The High Court · 2025

Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C praying that in fhe circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to quash the order daled.2-11-2021 passed in Criminal Revision Petition No.30 of 2018 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Medak at Sanga Reddy preferred against the orders dated. 18-6-2018 in CRLMP No. 78 of 2018 in Crime No.368 of 2016 on the file of the JMFC-cum-Special Mobile Court at Sanga Reddy and consequently direct the JMFc-cum-Special Mobile Court at Sangareddy to take cognizance of the protest petition filed for prosecuting fie Respondents No.2 to 4 in accordance with law in the interest of justice. This Petition coming on for hearing, upon perusing the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition and upon hearing the arguments of Sri V.T.Kalyan, representing Sri Gadi Praveen Kumar, Advocate for the Petitioner, Smt. S.Madhavi, Assistant Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Respondent Nos.1 and 5, Sri V.Surender Rao, Advocate for the Respondent No.2 and none appeared for the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The Court made the following: ORDER THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUWADI SRIDEVI CRIMINAL PET!TION No.4682 OF 2022 ORDER This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner_ complainant seeking to quash the impugned order dated

02.11.2021 passed in Criminal Revision petition No.30 of 2018 by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Medak at Sangareddy (hereinafter referred to as "the learned Sessions Judge"), whereby the learned Sessions Judge confirmed the order dated 18.06.2018 passed in C.F.R.No.163 of 2018 (Criminal Miscellaneous petition No.7g of 201g) in Crime No.368 of 2018 by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court at Sangareddy Jher.einafter referred to as "the learned trial Court,). By the said order, the learned trial Court dismissed the protest complaint filed by the petitioner under Section 190(1) ot.,tn" Code of Criminal Procedure (for short'Cr.p.C.').

02. Heard Sri V.T.Kalyan, Iearned counsel representing Sri Gadi praveen Kumar, iearned counsel for 2 I I I the petitioner; Smt.S.Madhavi, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and S-State; and Sri V.Surender Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2. No representation for the respondent Nos.3 and 5. Perused the record.

03. lt is the case of the petitioner that he instituted a suit for cancellation of the sale deed bearing document No.19481 dated 29.11.2005 on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sangareddy, in which an interim order of status-quo was granted against the respondent No.2 herein along with other defendants therein. lt is alleged that during the subsistence of the said status quo order, the respondent No.2 executed a sale deed bearin'g document No.30381 daled 13.12.2006 in favour of the respondent No.3 and subsequently cancelled the said sale deed by executing a cancellation deed bearing document Noi{9595 of 2013 dated 13.09.2013. However, the fact of cancellation was brought to the notice of the learned Junior Civil Judge after a lapse of one and a half years, by which time 36 adjournments had taken place, and the petitioner was 3 compelled to attend the Civil Court proceedings by travelling from Bangalore, thereby causing him undue hardship and harassment. The petitioner alleges that this sequence of events caused him harassment and amounted to a violation of the interim order by the unofficial respondents. For which, the petitioner sought for invoking criminal proceedings against the unofficial respondents for the offences punishable under Sections 120_B, 327, 406, 4Og, 420, 424, 467, 468, and 471 read with Section 34 of the lndian penal Code (for short 'lpC').

04. Learned counsel for the petitioner_complainant submitted that both the Courts have failed to appreciate the allegations made by the petitioner in proper persgBctive and erroneously dismissed his case. lt is contended that the Civil Court had passed an order of status_quo on OT.Ol.2006, and despite having full knowledge of the said order, the respondent No.2 in collusion with the respondent No.4 executed a sale deed in favour of the respondent No.3 with a dishonest intention to frustrate the petitioner,s claim and to cause inordinate delay in the disposal of the suit. The 4 I \ respondents compelled the petitioner to attend the Civil Court on 36 occasions, travelling from Bangalore, thereby causing him considerable hardship, including loss of valuable time and money. While praying to allow this Criminal Petition by quashing the orders passed by both the Courts, he relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and anotherl wherein it was held at ParagraPh No.14 that: "14. ln view of the above discussion, we hold that through the revision before the High Court under sub-section ('t ) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Cgurt under Section 483, the High is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the courts below. lt remitted the case to the Magistrale for .of the decision on merits after consideration evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case. Since the High Court has left the matter to be considered by the ' 119921 4 Supreme Court cases 24'1 I / 5 Magistrate, it would be in appropriate at this stage to go into that question. We have only considered the issue of power and jurisdiction of the High Court in the in the context of the revisional power under Section 397 (1) read with Section 397(3) and the inherent powers. We do not find any justification warranting interference in the appeal.',

