Il V Satvanaravana Pratap v. State of Andhra Pradesh

3. Gandani Gayatri, Wio. Gandanai Srinivas, Age. 49 years' Occ: Housewife, Rlo.'1 2-1 1 -1 368, Boudha Nagar, Warasiguda, Secunderabad, Hyderabad. 4. trlalyala Sridhar, S/o. trrl. Anlaiah , aged about 43 years, Occ: Business, F/o. 12-i1-1368, Boudha Nagar, Warasiguda, Secunderabad , Hyderabad' As per the Court Order dated 18-08-2023 inl.A. No. 1 I 2023 in Cd.A.No. 752 of 2007 L.R. Brought on record. ) ...APPELLANTS AND The State of A.P., rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court ., Hyderabad, ...RESPODENT Counsel for the Appellants: SRl. P. VAMSHEEDHAR REDDY Counsel for the Respondent: THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 755 OF 2OO7 ( Crl.Appeal Under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C aggrieved by the order dated 11-06-2007 in CC No. 1 of 2003 on the file of the Court of the Special Judge Under the Prevention of Corruption Act for Speedy Trial of Cases of Embez-zlement of Scholarship Amounts in Social Welfare Department, Etc., at Criminal Courts Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad) Between: Kadimi Venkateswara Rao,, S/o Late K.[/araiah, Superintendent in PAO Office R/o B-93, Madhura Nagar, Hyderabad. ...APPELLANT/ Accused No. 4 AND The State of A-P., rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court -, Hyderabad. t ) ..RESP.DENT Counsel for the Appellant: SRl. T. PRADYUMNA KUMAR REDDY Counsel for the Respondent: iHE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR CRIMINAL APPEAL NO:756 OF 2OO7 ( Crl.Appeal Under Section 37a Q) of Cr.P.C aggrieved by the order dated 11-06-2007 in CC No. 1 oI 2003 on the file of the Court of the Special Judge Under the Prevention of Corruplion Act for Speedy Trial of Cases of Embezzlement of Scholarship Amounts in Social lVelfare Department, Etc., at Criminal Courts Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad) Between: B.Sudhakar ( died ) (A-35), S/o tVaruthi Rao, Govt Servant R:/o 89-C, Vengalrao Nagtar;Xrderabd, B. Saritha D/o. B. Sudhakar age , 35 years Occ: House Hold No. 44-14fi , Road No. 6, Srinivasapuram, Gurramguda, 5015010 ( As per Court Order dated 18rca12}23 in l.A. No. 2 of 2023 in Crl.A.No. 756 ot 2OOl L.R. Brought on Record.) ANO ...APPELLANT/ Accused 35 The State of A,P., rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad. ...RESPONDENT Counsel for the Appellant: SRl. H. SUDHAKARA RAO Counsel for the Respondent: THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 790 OF 2OO7 ( Crl.Appeal Under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C aggrieved by the order dated 1146-2007 in CC No. 1 of 2003 on the file of the Court of the Special Judge Under the Prevention of Corruption Act for Speedy Trial of Cases of Embezzlement of Scholarship Amounts in Social Welfare Department, Etc., at Criminal Courts Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad) Between: R.Mothya Naik,, S/o R.Keshya Naik, Warden in Social Welfare Department R/o Flat No.315, Sanali Heavens Apartments, Ameerpet, Hyderabad. ...APPLLANT/ Accused No. 1 AND The StaF of A.P-,, rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court ., Hyderabad. ...RESPODENT Counsel for the Appellant: SRl. SREENIVASA RAO RAVULAPATI Counsel for the Respondent: THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR Bail Slip: The Appellant / A-2 was directed to be released on bail by the order of the High Court dated 15-06-2007 in Crl.A.M-P.No . 2369 of 2OO7 in Crl.A.No. 1019 of 2007 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 10't9 OF 2OOl ( Crl.Appeal Under Section 378 ( ) of Cr.P.C aggrieved by the order dated 11-06'200l in CC No. 1 of 2O03 on the file of the Court of the Special Judge Under the Prevention of Corruption Act for Speedy Trial of Cases of Embezzlement of Scholarship Amounts in Social Welfare Department, Etc., at Criminal Courts Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad) Between: D,Shankar Rao, S/o Hyderabad. Ra.jaiah, Rr/o. Plot No.131 ,Phase -lll, Kamalapuri Colony, ...APPELLANT/ Accused AND The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep.by the Public Prosecutor, High Court , Hyderabad ...RESPONDENT Counsel for the Appellant: SRI CH. DHANAMJAYA Counsel for the Respondent: THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court delivered the following: Common Judgment I a THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.674, 675, 7O3, 7 L5, 743.744.749. 752,755,756, 790 & 1019 0F 2007 COMMON JUDGMENT:

