The High Court · 2025

Order

This O riminal Petition is filed by the peti tioner / accused under Sectiort 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.(),') to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.1 o{ 2024 on the file of P:incipal Special Judge for CBI Cases, I\iampa11y, Hyderabad. Ihe offence alleged against the petitioner is under Section 7 of L\e Prevention of Cormption Act, 1988 (as ,rmended in 2O 18) (fc,r s;hort 'P.C.Act').

2. The lacts of the case are that a written complaint was

lodged by Siri T. Jagadeeswara Rao on 29.06.2022 a11e1{ng that the complat rrant met Suresh at his ofhce chamber, Sri SureshT/ petitioner herein initially demanded arr amount of Rs. 1O lakhs for ,l>:t(r [ding the currency of work under agreement dated

11.01.2019 treing carried out by the complainant, beyond

30.06.2022 and directed the complainant to pay Rs.S l,akhs as first instainrent at his residence at Nacharam, Hyderab:Ld in the evening r:f 2!}).06.2022 and also to submit a request letter seeking extension of currency under 17A (ii) of GCC. As the complainant ,1id not viant to pay bribe, he gave a written 2 o complaint to the Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Hyderabad. Accordingly, trap was laid and petitioner was caught red handedly while demanding and accepting the amount of Rs.5 Laths from the complainant.

3. Heard Sri Chetluru Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Srinivas Kapadia, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for CBI for the respondent.

4. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that Section 5 of Delhi Special Poiice Establishment Act, 1956 (for short 'DSP Act') provides for the powers and jurisdiction of the members of DSP Act for investigation under any of the offences specifred under notification under Section 3 may be extended to any State. However, Section 6 of the DSP Act states that nothing contained in Section shall be deemed to enable any member of Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise Powers and jurisdiction in any area in a state, not being a Union Territory or railway, or without the consent of the Government of that State.

5. I-earned counsel further contended that petitioner is working in the State of Telangana and the Government of Telangana, vide G.O.Ms.No.S1 Home (Special) Department dated \ l I i , i I i 3 3O.O8.2O'2I., withdrew al1 previorrs-general consents issued by the State Ciovernment under Section 6 of the DSP Act. It clearly states 1n (]. O, that consequent to withdrawal of all previous general c()ns€nts issued earlier, including the notihcation issued in G.O.Ms.lkr.160, Home (SC) Department dated 23.09.2016, prior cons,:nl of Government of Telangana is requir:d to be taken on a (:ase to case basis for investigation of any cffence or class ol offerLces under Section 3 of the DSP Act, but in the present casie, no such consent was obtained by the invcstigating ofhcer for the investigation conducted from 3O.08.2022 till hling of charge s[r:r:t. As such, the investigation and charge ,jheet are vitiated. ilis further contention is that CBI has registered another casr: against the petitioner on the allegation of possessing clisproportionate assets. In the said case, CBI has obtained inrlividual consent and the second contention of petitioner is 1.hat P.C. Act was amended in the .year 2018 and Section --7 -,1 was introduced which contemplates previous approva.l ol lJnion Government in the case of employees of Central Gorrernment before conducting any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have beer, comraitted by a public s,eruant under the P.C.Act. No such mandatory approval rv:rs' obtained by the CBI as it is not the case of arrest I I I I I i i I 4 a on the spot and arrest has taken place after one day, and sufhcient time was available between the date of FIR and date of arrest. If an offence is registered merely on the basis of written complaint of complainant, then disastrous consequences can be culled upon on public servant thereby exposing them to registration of offence and hling of charge sheet. A written complaint can be made by any person who bore grudge or prejudice against a public servant. The third contention of petitioner is that there must be demand and the same should be corroborated with the evidence submitted by CBI. In the instant case, there is no such demand and corroboration. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suraj Mal Vs State lDelhi Adminf l, wherein it was held that mere recovery of tainted money divorce from the circumstalces under which it is paid is not sufhcient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. In the present case, substantive evidence of corroboration of demand is not available with the prosecution. The crucial question would be that whether the petitioner had | 7979 4 SCC 725 I I ! 5 demanded zl.lry amount as gratifreation to show any official favour

