The High Court · 2025

Counsel for the Respondent: SRI P.GOVINDA RAJULU W.A.NO: 138 OF 2019 Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Preferred Aqainst the Order dated.04.'10.2018, in W.P.No.578 ot 2011 on the file of the High Cour1. Between:

1. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, (Prior to bifurcation known as Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation) Rep. by its VC and MD, Musheerabad, Hyderabad

2. The Depot Manager, Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, (Prior to bifurcation known as APSRTC)Siddipet Depot, Siddipet, Medak District ...APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS AND S.S.Nara OId AIwa yana, S/ o. Kistaiah, Ex- {DC, E. 57266, R/o. Suryanagar Colony, l, Hyderabad, Hyderabad Diskict. ...RESPONDENT/WRIT PETITIONER lA NO: 1 OF 2019 Petition under section 1 51 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the Order of the learned single Judge passed in WP No.578/201 1 dated 04.10.2018, pending disposal of W.A No. /2018' lA NO: 2 OF 2019 Between: S.S.Narayana, S/ Old Alwal, Hydera o.K istaiah, Ex- ADC, E. 57266, R/o. Suryanagar Colony, , Hyderabad District. AND ...APPELLANT/ RESPONDENT (.-, J:}.tz 1 Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, (Prior 1o bifurcation known as Andhri Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation) Rep. by its VC and MD, Musheerabad, Hyderabad ifre Oeoot Mandqer, Telanqana State Road Transport Corporation, (Prior to bifurcation known"as APSRiC)Siddipet Depot, Siddipet, Medak District ...RESPONDENTS/ APPELLANTS Petition under section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,. the High Court may be pleased to vacate the interim stay granted in lA NO 1 of 2019 in wA NO: 138 of 2019, dated; 25-2-2019. Counsel for the Appellants: SRI G.VIDYA SAGAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI CHANDRA SHEKAR, SC FOR TSRTC Counsel forthe Respondent: SRI P.GOVINDA RAJULU W.A.NO:781 OF 2019 writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent preferred against the order dated 04t 101201 8 in W.P.No. 57 8 of 201 1. on the file of the High Court' Between: S.S Narayana, s/o Kistaiah, Ex ADC, E 57266, R/o Suryanagar colony, Old Alwala, Hyderabad, Hyderabad dist. AND fJri'!'dl,tH

1. Telangana {itate Road Transport Corporation, (Prior to bifurcation known as Andhra Pradesh state Road Transpqrt Corporation) Rep by its VC and MD Musheerabad, Hyderabad.

2. The Depot l/anager, Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, (Prior to bifurcation known as APSRTC) Siddipet Depot, Siddipet, Medak District. ...RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Appellant: SRI P.GOVINDA RAJULU Counsel for the Respondents: SRI G.VIDYA SAGAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI CHANDRA SHEKAR, SC FOR RTC W.A.NO: 862 OF 2024 Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent preferred against the order dated 0Bl 1 1 12023 in the W.P. No. 1 8652 of 2019. on the file of the Hioh Court. Between: f: ?

1. TGSRTC, n-.p by its Managing director, Bus Bhavan, RTC Cross Roads, Hyderabad.

2. The Depot Manager, APSRTC (now TGSRTC), Bus Depot, Suryapet, ' Suryapet District. 3. The Secretary, TGSRTC, Employees P F Trust, Bus Bhavan, RTC Cross Roads' Hvderabad ...AppELLANis/RESpoNDENTs AND

1. A Saidaiah, S/o Late Tirupathaiah, Aged 60 years, Occ. Ex- Conductor, E.No.10876{1, Rlo 1-2-2701571111 , Sri Sri Nagar, Suryapet, Suryapet District ...RESPONDENTM/RIT PETITIONER 2 The Regional Provident Fund, Commission, Barkatpura, Hyderabad. Rep. by its Commissioner. ...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS lA NO: 3 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be oleased to grant stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the Order of the learned single Judge passed in WP No.1865212019 dated 08.11.2023, pending disposal of W.A No. 12024 Counsel for the Appellants: SRI G.VIDYA SAGAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI ANURAG, SC FOR TSRTC Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI V.NARASIMHA GOUD Counsel for the Respondent No.2: M/s. B.GEETHA, SC FOR EPFO W.A.NO: 1122OF 2024 Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent preferred against the order dated 09/08/2023 in W.P.No.10528 of 2014 and pass on the file of the High Court. Betweeh:

1. APSRTC, rep by its Hyderabad

2. The Depot Manager, Khammam District. tvlanaging director, Bus Bhavan, Musheerabad, APSRTC (now TSRTC), Bus Depot, Manuguru, AND ...APPELLANTS P. Sri Ramulu, S/o. late Naga Rao, aged 65 years, Occ Ex-Conductor, E. No. 53820, R/o. 4-5-6113, GraiiMarket Riad, Khammam, Khammam District. ...RESPONDENT/WRIT PETITIONER <- -c lA NO: 3 OF 2024 - Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the order of the learned single Judge passed in WP No.10528t2014 dated OglOBl2023- pending disposal of W.A No' t2024. Counsel for the Appetlants: SRI G.VIDYA SAGAR, SENIOR GOUNSEL FOR SRI ANURAG, SC FOR TSRTC Counsel for the Respondent: SRI V'NARASIMHA GOUD The Court made the following: COMMON JUDGMENT .) 2 THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL AND THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA WRIT APPEAL Nos.69, 138, 781 of2O19: 862 and Ll22 of 2o24 COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'bte the Acting Chief Justice &rjoy Paul) Sri G.Vidya Sagar, learned Senior Counsel appea-ring for Sri Shanthi Bhushan Rao, Sri Chandra Shekar and Sri Anurag, learned Standing Counsel for the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSiRTC), for the appellants in W.A.Nos.69 of 2019, 138 of 2019, 862 of 2024 and ll22 of 2024; Sri V.Narasimha Goud, Iearned <:ounsel for respondent No.1 in W.A.No.8(t2 of 2024 and for the sole respondent in W.A.No.1l22 of 2024; and Sri P.Govinda Rajulu, learned counsel for the respondent W.A.No.69 of 2079, for the respondent in W.A.No.138 of 20 19 and for the appellarrt in W.A.No.781 of 2019.

2. W.A.Nos.6,9 of 2019, 138 of 2019, 862 of 2024 and ll22 of 2024 are filed by TSRTC (hereinafter referred to as, 'the employerJ and W.A.No.78l. of 2019 is filed by the employee.

3. The basrc question which needs consideration is whether an employee, u,ho is inflicted with the punishment of removal from service, is entitled to get the benefit of leave encashment. f 3

4. The specihc stand of the employer is that in view of Regulation 50(B) of The Employees (Leavef Regulations, 1963 (hereinafter referred to &S, 'the Regulations), the removed employee is not entitled to get the benefit of leave encashment. In W.A.No.781 of 2Ol9 liled by the removed employee, the singular grievance is that the learned Single Judge was kind enough in issuing a direction to grant the benefit of leave encashment, but did not grant him 6%o interest, whereas the said benefit was granted in other connected matters like in the impugned order in W.A.No.69 of 2019.

5. Sri G.Vidya Sagar, learned Senior Counsel for the employer, by taking this Court to Regulation 5O(B) of the. Regr.rlations, submits that this provision nowhere provides the beneht of leave encashment to an employee who suffered the punishment of removal from service. Although, a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in W.A.No.640 of 2OO7 considered the said Regulation 50(B) of the Regulations, it only opined that it does not contain any prohibition for encashment of leave in case of employees who were removed from serrice and therefore the said judgment cannot be pressed into serrice. He placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Har5rana in Punjab State Civil Supplies \ \ .t. :' .: :.:. ) 4 Corporation Limited v. P5rare LaF and urged that the Full Bench revisited its previous judgment and opined that the leave encashment c;mnot be granted in cases of employees who were removed from service. Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on ttre judgment of High Court of Jharkha.nd in Dr Shailendra Kumar Sinha v. State of Jharkhand2.

6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the removed employees supported the order of the learned Single Judge, except 1n W.A.No.781 of 2019, wherein interest of 6%o was not granted for f, - J' belated payment of leave encashment, whereas such interest was granted to other similarly situated removed employees. 7 . Parties c:onfined their arguments to the extent indicated above.

8. We have bestowed our anxious consideration on the riva-l contentions ar-ld perused the record.

9. This is al admitted fact that the removed employees approached ttre Court by filing writ petitions for grant of the benefit of leare encashment. The learned Singie ,.Iudge has 2014 SCC Online P&.H 15012 : AIR 2014 P&H 147 2019 SCC Onl-ine ihar 3221 2 { 5 , recorded the findings in one of the writ petitions i.e., W.P.No.24687 of 2014, dated 19.O9.2018, as under: u4. In view of the decision of Division Bench the stand of respondents that petitioner is not entitled to claim enca shment of Earned Leave accrued to him while he was in servlce is not valid. Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. Respondents are directed to sanction the amount towards earned leave accrued to the account of petitioner while he was discharging his duties and responsibilities in the respondent Corporation. The entire exercise shall be completed ald amount due sha,ll be released within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner claims that illegally encashment of earned leave is denied to the petitioner for no fault of him and, therefore, he is entitled to interest from the date of amount due till the date of payment. Said claim is opposed by the learned counsel for respondents contending that writ petition is filed after six years of retirement and there are clear latches.