05. On the other hand, the learned Assistant public Prosecutor appearing for the State and the learned counsel for respondent No.2 contended that the learned trial Court as well as the learned Sessions Judge had righfly dismissed the case of the petitioner, and that there is no illegality or irregularity in their respective orders warranting interference by this Court. lt is further submitted that the present Criminal Petition is not maintainable, as the Retitionerf revision application has already been adjudicated upon by the learned Sessions Judge. While praying to dismiss this Criminal Petition, he relied upon a decigion of the Honourable Supreme Court in Rajan Kumar Machananda 6 I\j v. State of Karnataka2 wherein it was held at Paragraph No.2 that: "2. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. The respondent State had challenged the order before the Court of Sessions when the learned trlagistrate before whom the matter was proceeding directed release of the truck in favour of the appellant. The Revisional Court dismissed the petition of the State. A second Revision did not lie at the instance of the State to the High Court in view of the provisions of Section 397(3) of Cr.P.C. Obviously, to avoid this bar, the application moved by the State before the High Court was stated to be under Section 482 Cr -P .C . asking for exercise of inherent powers. ln exercise of that power, the High Court has reversed the order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Sessions Judge. The question ffor consideration is as to whether'the bar under Sectibn 397(3) Cr.P.C. should have been taken note of to reject the revision at the instance of the State Government or action taken by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power has to be sustained. lt is not disputed by counsel appearing for the State that the move before the High Court was really on application for revision of the order ' unruurscrozozrt66z -/ 7 of the Magistrate releasing the truck. That is exactly what is prohibited under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked the statutory bar could not have been overcome. lf that was to be permitted every revision application facing the bar of Section 397(3) of the Code could be labelled as one under Section 482. We are satisfied that this is a case where the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision. The appeal is allowed and we set aside the order of the High Court. The Order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Session Judge is upheld."

06. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and upon considering the submissions advanced by both sides, it is evident on the face of the record that during the pendency of the civil proceedings between the parties, wherein an interim status-quo order was subsisting, the unofficial respondents had executed certain -documents behind the petitioner. lt is alleged by the petitioner that the said acts of the unofficiar respondents amounts to vioration of the court orders and caused him much hardship and rnconvenience. ln such scenario, the petitioner ought to 8 \ -*I i -\i \l \.1 - have availed the remedy under Order XXXIX Rule 2(A) of the Civil Procedure Code (for short 'CPC') for necessary action against the unofficial respondents for violation of the interim orders passed by a Civil Court. But the petitioner tried to invoke criminal jurisdiction for violation of a civil court order.

07. lt is to be noted that in Krishnan's case cited supra, the Honourable Supreme Court at Paragraph No.10 held that: "'10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a Person accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397 (1) or under inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397 (3) or section 397(2) of the Code. lt is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Cdde. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or I sentence imposed by the tt4agistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. lt is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstance, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power and in appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397 (1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity or procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings."

08. ln the above authority, it is made clear that when a revision is barred under Section 397(3) of Cr.p.C. an accused or complainant cannot invoke the, revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 397(1) of Cr.p.C. or resort to its inherent powers under Section 4g2 of Cr.p.C. as doing so would amount to circumventing the statutory bar. However, the High Court possesses suo motu powers under Section 401 of Cr.P.C. and supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of Cr P.C Thus, where the High Court, upon 10 ^i, examining the record, finds a grave miscarriage of justice, abuse of process, non-compliance with statutory procedure, or any failure of justice, it is not only empowered but duty- bound to intervene. ln such exceptional circumstances, to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process, the High Court may justifiably exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and, where warranted, its revisional powers under Sections 397(1) & 401 of Cr.P.C Nonetheless, such powers must be exercised sparingly to avoid procedural multiplicity, undue delay, or protraction of trial proceedings

09. ln Rajan Kumar Machananda's case cited supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that thelparty cannot invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to circumvent the statutory bar and merely labeling a second revision as an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C does not confer jurisdiction and ruled that the High Court had no authority to entertain such a petition and restored the order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Sessions Court. / a' '- 11

10. Having regard to the settled principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the I petitioner, instead of initiating contempt proceedings for the alleged violation of the court's interim orders, has sought to invoke the criminal jurisdiction of this Court, notwithstanding the fact that he has already exhausted his remedy of revision before the learned Sessions Judge. ln light of the legal principle that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C are to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, the petitioner was required to approach this Court stricfly within the confines of such limited jurisdiction, but, in the present case, there "r"h exceptional circumstances shown by the petitioner. ln that "r3 view of the matter, this Crlminal petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. ,)"

11. Accordingly, the Criminal petition is dismissed 12 As a sequel, Pending miscellaneous aPPlications' if any, shall stand closed /TRUE COPY/' , SD/. L VIJAYA LAXMI ASSISTANT REGISTRAR 6 SECTION OFFICER To,

1. The Judicial First class Magistrate, special Motile court, sangareddy 2. The station House officer, Patancheru Police station, Medak 3. Two ccs to public prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana at 4. One CC to Sri Gabi Praveen Kumar' Advocate IOPUC] 5. One CC to Sri V.surender Rao, Advocate IOPUC] 6. Two CD CoPies HYderabad [OUT] o ABK ? -,{,-t HIGH COURT DATED: 0110812025 ORDER CRLP.No.4682 o12022 I I HT E S T4 tI o 2? BEg f'( * 'rrurC ,t , DISMISSING OF THE CRIMINAL PETITION :4