The State of Andhra Pradcsh v. N//S. HYDERABAD RACE CLUB

Courrscl for thc Respondent : SRI S. RAVI Sr. COUNSEL FOR CH PUSHYAM KIRAN Ttre Court nrade tl-re following: ORDER Paqe 3 of 42 THE HONOURABLE SRI ]USTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HONOURABLE SRI ]USTICE NA RSING RAO NANDIKONDA TAX REVISION CASE No.6O of 2O1O TAX REVISION CASE No.72 of 2O1O TAX REVISION CASE No.1O5 of 2010 TAX REVISION CASE No.1O6 of 2010 TAX REVISION CASE No.116 of 2O1O AND TAX REVISION CASE No.139 of 2010 COMMON ORDER: (per the Hon'ble Stu lusttc.: t'Sant Ko>ltt) Heard Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Tax appearing on behalf of the petitioner - State; and Mr. S.Ravi. learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. CH.Pushyam Kiran, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. These are six Tax Revision Cases filed by the State under Section 22(1) read with Rule 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Goods and Service Tax Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'APGST Rules') under the Andhra Pradesh Goods and Service Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'APGST Act') challenging the orders passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as the 'STAT'). The details of each of the case; like the Tax Revision Case number, assessment yea4 and Paee 4 of 42 the Tax Appcal nunrbcr before the STAT along with date on which it was d ecided is reproduced below: I t L st. No. 1 J 5 a, TREVC. N(,. 60 ol 201o 7 ) ol 2al o i05 or zoto 106 ol 20lO 1 l6 (,i l0li) l rq ()r 20l r) ASSESSMENT Y EAR 1995- 1996 r999-2000 l 994- 1995 reo8 ieet r 99 3- 1994 impue r'reo onore T.A.No.393 of 2001, decrded on O1. r0.2008 ZOOf, rfc.,aeO o,, Of LO.ibOS T.A.No.1093 of -1 T.A.No.392 of 20O1, decided orr 01.10.2008 T.A.No.396 of 2O01- decideci on 01.10.2008 T.A.No.391 of 2OO\, decideci oir 0L 10.2003 1995 1997 T.A.No.394 of 2O01, decideri on 01 10 2008

3. in all lhese: since cases the point of contention is same, they have [)een take,r up an:1 heard together and are decided by this Cornmon Order

4. for convenrence, the facts in Tax Revision Case No.1O5 oF 2010 arc discussed hereunder.

5. I he facts c)l' the case are that the respondent M/s. Hyderabad Race Club rs arr orgarrization engaged in horse racing activities. During the assessfirent years in question, the Commercial Tax Officer examined various transactions undertaken by the club and determined that it qualified as a "dealer" under Section 2(e) of the APGST Act. The assessing authority found that the club was involved in multaple commercial actavities including the sale of food items to outsiders (Rs.1,90,975/-), sale of oats to horse trainers (purchase value Rs.52,3O,4O5/-), sale of gunnies (Rs.sl,an/_), sale oF tender forms (Rs.4,930/-), arrd sale of scrap materials (Rs. 1.29,100/-). Additionally, tax was levied under Section 64 of the APGST Act amounting to Rs.2,66,3O2/- on works contract turnover. The respondent challenged the [ax assessment arguing that as a club it should not be treated as a dealer and that several of these transactions should either be exempted or taxed at different rates.

6. According to the respondent, the classification and taxation of oats formed the largest component of the contested turnover. The assessing authority had classified oats as "General Goods" under the seventh schedule and levied tax on the purchase value of Rs.52,30,405/-. The respondent stated that oats should be classified as "cattle feed" under Entry B0 of the First Schedule of the APGST Act, which would attract a lower tax rate of 4olo (w.e.f. 01.04.1995) or 1% (up to 01.04.1995). The respondent submitted that the oats purchased were wild oats and not fit for human consumption and were exclusively used for feeding horses. Furthermore, the respondent rrraintained that even if taxable, the levy should be on the sale value of Rs.10,66,914l- (at which the oats were sold at subsidized rates to trainers) ralher than on the purchase value, as Entry 80 stipulated taxation at the first point of sale.

7. Th(r pL'titioner filed these Tax Revision Cases stating that the STAT has erred in ii,; findrrqs ort tr,.,o grounds: a) { irstl,7, iroldir.q thal- the sale of tender forms is not exigible to tax, ,,!1r,. n sitclr aclivity constitutes a business transaction that attracts tax liabrlity under the APGST Act. b) Sr:condly, treating oats as cattle feed under Entry B0 of the First St l,,rclull at concessronal rates, when it should be laxed as general oc,cd s aI aDDli(.ablr] ratL-5.

8. f rrrtlr,:r tlrC !)etition€r :rt.lted that the Hyderabad Race Club's activities inclucling the sale of tender forms, supply of oats to horse trainers, and other conrnrer-cial tr.lnsactions cannot be regarded as incidental or ancillary to its nr,3rn t--harrti-trle oblectives, and therefore the Club qualifies as a dealer whose tr.rnsactions are liable to tax. Thus, the petitioner seeks to set aside lhe STATs ordcr dated 01,10.2008, and restore the tax liability on these transaclion:; as originally assessed by the Commercial Tax authorities.

9. Learned Special Slanding Counsel for Commercial Tax contended that the respondent qualifies as a "dealer" within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the APGST Acl. He argued that the definition of "dealer" specifically includes clubs that carry on business activities, and the club's operations clearly demonstrated commercial activities. He also pointed to the club's sale of food items to outsiders (Rs.1,90,975l-), supply of oats to horse trainers, sale of gunnies, tender forms, and scrap materials as evidence of business transactrons. Further, he emphasized that the respondent was receiving income through sale of various items including drinks and food, and was engaged in purchase and resale activities, particularly with respect to oats purchased from outside the State and sold at subsidized rates to trainers. According to him, these activities constitute "carrying on business" and therefore bring the club within the ambit of the dealer definition, making all such turnovers exigible to tax under the APGST Act.

10. Further, the learned Special Standing Counsel argued on the classification of oats where he had rejected the contentions of the respondent that oats should be classified as cereals under Entry 20 of the Third Schedule or as cattle feed under Entry B0 of the First Schedule. However, he submitted that oats should be treated as "General Goods" falling under the Seventh Schedule as unclassified goods, thereby attracting tax at a higher rate. Thereafter, he argued that the tax should be levied on the purchase value of Rs.52,30,405/- as assessed by the Commercial Tax Officer. Moreover, petitioner's position was that the classification as general goods was appropriate to the given nature of the transactions and the Page B of 42 manner irr whiclr rhe club was conducting its business operations. The Iearned Special Slanding Counsel contended that the assessing authority had correctly applied ttre applicable tax rates after proper examination of the nature of goods and transactions involved.

