The High Court · 2025

Petition under section 482 of cr.P.c praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of criminal Petition, the High court may be ;i;;.;J to stay all further proceedings in C CNo'614812019' on the file of ihe vt Additional MM Cum Vl AJCJ, Cyberabad, at. L.B.Nagar, including the ,ppuurrn"" of the Accused till the disposal of the ttrtain Quash Petition in the interest of the justice. This Petition ;o r irg on for hearing, upon perusingt th,-. [,/ emorandum of Grounds of crinr nar Petition and upon hearing the arguments of sridevi Jampani, ArJ rocate for the petitioner and the putrlic rros:cutor (TG) on behalf of the Rr-'spc r clent No. I and of Sri p. Nagendra Fleddy, A ivocate for the Respondent No I The Court made fhe following: ORDER 3 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER CRIMINAL PETITION No. 6073 OF 2O2O ORDER: This Criminal Petition is hled under section 482 of Cr.P.C by the petitioner/ accused seeking to quash the proceed.ings against her in CC.No.6148 of 2Ol9 on the file of VI Addl.Metropolitan Magistrate-cum-Vl Additional Junior Civil Judge, Cyberabad, at L.B.Nagar, for the offence under Section 304-4 of Indian Penal Code.

2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the petitioner, Dr' Swapna Kumari, is a Srnaecologist at Swapna Hospital, Chaitanyapuri, which she operates. The 2"d respondent lodged a complaint with Chaitanyapuri PS, alleging that his marriage with Divya was solemnized on 11.11.2018. His wife, Divya, became pregnant and regularly visited Swapna Hospital for check-ups under the petitioner's care. On 2O.2.2O19, Divya was admitted to the hospital for an abortion on the advice of the petitioner and remained there until 22.2.2019. After receiving antibiotics, she was discharged. Due to excessive bleeding, Divya suffered a miscarriage, resulting in the foetus expelling itself. She was subsequently readmitted to the hospital to remove the remaining 4 foetal tissue 'llr,r hospital authorities informed the 2",1 respondent that Di',ya s blr od level was only 7 .\yo. At 7:OO arr., tl e petitioner took her o tlLr: operation theatre, and by ll:0r) pm, the 2"d respondenl ',zr: s. informed that Divya had lost :onr;cio lsness and was advise f to sirift her to Omni Hospital. Upo. D v,va's arrival at Omni Hospit:rl c octors declared that she was b.-cuilht ,lead. When the 2"a resp:)rrl,:nt returned to Swapna Hospital, th,: petitioner refused to c orn rnunicate with him, leading to th e f: ting of the present co rrrl rk ir Lt

3. Upon r r:r:e iving the complaint, LW. 18 re5;rsterer,l Crime No. 99 /2019 unrler Section 3O4-A of IPC. During the. in restigation, LW. 19 collec'e<l the case sheet and other relevant cl,rcu nents from Swapna H,rs pital and forwarded them to L\trt. 1'2, 1r6s1ng 1s76 specific que ri e:-: : i. Whether a tloctor can proceed with DScC (Drlation and Curettage) 1rca.rlrent on a two-and-a-half-montlL pr,:gn;Lnt woman with haemc,g .ol; in levels at 7 .8,'/o and a prior fListorv of cardiac disease. ii. Whether r 1,11,1 yTss any negligence on the doctor ,s part in treating Dirr.Ti . 5 LW.l7, Dr. K.V'Swarya, DM&HO, RR District, opined that 4. there was clear negligence on the part of Dr' Swapna in treating Divya without adequate expert support and care' leading to her death, particularly given her history of cardiac disease' Additionally, LW. 16 issued the PME Report and final opinion' wherein he opined that the cause of death was due to 'gross pulmonary ed.ema in a case of pulmonary artery hypertension consequent to congenital heart disease''

5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner/ accused submits that the police committed an error in registering the FIR and frling the charge sheet without first obtaining a proper medical opinion from either a committee of Doctors or an Expert Doctor specializing in the relevant Iield' The opinion of LW' 17 cannot be considered an expert opinion, as she is neither a Srnaecologist nor a cardiologist' and thus lacks the requisite expertise to determine negligence on the petitioner's part. The PME report does not indicate any negligence or suspicious circumstances warranting the registration of an FIR. It was further argued that the police failed to adhere to the legal principles established in the Jacob Mathew 6 vs. State of Punjab and Orsr and. Martin F. D,,Souzct. us. Mohd.. Ishfaqz.

