High Court · 2025

this Court in CCCA No.21 of 1995 and Cross objection No.23057 of 1998 dated 27.A3.2006.

3. The contention of the petitioner - clairnant in the E.P was that the land to an extent of Acs.50.28 guntas and 46 Sq.yards i.e., 245434 Sq.yards at Baghlingampally was acquired by A.P. Housing Board through award, dated 31.12.1975 and possession o1'the land was taken on 18.01.1976. The market value of the land was fixed @ Rs.30/- per Sq.yard. Aggrieved by the same,, the claimants filed O.P. No.267 of 1979 for enhancement and the same was decreed on 14.07 "1994 by fixing the market value ol the larld @ Rs.37.50 Ps. per Sq.yard. Aggrieved by the said order, the Judgrnent Debtor (J.Dr.) had filed CC'CA No.21 of 1995 before the High Court and the Decree Holders (D.Hrs.) filed Cross .t I 2 Objection No.23057 of 1998 and the said appeal and Cross Objections were disposed of on2'l .03.2O06 by fixing the market value @ Rs.50.00 per Sq.yard. As per the judgment and decree in CCCA No.21 of 1995, the claimant was entitled for the E.P. amount. While stating so, the claimants also stated that the claim of each claimant was decided by the Court in O.P No.336 of 1979.

4. The J.Dr/LAO filed counter in the said E.P. admitting acquisition of land and passing the award dated 31.12.1975, but contended that since there were rival claims, the LAO referred the matter under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for adjudication of title and apportionment along with compensation amount and the said O.P. was numbered as O.P No.336 of 1979. O.P No.336 of 1979 was disposed of on 30.04. 1994. The present claimants were arayed as claimant Nos.62 to 65, who were the defendant Nos.l07 to 111 in C.S No.14 of 1958. While adjudicating the dispute under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act in O.P No.336 of 1979, the Court held that the claimant Nos.62 to 65 and some others had not placed any evidence, as such, their claim was closed. The above claimants were set ex-pafte. No apportionment of compensation was made to the said claimants. As such, the present claimants were not entitled to claim any compensation. The Court awarded amounts to claimant Nos.2 and 3, 50 to 55,61,101,102, 103,124, 151 to 155 only but not to the above claimants. The claimants 3 wrongly filed the E.P. showing the judgment in O.P No.2.67 of 1979 by suppressing the judgment in O.P No.336 of 1979 and prayed to dismiss the E.P

5. On considering the rival contentions, the learned I-Senior Civil Judge,, Cir.y Civil Court, Hyderabad, observed that O.P No.336 of 1979, dated 30.04.1994 was a reference under Section 30 of Land Acquisition Act for adjudication of title in respect of the same subject matter of propefty as in O.P No.267 of 1979. O.P No.267 of 1979 was refemed fbr dcterrnination of market value and OP No.336 of 1979 was refered for adjudication of title. The High Courl enhanced the market value in the Cross Objections frled by the claimants, but the title ol the claimants was not decided by the High Cour1. As the claimants had filed Cross Objections only for enhancement, the High Courl entertained their petition to that cxtent only. Mere enhancement of the market value would not conlbr any title to receive compensation, which was subject matter of O.P No.336 of 1979. The amount was deposited with regard to the rights of the claimants whose entitlement was declared in O.P No.336 of 1979. Since both the references were made with regard to the same sub.ject matter ,rf property, both the orders have to be read together. In view of the order of the Court in O.P No.336 of 1979, dated 30.04.1994, the present clairnants were not entitled for any compensation and as such, dismissed the E.P. with costs. I 4

6. Aggrieved by the said dismissal of the E.P., claimant No.29 prefered this revision. 7 . Heard Sri Mohammad Adnan, leamed counsel representing Sri Mohammad Osman Shaheed, leamed counsel for the petitioner and leamed Govemment Pleader for Arbitration representing respondent J.Dr.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the executing couft was against [aw. It was settled law that the executing court could not go beyond the decree. I'he executing court failed to take into consideration that even if the judgrnent and decree sought to be executed were bad on facts or on law, it couid not go beyond the decree. The executing court failed to take into consideration that the decree sought to be executed was the judgment and decree passed by the High Court in CCCA No.21 of 1995. The executing couft erred in holding that the order passed by its predecessor in O.P No.336 of 1979 was binding on it, but not the judgment and decree passed by the High Court. It also failed to take into consideration that the obiection taken in the E.P. was never taken before the High Courl while arguing CCCA No.21 of 1995. The respondent was estopped by its conduct to raise such I l i 5 a plea at the stage of execution and relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr.G.H.Grant Vs. The State of Biharl.