11. Lastly, on the other disputed items, the learned Special Standing Counsel contendcd that with regard to the overall turnover under Section 64 of the APGST Act (its.2,66,302/-) and sale of gunnies (Rs.51,473l-), the respondent failed to produce docurnentary evidence showing purchases from registered dealers, which would have entitled them to exemptions or concessional treatment. Furthe; he arqued that in the absence of such evidence, the assessing authority was justified in levying tax on these overall turnovers and in allowing only discount of 20Vo on the overall turnover under Section 64. For the sale of food items (Rs.1,9O,975/-), the respondent had been established as a dealer. Thus, the amount received from the sale of food items to outsiders was clearly exigible to tax under Section 5C of the APGST Act. N4oreover, he supported the view that the burden of proof lies with the respondent to establish entitlement to any exemptions or concessional rates, and in the absence of adequate documentation, the original assessment orders were correctly passed and should be upheld by the STAT. t2. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent contended that it should not be classified as a "dealer" within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the APGST Act. The learned Senior Counsel argued that while the definition of "dealer" includes clubs, there is a crucial rider that the club must be "carrying on business." He submitted that as a club primarily is engaged in horse racing activities, its core function was not commercial in nature. The club's activities, including the sale of food and drinks in the canleen to both members and outsiders. supply oF oats to trainers, sale of tender Forms to participants, sale of gunnies, and disposal of scrap materials were to be merely incidental or ancillary to its main non-commercial objective of horse racing rather than constituting independent business activities.

13. The learned Senior Counsel further emphasized that any sales or supplies made were subsidiary to its primary non-commercial objectives and therefore should not bring the club within the ambit of the dealer definition under the APGST Act, and consequently, these transactions should not attract liability to tax under the provisions of the APGST Act.

74. The learned Senior Counsel further emphasizing on the classification of oats, challenged the assessing authority's classification of oats as "General Goods" under the Seventh Schedule which resutted in taxation at 67o, half ,1.4 .\\ Pagc 10 of 42 percent, and 10o/t,.c,urcharge. He argued that oats should be classified either as cereals under Errlry 20 of the Third Schedule or, more appropriately, as cattle feed under Errtry B0 of the First Schedule. However, he acknowledged that the expression 'th.rt is to say' in Entry 20 of the Third Schedule rs exhaustive, limiting cereals to only three specified varieties i.e. Bazra, Kodon and Kutki and therefore, oats would not fall under this entry.

15. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent also relied upon a judgment of the Suprcme Court in the case of M/s. Shah Wallace & Company Limated vs. State of Tamil Nadul, which held that such exhaustive expressions 'that is to say' should be given effect only to the descriptions specified. Consequently, the oats squarely fall under Entry 80 of the First Schedule as 'cattle feed' since it is exclusively used for feeding horses and are nct fit for human consumption.

16. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submitted substantial evidence to support the classification of oats as cattle feed, including dictionary definitions and expert literature. According to the dictionary meaning presented, 'cattle' is defined as beasts of Dasture. especiallv oxen. bulls and cows and also horses. sheeD etc. This broad definition includes horses within the scope of cattle. He further cited a book about "Care & ' 3z src sz2 Page ll of 42 Management of Stabled Horses" which states that "Ponies and Horses in Legular hard work need additional lood to keep in a fit, hard-muscled cond itio n Lr ollLeri! q LELs- they nerd e nerqv rather than faltess. Ihis is pjo[iLed by lhc fecd in of concentrated food -stu ffs usuall kn own s 'short' qr bard'Jqed s-ofjhis lbe bCS!tS oa ts which can be bruised. cru shed or rolled to aid di CS ton

17. According to the learned Senior Counsel, oats have always been considered the ideal cereal for feeding horses. The fibrous husk, covering the rich seed encourages chewing arrd helps prevent the horse from eating too quickly, wlrich can seriously disrupt its digestive system. Furthermore, he argued that the wild oats purchased were exclusively fed to horses and were not suitable for human consump[ion. The horses in question are specifically breed and are maintained for the purpose of taking part in horse races conducted by the Race Club and consequently, the oats used to feed these horses to be classified as 'cattle feed'within the meaning of item B0 of the First Schedule. Thus, the oats purchased and sold by the respondent are properly classified under Entry B0 of the First Schedule as cattle feed and shall be taxed at the rate prescribed there under.

18. Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel on the quantum of tax liability for oats contended that even if the oats were held to be taxable as cattle feed under Entry B0 of the First Schedule, tax should be levied on the sale value rather than the purchase valuc. Further, he pointed out that Entry B0 provides for taxation at the first point of sale, and the club sold the oats at subsidized rates to trainers for Rs.10,66,914/ , whereas the purchase value Wi) S Rs.52,30,405/-. Therefore, ther t.:xatrle turrover should be limited to Rs.10,66,914/- and should be taxed at the rate applicable for cattle feed under Entry BO (4olo w.e.f. 01.04.1995 or l'7o up to 01.04.1995) rather than the higher rates applied by the assessing authority on the purchase value.

19. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, it would be relevant to take note of a few decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of the different High Courts on lhe subject matter.

20. The Supreme Cour[ in lhe c.-]sc of Venkataramana Hatcheries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer2 has helcl as under: "The use of the word "includes" in the definition of the expression "goods" in clause (12) of article 366 gives a clear indication that the definition is not intended to be exhaustive. Long before the Constitution of India was enacted, there were several sales tax laws in the country where "goods" was defined to mean all kinds of movable property. Parliament was well aware of the several sales tax laws in existence at the time the Constitution of India was drafted and adopted and it did not intend to restrict the meaning of the word z 1987 SCC Online AP 87 "goods" by using the expression "means" in the definition clause. lnstead, it used the term "includes". Had the Parliament intended to restrict the meaning of the word "goods" only to inanimate objects or things, nothing could have precluded it from stating so. Instead of doing that, the Parliament used the word "includes" in the definition clause thereby expressing its intention that the definition was not intended to be exhaustive. In construing a word used in a legislative entry we have to remember that the word should be given the widest meaning so as to comprehend all ant,illary or subsidiary matters as Gwyer, C.)., had observed in United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum AIR 1941 FC 16 at page 25: . "None of the items in tlte Lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehehded in it. I deprecate any att:empt to enumerate in advance all the matters which are to be included under any of the more general descriptions; it wjll be sufficient and much wiser to determine each case as and when it comes before this court. "" 2t. Similarly, in CIT vs. Kasturi & sons Ltd.3, the Supreme Court in paragraph No.g of its judgment reinforced the principle of strict construction oF taxing statutes. Paragraph No.9 for ready reference is reproduced below: t (rg9g) s scc :ao "9. The principle that a taxing statute should be strictly construed is well settled. In Principles of Statutory [nte rpretation by ]ustice G. P. Sinqh, 6th Edn., 1996, the law is stated thLts: "The well-esta blished rule in the familiar words of LORD WENSLEYDALE, reaffirmed by LORD HALSAURY and LORD SIMONDS, means:'The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words.' In a classic pdssage LORD CAIRNS stated the principle thus: 'lf tltc pcrson sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship na,/ appear ra the jud!ciel rnind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the sublect wttlttr: tlte letter of tlte law, the subject is free, however apparently vyithin the spirit of law the case might otherwise appear to be. ln other words, if there be admissible in any statutc, what is called an equitable construction, certainly, sLtch a constrLrction is not admissible in a taxing statute where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute.' VSCOUNT SIMON quoted with approval a passage from ROWLATT, l. expressing the principle in the following words: 'ln a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no roont for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax, Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.' Relying upon this passage LORD UPIOHN said: 'Fiscal measures are not built upon any theory of taxation."'