6. Coun,;t I further argued that G.O.Ms.No < 65. dated 16.10.199E, s:L:r issued by the Health, Me<lica[.:nc1 Family welfare Deprrrr rrent, directing police and reve -.ue atr.horities to refrain frorn trrrrassing medical officers with,ut cor rducting a proper depzrr Lnr : ntal enquiry The order mandaL ,ecl the formation of a com:rlttltr in each district, comprising; t].r e District coordinator br I{ospital Services as chairman, a rep -esentative from the Dislr;ct Medical & Health Oflice as it memlrer, and a general physr cirr r. or surgeon nominated by the Disrtric t collector from a panr:l .! rrr.ailable s,rgeons and physicizrns. Ar ditionally, the order srt,p.trrtecl that all cases of professiorL.l Ltegligence attributed t,; C.,: ors must be referred to this r;ommit,ee by the District Cojlt ctc r s. and the committee, after cr>ndr rcting an inquiry, rvo _rld submit a report for further necessa y action. However, tht:r.: is no such report by any committr,r:.

7. Learned C tr- nsel relied on the Judgment of the I{ rnourable Supreme Co'tr t, jr. Mortin F. D,Souzars case (stt,,:,ra.2i. ,uherein it was held that: ' {zoos1 o suprem j o. . --ases 1 ' (2009) 3 SCC 1 7 "112. While this Court has no sympathg for doctors tuho are negligent, it must also be said that friuolous complaints against doctors haue increased bg leaps and bounds in our country particalarlg afier the medical profession utas placed utithin the puruietu of the Consumer Protection Act. To giue on example, earlier when a patient uho had a sAmptom of hauing o heart attack tuould come to a doctor, the doctor uLould immediatelg inject him utith Morphia or Pethidine injection before sending him to the Cardiac Care tJnit (CCu) because in cases of heart attack time is the essence of the matter. Hotueuer, in some cases the patient died before he reached the hospital' After the medical profession u)as brought under the Consumer Protection Act uide Indion Medical Association u. V'P Shantha MANU/SC/0836/ 1995 : AIR1996SC55O doctors who administer the Morphia or Pethidine injection ore ofien blamed and- cases of medical negligence are filed ogainst them' The result is that mang doctors haue stopped giuing (euen as familg phgsicians) Morphia or Pethidine injection euen in emergencies despite the fact that from the sgmptoms the doctor honestly thought that the patient was hauing a heart attack. This utas out of fear that if the patient died the doctor uould haue to face legal proceedings.