6. The lorth contention of learned counsel for the ltetitioner is that even if the allegations in the charge sheet orL its face value is takerr to be true, no prima-facie case is made out by the respondenl.. He relied on the judgment in State of Haryana and Others Vs Bhajan Lal and Others2 and contendeC that the voice recorder and other devices are not legally valid and the same cannol, be taken as corroborative evidence. Admittedly, it is borne out cf charge sheet and that the alleged conrersion is not audit>lt: ernd the same cannot be considered. Hr:nce, the prosecution becomes a futile exercise as the material available do not shorv the offences are made out against the petittoner.

7. The lurther contention of petitioner is that the case file pertaininll tc, extension of currency in favour of complrlinant is not on the: table of petitioner. Therefore, petitioner has no opportuniq. r-o obtain any favour from the complarnant 1.o attract the ingredrents of Section 7 of the P.C.Act. The letter of extension sh,tuld come through the office of Deputy Chief Engineer, rooreover, the complainant was issued slow progress , 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335 6 a-l notice on 11.04.2022 to make good the prog:ress, by the Deputy chief Engineer who has to share his views and forward the said letter for approval to the Chief Engineer. Further, the Deputy Chief Engineer has also issued a letter wherein, it is stated that the progress of work is poor and the contractor has been deliberately postponing the work. The Deputy Chief Engineer has reminded the contractor to submit corrected Qualify Assurance Plan and summoning ttre accused is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. In the instant case, not even small evidence was collected by the prosecution which charges the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 7 ol the P.C.Act. Charge sheet was filed on O2.O2.2O24, the case was posted for consideration on O4.O3.2O24, charges were framed on 3O.O4.2O24 within less than two months of Iiling charge sheet. No opportunity was given to the petitioner to make submissions on framing of charges or hling a petition for discharge. It is further submitted that the cases of the year 2009 are still pending while the present which is of the year 2024 is posted for trial in July,