22. Recently, the Supreme Court again in the case of Checkmate Services (P) Ltd. vs. CITa reaffirnred the strict interpretation principles of tax statues in paragraph Nos.55 and 57 of its judgment. Paragraph Nos.55 and 57 for ready reference are reproduced below: "55. One of the rules of interpretation of a tax statute is that if a deduction or exemption is available on compliance with certain conditions, the conditions arc to be strictly complied with. I See e.9., Eagle Flask Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (2004) 7 SCC 3771 This rule is in line with the qeneral prtnciple that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly, and that there is no room for equitable considerations.

57. The Constitutioti Bench, in Commr- of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co. [Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kunar & Co., (2018) 9 SCC 1] endorsed as followirtg : (SCC pp. 19 & 23-24, paras 24 & 34) "24. In construing penal statutes and taxation statutes, the Court has to apply strict rule of interpretation. The penal statute which tends to deprive a person of right to life and liberty has to ba qiven qtflLl interpretation or else many innocents might becorne victims of discretionary decision- making. Insofar as taxation statutes are concerned, Article 265 of the Constitution ["265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law. -No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law."l prohibits the State from extracting tax from the citizens without authority of law. It is axiomatic that taxation statute has to be interpreted strictly because the State cannot at their whims o 1zozs1 o scc +5r and fancies burden the citizens without authority of law. In other words, when the competent legislature ntandates taxing certain persons/certain objects in certain circumstances, it cannot be expanded/ intet'pr eted to tnclude those, vthich were not intended by the leqislature.

34. The passaqes extracted above, were quoted with approval by this Court in at least tvto decisions beinq CIT v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd. [CtT v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 3461 and State of W.B. v. Kesotanl Industries Ltd. [State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) lC SCC 2C1j (hereinafter referred to as Kesorant Industries case, for brevity). In the later decision, a Bench of tive )udges, after citing the above passage front Jus ce G. P. Sinqh's treatise, summed up the followinq principles applicable to the interpretation of a taxing statute: '(i) In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. A taying statute cannot be interpreted on any presumption or assumption. A taxing statute has to be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot impoft provisions in the statute so as to supply any deficiency; (ii) Aefore taxing any person, it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging sectiotl by clear words used in the section; and (iii) If the words are ambiguous and open to two in terpretationsl the benefit of interpretation is given to the subject and there is nothing unjust in a taxpayer <,..4 escaping if the letter of the law fails to catch him on account of the leqislature's failure to express itself clearly. "'

23. The Supreme Court further in the case of Royal Hatcheries (P) Ltd. v. State of A.P.s dealing with the interpretation of livestock in tax rules held as under: "5. Having regard to the relevance of the language employed in Rule S(2)(xxvi), it would be appropriate to set oLtt the same over again here. It reads: "Livestock, that is to say, a!l domestic animals such as, oxen, bulls, cows, buffaloes, goats, sheep, horses etc." Ihe clause opens with the word, 'livestock', but it does not stop there. ttad it stopped there, there could be no doubt that day-old chicks or for that matter, older chicks and chicken would have certainly fallen within the ambit of the expression 'livestock' and would have been taxable at purchase point, But the clause proceeds further and restricts the ambit of the expression "livestock" to domestic animals referred to therein. That is the effect of the words "that is to say". The meaning and purport of the words "that is to say" is explained by this Court in Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Assn. v. State of Rajasthan [1994 Supp ( 1) SCC 413 : lT (1993) 5 SC 13Bl . They are words of limitation. In other words because of the use of the said words, the livestock contemplated by the said clause becomes confined Lo the dornestic animals referred to in the said clause. 'Livestock' is, ordinarily speaking, not confined to domestic animals. As held in Peterborough Royal Foxhound Show Society v. IRC [20 Tax Cases 249 : (1936) l All ER 8131 the word 'livestock' takes in 'animals'of any description- But t t993 scc online SC 1o - 6uneq poopLapun aq lsnlu [SA CWn Zt ($ef )] suoled A a6pDg ut po/'^ pes aq) uodn pa*1d uotleleJd)alut )aptM eL!.L 'spe[qo e)eLutueut auuJ l2utlstp se pefqo ,eleullue, fua,ta pue lue o1 sLalaL ,leutue, p-to/A aql 'asuas lueltl s11 uy qbnoql ',qeutue, se poqsJapun )o ol paJJaJaJ lou eJe * s4rltp /Je eLu leql )oJ Jo - s4Jtrp pto -lep 'atueped uou)tuo2 pue )epdod ul ;,sputue )tlsaLuop,, uorlrlutsap aql eaMSue Lptr.lM ,4)olsaA1, 1eq1 lluo ee^o) lI ',,4)qsa^t1,, lle JaAo) )ou saop (Z)S etnd )o (t^xx) asnep leql areq elerqar o1 qbnoua st )l 'S eted ut asnep eql pas^leue a.roJaqua)aq aAeL! aM aAoqe o) pdralal lp alpur )aqlo pue suotsDap aql Jo )t.l6tt aLll ut uotl eJapt5Lra'-) )no )oJ 5utsue uo4sanb aq1 Lamsue o1 paa)ud mou letu .t1y'6y ^lle)Upads TasnEp ptes dql lo MetNnd eql uttlltM lle1 o1 se os ,sleLutue )osaulop, pa D aq ue) s>pnp )aqlaqM 'sp)oM Jaq)o uI aasnep aLll utqlthl papnput se pelelduraluo) e-reM s\Jnp plo-^ep )aLllaqM 'sureLuar lltls uoqsenb elfl lnd -,,s!eutue )qsaluop lp,, spJolA aLll 6u!ueau aql utLlltM asoqj ol uotltppp papnput osle a)e ua-raq1 pauoEUaLu ut slpLutue )esaLuop a)oLu aluos leql ueeut seop q)tqM ',,21a,, poM .)Lil qlt).4 \;puo one esnel) eqf 'aAtlsneLlxe lou pue antie.4snili lluo ue Jallpa teLl) pauotlueut aJe )eLlM )eLll ale)tput ,,se q)ns,, sp)oh1 aLll os 6uruoquatu allrlM 'pJlq a16us e Ltot)LlatLl 'anrl st ) I lslpulue lau AlDoqtnp buqeLu-eln-r aql plp AqA pultu u! peq lluoqlne but4etu alru rq] slpLutue )tlsaLuop lo adAl aLll 4elpq ol aq Aluo plnfi lt 'asodlnd e lnoqlt uaeq aAeq lou qn@ sltlf ,, )1a,, p)oM aql ql!^4 spua uaql pue sasJoll pue daaqs's1eo6 'saoteLjnq 'sMo) 'sllnq 'uaxo llatueu 'Lueql Jo autos 6utuot|ualu ,,sPLutue )tlsauJop lle., uotssudxa aq) Jo 1ulueaLu aq alulsryt! ol uo seob pue Jaqun1 spaa)ud ll ,,sleu ue )]seuop lte,, spJoM aql ql!// dols lou saop asnep aql 'utebp la4 'u! alll pauotlueLu sleunug )DseLuop o) esnep ptps aql u! ,4)olsaAtl, 7o 6urueatu aql lllu!l ol esoq) 6u14etu-a1nt aq1 ^ueLU ^q ^luo ^luoqlne zt lo BI a6ed Paqe 19 of 42 regard to the object and purpose of the enactment concerned therein viz., prevention of cruelty to animals. For that reason, cock-fights were held to be covered by the enactment. The principle of this decision cannot be applied mechanically to every situation, more so to a taxing provision like the one concerned herein. The several decisions cited by Shri C. Sitararniah show that words of this nature are construed having regard to the context and the object underlying the enactment. For example, in Casher v. Holmes [109 ER 1263 : (1831)2 B & Ad 592 (KB)l arisinq under an enactment levying duties on several articles, 'metals'were construed as not including gold and silver. It was held that gold and silver are popularly referred to as precious netals and not as'metals'. This brings to our mind another illustration. Diamonds are stones so are there several semi-precious stones used in carvings in marble. They are referred to as precious or semi precious stones. When one speaks of stones, he does not mean to include the precious and semi-precious stones therein - unless, of course, the context drives him to do so. Coming back to the popular sense, chicks are referred to as'birds'- not as'animals'. That this is the setlse in which the said word is used is borne out by the type of animals nentioned in the clause by way of illustration. All of thern are animals domestic animals, to wit, oxen, bulls, cows, buffaloes, goats, sheep and horses. It is significant to notice that not one of them belongs to the birds' category. No doubt, the word 'etc.' follows the said wor{ls but then in the context, it would be reasonable and appropriate to say that while animals like dogs and cats - without trying to be exhaustive - may be covered by the said clause by virtue of the word "etc.", chicks cannot certainly be included therein. To do so would be to depart from and ignore the ordinary popular connotation of the words "domestic animals" besides doing violence to the spirit and structure of the clause. The use of the word "all" preceding "domestic animals" does not ntake any Jiiference. It only means all domestic animals of the type mentioned therein all of which are quadrupeds. If birds are also tncluded in the clause, the very purpose of giviog the illustrations disappears. Thosc words in the clause would become superfluous. Such an interptetation ought not to be adopted except perhaps to avoid an absurcl result. For all the above reasons, we hold, in agreement with the High court, that the chicks sold by the appellants are not included within clause (xxvi) of Rule 5(2) of the A.P. General Sales Tax Rules. "