6. Having resard to the law laid down by the Division Bench. emolove e is entitled to earned leave encashrnent as a matter of course even if he is removed from service and therefore, petitioner was erroneously denied encashloeq! when it was due. However, petitioner has not invoked the jurisdiction of this Court immediately after cause of action arose to him. Having regard to these aspects balancing the respective contentions, respondents are directed to pay interest at the rate of 60/o p.a., on the amount due from the date of institution of writ petition till the date of payment. Pending miscellaneous petitions shall stand closed." (Emphasis Supplied)

10. This is equally clear that the learned Single Judge has based its order on a Division Bench judgment delivered in W.A.No.640 of 2OO7, dated 13.04.2015. The Division Bench in the said writ appeal recorded the findings as under:- \ \ 6 "It is not in dispute that the frrst respondent was removed from service and had 77 days earned leaver to his credit at the time of removal from service. We have perused Rule 5O (Bl of (Leavel Regulations of A.P.S.R.T.C. as applicable to its employees and it does not contain any prohibition for encashment of leave in case of employees, who were removed from service. Hence, we are satisfiecl that the view taken by the Labour Couit as confirmecl by the learned single Judge is correct and there is no merit rn the writ appeal. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Miscelianeous petitions pending in the case, if any, also stand disposed of." (Emphasis Strpplied)

11. A bare perusal of the finding given by the Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment clearly shows that the Regulation 50(B) of the Regulatioris was considered in relation to the employee who was removed liom service. A careful reading of Regulation 5O(B) of the Regulatrons shows that it doeS not contajn arly prohibition, embargo or disrentitlement in relation to the removed employees. L2. So far the Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryala 1n Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited (supra) is concerned, it is apt to reproduce paragraph Nos.S and 1 1, which read thus:- o. Since Rule 8.21(aa) provides withholdins the amount of ieave encashment when disciplinary and / or criminal proceedings ar st an employee , therefore, the amount ol leave encashment can be withheld to meet out the ssibili of recovery from such amoun t I 7 'a 11. In view thereof, since the right to withhold leave encashment is part of the Statutory Rules, it satisfies the test laid down by the Supreme Court. Thus, we approve the judgment in Harbhajan Singh Riar's case while overruling the view taken h Gurdial Singh's case (supra). The judgments in two other cases i.e. B.S. Gupta's case (supra) and Dagal Singh's case (supra), pertain to Haryana. Since, the Rules iapplicable to Haryana, have not been brought to our notice, we leave the said matter open, to be adjudicated at an appropriate stage." (Emphasis Supplied)

13. A conjoint reading of paragraph Nos.S and 11 of the aforesaid judgment leaves no room for any doubt that the Full a Bench revisited its previous order because the statutory provision, namely Rule 8.21(aa), has escaped notice of the previous Bench. A plain reading of that provision shows that upon imposition of punishment in a disciplinar5r/criminal proceedings, there was a bar/enabling provision and leave encashment could be withheld. Thus, there was an express provision for withholding the leave encashment. In this backdrop, the Full Bench has taken a different view in the said case, whereas in the instant case, there exists no such clear bar or embargo which disentitles the removed employees from the benefit of leave encashment. The leave encashment is a benefit which is earned by the employee during his service. After removal from service, the previous benefits earned are ordinarily not taken away, unless the statutory rule so t t 8 prescribes. For example, if an employee is visited with punishment of dismissal or rqmoval from service, in many departments the relevant pension rules provide that such dismissal and removal will not make him entitled to get the benefit of retiral dues. In absence thereof, as rightly held by the High Court of Jhart:hand in Dr. Shailendra Kumar Sinha (supra), the leave encashrnent is a 'propert5r' under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Whether such benefits fall within the ambit of Article 300A of the Constitution of India or not rs also not unknown to service jurisprudence.

14. Property in legat sense means an aggregate of rights which are guaranteecl and protected by law. It extends to ever,' species of valuable right and interest, more particularly, ownr:rship and exclusive right to a thing, the right to dispose of the thing in every Iega1 way, to process it, to use it and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. The dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects is catled "property". The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying and ,lisposing of thing is property. in lega1 parameters. Therefore, the word "property" connotes everything which is subject of orvnership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that has I 9 an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate or status. Property, therefore, within constitutional protection denotes group of rights inhering citizen's relation to physical thing, a right to possess, use ard dispose of it in accordance with Iaw. The property is the most comprehensive of all terms which can be used, in as much as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have. The term "property" has a most extensive signifrcation and according to lega1 definition, consists of free use, enjoyment and disposition by a person of all his acquisitions without any control of diminution, t'j save only by the laws of the land.