8. While advocating to quash the proceedings against the petitioner, in support of the above contentions, he reiied on the \ 1 judgmenl.s rendered in the casestf Anvar PV Vs. PK Basheer and Others:r, Narendra Mishra Vs. State of Madhya ftadesha, Pepsi Foods Limited and Another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Otherss whereunder, in paragraph Nos.3, 4, 16 and 28 it u,as held as under: '3.'l'here are two appellants, the second appellant is the Malaging Director of the first appella:nt. The rr:spcndents aJe three. First respondent is the court \ h,:re the appellants along with others have been srrrnmoned for having committed offences under Sections 7 /16 of lL.e Act. The second respondent is the complainant and the third respondent is the State of Uttar Pradesh. 4.'rhe allegation in the complaint is that the conr llainant was sold a bottle of beverage under the brand 'Lehar Pepsi" which was adulterated. The b,rttle was purchased by the complainant on 13 9 l'l!la]. He hled the complaint on 6-5-1994. After rr:c,rrding preliminar5r evidence the Magistrate p;rs sed orders summoning the appellants and others on 9-5-1994. It appears that when the srirrlmons reached the appellants they immediately approached the High Court seeking the aforesaid rr:lie.'s- The High Court, however, refused to ente-:tain the I^rit petition on the ground that the appellarts should approach the first respondent for their discharge under Section 245 of the Code of Crirr.inal Procedure (for short "the Code") if the conrplaint did not disclose commission of any olience by the appellants and the Court considered ttre c harge to be groundless. The High Court did not app,rove of the appellants approaching it under writ ju.risdiction when sufhcient remedy was available u rrlr:r the Code. The High Court was a-lso of the ol)ir,on that it could not be said at that stage that 3 (20l4l 10 Sr:(l 473 a 2022 LawSuit tMPl 226 s (1998) 5 SCC 749 8 the allegations in the complaint were so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man could ever reach a just conclusion that there existed no sufflcient ground for proceedings against the accused. On the plea of t}.e appellants that the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act read with Rule 9-A of the Rules framed under the Act were violated and on that account the inquiry or trial stood vitiated the High Court said that the appellants could well approach the court for that purpose and that it was no stage for the High Court to record its finding. Yet another plea of the appellants that provisions of Sections 2O3 and 245(2) of the Code did not provide an adequate remedy for a person charged on flimsy grounds and that in view of the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Blnjan Lal [7992 Supp (1) SCc 335 : 1992 SCC lcnl 426:JT (1990) a SC 6501 the Court should interfere also did not {ind favour with the High Court. It was of the opinion that Blvajan Lal cose [7992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cnl 426: JT (1990) 4 SC 650l pertained to a cognizable offence where the police had taken cogniz.ance of the matter and in a complaint case the Magistrate was empowered to discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if it was found that the charge was groundless. 16. The complainant (second respondent) is a student. He says that he is appearing in examinations in various State and Central Services. On 13 9-1993, he went to a strop known as "The Flavours Fast Food and Cool Corner" and purchased 500 ml chilled botfle of "Lehar Pepsi" for drinking. Nitin Sachdeva is stated to have (accused named as No- 1) sold the bottle to the complainant. After he had consumed tl-re beverage contained in the bottle, the complainalt felt a strange taste. On observation, he found that tl.e bottle contained marly white partic.les. The complainant felt giddy and nauseated. One Dirya Trivedi was present at the shop as a customer. Another shopkeeper by the name Lal Bahadur Singh who owned a shop opposite to the one from where tJle complainant purchased the "Lehar PePSi" bottle was also present. They were shown the bottle by the complainant. The beverage was put in two glasses 9 to see the white particles- clearly and Nitin Sac:hdeva accepted the presence of the particles. Suspecting adulteration, tl.e complainant told Nitin Sar:hdeva that he would take a sample of the beverage for analysis. He thereupon gave notice to Nit.rL Sachdeva, purchased three clean and dry emDry new plastic jars from nearby Suri Stores and fitlec. up the same with the beverage ald which, a,:cording to the complainant, were sealed as per rtrl:s;, wrapped in the paper and tied with thick yarn. Nitin Sachdeva signed the jars and put stamp ol' his shop thereon. The complainant obtained the sl.arrLp of the shop "The Flavours Fast Food and Cool Comer" on a separate paper and one jar of the sanple with stamp used on the sample was d,:p,csited by the complainant in the ofhce of the Slatr: hrblic Analyst, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow on 21) 9-7993 for analysis. The complainant says that the :hree jars were sealed in ttre presence of the rvilrt,:sses and he also recorded their statemenl-s in writing including that of Nitin Sachdeva. The conrPlainant also made a report to the police on 13- 9.1993 itself about the incident. 28. liummoning of al accused in a criminal case is a s::ious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into mol.i,)n as a matter of course. It is not that the coml:lainant has to bring only two witnesses to strpport his allegations in the complaint to have the crininal law set into motion. The order of the Ma{listrate summoning t}re accused must reflect tLLa: he has applied his rnind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine tL.e irature of allegations made in the complaint and tL.e evidence both oral and documentary in support therepf and would that be suflicient for the cc,nLplainalt to succeed in bringlng charge home to tl-.e accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a srlent spel:ator at the time of recording of preliminary evid-ence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brorr,ght on record and may even' himself put questions to the complainant and his w.itnesses to etLcrt answers to frnd out the truthfulness of the a.ltegations or otherwise and then examine if any offe.rce is prima facie committed by all or arry of the accu sed. " 10 9 . In addition, reliance was also placed upon the following judgments: a State of Karnatalra vs. L.Muniswamy and Oah.oo, in paragraph Nos.9 to 11 it was observed as follows: tl.e leading