114. Hence Courts/ Consumer Fora should keep the aboue Jactors in mind ttthen dectding cases reloted to medical negligence,and not take a uieu.t tt-thich tuould be in fact a disseruice to the public. The decision of this Court in Indian Medical Association u. V.P. Shantha (Supra) should not be understood to .mean thot doctors should be harassed merelg because their treatment u)as unsuccessful or caused some mishap ulhich uas not necessarilg due to negligence ln fact in the aforesaid decision it hos been obserued (uide para 22) : 8 In the, .t,ct tcr of professional liability pro.fessrons clifl.tr from other oc,'u.cctions for the reason that professi.tn.s opr.'rate in spheres u.')?re success cannot be achieued in cuer11 ct se and uery oJl( rz sl,ccess or foilure depends upon fac\trs: bey md the proksi( rrr. 'nan's control.... 1 I 5- I itt tt, be mentioned that the All Incl.,a tnstitute of Sciencr'.s ltc s been doing outstanding reseorcL,. t,t Stt m CeIl Thera.ptl fc t the last eight aears or so for tr.athtq tr atients suffefi,-g ,,j om. paralg sis, terminal card;.nc co.tdition, pcLrkinso,ti:;,r . etc, though not Aet uith uery n)table .s tccess. This cLc <: : /.()1 nlea.n that the uork of Stem Cell 'rhertpu should_ stop, otlu'ru.i;e science cdnnot progress. 1 16. I /( tl.,ere.fore, direct that wheneuer c ccmpl int is receiueLl aod nst o doctor or hospital by the Consum< r Fora (u.thether Dr:;rict, State or National) or bg the Ci,ntinz Court then bef,trc., r.s.suln.g notice to the doctor or hospit al lgainst ulrcm tl c ':tmplaint uas made the Consunrcr' For,lm or Ciminc I C',t tt1 s hould fi"rst refer the matter t. o con petent doctor or .(-tltnlttee of doctors, specialized in the ficld r zlating to u.-th.iclt th< m edical negligence is attibuted, c,.ncl onl 1 after that dor'tu'r t- cornmittee reports that there is a p;,ma fa.c e_ case of med c ';l tt:qligence should notice be then tsst ed. to the cotrcern=tt ,lx tor/ hospital. This ls necessdry to auoid_ hctrassrtr, :a doctors who mog not be ultimate.trl founl to be negliqer .t. l\/,t fttrther warn the potice off.cials not to ar .est or harass ct o(.t),s unless the facts clearlg conc uith.,n the parame e .s lrid doun in Jacob Matheu.,,s rra{ii? (:upra), othertu[:;e t t: policemen will them,selues haue to .face legal acttotL.' I B. The counsel appearing for the respondent/ complainant would submit that a competent doctor has given opinion that there was negligence. It is for the trial Court to decide the issue and at this initial stage, the proceedings cannot be quashed' In viewoftheSupremeCourt,sdirectionintheaforementionedcase, alongwithG.O.Ms.No.465,d'ated16'10'1998'itisevidentthatin matters of professional negligence, before issuing a notice to the doctor or hospital against whom the complaint has been made' the Consumer Forum or Criminal Court must first refer the matter to a competent doctor or a committee of doctors specialized in the relevant field of medical negligence' Only after receiving a report from such a doctor or committee confirming a prima facie case of medical negligence should a notice be issued to the concerned doctor or hospital. Furthermore, as per the G'O'Ms'' all cases of professional negligence attributed to doctors must be referred to thecommitteebytheDistrictCollectors,andthecommitteeshall then conduct an inquiry and submit a report for further necessary action. g. Therefore, in the present case, obtaining the committee's opinion is a mandatory prerequisite before proceeding with any action against a medical practitioner for medical negligence' 10

10. In the pr:sent case, an opinion was issrred. 1rr. LW. lZ, and. based on L.V'.I /'s opinion, LW19, the Sub Insp.:ctor of police, fiIed a charge slteet against the petitioner.

11. L\[r-1] s,,rrr . letter to the District Medical anrl Hr alth officer (DM&HO), rr,q':e sting an opinion regarding the mr:Cicz I treatment provided b r r-hr, petitioner to the patient, Divyrr. Iiurtl rermore, as per R.C. N:. llttr6lDtrMO/DMHO/RR/2019, is,r;ued by the office of the Distric r iv-t:dical and Health officer, a clire<:tio n iv rs given for the appoinlnre.rt ol Dr. B. Lalitha, Civil Assista.:t is,r,a3on, as the Joint EnqrLilv Offlcer to conduct an inquiry i1:o .he alleged negligence.