15. The Apex Court on different occasions had considered the scope and ambit of property. In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India3, opined that Prievy Purse payable to ex-rulers is property. In Nagraj, K v. State of A.P.4, the Apex Court opined that right of person to his livelihood is property rtlhich is subject to rules of retirement. In State of Kerala v. Padmanabhans, the Apex Court opined that right of pension is property under the Government service Rules. In Madhav Rao Scindia v. State of M.P.e and 3 lrezry t SCC 85 : ArR l97l sc 530 a ltets; r SCC 523 : ArR 1985 sc 553 5 (tsss) r SCC 429 : ArR 1985 SC 356 6 AtR l96t sc 298 \ t ,, i.\ i0 State of M.P. v. RanojiraoT, the Apex Court opined that propert5r in the context of Article 3O0A includes 'money'. salary which has accrued pension, and cash grants annually payable by the Government; pension due under Government Service Rules; a right to bonus and other sums due to employees uncler statute. This view was also taken in Deokinandan v. State of Bihara. The Bombay High Court in Shapoor M. Mehra v. Allahabad Banke, opined that retiral benefrts including pension aLd gratuity constitute a valuable right in property. In Deokinandan (supra) the Apex Court opined as under: The rieht of the petitioner to recelve penslon 1s "(i) properff under Article 31(1) and bv a mere executive order the State had no powers to withhold the same. Similarlv, the said clainr is also property under Article 19(1)(f) and it is not saved by sub-article (5) of Article 19. Therefore, it follows that the order denying the petitioner right to receive pension affects the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 19(1)(f) ancl 3f (1) of the Constitution and as such the writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable." (Emphasis Supplied)

16. In State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumat Srivastavaro, it was held that such dues fall within the ambit of propert5r under Article 300A of the Constitution and in absence of any statutory provision, it czrnnot be taken away, withdrawn nor employee can 'Arn t96E sc ro53 8 ltsttl z scc 330:AIR r97r sc l4o9 e (zotz) l Mah LJ r26 'o lzot:y tz scc zto artt !{St t:!- ;,.:11:,--: j :;ilii&g.dlt 5XXt5rt &r' :.-.';: 1 1l c. be deprived from the said benefits. Similar is the view taken by the High Court of Jharkhand and it was poignantly held that such benefit even cannot be taken away by any executive instructions. t7 We Dspectfully agree with the view talen by the Division Bench in W.A.No.64O of 2OO7. In absence of any clear prohibition, bar or embargo for not paying the benefit of leave encashment, we are unable to countenance the stand of the employer that removal forfeits the benefit of leave encashment.

18. In W.A.No.78 I of 2019, the appellant has shown interest in getting the interest. This is settled that if the amount is due to an employee and it is paid belatedly for the reasons solely attributable to the employer, the employee is entitled to get the benefrt of interest (See Union of India v. Justice S.S. Sandhawaliarr). The appellant herein therefore entitled to get 67o interest. He is entitled for yet another reason that in the case of the other similarly situated removed employees in the connected ..r.it".", the learned Single Judge has given 60/o interest. Thus, the appellant in W.A.No.781 of 2019 will get the benefit of 67o interest on payment of leave encashment till the date of actual payment. (1994) 2 SCC 240 \ \ 12

19. Accordingly, W.A.Nos.69 of 2019, 138 of 2OI9, 862 of 2024 and 1122 of 2024 arc dismissed and W.A.No.781 of 2019 is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. No ,rrder as to Miscelia.rreous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. //TRUE COPY// SD/-T. KRISHNA KUMAR DKpw REG|srR^B.-// Hdcrror,r oFFrcER \ t .'t To One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble THE ACTTNG CHTEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL (For His Lordships Kind perusal) one Fair copy to u.," Hon,urftDr,rrr. JUSTIcE RENUKA vARA (For His Ladyships Kind perusal) l The VC and MD Musheerabad rerang-ana state Road rransport corporation. (Prior to bifirrcation kno as Andhra Pradesh state Roaoriinsd;''"'"''""' - corporationt t-tyoerabafln :ii?y",:'{[ili:l;,::IB,3R+3'-'l;5"f"ilrsif.:x"?;l"ul",nll,Ji:,," 3. 11LR Copies. t t Union or lndia Ministry or Law, Justice and company Telansana Advocates Association Library Hish court "^*,Th.i,HfliJryLi,fli"iHd .puc] Il: N:fl,"J-tBl;l', Jli,.t""T:li#' ? 3r3 33 3 sH r 8. One CC to SRI ANURA( 9. One CC to SRt p.GOVI 10.One CC to SRt V runna 1 '1. One CC to M/s B GEET 12.Two CD Copies PSK. BS% HIGH COURT DATED:2510212025 t / COMMON JUDGMENT WA.Nos.69,138,781of 2019; 862 AND 1122 OF 2024 E -'.Y 1l,E ST4I( t 0 2 lpi ZtZs ( ': . .( DISMISSING THE W.A.Nos.69 & 138 OF 2019, 802,& 1122 OF 2024 AND PARTLY ALLOWING THE W.A.No.781 OF 2019 WITHOUT COSTS