SRI v. vs S. N. RAJU

Petition under Section 1s1 cpc praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High court may be pleased to vacate the lnterim order granted in w.p. No. 16108 of 2o2s dated 13.06.2025 and dismiss the above referred writ petition with costs. lA NO: 4 OF 2025 Petition underSection 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to extend the interim orders granted on 13.06.2025 in l.A. No. 1 of 2025 in W.P. No. 16108 of 2025 until the final disposal of the Writ Petition lA NO: 5 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to extend the interim orders granted on 13.06.2025 in l.A. No. 1of 2025 in W.P. No. 16108 of 2025 until the final disposal of the Writ Petition Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI V. V. S. N. RAJU Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 & 4: ..-- Counsel for the Respondent No. 2: SRI K. RATHANGAPANI REDDY Counsel for the Respondent No. 3: SRI P. SHASHIDHAR REDDY The Court made the following: ORDER HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAI{A WRIT No. 16108 oF2025 ORDE R: petitioner,s case is that Respondent No.1 is functioning as a specialized branch to handle NpA accounts and undertake proceedings under the SARFAESI Act for rearization of security interest. Respondent No.4 is the Head t)rnce of the union Bank of India, wh,e Respondent Nos. 2 and.J are formar parties to the case.

1.1. It is stated, Novus Green Energz Systems Ltd., a company under the Companies 'Act, 2013, had availed several credit facilities from the union Bank of India thro,gh its Mid corporate Branch, Jubilee Hilrs, Hyderabad. After crassification of those loan accounts as Non-performing Assets (NpA), the accounts were transferred to Respondent No.1 for recovery. The Bank, in order to recover dues, invoked provisir>ns of the SARFAESI Act, 2oo2, and initiated steps to enforce the security interest created by guarantors. Among the securities was the subject property, which had been mortgaged. by one sri Yenigalla vardhaman through his attorney holder, sri yeniga[a Anshuman. I I 2

1.2. while so, Respondent No.l issued a public auction noti{ication dated 14.O2.2025 for the sale of various properties, including the subject property, stating that property was free from encumbrances and litigation and that the Bank had taken possession. E-auction was conducted on 11.o3.2O25. Believing these representations, petitioner participated and offered a bid of Rs. 4,86,78,000/-, emerging a5 thehi-ghEst bidder. He duly paid, 25o/o of the bid amount, totalling Rs' 1,2L,69,5OO I -, as per the auction terms, whereupon sale of the property was confirmed in his favour. Auction terms also stated that property was free from encumbrances and any court litigation, thereby inducing petitioner's participation. Petitioner asserted that after payment of 25oh of the

1.3. bid amount, he visited the subject property on 15.a3-2025 and was shocked to discover a notice board stating that a civil suit, O.S. No. 2ll of 2024, was pend.ing before the XIX Additional Senior civil Judge, city civil court, Secunderabad, concerning the same property. Petitioner immediately addressed the letter dated 24.O3.2O25.to the Bank, enclosing photographs of the notice board and sought extension of time to verisr the third- party claims. Bank's auction sale notice claimed that ., possession of the property was taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rure g of the security Interest (Enforceme't) Rules, 2oo2. However, in reality, the Bank had neither taken physical possession nor disclosed the existence of pending litigation. The Bank's concealment of litigation and possession details was deliberate and in violation of the statutory requirements under Rule g(7)(a) and (f) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rures, 2oo2. Furthermore, the Bank later filed an Application seeking impleadment in the saicl civil suit, thereby confirming that litigation existed even before the auction notice was issued. L-4. Petitioner relied on the settled positio. of law laid down by the Hon'bre Supreme court in rndian B,,nks, Association, Bombay a. Deukq.lq. consultancy senticest, wherein it was held that statutory authorities must exercise powers strictly in the manner prescribed and that disclosure of encumbrances and pending litigation is a mandatorv statutory duty and not a mere formality. He also cited other judgments, including K. senthil Kumar a. The General Manq.ger (writ Petition No. 13269 of 2016) and s. shanmuganathan a. The | (2OO4) 1 1 SCC I 4 Authorized Officer, IOB Bank2 wherein it was reiterated that the bank's duty to disclose encumbrances is a statutory obligation under Rule 9(9) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2OO2, and that failure to do so would attract Section l8(2) of the Indian Contract Act, L872, enabling the purchaser to avoid the contract.