24. Whr:reas. in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Bhagya Lakshmi Hatcheries Pvt. Limited5, the unified Hiqh Court of Andhra Pradesh took different views on whether poultry constitutes livestock in paragraph Nos.1O to 14. Paragraph Nos.1O to 14 of the said judgment, are again for ready ref'erence reproduced hereunder: "10. Apart frorn the Obiter dictum of the Supreme Court, we may independently consider tlte question whether chicks which belonq to the category of poultry are livestock. There is abundant authority in the form of dictionaries, publications dealing with livestock and poultry, statutory enactments concerning livestock, including the notifications issued under taxation statutes which proceed on the basis that poultry is livestock. We may refer to few of them.

11. In the dictionaries, the following meanings of "livestock" are given: The Chambers 2lst Century Dictionary defines "livestock" as under: u 2000 scc onlrne AP 55 / ..,:44 Page 2l of 42 "Domesticated animals, especially sheep, cattle, pigs and poultry kept for the production of meat, milk, wool, etc., or for breeding purposes". Elack's Agricultural Dictionary, II Edition, defines "livestock" to mean "domesticated animals such as cattle, horses, pigs, poultry. sheep, etc." + Here italicised. In Venkatarama iya's Law Lexicon with Legal maxims I I Edition refers to the publication titled Legislative Drafting & Forms hy Six Alison Russel, page 208 "livestock" is defined as under: "(a) Cattle, sheep, goat, swine, horses or poultry and for the purposes of this definition 'cattle' means cows/ oxen, calves and 'poultry' means domestic fowls, turkey, goose or ducks. (b) Any creature kept for the production of food, wool, skrn, fur or for tlte purposes of its use in the farming by man. Livestock includes horse, cattle, sheep, goats, swine, mules, donkey and poultry". In Ramanatha Aiyer's Law Lexicon, it is said that "livestock" is restricted in its meaning so as to include only sotnethinq which is either a mammal or a bird". ln the book 'The Livestock Industry in Less Developed Countries' published by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, poultry industry is also dealt with. In the Foreword to the book'Indian Poultry Industry Year Book', 10th Edition published by Government of lndia, it is stated that amongst the livestock-based vocations, poultry occupies a pivotal position. From the book "lndian poultry Industry Year Book," it is seen that livestock census includes poultry population. ln the book pLrbtished by lndian Standards lnstitution-"Standard s on Poultry", day ald clticks is clealt with under the topic "livestock".

12. tn the detision in PL-terborough Royal Foxhound Show Society's case 20 Tax Cases 249; 2 K.B. 497, cited with approval by the Supreme Court, it was observed as follows: "......The words'livestock' are ordinarily and properly used in contrast with dead stock and include ail live animals and birds the breedinq of wl'tich is regul,ttt:d by rnan." ln the "Words and Phrases l-egally Defined", by Saundes'livestock'is defined as "cattle, sheep, qoats, swine, horses, or poultry and for the purposes of this definition 'cattle means bulls, cows, oxen. heifers or calves, 'horses' includes asses and mules, and 'poultry' means domestic fowls, turkeys. geese or ducks". 13. In Wardhouqh (A.F.) Ltd. v. Mace (1952) 2 All ER 28, Lord Goddard defined "livestock" as under: "Livestock generally means live animals. If the live and dead stock on a farnt are advertised for sale, everybody knows what that means. The dead stock are implements; the livestock are the animals on the farm and I should think that in the great majority of cases at any rate it would include and would be thought to include the poultry on the farm".

14. These dictionaries, publications on the subjects of 'livestock' and poultry and the judicial opinion, all go to show that livestock is understood in a broad sense to refer to poultry as wet!, Thus, even in popul a r u nderstand i ng, I i vestock i ncl udes pou |try.,.