8.1 . He relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sneh Lata Goel Vs. Pushplata and others2 and Asma Lateef and another Vs. Shabbir Ahmad and othersr on the aspect that the Court executing a declee could not go beyond the decree and could not entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts and had to take the decree as per its tenor.

8.2. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Balbir Singh & another etc. Vs. Baldev Singh (died) through his L.Rs and others etc.a on the aspect that the decree passed by the trial Courl would stand merged with the decree passed by the appellate Court and as it was the order of the appellate Court which was sought to be executed, the erecuting Court could not rely upon the order of the trial Court in O.P No.336 of 1979.

9. Leamed Govemment Pleader for Arbitration' on the other hand, contended that there was no error in the order passed by the leamed I-senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. There were two O.Ps, one filed by the claimants under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act vide O.P No.267 of 1979 for enhancement of compensation and another O.P ' AtR 1966 sc 237 ' izo ro; : scc ssa 3 zoz+ (r) aLo z:+ (sci o 2025 INSC 8t I 6 No.336 of 1979 preferred by the LAO for adjudication of title and apportionment along with compensation amount. The petitioner was also cited as claimant No.65 in O.P No.336 of 1979. No evidence was adduced by her in the said O.P. As such, no apportionment of compensation was awarded to her. The amount 'deposited as per the orders in CCCA No.21 of 1995 and Cross Objection No.23057 of 1998 was pertaining to the rights of the claimants whose entitlement was declared in O.P No.336 of 1979. The market value of the subject property was decided in O.P No.267 of 1979 but the title of the rival claimants was adjudicated in O.P No.336 of 1979. The judgrnents relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner were not applicable to the facts of the case and prayed to dismiss the CRP.

10. Now the point for consideration in this CRP is: Whether the executing court committed any error ln dismissing E.P No.l15 of 2008? I I . Admittedly, two O.P's are filed against the same subject matter of Acs.50.28 guntas and 46 Sq.yards i.e.,245434 Sq.yards situated at Baghlingamaplly, which was acquired by A.P. Housing Board through award dated 31.12.1975. O.P No.267 of 1979 was filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation which was fixed by the LAO at Rs.30/- per Sq.yard. The said pP-,was decreed on 14.07.1994 fixing the market value of the land @ Rs.37.50 Ps.per Sq.yardp. Against the said -l 1 order in O.P No.267 of 1979, the LAO had filed the CCCA No.21 of 1995 and the claimants filed Cross Objection No.23507 of 1998. The said CCCA and Cross objections were disposed of by this Court on

27.03.2006 enhancing the market value @ Rs.50.00 per Sq.yard. O.P No.336 of 1979 was refened by the LAO under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, since there were rival claims by the claimants for adjudication of title and apportionment of the compensation amount between the rival claimants. O.P No.336 of 1979 was disposed of on

30.04.1994 and O.P No.267 of 1979 was disposed of on14.07.1994.

12. The revision petitioner claimant was aware of adjudication of O.P No.336 of 1979 as the claimants themselves stated in E.P. that the claim of each claimant was decided by the Court in O.P No.336 of 1979. The present claimant had not adduced any evidence in O.P No.336 of 1979 and she was set ex-parte. Though, the market value ofthe property was determined by the Court in O.P No.267 of 1979, which was enhanced as per the orders of the High Court in CCCA No.2i of 1995 and Cross Objection No.23057 of 1998, the entitlement of each claimant was decided only in O.P No.336 ol 1979.

13. Leamed counsel for the revision petitioner contended that under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act also, the Land Acquisition Officer could determine the amount of compensation and the persons to whom it was payable or the apportionment thereof among the persons t 8 I entrusted. As such, Section 18 is wide in nature and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court Dr.G.H.Grant Vs. The State of Bihar.