1.5. Being disturbed by these dgvelopAen_t1, petitioner addressed several communications to the Bank on 24.03.2025,

22.05.2025 and 23.A5.2025, informing them about the litigation and caution notices, and sought time to veriSr the third-party claims. Subsequently, petitioner came to know that an ex parte ad interim order had been passed on 28.O4.2025 in I.A. No. 757 of 2024 in o.S. No. 211 of 2024 by the XIX Additional Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, restraining alienation or interference with the property. Upon discovering this, he addressed a detailed representation dated 30.O5.2025 to Respondent No.1, seeking clarification and appropriate action.

1.6. According to petitioner, it was the Bank's responsibility to verify the title, possession and extent of the ' 1zotz1 ibclaw.in 1o4 HC, ) land before auction. Having relied on the Bank,s representations, he paid the bid amount in good faith. Hence, Bank's faih-rre to disclose ongoing litigation and the interim order dated 28.04.2025 constituted a clear violation of the statutory and judicially-recognized obligation to disclose all known encumbrances. Petitioner stated that in its reply dated os.oo.zo2S, the Bank admiited awareness of the notice board and that it rvas taking steps to get impleaded in o.S. No. 211 of 2024. It is stated, due to the pending litigation, he could not peacefully enjoy or utilize the property. The trncertainty regarding the duration of the case prevented him from developing or alienating the property, thereby causing financial loss and distress. Upon further scrutiny, petitioner discovered that mortgage had been executed by the attorney holder, Mr. Yenigalla Anshuman, under a power of attorney granted by the owner, Mr. Yenigalla Vardhaman. Legal examination revealed that the saicl power of attorney did not authorize the attorney to mortgage the property, rendering the mortgage itself doubtful and possibly invalid. Thus, the legality of the Banl<,s action in bringing the property to auction was questionable. 6 \ L.7 . When petitioner requested refund of the amount paid, the Bank refused and instead issued a threatening e mail dated 05.06.2025 demanding payment of the remaining 75oh of the sale price on or before 09.06.2025, failing which 25o/o already paid would be forfeited. This arbitrary act of the Bank, without addressing petitioner's grievances or clari$ring the legal status of the.property, was stated to be illegal, violative of the SARFAESI Act, 2OO2, and the Constitution of India-

2. While issuing notice before admission, this Court by order dated 13.06.2025, taking into consideration the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that petitioner does not want to pursue further with the purchase of the property in view of the litigation on the subject property, directed respondent / bank not to forfeit 25o/o of the bid amount up to LL.O7.2025 and the said order was extended from time to time.

3. Respondents 1 and 4 filed counter asserting that no constitutional rights have been violated; Bank acted strictly as per the SARFAESI Act, 2OO2 and SARFAESI Rules, 2OO2. They took preliminary objection that Writ Petition is not maintainable as Petitioner's remedy lies before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of tLle 2oo2 Act. Petitioner, if aggrieved by any 7 measure under Section 13(4) of the Act, should have filed a Securitisation Application before the DRT. It is a settled position that auction purchasers aggrieved by measures under Section must approach the DRT and not to invoke writ lrtOt jurisdiction. writ jurisdiction under Article 226 being equitable and discretionary, should be exercised only in exceptional cases, which Petitioner has failed to demonstrate. The writ Petition is therefore, liable to be dismissed on maintainability.