9. Learned counsel for the State Government relies upon a decision of this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [(1960) 3 SCR 388 : AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1961) 1 ScJ 59 : 196O CrLJ 12391in which it was held that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-,{ of the Code of 1898, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not. That may be so, But in the instant case the question is not whethe.r any reliance can be placed on the veracity of this or that particular witness. The fact of the matter is that there is no material on the record on the basis of which aly tribunal could reasonably come to the conclusion that the respondents are in arty manner connected with the incident prosecution. Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke for the Court in Kapur case observes in his judgment ttrat it was not possible, desirable or expedient to lay dowrr any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of the High Court's irherent juristliction. The three instances cited in the judgment as to when the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction are only illustrative and carr in the very nature of things not be regarded as exhaustive. Considerations justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conJerred by Section 482 ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. 1O. On the other hand, the decisions cited by leamed counsel for the respondents it Vadiktl Panchol v. D.D. Ghadigaonkar [AIR 1960 SC 1113 : 1960 Cri I) 1499 : 62 Bolrl LR 9l5l and Century Spinning & Manufartuing Co.v. Stqte of Mahorashra lAlR 1972 SC 545 : 1972 Cn l) 3291972 SCC (Cri) 4951 show that it is wrong to say 6 (79771 2 SCC 699 11 th€rt at the stage of framirrg charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration r'/l1ether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As obser-ved in the latter case, the order frarning a cha:-ge aflects a person's liberty substaltially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judi,:ially whether the material warrants the franring of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the de<:ision of the prosecution that the accused be ask(:d to face a trial. ln Vadilal Panchal case. Section 2O3 of the old Code was under corr;ideration, which provided that the Magistrate corrld dismiss a complaint if after considering certain matters mentioned in the section there was in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding wilh the case. To an extent Section 327 of the neu CoC3 contains an alalogous power which is conlerred on the Sessions Court. It was held by this Court, while considering the true scope of Section 201 of the old Code that the Magistrate was not f al enquir5' or bor-r:rd to accept the result o in\estigation and that he must apply his judicial minC to the material on which he had to form his juclg;ment. These decisions show that for the purllose of determining whether there is sufflcient prc,rrnd for proceeding against an accused t}re court por;.(iesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question rvhether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is srch on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible.

11. We are therefore in agreement with the vit:w of thc High Court that the material on which the prosiecution proposes to rely against the respondents is wholly inadequate to sustain the charge that they are in any malrrer connected with thc assault on the complainant. We would, however, like to observe that nothing in our j udEiment or in the judgment of the High (lourt sh,)r,rld be taken as detracting from the case of the prosecution, to which we have not applied our mind, as against Accused I to 9. The case against thosie accused must take its due and laqful coll-se." I I II i x, :4,... t2 a In the case of Subramanien SwaEy Vs. Meomohan Singh and Another? whereunder, in paragraph Nos.73 and 74 it was observed as follows: '73. It was pointed out by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sheonanrlan Pastaanv. State of Bihar l(1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 821 , SCC at p. 315: ISCC para 14) "14. ... h is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderLiness in the society that certain acts are constituted offences and the right is given to any citizcn to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason that in A.R. Antulag v. R.S. .lvayak [(1984) 2 SCC 5O0 : 1984 SCC (Cnl 277] this Court pointed out that: (SCC p. 509, para 6) '6. ... Pdnishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of ttre objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings carnot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a straitjacket formula of locus standi.... -

74. Keeping those principles in mind, as we must, if we look at Section 19 of the PC Act which bars a court from taking cogniz-ance of cases of cormption against a public servant under Sections 7, 10, 17, 13 and 15 of the Act, unless the Central or the State Government, as the case may be, has accorded sanction, virtually imposes fetters on private citizens and also on prosecutors from approaching court against cormpt public servants. These protections are not available to ottrer citizens, Public servalts are treated as a special class of persons enjoying the said protection so that they can perform their duties without fear and favour and without threats of malicious prosecution. However, the said protection againit malicious prosecution which was extended in public interest cannot become a shield to protect corn-rpt oflicials. These provisions being exceptions to the equality provision of Article 14 are analogous to the provisions of protective discrimination and these protections must be construed very narrowly. These ' 1zorz1 : scc o+ 13 procedural provisions relating to.snction must be construed iI such a manner as to advance the causes of h()nesty ,1nd justice and good governance as opposed to escalation of corrupti)n." In Panalal Damodar Rathi Vs State of Maharrashtras, relian(x) was placed in paras 8, 9 and 11, rvhich reads as under :