1. Criminat Appeal No.674 of 2OO7 is frled by A36, Crl.A.No.675 of 2OO7 is frled by A24, Crl.A.No.7O3 of 2OO7 is filed by A3 & A7; Crl.A.No.7lS of 2OO7 is fi-Ied by A42, Cr1.A.No.743 of 2OO7 is filed by A10, Crl.A.No.744 of 2OO7 is frled by ,{5, Crl.A.No.749 of 2OO7 is filed by A2O, A22 & A41, Cr1.A.No.752 of 2OO7 is filed by A6, Crl.A.No.755 of 2OO7 is frled by A4, Crl.A.No.756 of 2OO7 is filed by A35, Crl.A.No.79O of 2007 is filed by A1 and Crl.A.No.lO19 of 2OO7 is Iiled by A2, questioning their conviction in CC.No. 1 of 2003, dated LI.06.2007 recorded by the Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act for Speedy Tria,l of Cases of Embezzlement of Scholarship amounts in Social Welfare Department, Etc. at Criminal Courts Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad. Accused Nos.A3, A4, A2O, A22, A34, A35, ^436, A4l & A42 for the offences punishable under Sections 109 r/w 4O9, lO9 r/w 419, IO9 rlw 42O, lO9 rlw 467,109 r/w 468, IO9 r/w 471, lPC, A24 is convicted and sentenced under Sections lO9 r/w 4O9, 109 r/w 419, 109 r/w 42O, 109 r/w 467, lO9 r/w 468, 1O9 r/w 2 471 and Section 1O9 r/w 2Ol of IpC and AS, ,46, A7 & A10 were convicted and sentenced under Sections lO9 r/w 419, lO9 rlw 42O, IO9 r/w 467,IO9 r/w 468, 1O9 r/w 47t lpC; convicting and sentencing Accused No. I for the offences punishable under Sections 419,42O,467,46g,4O9,42 I of the Indian penal Code and A2 is convicted and sentenced ulder Sections 4Og, 4lg, 42O, 467,468 and 471 IPC.

2. Since all the appeals are arising out of common judgment in CC No. 1 of 20O3, all these appeals are being heard together and disposed by way of this Common Judgment.

3. The Centra,l Crime Station, Detective Department, Hyderabad investigated into the scholarship scarn case regarding pre-metric and post-metric scholarships. Three cases in a-11 were filed. Two cases pertaining to post_metric scholarships (C.C.No.1 of 2OO3 and CC No.3 of 2003) and one case pertaining to pre-metric scholarship (CC No.2 of 2OO3). All the three cases were tried by the Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act for Speedy Tria-l of Cases of Embezzlemen t of Scholarship Amounts in Social Welfare 3 Department, etc. at Criminal Courts Complex, Red Hills,Nampally, Hyderabad

4. The case is that the accused A1 to A43 in CC No.1 of 2003 herein are from the office of the Social Welfare' Department, Pay and Accounts Department, Nationalized Banks and also private persons, who are kith and kin of the accused. All of them have conspired to cheat the Government. Pursuant to the alleged conspiracy, A.1 and A2 have floated bogus colleges and claimed scholarships in the names of those colleges. A1 and A,2 prepared forged and fabricated post-metric scholarships, bills, which is Form 103. The said Form 103 which are scholarships bills were prepzrred in the name of bogus colleges by preparing sanction proceedings and forging the signatures of District Social Welfare Ofhcers (DSWOs), District Backward Classes Welfare Ofhcers (DBCWOs), District Tribal Welfare Officers (DTWOs) and also forging the list of SC, ST and BC communities. The signatures of hctitious principals were forged on the bills. A2 also forged the bills and signatures of bogus colleges by preparing post-metric scholarship bills in 4 Form 103. Both A1 and A2 opened bank accounts in the name of 25 fictitious colleges. After having produced the bills in the Pay ald Accounts Ofhce and after processing, cheques were taken and deposited into Bank accounts and money was withdrawn. The tota_l loss to the Government was Rs.26,38,46 .476/-.