3.1. It is stated, M/s Novus Green Energg Systems Private Limited (Principal Borrower) availed financial assistance of Rs.113.07 crores from Union Bank of India, Mid corporate Branch, Hyderabad. The repayment was secured bv immovable properties mortgaged by the Principal Borrower and guarantors, including Mr. sri Yenigalla vardhaman. upon default in repayment, the account was declared as Non-perforrning Asset (NPA) on 28.02.2024 and the account was transferred to Respondent No.l branch for initiating recovery under the SARFAESI Act. Respondent No.1 initiated recovery measures under the SARFAESI Act, 2oo2, and issued a pubr.ic e-auction notice dated 14.02.2025 for sale of mortgaged properties, including Plot No.63P (Northern part), Manasa Hills, Budvel, 8 Rajendra Nagar, Hyderabad ("subject property") belonging to Sri - Vardhaman' Yenigalla As per the e-auction notice dated l4-o2.2o25, bidders were allowed to inspect the secured assets with prior appointment and. required to satisfy themselves regarding title, encumbrances and dues before bidding. The sale was to be conducted. strictl5r on "as is where is," "as is wha.t is," and ,,whatever basis- Respondent No.l states that it duly complied with all the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and Rules, disclosing encumbrances on the property as known to the Bank, which were 'NIL',at that time. The Bank categorically declared that, to its. best knowledge, there was no encumbrance on the subject is" property. Bidders, including Petitioner, were required to conduct their own due diligence prior to bidding' Petitioner participated in the e-auction cond'ucted

3.2. on 11 .O3.2O25 after unconditionally accepting all the terms and conditions, and was declared the highest bidder for Rs.4,86,78,000/-, and was issued a sale intimation letter dated 11.03.2025 directing payment of 25oh within one working day and the remainingTSo/o within 15 days (by 26.03.2025]l' Instead I of paying the balance, Petitioner sent an e-mail dated

24.03.2025 alleging discovery of a notice board on the subject property rel'erring to o.S. No.21l of 2024 before the XIX Addl. Senior civil Judge, city civil court, secunderabad. petitioner alleged non-disclosure of this suit and sought 60 days' extension or time till completion of section 14 proceedings under SARFAESI Act. Petitioner again, through e-mail dated

22.05.2025, demanded the Bank to take steps under Section L4.

3.2(l). Petitioner, by e-mail dated 23.O5.2O25, informecl Respondent No.l that transfer of balance amount was in process but delayed due to procedural issues in his capital Gain Account. He requested a 15-day extension, assuring completion of payment within 3 months. This, according to Respondent No.1, shows that Petitioner was fuly aware of the terms of the e-auction and voluntarily sought extensions. Later, Petitioner's letter dated 30.0s.2025 stated that an ex parte interim injunction was granted on 28.o4.2o2s in I.A. No.757 of 2024 in o.s. No.21L of 2024 restraining dealings in the subject property, and questioned the validity of the Menrorandum of Deposit of l'itle Deeds (MorD). Respondent No.1 notes that this l0 interim order came after the e-auction on 7L.03.2025. Respondent No.1 replied by letter dated 05.06.2025 to Petitioner's letters dated 30.05.2025 and 04.06.2025 stating that Bank was not a party to the suit and no notice was served. However, after the auction, the Bank noticed a board on the property by unknown persons referring to the civil suit. The Bank file{ an impleadment application in that suit and _no adverse order existed against the auctioned property; the Bank clarified that no stay was granted by the DRT and auction was held under SARFAESI Act, a special enactment for bank recovery; Bank informed Petitioner that extensions had already been granted five times and final deadline to pay 75o/o balance was 09.06.2025, failing which 25o/o bid amount would be forfeited.

3.3. It is stated, Petitioner, having voluntarily accepted all the arrction ternts, cannot later challenge the contractual consequences of non-compliance. Forfeiture of 25oh deposit is valid under Rule 9(5) of SARFAESI Rules, 2OO2. The doctrine of estoppel applies as Petitioner cannot now take a contrary position. Respondent No.1 reiterates that it disclosed encumbrances to the best of its knowledge as 'NIL'. Bank was under no further obligation under Rule 8(6) beyond disclosure of facts within its knowledge. The Principal Borrower and guarantors, who received the sale notice under Rule 8(6) and Rule 9(1), did not disclose any civil suit. Hence, there was no concealment by the Bank. The e- auction terms expressly at"tad the sale was on "as is where is,,, "as is what is," and "whatever there is" basis, and bictders were responsible to verify title and encumbrances. The Bank made no representation or warranty, and cannot be held li:rble for any third-PartY claims. Petitioner participated after accepting the e-auction r:onditions.