25. In the case of Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd. v. State of GujaratT the GuJaral High Court examined the meaning of cattle feed and poultry feed in the context of laxation entries and held as under: " 7o. According to Corpus luris Secundum, Volume 36, page 63 1, the said word "as a noun is used as referring to articles to be fed to aninals, particularly domestic animals". In Webster's New Twentietl) Century Dictionary (Unabridged), at page 671, several meanings of the word "feed", when used as a noun, are given. The appropriate meantngs, as applicable in the context of the use of the satd noun it) the entrtes in question, however, are as follows:"( 1) food given to anintals; fodder; pasture; (2) the customary amount of fodder qiven at one time; as, to carry on a journey two feeds of oats; and (6) a meal." In the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume IV, at page 130, various meanings of the word "feed" are given and out of them only the following meanings appear to be relevant:"(3) Food (for cattle); fodder, provender; (4) A meal; a sumptuous meal; a feast." It would thus appear that etymoloqically the word "feed" means animal food or {odder. 77. In the two entries in question, the word "feed" is used tn conjunction with another word, namely, "cattle" in entry 21 and "poultry" in entry 25. Besides, in entry 21 there are words of inclusion as well as of exclusion following upon the word "cattle-feed". Under these circumstances, it appears to us that the correct way of approaching the matter would be to read the expressions "cattle-feed" and "poultry-feed" as a whole and to read the former expression in the context of the words which follow. When so read, one thing at least is ctear that the goods which are intended to be covered by both these ' 1978 scc online Guj 102 ( expr essions ar.: those vrhich are nteant for consumption by animals or birds, as lhe arse may be, which are more often than not reared for comrnercial purposes.

72. The word "cattle-feed" has acqurred a precise meaning in the field of live stock fanning and so also has the word "concentrates". [n the book entitled "Nutritive Values of Indian Cattle Feeds and the Feeding of Animals" by Shri K.C. Sen, which has been published by the Indian Council of Agncultural Research, New Delhi, Chapter I, entitled "Nutrition of Animals", deals with the feeding stuffs of animals. It is there pointed out that food ts essential for the maintenance of life. The nutrients in a feeding stuff enable the animal body to maintain energy, to perform the vital processes oi iiie and provide the material to replace the essential tissues breakdown which occurs in the body continuously. food also provides the constituents and the energy required for body gtowth. All feeding stuffs are composed of water, and organic and mineral matter. Organic matter is composed of proteins, fats, crude fibre and soluble carbohydrates. Besides the above, there are certain substances known as vitamins, which are considered to be essential for the proper nutrition of farm stock. Of these, the more important ones, from the point of view of cattle nutrition, are vitamins A and D, because these have to be supplied to the animals through their feed; but vitamins B and C can be synthesized in the ruminant body. The learned author proceeds to point out that the ration of an animal may be divided for convenience into two parts, one for maintenance ration is that portion of the diet which just enables the animal at rest to carry on the essential processes of life, such as breathing and circulation of blood, without either gain or loss of weight. As, however, no animal is kept in a farm in a state of non-production, the requirements for maintenance form only a convenient basis for the calculation of rations for productive purposes. Whatever is supplied to the animal over and above its maintenance requirement is available for production, such as .for qrowth or fattening, for production cf calf, for production of milk or for output of work. These observations contained in a standard book published by the tndian Councrl of Agricultural Research establish two things : first, that in the context of live-stock, which is not intended to be kept in a state of non-production, food consi sts not only of that constituent which is essential for the maintenance of life but also of the other constituents which provide the energy required for production, be it the production of calf, or milk or output of work and, secondly, thal vitamins are considered essential for the proper nutrition of farm stock and some of the vitamins like vitamins A and D have to be supplied to the animals through their feed. If this concept of cattle-feed is borne tn mind, it would become immediately clear that tlte said expression is not understood by the people conversant with the rearinq of live-stock as merely consisting of ration for maintenance but also as camprehen(1ing ration for production purposes. 24. It is true tltat the cammon parlance test u4tas applled in the said decision and that to that extent the decision is in point, However, beyond that no assistance can be derived from this decision for determining the meaning of the word "cattle-feed" or "poultry-feed". Foodstuff or food provision for human beings has a definite meaning in common parlance and it cannot possiblY include articles like Limica! which have special use and properties. One cannot possibty serve as foodstuff or food provision Limical to a guest at dinner or lunch. "Cattle-feed" and "poultry-feed", however, are words which are used in the context of the mixed feed of live-stock and pouttry, both of which are reared for production purposes not only domestically but also commercially. Front what has been stated above, it becomes clear that even in its ltopula; sense, lltat is to say, fhe sense in which people conversant with ltve-stock farmin,g and poLtltry raising and those dealing in cattle-feed or poLtltry feed rtould attribute to those words, ration for production, such as feed additives or supplements like proteins, minerals, vitamins, etc., would truly constitute "cattle-feed" or "poultry-feed", as the case may be. In such a context and in view of the setting of thc word "cattle-feed" in the company of the word "concentrates", it would be difficult to reach the conclusion at which the Tribueal arrived. The I ribunal's decision as to the true scope of the entries in question in the instant case, relying upon its earlier decision, therefore, is obviottsly not correct in law. "

26. Lastly, in the case of State of A.P. vs. Coromandel Agro Products and Oils Limiteds, the erstwhile High Court of Andhra lradesh dealing with the interpretation of vegetable oils in a tax entry has held as under: "We need not qo into the qLtestion of applicability of the Supreme Court decision or the Allahabad High Court decision for resolving the controversy in this case, because it can be decided on the language of the entry itself. The entry relates to "vegetable oils" and the various oils mentioned therein are only illustrative. The entry specifically says "vegetable oils" including those mentioned therein. In the circumstances, there is no warrant for placing the construction that the said entry relates only to those vegetable oils which are edible. It appears from the facts of the case that cotton seed sludge oil and cotton seed acid oil is the residue after the cotton seed oil is refined, i.e., what is known as "washed cotton seed oil" is taken away. This u '1987 SCC OnLine AP 558 residue is usually sold and is used in the manufacture of soap as oil. The mere fact that it is a residue left after the refined cotton seed oil is taken away, or that it contains some residuary additives it does not cease to be "vegetable oil". Having regard to the wide language used it is not possible to restrict it only to edible vegetable oils. Apart from this, groundnut oil which is also an edible oil is shown as a separate entry 24. This also negatives the contention that entry 128 relates to edible oils. "

27. In everyday usage, there exists a clear distinction between horses and cattle. Cattle specifically refers [o domesticated bovine animals belonging to the Bos genus, including cows, bulls, and ca{ves. Horses, on the other hand, belong to an entirely different biological classiFication - the Equus genus and, which are classified as equids, not bovines. Under normal circumstances, horses are considered Iivestock but remain a separate group from cattle Howevcr, Indian law demonstrates that the classification of animals, including whether a horse qualifies as cattle, varies significantly depending on the specific statute and its context. This is precisely where the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, creates a legal framework that expands the traditional definition. Section 3 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, contains an interpretataon clause that fundamentally broadens the scope of 'cattle'. The provision explicitly states that: ""cattle" includes not only traditional bovines but also elephants, camels, buffaloes, horses, nares, geldings, ponies, colts, fillies, mules, asses, pigs, rams, ewe, sheep, lambs, goats and kids."