72. Horveve r, there is no evidence indicati-g tha a three_ member cor, rx .1 t ee was constituted, and no cornmitte ) report or expert medrc;l <,1tinion establishing a prima faci: case of medical negligence 'r', s submitted before issuing notice tc the petitioner and subsequr n Jr fi1ing the charge sheet, as marL,jated l,v G.O.Ms. No. 465. 13 The opirric,n in this case was issued solely by l.W. 1.7, who is the DM&H(), Ii:irlga Reddy District. However, it has not been specified in r1,1.136 field LW. 1 7 is an expert. r\ltlLoul h Dr. B Lalitha, Civ I As s,istant Surgeon, was appointt:C o i.ssist the 11 DM&HO in conducting the inquiry, it has not been established that she posse sses training in obstetrics and rynecolory (OB-GYN) to be considered an expert qualified to render an opinion in this case. Furthermore, appointing only one surgeon to investigate the allegation of medical negligence against the petitioner is contrary to the procedure prescribed under G.O'Ms. No. 465, which explicitly requires the opinion of a three-member committee before any further action can be taken. 1,4. Additionally, the Supreme Court, in Martin F. D'Souza's ccse, issued a caution to police officials, stating that doctors should not be arrested or harassed unless the facts of the case clearly fall within the parameters laid down in Jacob Matheut' Failing to adhere to this directive would make the police officers themselves liable to face legal action.

15. The finding of the Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew's case, is as follows "49. We sum up our conclusions as under:- (1) Negligence is the breach of a dutg caused bg omission to do something which a reasonable man guided bg those considerotions tahich ordinorily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something ruhich a prudent and reasonable man utould not do. The definition of negligence as giuen in I'a ut of Torts, Ratanlal&Dhirajlal 12 (editeC bu .tu stice G.P. Singh), referred to her:inabot,<,, ltolds good. . le,7l.tqence becomes actionable on ac.outtt o,' injury resultin q t'rtm the act or omission amountin;' t,'t neuligence attrib tt:t/;lz to the person sued. The essentia corlpot ents of neglige'1(e (rre three: 'duty', 'breach' and'resul''ng d.at age'. (2) Neot;q1e y.:e in the contert of medical profeslr on nec(,ssanly calls .to " (t i reatment utith a difference. To iry\:r r osh le.ss or neqlige,rcrt t'n tlrc part of a professional, in parl'cultr a doctor, oddittcla, cortsiderotions applg. A cose (')' ,:t:ct4 ationol neqLicletrcr, ts d[fferent from one of professioncr I negliq,nce. A simpb ,acl.'. of care, dn error of judgment or an ocr:idert , is not proof ol ne g,ligence on the part of a medical {\,'oJ€ssional. So Long cs a tltctor follotus a practice acceptable to the r tedical profes s'or. cf that dag, he cannot be held liabltt .for neq,liqence merelil bet:c:use a better alternatiue course or tnetlnd of treatft'.e tt r/a.s also audilable or simplg becatt.;e (, more skilletl. 'lctcty tuould not haue chosen to follo,-u or rt sorlr to that prc,ct rt: or procedure ruhich the accused _,itllo. Ltetl When it come.'; tc the failure of taking precautions uhcn ha ; to be seen is ut\etlter those precautions tuere taxen u_.tlt,, ch the ordinc nt eyoeience of men has found to be :;,t.ffic ent; a foilurt lo use special or ertraordinarA preceuti)ns tuhich might ltt.t'z preuented the particular happenino castnot be the standr.tr '1 l or judging the alleged negligence Sc al: o, the standLtr'.1 o.F care, ruhile assesslng the practice as edotr ted., is judgert. 'n the light of knouledge ouailable at tLrc ,.ime of the incide,tt tt td not at the date of tial. SimiLc.rlg , u.'h zn the charg( oJ' n.egligence aises out of failure to use some partict,.lt,r c(ulpmen| the charge uould fail if the equ pment LUas no1 qe r,erallg auailable at that particular tirr.e (t,tat is, 13 the time of the incident) at uthich it is suggested it should haue been used. (3) A professional mag be held liable for negligence on one of the tttto fi.ndings: either he ttas nof possessed of the requisite skill tahich he professed to haue possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the giuen case, the skitl tuhich he did possess. The standard to be, applied for judging, tuhether the person charged has been negligent or not, ulould be that of an ordinory competent person exercising ordinary skill in that profession. It is not possible for euery professionol to possess the highest leuel of experti'se or skills in that branch rtthich he practices A highlg skilled professional mog be possessed of better qualities, but that cannot be made the basis or the gardstick for judging the performance of the professional proceeded against on indictment of negligence. ft) The test for determining medical negligence as laid doun in Bolam's case [1957] 1 W.L.R 582 holds good in its applicabilitg in India. (5) The juispntdential concept oJ negligence differs in ciuil and criminol lant. What mag be negligence in ciuil laut mag not necessailg be negtigence in ciminal lau-t' For negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shoun to exist. For an oct to amount to ciminal negligence' the d.egree of negligence should be much higher i'e' gross or of a uery high degree. Negtigence which is neither gross nor of a higher degree may prouide a ground for action in ciuil latu but cannot fonn the basis for prosecution' 14 (6) Tl',e 'L,tt7 gross'has not been used in Secfion llOt.t of IpC, llet 1 i:i settled that in ciminal lato neqliqe nce or reckl(s;r.?ss, lo be so held, must be of such a liq\ de qree os to b< qtc::s'. The expression 'rosh or nec,tligtnt .zcf ' as occur 1t c1 tt Section 304A of the IPC has to lte rad as qu.tlilia:l it 7 the word'grosslg'. (7) 1'o 1 .ose cute a medical professional for nt.qliqe nc< urtrler crimir, cL 'tr.u it must be shou.n that the acc,us,,cl did. sometlll tl() cr failed to do something uhich in t|te, c1it,c n facts and c[, u l,:;tattces no medical professional tt lt s ,t, dinarg sense i ,tr tl pntdence tuould haue done or fait.ect to c'o. The hazar,l krl<n bg the accused doctor should bt, oJ' ;uch. a natur( tlt(,t the injurg tuhich resulted wa:; n.Lost likelg immin:r.t. /8/ ,Re..r r r.sr, t.oquitur is onlg a ntle of euidence ct 1.L oper :/.es in the don irr o.f ciuil laut speciallg in cases of torl.; a::Ltl h:lps in detertr'.tr in9 the onus of proof in actions relating to trcql,qence. It caniu't t:e pressed in seruice for determintng per ;e the liabilittl .'ot negligence uithin the domain of cinLincl lottt. Res ipsa lcrl:tittr has, if at alL, a limited applicatiorL irt tnal on a charga o' cr:rninal negligence. "

