbitrar proceedings were terminated at the stage of cross-e'Yamination of respondent's witnesses which goes to show that most of the proceedings u)ere compreted. If the proceed.ings not permitted to continue further the interest of petitioner would. be put to jeopardg. 22' In uieut of the aboue discussron and. reasons mentioned, it is a fit ca^se to grant ertension of period of (0g) month"s from the date of this order for completion of arbitral proceedings bg the same Hon,bre Arbitrator. The pe,itioner shall pay costs of Rs.S,OOO/ _ to DLSA. Accordinglg, this point is ansurcred. In the resur| petition is arowed ertending of tinte of (os) months from tl'e date of this order for compretion of arbitrar proceedings subject to paAme,Lt o./cosfs of Rs.S,OOO/ _ to DLSA-"

6. The brief facts of the case is that respondent No.1 herein had preferred two arbitration applications, viz., Arbitration Application Nos-lr2 zrnd 126 of 2orr under Section 11(6) of the above Act before tht: High court for the State of relangana, at Hyderabad. vide com:aron order dated 20.06.2019 in Arbitration Application crp_37OL_2025 PSK,J Nos.112 and 126 of 2OI7, a learned Single Judge of this Court had passed orders by appointing Sri Justice K.C. Bhanu, Retired Judge, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, residing at Villa No.43, Aditya Royal Palms, Gated Community, Road Opp. To 7 Tombs Gate, Shaikpet, Hyderabad, as the sole Arbitrator for resolution of dispute between the applicant company (respondent No.l herein) and the respondent corporation (petitioner herein) arising out of Agreements dated 03.05.2013 and 19.06.2014 in accordance with the provisions and mandate of Act of 1996.

7. Thereafter, the period of arbitration proceedings stood expired w.e.f. 31.12.2020. However, ofl account of COVID Pandemic, the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed orders in Writ Petition No.3 of 2O2O, dated 08.03.2021, holding that : "the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Section 23(4) and 29A of th.e Arbitration qnd Concitiotion Act, 1996, ...'. Subsequent thereto, respondent No.l had also filed Writ Petition No.9O61 of 2O2L which was however withdrawn on 19.04.2021, and thereafter, the above arbitration applications were filed under Section 29A of the Act seeking for extension of time in the light of exclusion of the crp_3701_2O25 PSK,J COVID period from 15.03.2020 till 14.O3.2O2L for computing the periods proscribed under Section 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

8. The s;olitary contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the above arbitration application, vtz., A.O.P.No.172 of 2023, could not have been filed before the Trial Court as the learned Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the above arbitration petition. According to him, the appointment of an Arbitrator having been done by this High court vide common order dat,:d 2O.O6.2OL9 in Arbitration Application Nos.112 and 126 of 2017 in terms of section 11(6A) of the amended Act of 1996, the Trial court ought not to have granted extension; and for this reason, the impugned order passed by the Trial court deserves lo be set aside.

9. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions of various High Courts, viz., (al clvington Finance Rrt. Ltd. vs. Bindiya Nagarl, (b) Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd. vs. Mina pradhanz, and (c) Sheela C:howgule vs. Vijay V. Chowgule and otherse. ,9,M.P (MISC.) (COMM.) 695 OF 2024, dated t3.1r.2024, of the High Court of Delhi, at New Delhi 2 AP-COM - 296 of 2025, dated L3.O9.2O25, of the PageT of 74 crp_370t_2O25 PSK,J

10. Per contra, learrLed senior counsel, appearing on behalf of respondents, contended that there is no illegality or any error of jurisdictional issue in the course of passing of the impugned order by the Trial court in an petition under section 29A(41 of Act of L996. According to him, the Trial court derives power to decide an application for extension of time in view of Section 2(1)(e) of the Act which defines the term 'Court' as under, viz., "(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes."

11. [n view of above, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District retains the exclusive power to extend or terminate the mandate of the Arbitrator; and therefore, prayed that the instant Civil Revision Petition may be dismissed. High Court at Calcutta, Commercial Division, Original Side r Writ Petition No.88 of 2024, dated 07.O8.2O24, (Division Bench), Of the High Court of Bombay at Goa. crp_3701_2025- PSK,J L2. Havirrg heard the contentions put forth on either side and on a perusal ,rf the record, the only ground of challenge assailing the impugned order whereby the Trial Court had granted. extension of time in arL arbitration proceedings was on the 'Jurisdiction,, part. Therefore, the question of law to be considered is :: whether in an arbitratiorr petition seeking for extension of time under Section 29A(4) of Act of 1996, would it be the High court for the state of TelanganeL (which had allowed the Arbitration Application Nos.l 12 and 126 ,tf 2ol7 under section 11(6) of the Act) to decide such questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration; or would it be the r:oncerned jurisdictional Civil Court in the District which has the Frower to decide matters relating to grant of extension of time undt:r Section 29A(41of Act of 1996 ?

13. For proper understating of the above question of law, it would be necessary at the first inst€rnce to read proviso to Section 11(6), wtrich for ready references is being reproduced as under, vlz., '(6) where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parlies,- (a) et party fails to act as required under that procedure; or (b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, f"il 'to reach an agrr:ement expected of them under that procedure; or .1 crp_3701._2025 PSK,J (c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a party may request [the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court or any person or institution designated by such Courtl to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other mezu-ts for securing the appointment."