14. On a perusal of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Courl in the case of Dr.G.H.Grant Vs. The State of Bihar(Supra-l) it was held that: "12..... By S. l8 the Collector is enjoined to refer to the District Court for determination, objections as to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment thereof among the persons interested. Part IV deals with apportionment of compensation. If the persons interested agree in the apportionment of the compensation. the particulars of such apportionment shall be specified in the award (s. 29): if there be no such agreement, the Collector may, ifa dispute arises as to the apportionment ofthe compensation or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, refer such dispute under s. 30 for decision by the Court.

13. There are two provisions ss. l8(l)and 30 which invest the Collector with power to refer to the Court a dispute as to apportionment of compensation or as to the persons to whom it is payable. By sub-s. (l) of s. I 8 the Collector is enjoined to refer a dispute as to apportionment, or as to title to receive compensation, on the application within the time prescribed' by sub-s. (2) of that section of a person interested who has not accepted the award. Section 30 authorizes the Collector to refer to the Court after compensation is settled under s. I I, any dispute arising as to appoftionment ofthe same or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereofis payable. A person shown in that part ofthe award which relates to apportionment of compensation, who is present either petsonally or through a representative, or on whom a notice is served under sub-s. (2) of s. I 2, must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector within the tirne prescribed under s. 9 l8(2)to refer the matter to the Court. But a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable, and apply to the Court for a reference unders. 30, for determination of his right to compensation which nray have existed before the award, or which may have devolved upon him since the award. Whereas under s. 18 an application made to the Collector must be made within the period prescribed by sub-s.(2) cl. (b), there is no such period prescribed under s. 30. Again under s. l8 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested. The Collector unders. 30 is not enjoined to make a reference: he may relegate the person raising a dispute as to apportionment, or as to the person to whom compensation is payable, to agitate the dispute in a suit and pay the compensation in the manner declared by his award.

15. Thus tl.rere is a distinction between Section l8 and Section

30. Though under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act also, the land acquisition officer can decide the aspect of the amount o{' compensation and the persons to whom it was payable and the apportionment thereof among the persons interested the names of the claimants rvho agreed to such apportionment would be specified in the award but if there was no such agreement between them, the land acquisition officer would need to refer the said dispute under Section 30 for decision of the Court. As the land acquisition otficer had referred the dispute to the Court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Court had decided the said dispute by its order dated 30.04.1994 and, the same was not challenged by the claimant, being aware of the same, she cannot take { l0 I recourse of the order in O.P No.267 of 1979 which merged with the order in CCCA No.21 of 1995 and Cross Objection No.23057 of 1998. The entitlement of the petitioner for compensation was not decided in CCCA No.2 I of 1995 except that the interested persons were entitled for an enhanced compensation as declared in the award.

16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the above judgment Dr.G.H.Grant Vs. The State of Bihar (Supra-l) also held that: "In our j udgment the powers exercisable by the Collector under s. 18(l)and under s. -?0 are distinct and may be invoked in contingencies which do not overlap." I l- But, if the powers exercisable under both the Sections would overlap, as the persons who were entitled to receive compensation was decided under Section 30 reference, the persons whose names were set out in the award under Section 30 are only entitled to receive the compensation.

18. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sneh Lata Goel Vs. Pushplata and others (Supra-2) is pertaining to the objection with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. As such, it was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that it was an objection to territorial jurisdiction which did not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil couft to entertain the suit. Al executing court cannot go beyond the decree and must execute the decree as it stands and by extracting its earlier judgment in Vasudev Dhanjitrhai Motli v I Rajabhai Abdul Rehman [(1970) 1 SCC 670], wherein it was held that: "6. A coun executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entcrtain any objection that the decree was incomect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties."

19. However, the contention of the respondents in the present case was not with regald to the judgment in CCCA No.2l of 1995 is not coffect on law c'r on facts but that it was perlaining to only' enhancement of compensation but not with regard to the entitlement of the claimant. As such, the above judgment can be distinguished on the facts of the present case.