16. In the 1 rrr:r;r:nt case, there is no dispute that the petitioner did not poss,,sri the requisite skill which she :,rofess( d to have possessecl. 'll Le ,luestion that needs to be deterrnined s rvhether the petitior-rt:r d (l not exercise, with reasonable <,,;rrLttetence in the given case, th,:. :rl<il1 which she did possess. 15

17. Considering the evidence frled, namely the record of Swapna Hospital, it is evident that the petitioner obtained the patient's signature on the consent form for surgery and informed her of the high-risk content. The informed high-risk consent form specifically mentions the risks associated with the surgery for incomplete abortion performed on the patient, Divya, and also acknowledges unexpected risks and unforeseen conditions that may arise during the procedure, to which the patient consented and signed'

18. The case of the 2"d respondent is that, prior to the surgery, he was informed that his wife's haemoglobin level was critically low at 7.87o. Despite being aware of the risks associated with the surgery, the petitioner proceeded with the procedure based on the consent given by the patient. Hence, it is evident that the petitioner exercised reasonable competence in the given circumstances.

19. Furthermore, the final opinion issued by LW' 16, which states "gros s pulmonary edema in a case of pulmonarg artery hgpertension consequent to congenital heart disease," does not conclusively establish negligence on the part of the petitioner'

20. The opinion issued by LW.17, is as follows 16 "it is tt rLsual practice to do D&C to th.:. Ttatie,t.t tuhose haetnoql ''l.ti.'t leuel is 7.8%, the D&C tuould hat,e bz_en done after l,it ocl transfusion under tlte supertt,:;icrt o./ General Physicta,. o. cl Cardiologist and in fhis cose no such procecl;tt.r it,a.s done, patient tuas transfe'te'd tc another hospitc.l 't rrtLspittg stage tuhich led to death tn tran:;it duing transpttr ' 2l . The IJ orLrr urable Supreme Court, in Ja<:ob [,I:: thsws s2sa (supra), stilt rcl t 1e1t: "So lon,1 ,ts a doctor follous a practice (t..ceptab,e to the medical o-rt'bssion of that dag, he cannot L,z ltekl. 'iable for neglig,:r, ':t. nerelA because a better alterrr-etitte c )urse or metho 7 ! treatment was also auailable or simptu l_t tcause a more ;l .il.le d doctor u.tould not haue chos<;n to 1'olloro or resort t .' tL at practice or procedure uhicl-t ;he acatsed. follorucc; . '