3.4. The judgments cited by petitioner are in.applicable as the facts differ. Respondent No.1 submits that the Petitioner's e-mail dated 23.05.2025 shows he had accepted the e-auction terms and sought time due to transfer delays, not because of zrny alleged concealment. His later objections were afterthoughts to delay payment. The allegation regarcling power of Attorney is false. The Power of Attorney was exe<:uted by Sri Yenigalla Verrdhaman in favour of his brother Sri yenigalla Anshuman on 23.12.2015 (Document No.157/BKfi-2o15) and t2 - again on 26.O4.2OL9 (Document No.60-BKIV-19). The Petitioner was free to inspect the property prior to auction but failed to do so. The Bank had no further obligation beyond this disclosure- request for extensions was accommodated twice, on .petitioner's 25.03.2025 and 27.05.2025, yet he failed to pay the balance Rs.3,65,O8,5OO1-. consequently, the Bank issued a final letter dated 05.06.202! w-arning of forfeiture-' Heard Sri V.V.S.N. Raju, Iearned counsel for

4. petitioner, Sri P. Shashidhar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the 3.d respondent, Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy, learned counsel for the 2'd respondent' Upon careful consideration of the pleadings and 5. submissions, this Court finds that the principal issue is the maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters arising under the SARFAESI Act,2OO2- The scheme of the SARFAESI Act provides a

6. complete mechanism for redressal of grievances of aggrieved persons under Section 17 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT). Section 17 confers jurisdiction upon the DRT to examine l3 the legality of measures taken under Section 13(4). It is well- settled that when a statute provides a specific rernedy, writ jurisdiction shall not ordinarily be exercised. Petitioner, being an auction Jrurchaser, has the same remedy under Section l7 if aggrieved by the measures of the secured creditor.

7. This legal position has reiterated by the .been Honble supreme court in tlnited Bonk of India a. satyautati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], Authorized Officer, State Bank of Trauancore a. Matheut K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], and phoeniz- ARC Pvt. Ltd. a. Vishuta Bharati Vidya Mandir U,.),O22) 5 SCC 3451, holding that High courts should refrain frorn exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 when statutory remedy is available. In PIIR rnaent Education societg a. tJCo Bo;nks, the Hon'ble Supreme court taking into consideration the above judgments held in the following lines: u 22- The iaw with regard to entertaining a petition uncler Article 226 ol the Constitution in case of availability of alternative remedy is well settled. ln satyawati'l'ondon[IJnited Bank of Ind.iav. satgawatt rondon, (2olo) g SCC 110 : (2010) 3 scc (civ) 260 :2oto INSC 4281 , this court observed thus : (scc p. 123, paras 43-45) "43. Unfortunately, the High court [Safyawati rondonv. state of u.p., 2oo9 scc Online All 2608l overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with llreater rigoui in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money ana tne dues of banks :lnd other Frnancial institutions. In our view, while iealing with the t (:o:+) 6 scc -5?9 t4 petitions involving challenge to the action taken flor recovery of the public dues, etc. the t{igh Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

44. Wlr,Jle expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement o[ any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