5. The learned Special Judge mainly relied on the evidence of witnesses who stated about the non-existent colleges and also opening of accounts in Andhra Bank and other banks.

6. Learned Special judge also piaced reliance on the bank transactions whereby the cheques were deposited and amounts were withdrawn. Further, the writings ald signatures of the accused which were identified formed basis for conviction. Out of 43 accused, A1, A2 worked in Social Welfare Department, ,{3 and 44 were Auditors in Deputy pay ald Accounts Office, A5 worked as Assistant Social Welfare Officer (ASWO), 4,6 worked as Assistart Backward Classes Wellare Officer (ABCWO), A7 worked as Superintendent in Deputy Pay and Accounts Oflice, A1O worked as Assistant pay 5 arrd Accounts Offrcer in Deputy Pay and Accounts Ofhce, A2O worked as Assistant Pay and Accounts Ofhcer in Deput5r Pay and Accounts Ofhce, A22 worked as Superintendent in Deputy Pay and Accounts Offrce, A24 is the wife of A2, A34 and A35 worked as Superintendents 1n Deputy Pay and Accounts Office, A36 worked as Accountant in State Bank of Patiala, R.P.Road branch. A4l worked as Deputy Pay and Accounts Officer and A42 worked as District Tribal Welfare Officer (TDWO), Hyderabad.

7. Acquitted accused are A8-District Tribal Welfare Ofllcer, A,9- District Triba-l Welfare Officer, A11-Junior Assistant in Tribal Welfare Oflice, A12-Welder, A13 (wife of Al2l, Al4- Inspector of Branches, Andhra Bank, Ai5-Branch Manager, Andhra Bank, A16-Business man, A17-Deputy Director, Social Welfare Department, Al8-Branch Manager, Andhra Bank, Al9-Branch Manager, SBH, A2 1-retired PAO, A23-wife of A1, A25-son of A2, A3O-Auditor (Computer operator) in DeputSr PAO office, A,31-Assistant Auditor in PAO, A37-Retired Deput5r 6 PAO, A38-Retired Superintendent, pAO, A4O, A43. Proceedings against A26 to A29 were quashed by High Court.

8. Totally 122 charges were framed for the offences under Sections 419, 42O, 4O9,467,468, 47 I and 1O9 of IpC against the accused. The charges were framed on the basis of the bills produced in Pay & Accounts Ofhce, opening of accounts in banks, withdrawal of amounts from the Bank and fabrication of sanction proceedings ald hled along with Form 103 bills, which were zrlso fabricated. 9 . As already stated, the cnrx of the allegation is that the scholarships meant for SC, ST, BC students were swindled by submitting fake scholarship application forms in the names of hctitious and bogus educational insLitutions with fictitious student narnes as belonging to SC, ST and BC communities, sanction proceedings of schoiarships, stamp receipts, bills etc., were aII fabricated. SANCTION U lS.L97 Cr.P.C: 7

10. Learned Special Judge has framed point No.45 to assert whether tJre prosecution is bad in respect of accused for want of sanction orders under Section 797 of Cr.P.C.

11. Answering the said point, learned Special Judge has found that though sanction orders were obtained from the competent authorities against A1 to A10, A20 to A22, A3O, A31, A34, A35, A37, A38, A41 and A43, the prosecution failed to bring on record the said sanction orders.

12. However, the learned Special Judge found that the said sanction orders were not necessary in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal and another v. State of Punjab and othersr, wherein it was held as follows: "Tle offence of cheating under section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to sections 467, 468, 471 and 12O-B can bg no stretch of imaaination bg their uery nah)re be regarded as hauing been committed b1l ary1 public seruant uthile acting or purporting to act tn discharge of official dutu. In such case, offtcial status onlg prouides an opportunitg for commi.ssion of the offence." ' lzoou 1 r scc I 8

13. Having extracted the said paragraph, learned Special Judge found that there is no necessit5r for sanction to be obtained under Section 197 of Cr.p.C to prosecute the ofhcia,ls and it cannot be said that prosecution is bad for want of sanction order.