8. Thele could be no doubt that the evidence of :he complainant should be corroborated in material particul:rrs. After introduction of Section 165-A of }re Pena.l tlode, 1860 making the person who offers bribe guilt1 of abetment of bribery, the complainant cannot be placed cn any better footing tJlan that of arr accompiice and corloboration in material particulars connecting tlre accused with the crime has to be insisted upon. It has to be bornr: in mind that the marked notes were recover.ed from the possession of the second accused and not the appellant. It is the case of the prosecution that the marked notes were paid to the second accused for rhe purpose of being handed over to the appellant. The evidence of the complainalt regarding thJ conversaton between him and the accused has beLn set out earlier. As the entire case of the prosecution depends upon rhe acceptance of the evidence relating to ttre conversatron between the complainant and the appellalt durrng which the appellant demanded the money and direcred pa]finerit to t]re second accused which was accepted by the corrLplainant, we will have to see whether this part of the e',iclence of complainant has been corroborated. The prosecu tion relies on the testimony of pW 3, the panch witness, as corroborating the evidence of the complajnalt on this aspect. It may be reiterated th at according to the complainant when he asked t he appella:rt to relieve him from the case and to see that fre was give:e a lesser sentence, the appellant asked him if he had brought the money and the tomplainant told him that he had and the appellalt asked thi complainant to pay thc rnoney to Dalvi, the second accused, ald ask,:d the second accused to receive the money from the I (1979), 4 Supreme Court Cases 526 L4 complainant. On this aspect the evidence of PW 3 is as follows: "They saw the appellant coming out of the court hall and the complainalt informed them ttrat he was the Police Prosecutor. Then there was a talk tletween the complainant and the appeilant in the verandah. The witness was at a distance of 3 to 4 feet from them and was in a position to overhear the conversation. According to tlle witness he heard the appellant asking the complainant Tlave you come', the complainarrt then said Yes'. The witness further heard the appellant saying that he would see that heavy punishment is not inflicted and the case as it is, was diIhcult. The complainant had then asked the appellant whether his work will be achieved. The appellant assured him in the allirmative. The appellant told the complainarrt to give what was to be given to the second accused."

9. It will be seen that the version of tJre complainant that the appellant asked the complainant whether he had brought the money and that the complainant told him that he had and that the appellant asked him to pay the money to the second accused is not spoken to by the panch vritness PW 3. According to panch witness on tJ:e complainant asking the appellant whether his work will be achieved, the appellant assured him in the afhrmative and the appellant told the complainant what was to be given to the second accused. It is significant that PW 3 does not mention about the appellant asking the complainant whether he had brought t1.e money and on the complainant replying in the allirmative asking the complainant to pay the money to the second accused. Omission by PW 3 to refer to any mention of money by the appellant would show that there is no corroboration of testimony of t-]1e complainant regarding t].e demald for tl"e money by the appellant. On this crucial aspect, therefore, it has to be found that the version of $re complainant is not corroborated and, tlerefore, the evidence of the complainant on this aspect cannot be relied on.