14. Next, we proceed to also consider the proviso to Section 29A of the Act which again for ready reference is reproduced hereunder, viz., 129A. Time limit for arbitral award.- 3 [(l)The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23: Provided that the award in the matter of international commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously as possible and endeavor may be made to dispose of the matter within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23.] If the award is made within a period of six months from the l2l date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as the parties may agree. (31 The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making award for a further period not exceeding six months. (41 If the award is not made within the period specified in sub- section (1) or the extended period specilied under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, crp_3701,_2025 PSK,J extende,l the period: Provided that while extending the period under this sutr-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may or<ler reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent for each month of such delay. [Provided further that where an application under sub- section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till tJ:e disposal of the said application: Provided also that the arbitra:or shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced.l (51 The extension of period referred to in sub-section (4) may be on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for sufficit:nt calrse and on such terms and conditions as may be imposr:d by the Court. (61 While extending the period referred to in sub-section (4), it shall tre open to the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators and il one or a]l of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proce(:dings shall continue from the stage already reached and on the bzrsis of the evidence and material already on record, and the arbitr;rtor(s) appointed under this section shall be deemed to have received the said evidence and material. In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this l7l section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal. It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplar5r (81 costs upon any of the parties under this section. (9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the court as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made, to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days from the date of service of notice on the opposite party." crp_3701_2O25 PSK,J

15. A ptain reading of the above two provisions would make it clear that when it comes to appointment of an Arbitrator at the first instance, Section 1 1(6) prescribes that only the High Court has the inherent jurisdiction and power to decide the s€une; whereas, when we read Sub-Section (4) of Section 29A of the Act, it is the principal Civil Court which has been referred to and not the Court which had appointed the Arbitrator. Thus, the framers of the law had clearly drawn the distinction while exercising powers under Section 11(6) of the Act vis-it-vis Section 29A of Act of 1996.

16. Keeping in view the aforesaid provision of [aw, it would be relevant at this juncture to refer to definition of the word "Court" as is defined under Section 2(1)(e), which again for ready reference is being reproduced hereurtder, viz., "(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil court of originat jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes." Page L2 of L4 crp_3701,_2O25 PSK,J

17. [n th,: teeth of aforesaid definition, if we read Section 29A of the Act keeping in mind the definition of "Court" as defined in Section 2( )(e) of the Act, this Court has no hesitation in reaching to the conr:lusion that when it comes to proceedings under Section 29A, it would be the jurisdictional District Court which would have the lrower for exercising the s€une and which is distinct to Section 1f (6) of the Act. Whereas, it is only the High Court or the notified Jrrdge of the High Court who has the power to decide the S€UNC

18. As regards the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the pr:titioner (referred supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that those decisions were rendered by the respective High Courts ',r'here the High Court simultaneously had original side jurisdicticn unlike the High Court for the State of Telangana; therefore, the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner (referred supra) are in itself distinguishable on its own facts.

19. so far as facts in the instant case and the provisions of Section 29A of the Act are concerned, what needs to be understood is that if the law makers were of the view that the extension or termination of the mandate was to be done bv the crp_3701_2025 PSK,J sarne Court which had allowed a petition under Section 11(6) of the Act at the time of appointment of an Arbitrator, then the provision of law would have been to simply confer power to grant extension or power to terminate the mandate with the same court which had appointed the arbitrator rather than specifically mentioning the power being with the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District. 20,. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds it difficult to accept the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner when it questions the power of a Civil Court in deciding the petition under Section 29A(41 of the Act. Another reason which this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order is that the issue of jurisdiction was not the focal point of contention while deciding the above A.O.P.No.l72 of 2023 by the Triat Court. The points for consideration by the Trial Court before passing the impugned order were that : (a) could a petition which was filed for extension of time for completion of arbitral proceed.ings which were terminated on 31.12.2020 be entertained at the first instance; and (b) after a considerable period of time had got lapsed from the period the mandate got terminated, such a petition can be entertained or not. Both these points have been rdgc r4 or 14 crp_3701_2025 PSK,J answered b, the Trial court by giving elaborate reasons and arso taking note rrf the recent decision of the Honbre Apex court in the case of M/s.Ajay protech pvt. Ltd. vs. General Manager & anothera wberein the Honble Apex court had herd that extension of time c€Ln be entertained and granted even after expiry of statutory extendable period. 2l' For a, the aforesaid reasons, this court does not find any strong case made out by the learned counsel for the petitioner calling for interference to the impugned order passed by the Trial court' The '3iv, Revision petition being devoid of merit deserves to be and is etccordingly dismissed. No costs. 22. As a serluel, miscellaneous applications stand closed. __-vvqe a.yprr(-i1uons pending if any, shall h tc,lt l^,gc- 's1 //TRUE COPYII Onrr Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justi (For His Lordships kind To, SECTION OFFICER KOSHY 1' The XXr\r Additionar chief Judge, city civir court, Hyderabad 2 The Hon,trle Arbitral Tribur jd*;:ri,fl#,*ffi 3ff ,.rffi ,ia,,"'?:#f :,Iif.r%Hff ; 4 l[:,r:'fl:;tffitarv, Union or rndia, Ministry of Law, Jusrice and company S The Sbc i;,l,"nE;::'?i,';nttTffiirffiT:iiri;f"[B:?, Hish courr ror the state or }:iJir*:' Mr' G pAvAN : il:::.." , T, u #IJ:..,H R s AssocrArEs Advocate .opucl K,MAR, seniorAdvocare ropucl HIGH COURT PSK, J DATEtt: 2111112025 THE S () 2 5 r[B ?rnt, * ORDE]R CRP.No.3701 of 2025 Accortlingly, the Civil Revision Petition is Dismissed b ,v tL l1z