14. Firstly, there is no explanation as to why the prosecution tailed to bring on record the sanction orders which were obtained against the accused. Sanction against public servant is arr act necessitated under Section .1,9T of Cr.p.C to protect officers from lalse criminal prosecutions. Learned Special Judge has committed an error in finding that there was no necessit5r reducing sanctit5r of Section 197 of Cr.p.C for obtaining salction orders and its object redundant. Section I97 of Cr.P.C or similar provision under the prevention of Corn:ption Act were introduced by the legislature to prevent and protect public servants from being criminally prosecuted, which acts amounted to criminal offences, during discharge of their official duties. 9

15. Recently, the Honble Supreme Court in the case of A.Srinivasulu v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police2 clarifred that the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prakash Singh Badal's case (supra), held as under: tso. But the above contention in our opinion is far-fetched. The observations contained in paragraph 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal (supra) are too general in nature and cannot be regarded as the ratio flowing out of the said case. If by their very nature, the offences under sections 42O,468, 471 arrd 12OB cannot be regarded as having been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of ofhcia-l du ty, the same logic would apply witJ. much more vigour in the case of offences under the PC Act. Section 197 of the Code does not carve out any group of offences that will fall outside its purview. Therefore, the observations contained in para 5O of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal cannot be taken as carving out an exception judiciaJly, to a statutory prescription. In fact, Parkas h Singh Badalcitcs with approval the other decisions (authored by the very same learned Judge) where this Court made a distinction between all act, though in excess of the duty, was reasonably connected with the discharge of ofhcial duty and an act which was merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. Interestingly, the proposiLion laid down in Rakesh Kumar Mishra (supra) was distinguished in paragraph 49 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal, before the Court made the observations in paragraph 5O extracted above.

51. No public servant is appointed with a mandate or authority to commit an offence. Therefore, if the observations contained in paragraph 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal are applied, any act which constitutes an offence under any statute will go out of ttre purview of an act in the discharge of official duty. The requirement of a previous sanction will thus be rendered redundalt by such an interpretation." '? 2023 SCC Online SC 900 10

16. The Hon'bie Supreme Court observed that the requirement of previous sanction would be rendered redundant if it is interpreted that every act of which a public servant is alleged to have committed would be without protection, which the legislature thought it fit to protect public servants who were discharging their duties, which a.re reasonably connected to their official functions.

17. The prosecution has committed an error in not bringing the salction orders on record. The application or non- application of rnind in granting sanction and whether the acts alleged in the presen t case were connected with their official duties or not would have been part of the record. Even before discussing the evidence, the learned Special Judge concludes that the accused/public servants have indulged in the alleged acts of cheating, criminal misappropriation and forgery and sanction to criminally prosecute public servants was not necessary.

18. None of the official witnesses have stated that the bills which were brought ort record were fake and fabricated bills or 11 that the ofhcia,ls have fraudulently committed such acts of producing fabricated bills, having knowledge about ttre a-lleged falsity of the bills. The witnesses from Backward Class Welfare Department, Social Welfare Department, Tribal Welfare Department and Pay & Accounts Ofhce, stated that no infirmity was detected in any of the bills and procedure adopted while passing bills.

19. The admissibility of the evidence produced by the prosecution and documents marked would be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs, which has a bearing on the application of mind by the Competent Authority granting sanction to prosecute public servants.

20. Even prior to discussing the evidence in the present case, it is necessar5r that the law laid down by tJle Hon'ble Supreme Court for appreciating evidence has to be gone into. A reading of the evidence of witnesses and findings of the learned Special Judge, the basics of admissibility of evidence in criminal trial have been utterly disregarded and on the 72 basis of inadmissible evidence, conclusions were drawn in the judgment