11. We are conscious of the fact that both the trial court as well as the appellate court accepted the evidence of the complainant and PW 3 and found the appellant guilty. Though this Court normally will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts : 15 bekrw. rve feel that on the rraterial placed before ur; it u.il1 br hazardous to base a conviction. The marl<ed notes rvere not recovered from the appeilant. "lhe prosecuLion case is that the money rvas paid to the second ,lccused to be handed over to the appellant. 'l'he compli,:if of tJle appeliant is sought to be established by the conversation that took place bet$.een the complainant and the appellant in the presence of P\\ 3. The version regarding the conversation as given by [he complainant and PW 3 is not consistent. In [he circumstances, we are constrained to give the benefil of doubt. In doing so we make it clear that we are jlot convinr:ed about the innocence of the appellant. We l'eel or-r thc material before us, though there is grirve suspicion, the guilt of the accused has not bt:en established beyond reasonable doubt. in circumstances, we are constrained to give the benefr,. of doubt to the appellant. [n t]re result, we allow ]re appeal, ,set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit tJ,.e appe:llant." In State of Kerala and another Vs C.p.Raoe, in para 7 and 10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as uncler : in ParutloL Damod.ar Rathiv. State '7. ln the background of these facts, especially the nr)n examination of CW 1, was found very crucial by the High Court 'lhe High Court has referred to the decision of this Court Maharashtra ll1979l 4 SCC 526 : 198O SCC (Cri) 12 Ll wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that when there r,ras no corrol:oration of testimony of the complainant regard ing the <lemand of bribe by the accused, it has to be accepted that tfre versjon of the complainant is not corroborated ar1d, thereforc, the erridence of the complainant cannot be relied r)n. In the .aforesaid circumstances, the three-Judge Ber.ch in Pdndal Damodar Rathi ca.se l(1979) 4 SCC 526 : 1980 S OC (Cri) t21] held that there is grave suspicion about rhe appellart s complicity and the case has not been prol.ed beyonrl r-easonable doubt. (See SCC para 1 l.)" lO. ln C.ll{. Giish Babuv. CBI [(2OO9l 3 SCC 779 : (2009 2 SCC (Cn) 1l , this Court while dealing with the case under lhe e l20lll 6 S uprt:rne Court Cases 45O 16 o Prevention of Cormption Act, 1986"6v referring to its previous decision rn Suraj Malv. State (Delhi Ad_mn.) [(19791 4 SCC 725 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 1591 held that mere recovery of Lainted money, divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid, is not sulfrcient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. In the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted tie money knowing it to be bribe, conviction cannot be sustained. (See SCC pala 18.)"

10. Relying on the above judgments learned counsel for the petitioner prayed to quash the proceedings initiated against the petitioner.

11. On the other hand, the learned Special public prosecutor appearing for the respondent wouid submit that no sanction is a required for proceeding vrith the case and no permission is required for spot arrest, though learned counsel for the petitioner submit that sanction was not obtained under Section 17-A of the P.C. Act, it is not necessary for the trap case and the said section itself says that no such approval is necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or demanding to accept any undue advantage for himself or for arry other person. In the present ca3e also, petitioner was trapped and was arrested on the spot on

30.06.2022 and there is no illegality in his arrest. \

12. l,earn :c[ Special Public Prosecutor further submits that the conten.tior-r of petitioner that as he is a Central Govc:rnment employee, pros;eculion has to take permission from the Central Government., rvhereas in a trap case, no sanction is ntcessary for prosecu ling the accused as he was caught red hztndedly. Therefore, t.here is no illegality in prosecuting the z:ccused. Whether thr>re is any file pending before the accused for which ofhcial favour '.s sought, and with regarding to audio rec,rrdings, it can be a<ljudicated during the course of trial. In a petition under Secti,)rt 482 of Cr.P.C, the Court cannot go into :he said aspects and it is the duty of trial Court to decide the same. As such, praye,l this Court to dismiss this petition.