28. This legal expansion finds supporl in certain dictionary definitions. While the Collins Enqlish Dictionary maintains the traditional narrow definition stating that cattle are simply cows and bulls. However. the American English definition, particularly in biblical usage, acknowledges a broader interpretation. It defines cattle as bovine animals of the genus Bos. but also extends to include "other domesticated quadrupeds, as horses, swine, etc." Therefore, while biologically and colloquially horses remain distinct from cattle, the Cattle Trespass Act legally transforms horses into a subcategory of 'cattle' for purposes of that legislation. This statutory inclusion creates a legal fiction whereby horses are treated as cattle under the law.

29. Having established that horses are legally classified as cattle under the Cattle Trespass Act, we can now understand why oats are properly categorized as cattle feed. According to Stephen Boyles, The Ohio State University & Ladon Johnson, North Dakota State University held that: "Oafs is lower in energy and more bulky than other common feed grains since it threshes with the hull intact. The hull commonly accounts for 24 to 30 percent of the weight of the oat kernel. Since oat grain yield and quality are highest under relatively cool growing seasons, it is produced and fed primarily in the northern part of the Great Plains. Quality, as measured by bushel weight. commonly varies inversely with temperatures during the kernel filling and ripening period of the grain. A traditional pattern in movement of feed oats is for high-quality, heavy- test-weight horse" oats to move from northern producing areas to soLrth and easterly directions. Energy content of oats varies directly according to bushel test weight, which in turn is dependent upon size of groat (whole seed minus the hull) and kernel plumpness. " 30, Wrth regard to growing and finishing cattle, it was held that: "Oats has earned the reputation of being a good "growing" feed but of having lesser value than corn, barley, grain sorghum or wheat when used as the major energy source in finishing rations. Oats is only worth about 85 percent the value of corn or barley per ton when fed as one-half or more of the qrain diet for finishing cattle. Rations containing very high levels of oats or even ratians with no roughage do not produce comparable gains to those of corn or barley. This is particularly true during the last 40 to 60 days of the finishing period. Good quality oats (35 pounds per bushel or heavier) can be used at levels up to one-third of the concentrate intake in finishing type rations without reducing rate of gain or markedly affecting feed efficiency. Oats may have a place in all-concentrate diets as a supplement for cereals which have low fiber contents. "

31. The connection becomes clear through this logical chain that: f; !:r i E: ; e n: =; + c, > q l, ? a g; t P 1a=L..-aa=t t : ; ic;an-t rAi'-:'95i"; s d p'g .- A 9 P r E e a:: aa=..o==()cur i--r--lrn="_dtc= or:=='?,rOt *:;E;3E!EEEs dU:g;boE'(^--E :;pyaoii.-afqLo :eZI.2,r->c2d; !rllj-i-.cJ.r--'.= F:g;Ei€

3.5:s;i :;;,":3E;i'c"3 elJ,!;'utr!oru; ..oYXrO>lEXGq:5E_ ce!:E:EF'.aod5 s 3 i € H;8=SEE'q,E"=i YcoJro ! o b;u-o',!E!8-e;;ru(Lq,r-c ;E;g: ; E a,,; =ai...)-tcru ;,:{f"4,:etao'5 i--5E"P,iniq:5 ItLt;;-vooc $ro6.,:!I=o-== ttlYEr:5:!":"t ooa=cc*c:=:cro F.\.-vo-;:=EpE " E 3,:3. e= ! e yl ; L= E Bi : -? ( " g ! n =ebeb€e 9 -oif-tiP ?ali=E; OU aJ UF ,o -oU) o- (U s- Ea). h6-'; oNo.) N U \Jr >uYO0JoJ !(/)E c i5 .;U :Y t, L- -: o)LLX oqr+ !)!S, ,_Y,o- !r., E OYto a..! c'l : c L) .l O sL= 0r(,(/1 3:or >v o:CJz rYl;ts PS:ii O Y S .- iEpt' ,,Y\.E*FSE L^oUPY 3S.xEl e-tr(b ;o),^'.!a sci'jo iEEst rs*:.E _\*odbx(io Psi}-h F 3 E e,b sgs:E S*5!ts 14 i tr O€ di.p9i "o E E b ta ut >: \r,)o jptEE i S ic !Jo"\olE Sb E S 0la.on.E3S!8. !3idb OJhL b 6i L 0r I I r \ ?age 37 of 42 commission, remuneration or othet valuable consideration, and includes. - a casual trader, as herein before defined; (i) local authority, a contpany, a llindu undivided family or any society (including a cooperative sociely), club, firm or association which carries on such business; (ii) a society (including a coopcrative society), club, firm or association whiclt buys goods from, or sells, supplies or distributes goods to its members; (iii) (iii)(a) any person, who may, in the course of business of running a restaurant or an eating house or a hotel (by whatever name called). supply by way of or as paft of any service or in any other manner wltatsoever, of goods, beinq food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating); (iii)(b) any person, who may transfer the right to ttte use of any goods for any purpose wltatsoever (whettrcr or not for a specified period) in the course of business to any other person; (iv) a commission agent, a broker, a delcredere agent, an auctioneer or any other mercantile agent, by whatever name called, who carties on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods on behalf of any principal or principals; Explanation-I:--- Every person who acts as an agent of a non resident dealer that is, as an agent on behalf of a dealer residing outside the State, and buys, sells. supplies or distributes goods in Lhe State or acts on behalf of such dealer as - (i) a mercnntile agent as defined in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Central Act III of 193o); or (ii)an agent for handling goods or documents of title relating to goods, or ?age 32 of 42 (rii) an aqetlt for the collection or the payment of the sale orice oI goods or as a gLlarantor for such collection or payment and (.\/ery local branch of a firm ot company situated outside the State, shall be dcemed to be a dealer for the purpose of this Act. Explanation-II:--- Whcre a grower of agricultural or hofticultural y:trocluce sells such produce grown by himself or grown on any land in which he has an intcrest whether as owner, usufructuary mortqaqee, Lcnant ar othcrt\ase, in a form different from the one in which it w'as produced aftet sub)ectitlg it to any physical, cltemical or any process othtr tlDn rnete cle,uting, gradtng or softing, he shall be dcarrted to be a dealer fot tlte purpose of L:his Act; Explanation- III: - -- The Central Government or tlte State Government whictt, whethtlr or not in the course of business, buys, sells, supplies or drstributes goods, directly or otherwise, for cash or for deferred for commission, remuneration or other valuable pJvment u consideration shall be deemed to be dealer for the purposes of this Act; Explanation-IV: - For the purpose of this clause, Ieach of tlle following per;ons and bodies whether or not in the course of business who sell ot dtspose afl ISubstituted 'each of the following persons and bodtes vtlto sell or dispose of' by Act No.25 of 2002, datL,d 21.12.2002.1 any qoods including unclaimed or confiscated or unserviceable goods or scrap surplus, old, obsolete, or discarded material or waste products whether by auction or otherwise, directly or through ati agent for cash, or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration shall be deemed to be a dealer to the extent of such disposals or sales, namely: - (a) The Port Trust; (b) Municipal Corporation, and Municipal Councils, and other local authorities; Page 33 of 4? (c) Railv,,ay administration as defrntd Lioder the Indian Rail,,1ra',,s Act, 1ti90; (d) Slttpping, Lransport and constructton cotnpantes; (a) Air transport companies and airlrne:;; (f) Transporters, holding pennits for tr.tnsport vehicles granLed under the f'lotor Vehicles Act, 1988 which are used or adopted to be used for hire; (q) Tlte Andhra Pradesh StaLe Road lranspott Lorporation; (11) Customs DepartnEnt of tltt: Govt:i rtrr)ent of Ir]dra adtntuistt:ing tltt CLtstoms Act, 1962; (i) [nsurar]cc and Financial CotpontioD:; or Con)par)ios and Banks irtcluded in the Second Schedule to t.he Reserve tsank of lndia Act, t q'14 (j ) Adv erti si ng Agenci es ; (k) Any other Corporation, Company body or authority owned or s.t up by or subject to administrative control of the Central Government or any State Govenment.