22. Accor rl ni1 to LW. 17, it is not a usual pr,rcti,:e t rat D&C is given to th I r)i, ti3nt whose haemoglobin level is 7.t96, ror,vever, in light of Hon, )11I ..ble Supreme Court,s obserwation , pe itroner not adopting tte usl:a1 practice cannot be said to ht:r trein,l negligent. Further, th: Ionourable Supreme Court also obs;ervecl hat: "When i.l t:omes to the failure of taking precanttion; tuhat has tr' ,le seen is uthether those precautions t,,tere taken tuhich tl'u' ordinarA expeience of men ha: Jcunc to be suffictet ,t. t failure to use special or e xt.aor Cinary precal:t rst,:; tuhich might haue preuented_ lh.e, pa t ticular 17 happening catlnot be the standardfor judging the alleged negligence. So also, the standard of care, uhile assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knouledge auailable at the time of the incident, and not at the date of tial".

23. From the evidence on record, it shows that a record was made that at 10:40 a.m, patient was in a gasping stage, and CPR was started, further that HR dropped to 38/m. Further, doctor's progress report shows that when CPR was continued, HR improved to 100/m, however, patient was stili unconscious'

24. It is also scribed on the report that: "patient's attendants are tuilling to shift to higher centre for further managernent and hence patient is shified to higher centre. " Hence, it is apparent that petitioner had tried to do her best in the circumstances 25 In Shiu Prasad Setnual a. Sto:te of Uttarakhand,s tlre Honourable Supreme Court held as follows: u33. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (l) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC Pn) 4261 , this Court examined the pinciples gouerning the scope of exercise of pouers bg the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution t 1zoza1 z scc sss 18 of In,.li, tr d Lutder Section 482CrPC seek L,J quos tinq of cimfitoi 1:r cceedings and held as follou.ts : (S,I:C pp. :t7B-79, para I ( 2) " 1 0 .;. I't the backdrop of the interpretatior oJ' lhc )arious ysl.s. t:tttt prouisions of the Code under Chalte, XI\/ and of th: tr t,,t:ipl.es of latu enunciated bg this Court in c .senes o-f r.,:cir;;ons relating to the exercise of the, e;:iraot dinarg p(ut)r under Article 226 or the inherent ,cor,.ters under Sr r:rrorz 482 of the Code tuhich toe haue zxtrcLct< d and re trttlt cecl ctboue, we giue the following, cutegtLt ies of e,ret::i, <'tl either to preuent abuse of the prot.-L ss tf ang co )t t '.1 othenDise to secure the ends of iu.,ticr, tLLrrugh it mlLL, r, ( 't be possible to lay down any p,t-ec'ise :Iearlg deti,teil and sufftcientlg channelised onct itlteible guia:lir,< s or rigid formulae and to giue an exh,ttLst ue list oJ trilr'tt,:l ltinds of cases u.therein such pot,-'e,. sh.c:.Llcl be exer i:;( (1.. tt ) lMlrcre the allegations made i,, tttt first inf )t'nu'ton report or the complaint, euen if :.,teq rtre taken cLt tl 'zt' lace uol.ue and accepted in their etttir,.tu ,l.o not pint L.f,t,.:ie constitute ang offence or malte cut c case agtTi ls t\e \ccused. t2 ) Where the ollegations in the f.rst irtlorr,rution rey. o t. ttrl other mateials, if any, accompcttgitLq tl e FIR do tot dlsclose a cognizable offence, llLsti.fl1it q an inu=: 'itrtt .ion bg police officers under Sectiort j:;O(j ) cf the Cotl( e\cept under an order of a Mogistrcte tuitl.t n th.e pllt ut'..tt) 1'.f Section 155(2) of the Code. t.)t \ryl1sys the uncontrouerted allega;ion:; rtc d.e in the F'R ot c,omplaint and the euid.ence collec|erl tn sL ppott 19 of the same do not disclose the commission of ang offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute onlg a non- cognizable offence, no inuestigation is permitted by a police officer tuithout an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of tt-thich no ptudent person can euer reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against th.e accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in ang of the prouisions of the Code or the concemed Act (und.er tuhich o ciminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or uhere there is o specific prouision in the Code or the concerned Act, prouiding efficacious redress for the gieuonce of the aggrteued Partg - (7) Where a ciminal proceeding is manifestlg attended ruith mala fide ond/ or where the proceeding is maliciouslg instituted utith an ulteior motiue for ureaking uengeance on the accused and u-tith a uieLu to spite him due to piuate and Personal grudge."