13. Havrng regard to the submissions made by both the counsel an,l the material on record, the first contelrtion of learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no s;anction under Secti:n 17-A of ttre P.C.Act, which is mandatory and the same reads as under : "17A. EEquiry or IDquiry or iavestigation of offences relatatrl<: to recomBeudauoas made or decision takeu loy public servant ia discharge of ofllcial functions or duties.-- No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investiilatjon into arly offence alleged to have been commitl3d by a pubiic servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is relatabl.- ro any recommendation made or decision taken b]' such grublic servant in discharge of his official functions or duties, u irhout the previous approval -'::1..r'.'€'-l...:1'.!.i'..!i'''.e."r! 18 .) (a) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of the Uni.on, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when tl:e offence was alteged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of Lhat Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his ofhce, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed; Provided that no such approval shali be necessarl" for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for trimself or for any other Person: Provided further that the concerned authoriry shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month']"

14. The contention of learned Special Public Prosecutor 1s that as it is a trap case and petitioner was arrested on the spot, sanction is not necessar5r. The hrst proviso of Section 17-A says that no such approval is necessaqr for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for himself or for any other person' As such, there is no illegality in arresting the petitioner and no sanction is required. Though learned counsel for the petitioner contended that G.O.Ms.No.16O, Home (SC) Departrnent dated 23.Og.2016, was issued stating that prior sanction of Government of Telangana is required to be taken on a case to i 19 case basis frr investigation of arry-offence or class of offences under Secticn 3 of Delhi Special Police Establishment fct, 1946 by the Delhi Sipecial Police established in the State of Telangana, there is no dispute that for each case, the CBI has to take permission liom the State Government on case to case basis, whereas in tee present case, it is a trap case. Hence, there is no illegalilv anc no prior sanction is required to be taken Hence, there is no l,rrce in the contention of petitioner on the ,lspect of sanctlon

15. Further, the second contention of petitioner is that there must be demand and the same should be corroborated with the evidence subrnitted by the CBI. In the instant case, there is no such demanrl and corroboration for demand. The further contentioil is that the voice records and other device-. are not legally vali<i .and the same cannot be taken as corrr>borative evidence. Gcing through the said contentions, this Ccurt is of the considerr:rl opinion that these contentions are inapltropriate to consicler when exercising jurisdiction for the :ollowing reasons; i. l.rrstly, the requirement of corroboration depends on the evidenr:e presented which is a determination for the trial Court. Therelbre, it is impermissibte for this Court to e,ncroach 20 upon the trial Court's jurisdiction. Similarly, the authenticity and reliability of digital evidence is also the matter for the trial Court to decide. Consequently, tlris Court finds no merit in these contentions. . ii. The another contention is that there is no favour pending with the petitioner and the complainalt was issued slow progress notice dated 11.04.2022 by the Deputy Chief Engineer. The petitioner herein is the Chief Engineer and the letter of extension was received from the office of Deputy Chief Engineer, as such, there is no file pending before the petitioner and the complainant himself is not working in accordance with the contract and his performance was poor. The contention of petitioner is that ttrere is no frle pending with him, and he is no way concerned with extension of currency. The power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in rarest of rare cases. The Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer on arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whirns. This Court cannot conduct mini trial while dealing with quash !. \ 21 petitions. Ir. is for the trial Corrrt- to adjudicate: thos,: factual aspects L6. In thc present case petitioner was red handedly caught by the CBI. Th:refore, the said contentions of petitioner c lnnot be considered lnd all these allegations against the pretitioner require trial. Hence, the criminal petition merits no consideratior-r and the same is liable to be dismissed.

17. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is drsmissed. Miscellaneo-' s, petitions, if any, pending shall stand clos:d. //TRUE COPY// ASSI Sd/- MOHD. ISMAIL QTANI REGISTRAR ,,,SECTION OFFICER To

1. The Principal Special Ju 2 rhe station s";;" c;i,i."I%"eri,^3tJ iiiEi;#X.parry, Hycierabar 3. One CC to SRt CHE Tt t, iff :$';"#3[i,i,iXS',.^'F^":I','$i1"'?'34"Jg;X',1,"**ropuc] I HIGH COURT DATED:2810112025 ORDER GRLP.No.8129 of 2024 os lHll S14; A ( J o () 2 6 ltAn [tz5 ,r d\'a o * Op -sI'et Cir,f a='-:-==5 * o DISMISSING THE CRIMINALPETITION /, 1O &_--