33. Section 54 of the APGST Act which deals with levy of tax on turnover is also reproduced hereunder, viz., Section 5. Levy of tax on sales or purchases of goods:--- [(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act every dealer shall pay tax under this Act for each year on every rupee of his turnover of sales or purchases of goods in each year irrespective of the quantum of his t tinto'.,'i :rt l/rp r.'rl,rq o{ tax and ,}l the points of levy sp.:(ified u} the '>,-lt,:dli,.;.l i)) Fot titc ,)t post af this sectian and the other provisions of tltt Act, lhe Lrtt:avtr |rhtah a dealcr shall be liable to pay t3): >htlt t:e dotentir)ed ,)lter naking such deductions from his total tLtrnover, and t1 sLtclt irlJnn('t as ntay be rtrt:scribed, , i) ilr' '-rr,, ti)rj.)t il)ts sa.iior't ';h3ll bc a:;sessed, levicti ,tn;l :oll, .l?.1 )ti 5|t l1 ii)3t',nt't , a,- tr,ll/ bt: ltttscnbed: Provtd..d thal , r) ,/r rr.5/)1,.f o[ t/)o sa,flc tansaction, the buye r or the :;eller i,ii:. t,,; itt)tit, .)5 doLrrntinetl by such i.u/es .Js ntay bt pr cscr rlttzrl, shall be taxed. 1ii.) uvltue a dealer has beett taxed in respect of tlte purchase oi anv aoods, in accordance with the rules rcferred to in ' l,tu:;a (r) of tl)i:; proviso, he shall not be taxe.l again ir'l r cspatL of any salc of such goods effected by him."

34. Scctiorr 5 t. of the APGST Act which deals with tax in respect of su pp ly of artrcles of fooc or drinks in restaurants or catering houses or hotels is a lso reprod Llced hereunder, v iz., fSection 5-c. Tax in respect of supply of articles of food or drink in restaurants or catering houses or hotels:--- Every dealer running any restaLlrant or eating house or hotel (by whatever name called), ttho supplies, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manns wlntsoever of goods, being food or any alb ,afticle for human consuntption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) and whether or not such goods have suffered tax under the Act. where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration shall on the total amount charged by the said dealer for such supply, pay a tax at the rate of eight paise on every rupee on the aggregate of such amount realised or realisable by him during the year. Provided tltat no suclt tax shall be levied if the total turnover of the dealer including suclt aggregate during the year is less than Rs-2,00,000.1

35. Section 5-E of the APGST Act deals with tax on the amount realized in respect of any right to use goods is also reproduced hereunder, viz., [Section 5-E. Tax on the amount realised in respect of any right to use goods:--- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,--- (a) Every dealer wtto transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose, whatsoever, whether or not for a specified period, to any /essce o/- licensee for cash, deferred payment or otltet valuable consideratiort, in the course of his business shall, on the total amoutlt realised or realisable by him by way of payment in cash or otherwtse on sltch transfer or transfers of the right to use such goods front the lessee or licensee, pay a tax at the rate of eight paise on every rupee of tlrc aqgregate of such amount realised or realisable by him during the year- (b) the transfer of right to use any such goods entered into by any dealer, shall be deemed to have taken place in this State whenever the goods are used within the State, irrespective of the place where the agreernent whether written or oral for such transfer of right is Inade. Provided that no such tax shall be levied if the total turnover of the dealer including such aggregate is less than rupees two lakhs.l"

36. Othcr S(rcLions of ltre APGST Act which have to be taken into consideration are Sr:clion 6 dealing with tax in respect of declared goods and Section 6 A dcalin<1 wrth levy of tax on turnover relating to purchase of certain goods. For ready reference, Section 6 and Section 6-A are reproduced hereunr jer, viz., 6, Tax in respect of declared goods:--- Notwithstanding anything containeLl t1 .,,:, tt?it 5, tlle sa/es or purchases of declared goods bV a deJler sltrll br, riab/e lo Lax at the rate, and only at the point of salc or pur chaso sltaL tft,:d ,,Jqatnst each in the third Schedule on his turnover of sr/ch salL,i rrr lrurclr.]ses for each year irrespective of the quantum of his tutnovet io .;Lt.:h qood<; and the tax shall be assessed levied and collected in sttc/t ntanrrer as tnay be prescribed. [Provided tltat lvhere ant/ such goods on which a tax has been so lcvied ,trejotd u1 llte coursc of inter State trade or commerce- and tax has been fatd under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 in respect of the sale of suclt qoods rrt the course of inter State trade or commerce the tax so lcvtac, ( shall bc reintbursed to the person making such sale in Lhe coutsc DI tnter State trade or commerce,) in such manner and sublect to sLjch condilions as may be prescribed.l [6-4. Levy of tax on turnover relating to purchase of certain goods:--- Et,e:r v dt:aler, who in the course of business,--- (i) purchasc:s any goods (the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under this Act) from a registered dealer in circumstances in which no titx is payable under section 5 or under section 6, as the case may be, or. (ii) purchases any goods (the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax Ltnder this Act) front a person other than a registered dealer, and (a) consuntes suctt qoods in the manufacture of othet qoo{Js for sale or consumcs lhem otherwtse, or: (b) disposes of such goods in any manner other than by way of sale in the State or. (c) despatches thern to a place outside the State except as a direct result of sale u purchase in the course of inter State trade or commerce, shdll pdy tax orl the turnover relating to purchase aforesaid at the same Gte at whiclt but for the existence of the aforementioned circumstances, the tax would have been leviable on such goods under Section 5 or Section 6.