34. Tested- on the touchstone of the aboue pinciples, we are of the firm uieu-t that ollouing continuance of the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR beoring No- 31 of 2O2O registered at PS Muni Ki Reti, District Tehi Garhulol against the appellant is nothing but gross abuse of process of latu because the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients of any cognizable offence- Hence, the impugned FIR 20 ancl ) i i. t . c(,e.linqs sougllt to be talcen aga tst Lte L Lppellant are h,.'r e.ltt. :ltr.aslted and set aside."

26. On f.,ri.i rf the given case, where the allee;aticns rlade in the FIR of thr: r'o'rrplaint do not clisclosc commiss.iorr o1- any offence made ag.rir s - )(' ilccused, the proceedings can bc qua shed 27 . T['rt: l{ot'onrable Suprcme Court in Jacob Mat hew,s case held thal. n :.;, igence cannot be inferred only for lhe re:r son of there being a l,,r' r,r :rltemative course of method of trjetnl .tn1, or that therc u,as r l):ttcr doctor rvho Lvas more skilkd that- tlte cloctor against rr,'h rl L r he allegation is made. Such gr,: r_rr-rds r antrot form basis to J t-,:sc:ntc the doctor for negligence. A:; cL:scu;sed above, the petiticn l \\as a competent doctor who was iurr)in j a hospital and had Fir cr' 1...,*.nt to the best of her abilily. lhc Police have not follow:r i .t. procedure prescribed by the (i(rve,t.rLm rnt in such conditions I ) ! lr .ic the opiniol of a committee_

28. For -l-,r : lolesaid reasons, the criminal pt:ti:;ol lescrves to be allou,ecl, Ll<[ is accordingly allowed. //TRUE COPY// SD'. T.'I'IRUMALA DEVI DEPU TYIREGISTRAR r!t \--- SE,)T16N OFFICER - I ()ne lair copv to the Hon'ble SRI JUSTICE K. SURENDER '[fo. his Lordships kind perusal' ' To,

1. The V Ldclitional Metropolitan f\'4agistrate Cum Vl riddl' Jur ior Civil Judge' Cyberlt';:r;, at L B.Naqar. I r I t

2. 3. 4. o. 7. B. 9. The Station House officer, Chaitan yapuri Police Station, Rachakonda 11 L.R. Copies The Under Secretary, Union of lndia, I\.4inistry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi. The. Secretary, Telangana Advocates Assocration Library, High Court Buildings, Hyderabad. Two CCs to The Public prosecutor High Court of Telangana, [OUT] 9n" 99 to Sridevi Jampani, Advocate tOpUCl 9"" 99 to of Sri P. Nagendra Reddy, Advocare tOpUCl Two CD Copies SR/gh i i;I j,' I I i ,.D - _ ':r A .q Q (;l Ii 1J Jll

1.. HIGH COURT DATED:1610412025 \ \ I l I I ORDER CRLP.NcI.6(t73 of 2020 CRIMINAL PETTTION IS ALLOWED t9 o .rr@ W .flJ.r5 ar.