20. In a sirrilar manner, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Asma Lateef and another Vs. Shabbir Ahmad and others (Supra-3) considered its earlier judgments and held as follows:

27. In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman reported in (1970) I SCC 670, this Court rvas considcring the scope of objection under section 47 of the CPC in relation to the executability of a decree. Therein, it was laid down that only such a decree could be the subject- matter of objection which is a nullity and not a decree which was erroneous either in law or on facts. Law was laid down in the following terms: f t 12 r\. "6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the pa(ies or their representatives it must take thc decree according to its tenor and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decrec even if it be enoneous is still binding between the parties.

7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed wilhout bringing the iegal representative on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may bc raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is nrade by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appean on the l'ace of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the cxecuting Court will have no jurisdiction to cntcdain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence ofjurisdiction. . . ."

28. In Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash Universityl3, this Court further expounded the powers of a court under section 47, CPC in the following words: "24. The exercise of powers under Section 47 of the Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole. Thus it is plain that executing court can allow objection under Section 47 of the Code to the executability of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and a nullity, apart from the ground that the decree is not capable of execution under law either because the same was passed in ignorance of such a provision of law or the law was promnlgated making a decree inexecutable after it$)fising.. .." 13

29. The legality of the order of the High Court, together with the order of the Executing Court that the former went on to uphold, has to be tested having regard to the settled position ol law as noticed above and bearing in mind that the powers of an executing court, though narrower than an appellate or revisional court, car be exercised to dismiss an execution application if the decree put to execution is unmistakably found to suffer from an inherent lack of jurisdiction t-r l lhe court that made the same rendering it a nullity in the eye of law. 21 . The contention of the leamed Govemment Pleader for Arbitration is not that the trial Court or the High Court was not having jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the claimant was $ able to show that her entitlernent to the award was also decided by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court in the above judgment, the E.P is executable on this count. However, as she failed to show that her entitlement was also decided in the r;aid appeal but as the same was reporled to be decided in O.P No.336 of 1979, she could not seek to execute the judgment in CCCA No.21 of 1995 and Cross Ob.jection No.23057 of 1998 for realization of the EP amount deposited for the claimants whose rights were decided as per O.P No.3.i6 of 1979. There is no quarrel with regard to the proposition of larv laid down in Balbir Singh & another etc. Vs, Baldev I t Singh (died) through his LRs and others etc (Supra 4) which describes I I the doctrine of rnerger and held that:

28. I he doctrine of merger is founded on the rationale that there cannot be more than one operative decree at a given point of time. The doctrine of merger applies irrespective i /: ).4 t, of whether the appellate courl has afhrmed, modified or reversed the decree of the trial court. The doctrine has been discussed and explained succinctly by this Court in Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan Lat (Dead) tkough Legal Representatives, (2020) 15 SCC 771.

22. The judgment of the trial Court in O.P No.267 of 1979 merges with the judgment of the I{igh Court in CCCA No.21 of 1995 and Cross Objection No.23057 of 1998. Bu| as the judgment in O.P No.336 of 1979 is not merged with CCCA No.21 of 1995, the petitioner could not claim that her entitlement was also decided by the High Court in CCCA No.21 of 1995 and Cross Objection No.23057 of 1998 dated27.03.2006

23. This Court does nol find any illegality or irregularity in the order of the Executing Court in dismissing the E,.P filed by the claimant.

24. ln the iesult, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed confirming the order dated 07. 10.2020 passed in E.P No.l15 of 2008 in O.P No.267 of 1979 by the learned I Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending shall stand closed. / /TRUECOPY/ / sd/-K. AMMAII ASSISTANT REGISTRAR \ I SECTION OFFICER To,

1. The i Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad. 2. One CC to Sri Mohammad Adnan, Advocate [OPUC] 3. One CC to Govt. Pleader for Arbitratioru High Court Buildings, Hyderabad.[OPUC]

4. Two CD Copies. JCK/kam ( I I I HIGHCOURT DATED:74/02/2025 ORDER CRP.No.1355 of 2020 Dismissing the C.R. P. \^'ithout costs I I z 1E APil ilE o .5 t Og spal-c. * Ic