21. The case is one of circumstantial evidence. The hve golden principles constituting panchsheel to prove a case based on circumstantial evidence were summed up in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra3, which reads as follows: "153. A c:lose anal.gsis of this deci.sion uLould sftou.t that the follotoing conditions must be futfilled before a cose against an acatsed can be said to be .fttlh.t established: (1) the circurn-startces front utltich the condusion of guitt is to be draun should be ftlltl cstctblished. It maA be noted here that this Courl [rtdicated tllot the circumstonces concerned'must or shouLd,, and not "mag be" established. There is not onLy o grammatical but a legal distinction between "mag be proued" and "must be or should be prouecl', as u)as held bg this Court in Shiuaji Sahobrao Bobade u. State of Maharashtro [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC iC41O33 : 1973 Crl LJ 17831 tuhere the obseruations tuere made: ISCC para 19, p. 8O7: SCC (Cn) p. loa7l "Certainlg, it is a pimary pinciple that the outtsed must be and not merelg maq be guiltg before a court can conuict and the mental distance betueen'mag be'and'must be'is long and diuides uague conjectures from sur e conctu sions. " (2) the Jacts so established should be consisrent onlg uith the hgpothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to saA, theA should not be explainablet on ctng other Ltgpothesis except that the accused is guiltg, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusiue nature and_ tendencA, '(1984) 4 scc 1 1(r 13 (4) they should exclude euery possible hApothesis except the one to be proued, and (5) there must be a cLnin of euidence so complete as not to leaue any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of tlrc acansed and must shou that in all human probability tlrc act must haue been done bg the acatsed."

22. In Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhil4 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "52. Again, oral euidence can be classified as oiginal and hearsag evidence. Original euid.ence is that uhich a uJitness reports him.seU to haue seen or heard through the medium of his oun sen-ses. Hearsag euidene is also colled deiualiue, transmitted, or seand-hand euidence in which a u.titness is merely reporting not uhat he himself saD or heard, and not uhat has come under the immediate obseruation of his ou-tn bodilg senses, but uhat he has learnt in respect of the fact through the medium of a third person- Nonnally, a hearsag u.tttness would be inctdmissible, bul when it is corroborated bg substantiue euidence of other urilnesses, it u.tould be admissible uide Mukhtiar Singh lMukhliar Singh u. State of Punjab, (2017) I SCC 136 : (2o17) 3 SCC (Cri) 607l .

55. Doanmentary euidences, on the other hand, are to be proued bg the production of the documents themselues or, in their absence, bg seandory euid.ence under Section 65 of the Act. Furtller, facts slnuing the existence of anA state of mind, such as intention" knowledge, good faitl4 negligence, or ill utill need not be proued by direct testimong. It may be proued inferertiallg from conduct, sunounding ciramstan es, etc. (See Sectrons 8 and 14 of the Euidence Act.)

56. Insofar as orol eutdence is ancerned, this Court in State of Rajasttnn u. Babu Meena [State of Rajastlnn u. Babu Meena, (2O13) 4 SCC 206 : (2013) 2 SCC Pd 36al ("Babu Meena") Lns clossifted the same into tlvee categoies : (i) uhollg reliable; (ii) ttholly unreliable, and; (iii) neither uholly reliable nor uholly unreliable. While an accused can be conuicted on the sole testimonA of a u.thollg reliable '12023) 4 Supreme Court Cases 731 14 r/itnes.s, the unconoborated euidence of a uholly unreliable testimonA of a tuitncss musl result in an acquittal.

57. Seclion 6O of the Duidence Act requires that oral euidence must be direct or positiue. Direct euidence is uh,en it goes straight to establish the mairt fact in issue. The tuord .direct" is used in juxtaposition to denuatiue or hearsa4 euidence uhere a uitness giues euidence that he rece[ued [nfonnation from some other person. If thnt person does not, him-self, state such information, such euidence tuould be inadmksible being ht'arsay euidence. On the o*Ler hnnd, forensic procedure as circumstantial or inferential euidence or presumptiue euidence (Section 3) is indtrect euidence. It means proof of other facts from tuhich the eistence of the fact in issue maA be logicnllA inferred. In this contert, the expression 'ciratmstantial euidence, is used in a loose sense as, sometime.s, circumstantial euidence mag also be direcl. 58. Atthouglt the expression ,,hearsag euidence" k not defined under Lhe Euidencc Act, it is, neuertheless, in constant use in the courls. Hotueuer, hcrtrsag euidence is inadmissibte to proue a fact uhich is deposed to on hearsaA, but it does not necessailg preclude euid_ence as to o stalement hauing been mo.de upon uhich certain action tDas takerr or ccfioin results follotued such as euid.ence of an informant of tltr: <:rirtt,