45. lt is true that the rule of exhaustion o[ alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why thc High Cor-rrt should entertain a petition hled under Articlc 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance." 23. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an ellective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. It has been held that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other t)'pes of public money and the dues o[ banks and other linancial institutions. The Court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. It has been hetd that, though the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are of widest amplitude, still the courts cannot be oblivious of the rules o[ self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court. The Court further held that though the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, stitl it is difhcult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed trnder Article 226 of the Constitution. 24.Th'e view taken by this Court has been followed inAgarutal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Punjab Natiorual BanklAganaal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Puniab National Bank, (20181 t SCC 626: (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) a25 :2017 INSC 11461 . 25. ln State Bank of Trauancore v. Mathew K.C. lState Bank of Trauancore v. Mathew K.C., (2ol8l 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) al : 2Ol8 INSC 7ll , this Court was considering an appeal against an interim order passed by the High Court in a rvrit petition under Article 226 of the Constitution staying further proceedings at the stage of Section l3(a) of the Sarfaesi Act. After considering various judgments rendered by this Court, the Court observed thus : (SCC p. 94, para 16) " 16. TLre rvrit petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without iven granting opportunit5r to the appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ l5 petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter-affidavit having subscquently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justilication to have declined interference." 26. The same ltosition was again reiterated by this Court in Phoenix ARC (p) Ltd.v. Vishtua Bharati Vidga MandirlPhoenix ARC (P) Ltd.v- Vishwa Bharati Vidga Mandir, (20221 5 SCC 3a5 : QO22l3 SCC (Civ) 153 : 2022 INSC 441 . 27. Again, in varimadugu obi Reddg v. B. sreeniuasulu lvarimadugu obi Reddg v. B. Sreeniuasulu, (20231 2 SCC 168 : (20231 1 SCC (Civ| 58 : 2022 INSC 12071 , after reflerring to earlit:r judgments, this Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 181-t]2, para 34) " 34. The order of the Tribunal dated l -8-2019 was an appealable ordt:r under Section 18 of the Sarhesi Act, 2oo2 and in the ordinary course of tlusiness, the borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to avail the statutory remedy of appeal which the larv provides under Section,18 of the S4rfae_qi Act, 201,92. In th_e absence of efficacious altcrr"rative remedy being availed, there was no reasonable justilication tendered by the respondent borrowers in approaching the High Courl and l-rling writ application assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 under it.s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the statutory right of appeal available at its comrnand." 28. It could thus be seen that this Court has strongly deprecated the practice of entertaining rvrit petitions in such matters.

29.Recentl-v,inCelirLLP[CelirLLPv.BafnaMotors(Mumbai) (P) Ltd.,(20241 2SCC I : Qo2al I scc (civ) 62 : 2023 INSC 8381 , after surveying various jtLdgments of this Court, the Court observed thus: (SCC p.81, para 101) "101. More than a dccade back, this Courthad expressed serious corlcern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the Rdbfi Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after the decision of this court in satyautati rondonlunited Bank of Indiav. satgawati rondon, (2010) g scc 110 : (2010) 3 scc (civ) 260 :2olo INSC 4281 , it appears that the High courts have continued to exercise its rvrit jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoing the statutory remedies under the Rdbfi Act and the Sarfaesi Act." 3O. It can thus be seen that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in such matters, the High Court strould not entertain a petition under Article 226 of tine constitution particularl-v when an alternative statutory remedy is available. 31. The only reasoning that could be seen from the impugned order lM.v. Ramana Raov. UCO Bank,2022 SCC Online TS 34791 given by the learned Division Bench of the High court is as under : (M.v. Ramana Rao case lM.v. Ramana Rao v- uco Bank, 2022 SCC Online 'fS 34791 , SCC OnLine TS paras I l-tS) "11. rt is true that under Section 18 of the SarfaesiAct, the petitioner has the alternative remedy against the impugned order by hling appeal belore the appellate Tribunal. However, having regard to the fact that the writ petition is pending before this Court for qtrite some time and also considering the fact that Lf the impugned order is allowed to stand, petitioner rvould be left without a remedy to ventilate his grievance, we dt:em it fit and proper not to non-suit the petitioner cn the ground of not availing the alternative remedy. 12. Section l7 of the Sarfaesi Act provides that any person including a borrower rvho is aggrieved by the action of secured creditor under Section 13(a) oi tLre Sarfaesi Act t6 may lile an application thereunder. The Supreme Court has held time and again that the Tribunal exercises wide jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SarfaesiAct, even to the extent of setting aside an auction;sale. In the instant case, we are consciously not referring to the merit o[ the case. All that we are concerned is whether for whatever reason a person who is aggrieved in law should be left remediless. In the instant case, the petitioner had invoked his remedy by filing securitisation application under sub- section (t) of Section 17 of theSarfaesiAct. The application was pending for three years before the Tribunal. From the docket order dated 21-9-2O2O, we find that a junior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had reported that the matter was settled out of Court and therefore, leave was sought for withdrawing the securitisation application which was accordingly granted. 13. When the settlement did not materialise, petitioner went back to the Tribunal for revival of the securitisation application which was however dismissed on the ground that version of the petitioner did not deserve acceptance.