37. Following this, reference is made to the First Schedule oF the APGST Act which specifies the goods subject to single-point taxation under Entry B0 of the said Schedule. For ready reference/ Entry B0 is reproduced below: Sl.No. Description of Coods 1 2 Point of Levy 3 Rate of Tax 4 I aO. Poultry Fecd and Cattle fced At the poant of first sale in State 4 paise in thc rupee

38. Next, attention is invrted to the Third Schedule of the APGST Act, which specifies the goods subject to single-point taxation under Section 6. i Pagc 38 of 42 Entry 2O of this Schedulc peftains to various types of cereals, and the corresponding point of Icvy and rate of tax ai-e reproduced below: Sl. No. Description of Goods Poin t of Levy Rate of Tax 1 20 2 3 4 Cereals, that rs to sJy, (i) ba.lr.r (P( rrnrsetrrn ty,rhord.Lrnr l .) (ri) kodun (P.srpalullr sarr brcul itun-r L. ) iiii) kutkr r:,n,r(unr liirir.1r.,, , .: Irv) lr.)r,r'/ il ,rrd.rurrr .,rri1l jrl t At thc Doint of first sale 2 paise in the rupee rn thc State

39. It is evidenr- fronr the above definition and the elaborate interpretation that the respondent docs not fall within the definition of 'dealer' as contemplated under Section 2(e) of the Act. The respondent's activities are undertaken solely tor charitable purposes, and any income generated from the sale of oats is utilized cxclusively for furthering these charitable objectives rather than for commercial gain or profit. The essence of being a 'dealer' under tho APGST Act presupposes carrying on business with a profit motive or for valuable consideration in the commercial sense. Since the respondent's operations are driven not with profit intent and the funds are apptied towards charitable purposes, the respondent cannot be classified as a dealer within the meaning of the APGST Act. This interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent to exclude charitable organizations From the purview of commercial taxation when their activities are not conducted for p rofit.

40. Furthermore, it is important to note that the respondent sells oats to trainers who cxclusively use it as feed for their horses. In examining the nature of horses within the legislative framework, reference must be made to the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, which explicitly includes horses within the definition of 'cattle' or 'livestock'. The judicial pronouncements cited above, particularly the decision rn Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd, (supra) and the analysis of livestock definitions across various statutory instruments and authoritative publications establish that livestock encompasses horses along with other domestic animals. The Supreme Court's observation that 'livestock' includes all live animals and birds and the breeding of which is regulated by man, Ieaves no room for doubt that horses constitute cattle for the purposes of lavestock and cattle feed provisions. Consequently, oats supplied by the respondent to trainers for feeding horses must be regarded as cattle Feed in its true legislative and it sense. 4L. The classification of oats as cattle feed is a matter of legislative interpretation that must be guided by the principle that entries in taxing statutes should not be read in a narrow or restricted sense. It is well established that each general word in a legislative schedule should be held to extendable to all the ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended urithin it

42. In the present case, oats fall squarely within the ambit of Schedule 1 of Errtry 80, whiclr explicitly provides for 'Poultry feed and cattle feed'. This entry is broad enough to encompass all forms of feed meant for livestock, including oats conrmonly used as nutritional feed for horses and other cattle. Conversely, Entry 2O of Third Schedule enumerates specific cereals such as bajra, kodon, kutki, and barley, and does not include oats within its purview. The absence of oats from this specific enumeration cannot be construed as an exclusion from the broader category of cattle feed under Entry B0 of First Schedule. The legislative intent behind these entries is to distinguish between cereals nreanl for hunran consumption or general commercial purposes and those which serve as cattle feed. Applying the principle of liberal interpretation, oats, when used as feed for horses and othcr livestock, must be classified under Entry BO of Farst Schedule. This interpretation is consistent with the judicial approach that taxing entries should be construed in a manner that gives effect to their plain meanang and purpose, without imposing artificial restriciions that defeat the legislative objective.

43. Another aspect which comes in the mind of the Bench in the course of deliberation is that Entry 80 of First Schedule purely reflected "poultry feed and cattle feed" both had to be given a wide and exhaustive interpretation. More so for the reason that the said schedules stood amended vide Acl No.27 of 1996, w.e.f. 01.08.1996, and in the process Entry 80A and Entry 80B were introduced. For ready reference, Entry 80A and Entry B0B are reproduced hereunder: Sl.No. Descriptiolr of Goods Point of Levy

1. BO-4. 2 3 Feed supplefirents, nutients, At the pornt of first sale an State Flinerol rnrxtr.rre, vrIJnrir)!, n'ledrclne5, a,rd .lny alirsi category of food suillrlcnrenls which are uscd in l)or:ltry fe.:d, frsh fecd, prdwr fc.rd and i{r.r.J For lrvcstock. Rate of T.f x 4 I paise io thc rupr,,: BO-B Fish feed and piawo feed for At thc point of first sale in State livestock other tlr.rn .:attle- 4 paise in the rupec A bare perusal of tlre aforesaid Entries would go to show that according to the law, as it existed prior to 01.01.2000, all t6ose items which are reflected in the newly brought in Entry B0A and Entry B0B were all inclusive in the original Entry 80. This in other words also means that feed For livestock was not earlier there in any oF the Schedules and therefore feed for livestock also would automatically have to be brought within the ambit of cattle feed. If feed for livestock was not part of cattle feed, the necessity of incorporating Entry BOA and Entry B0B was not necessary. This also means that if it had becorre necessary and hence it was segregated as a specific Entry, this itself forcer; this Bench to also considr:r that it was earlier part of cattle feed itself.

44. For this reason also the arguments acl,.rarrced by thc learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Tax does not have ar)y stronq ground to sland.

45. For all the .rforesaid reasons, the Tax Revision Casc No.105 of 2010 filed by the State being clevoid of rnerit deserves to be and is accordingly orsilrisscd. Consequently, tire olhcr batch of fa x llevision Cases also stand dismissed.

46. As a sequel, rniscellaneous petitions pc.nding if arry, shc:ll stand closed. Howevet there shall be no order as to costs. //TRUE COPY// D/-K.SRINIVASA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER \ One fair Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice P' SAM KOS (For his LordshiPs kind Perusal) One fair copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA (For his Lordships kind Perusal) To, 1 2 3 4 5 6 . The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad' . ff," oV. C"rnmissioner (CT), PunjaguttlDivision' HYderabad' . ff," C6**"tcial Tax Officei, tvlalakpet Circle' Hyderabad 1 1 LR Copies fneUnOer Seeretary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Law' Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi in" S1"r"tr.v, Advocates Association Library' High Courl for the State of Telangana, tiign Court Buildings at Hyderabad t'r

7. One CC to SRl. Swaroop Oorilla( SPL SC FOR CT) Advocate IOPUCI 8. One CC to SRl. CH PUSHYAIV KIRAN Advocate [OPUC] 9. Two CD Copies ASR/I'St, w HIGH COURT DATED:1311112025 COMMON ORDER TREVC.No.60, 72, 1 05, 106, 116 & 139 0F 2010 I ,(tlE S}t 2 B JAN 202[ C) (-) 1:. * ^-rCl). DISMISSING I'IIE TRF]V CASES ,r*'it)' -ff*