61. Seclutn 62 of the Euidence Act defines pimary euidence to mean tht: dot:uments itself produced for the inspection of the court. If pnmary eu[dence is auailable, it tuould exclude secondary euidence. Section 63 of the Luidctrce Act deals with secondary euidence ond defnes ullut it means and includes. Section 63 mention s fitn kinds of second.ary euidence, namely (i) Cerlifre,<t copies @uen under the proubions hereinafier contained; (ii) Coptes rnade from the oiginal bg mecha.nicol processes ulhich in themselues ensure the acatracA of the apg, and. rnpies compared utith such copics; (iii) Copies made jrom or compared uith tle ori@nal; (iu) Counterparls of documents as against the parties ruho did not exes)te lllem; and (u) Oral accounts of lhe contents of o doanment giuen by some person tuho hcts himself seen tt. 69. ()ne oJ tLp- modes thrc;ugh u.tltich a fact cttn be proued- But, thot is not thc ottlq rrrode enuisaqed uncler the Duidence Act. proof of the fact 15 depends upon the degree of probabtlitg oJ it hauing existed. The stondord required for reaching the supposition is thot of a prudent man acting in ang important matter conceming him."

23. In Sherimon v. State of Keralas, the Hon'lole Supreme Court held as follows: '17.The gist of the offence of anspiracy is the agreement betu.teen tuo and more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or a legal act bg illegal means. There must be meeting of minds resulting in on ultimnte dectsion taken bg the conspirators regarding ammission of the crime."

24. In P.K.Narayanan v. State of Kerala6, the Honble Supreme Court held as follows: "9.---...- An offencn of conspiracy cannot be deemed to haue been established on mere suspicion and sunnises or inferences uhich are not supported bg cogent euidence.

10. The ingredients of this offence are that there should be an agreement betueen the persons uho are olleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing bg illegal means an act uthich bg itself may not be illegal. Tlrcrefore the essence of ciminal conspiracg is on agreem.ent to d.o an illegal act and such an agreement can be proued either bg direct euidence or by circum.stantiaL euidence or by both and it is c1 matter of ammon expeience that direct euidence to proue tnnspiracE is rarely auailable. Therefore the circumstances proued. before, duing anl ajLer the occunence haue to be considered to decide about the complicitg of the accused. But if those circum,stances are compatible also tuith tle innocence of the accused persons then it cannot be held that the proseantion lns successfullg established its @se. Euen if some acts are proued to hnue been committed it must be clear tlat theA uere so committed in pursuance of an agreement made betueen '(2011) 1O Supreme Court Cases 768 '(1995) 1 Supreme Court Cases 142 16 the accusc:d tuho tuere parties to the alleged anspirocy. Inferences from such proued circumstances regarding tfle guilt may be dratun onlg when such ciranm-stances are incapable of ong other reasonable explanatiort. From the aboue disanssion it can be seen that some of the circumstances relied upon bA the prosea)tion are not established bg cogent and rellable euidence. Euen othenuise it cannot be said. that thost: ciranmstances are in.capable of anA other reasonable interpretation- "

25. In Jethsur Suranghai v State of GujaratT, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows "9. Hauirtq gone through the judgment of the High CourT----.-ln our optnion, Lhe contention raised by the counsel for the appe ant is uell-foun ded and must preuail. With due respect what the High Courl see-ms to haue missed ts that in a case like this tlhere tlere uas seious defalcation of the properties of the Sangh, unless the proseattion proued thnt there was a close cohesion and collusion betueen all the acatsed u.thich fonned the subject matter of a consplracry, it tuould be dilJiatlt to proue the dual chctrges pttrtlatLarly aqainst the appellant (A-1). he charge of conspiracg hauing failed, the most mateial and integral part of the prosea)tion storll ogainst the appellant disappears...."

26. ln State of U.P. v. Wasif HaiderE, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "22,. In the instant appeals before us, the prosea ion hr;'s failed lo link the clutin of ciranm^stances so as to dispel tfle cloud of doubt about the culpabllity of the respondent-accused. It is a uell- setlled pinciple that a suspicion, houeuer groue it maA be cannot take place, of proof i.e. there is a long distance betueen "may be" and "must be", uthich must be trauersed by tlte proseantion to proue il.s case beqond reasonable dortbt [see Narendra Singh u. State of '1984 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 207 ' (20t9l 2 SCC 3O3 €t 11