14. On thorough consideration of the matter we are of the view that dismissal of the miscellarr-eous application of the-petitioner- -by,-the Tribunal does not appear to be justified.

15. Though subsequent developments may have a bearing on the grant of ultimate rclief to a litigant but the same by itself cannot denude the adjudicating authority of its porver to adjudicate the grievance raised by the aggrieved person which it otherwise possess." 32. It can thus clearly be seen that though it was specifically contended on behalf of the appellant herein that the writ petition was not maintainable on account of availability of alternative remedy, the High Court has interfered with the writ petition only on the ground that the matter was pending for some time before it and if the petition ivas not entertained, the borrower would be left remediless. We however find that the High Court has failed to take into consideration the conduct of the borrorver. It is further to be noted that, though the High Court had been specifically informed that, on account of subsequent developrnents, that is confirmation of sale and registration thereof, the position had reached an irreversible stage, the High Court has failed to take into consideration those aspects of the matter.

8. In the present case, petitioner's grievance pertains to alleged concealment of litigation and forfeiture of deposit amount, which are measures arising from proceedings under Section i3(4) of the 2Oo2 Act and Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules. Therefore, petitioner's remedy lies before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The Writ Petition is thus not maintainable. t7

9. On merits also, this Court finds that e-eruction was conducted on 11.O3.2O25 and interim injunction in I.A. No.757 of 2024 in O.S. No.2ll of 2024 was passed on 28.O4.2025, subsequent to the auction. The Bank's disclosure of encumbrances as 'NIL'was based on the information available as on L4.O2.2O25, and there is no material to sho',r, that Bank was in the know of the said suit eariier. The terms of auCtion, particularly Clauses 11 , 14, 15, 26, and 28, clearly placed the responsibility on the bidder to verifir encumbrances and title. Petitioner, having voluntarily participated, is bound by these terms. The doctrine of estoppel therefore, applies. The Bank,s action of forfeiture under Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules, 2oo2 is legally- valid where the purchaser fails to pay r-he balance within the stipulated period. Petitioner admitted delay in his e mail dated 23.o5.2025 citing procedural reasons in his capital Gain Account. The subsequent objections appear as afterthoughts to avoid payment. The Bank extended time multiple times and acted in compliance with law.

10. Therefore, this Court holds that there is no illegality, arbitrariness or violation of Articles 14 or 300-A of the 18 Constitution of India in the Bank's action. The allegations of suppression or misrepresentation are unsubstantiated. 1 1. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that Writ Petition is not maintainable in view of the statutory remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2OO2 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs; L2. The interim order dated 13.06.2025 stands vacated automatically //TRUE COPY// SD/. C. DEEPIKA ASSISTANT REGISTRAR G SECTION OFFICER To to SRI V.V.S. N. RAJU, Advocate [OPUC] to SRI K. RATHANGAPANI REDDY, Advocate [OPUC] to SRI P. SHASHIDHAR REDDY, Advocate IOPUC] One CC One CC One CC Two C.D Copies t 1 2 3 4 MMT GJP HIGH COURT DATED:1211112025 ORDER WP.No.16108 of 2025 Sottou6 )) I z { t DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS i. +l Dl \ r{\tt