The High Court · 2025

Counsel for the Respondent No.1 : SRI R NAGARJUNA REDDY Counsel forthe Respondent Nos.3 & 4 : SRI TARUN G. REDDY The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT I l THE HONOURAtsLE SMT. JUSTTCE RENUKA YARA SECOND APPEAL No.277 of 2024 JUDGMENT: I Heard Sri T. Sharath, leamed counsel for the appellant and Sri Tarun G. Reddy, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4. Perused the entire record

2. This Second Appeal is preferred aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2023 in 1.A.No.2799 of 2023 in A.S.SR.No. 13388 ol 2023 on the tile of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar ('tirst appellate Court'), wherein the application filed to condone delay of 12 days in filing the first appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 02.08.202-1 in I.A.No.269 of 2022 in O.S.No.2 I ol'2016 on the file of the I Additional Junior Civit Judge-cum-Xll Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Rajendranagar ('trial Court'), whereby the petition filed under Order VII Rule I t CPC was allowed rejecting the plaint, was dismissed.

3. The brief lacts of the case are that the appellant herein filed suit vide O.S.No.21 of 2016 on the file of the trial Court seeking cancellation of judgment and decree in O.S.No.288 of 1981, dated 30.03.1982 on the file of the District Munsiff West and South Court, Hyderabad, along with consequential reliels to declare sale deeds i.e., sale deed docurnent bearing \ \ ! xl\ RY,J sA 277 2024 No.6454 of 1985, dated 12.09.1985 in favour ofdefendant No.1/respondent No.2 herein and consequent sale deed document bearing No.2256 of2003, dated 04.04.2003 in f-avour defendant Nos.? and 3/respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein as null and void and to grant perpetual injunction. Upon filing ofthe said suit, delendant No.5/respondent No.1 herein filed I.A.No.269 of 2022 in O.S.No.2l of 2016 before the Trial Court under Order VII Rule 1l read u,ith Scction l-5 1 ol ('.I').C.. to re.icct the plaint. The said interlocutory application was allowc'd vrde order dated 02.08.2023 and plaint was rejected. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant herein preferred appeal along with condonc dclay application vide I.A.No.2799 of 2023 in A.S.SR.No. 13388 of 2023 to condonc delay ol l2 days in filing the appeal I before the first appellatc Courl. 'I'he flrst appellate Court dismissed the aforesaid interlocutory application fited seeking to condone delay vide order dated 16.1L.2023 and consequently, the first appeal was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein filed a Civil Revision Petition betbre this Court in C.R.P.No.3523 of 2023., which was a dismissed as not maintainable as an appeal has to be preferred against the judgment and decree dated 16. I1.2023 passed by the first appellate Court. In the said circumstances, the appellant herein filed the present Second Appeal along with I.A.No. l of 2024 ro condone delay of 132 days in filing the Second Appeal. -l'his Court vide common order dated 08.11.2024 / 2 / dismissed the condone delay application and consequently, rejected the I RY,J sA 277 2024 Second Appeal. The said dismissal order was challenged by the appellant herein before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal Nos.6648-6649 of 2025 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.30478-30479 of 2024. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 13.05.2025 by setting aside the common order passed by this Court dated 08.11.2024 condoned the delay of 132 days and restored the present Second Appeal to its original number. Currently, the order dated l6.l 1.2023 in I.A.No.2799 of 2023 in A.S.SR.No.I3388 of 2023 passed by the first appellate Court is under challenge for refusal to condone delay of l2 days in filing the present first appeal.

4. The substantial questions of law raised in the present second appeal are whether the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2023 passed by the first appellate Court is perverse in disrnissing the application filed to condone delay of 12 days depriving the appellant herein from exercising valuable statutory right of apPeal. t

5. During the arguments in the present Second Appeal, learned counsel for the appellant referred to paragraph No.l I of the impugned order dated

16.11.2023 where exception is taken to non-fumishing of the detaiis of illness of the appellant, legal advice taken and the names of persons from i \ \ RY,J sA 277 2024 whom legal advice is taken. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant is at liberty to take legal advice from any of the resource persons he chooses and such information need not be revealed as per Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It is argued that the reasoning given for refusal to condone delay of l2 days is on two grounds one is non-fumishing of details of illness of senior citizen, who is 73 years old and non-disclosure of namcs as rvell as the communication between the appellant and his legal counsel, the samc are perverse and therefore, liable to be set aside.

6. In that context, leamed counsel lor the appellant relied upon the judgment of High Court of Delhi in Raj Kumar v. Ghanshyam Das Guptar, wherein it is held that a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, does lie against a first appellate order which dismisses the condone delay and consequently, rejected first appeal as time barred. Further, reliance is placed on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case between N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy2, wherein it is held as under: "12. A court knorvs that relusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor lrom putting lorth his cause. There is no presumption that dela1, in approaching the court is alrvays deliberate. This Cou( has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Scction ' ueNuloz/ztat/zozt 'l 1rs961 z scc rz: 4 / RY,J sA 277 2024 5 of the Limitation Act should receivc a liberal construction so as to advance substantial .justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. 13. It must be remembcrcd that in every case of delay, thcre can be some lapse on the part ol thc litigant concemed. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut thc door against him. If the explanation does not smack ol'mala fides or it is not put forth as part ofa dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party delibcrately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning detay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be bome in Inind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation cxpenses. It rvould be a salutary guideline thal whcn courts condone the delal' duc to laches on the part of the applicant, thc court shallcompcnsate thc opposite party lor his loss "

7. Leamed counsel lor respondent Nos.3 and 4 opposed the Second Appeal alleging that there is no need to consider the delay liberally when there are laches on the part of the appellant in preferring the appeal in time. It is emphasized that law of limitation has to be strictly implemented and limitation period cannot be extended unless there is sufficient cause. In that context, reference is made to the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case between Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Special Land Acquisition Officerr, D. Gopinathan Pillai v. State of Keralaa, Balwant l.(zor:) ro scc zos tr3ooz1 z scc :zz o 5 RY,J sA,777 2024 '\i \ Singh v. Jagdish Singhs and Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.6

8. In, Popat Bahiru (lovardhane (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4, a petition is filed to condone delay of four days was dismissed and the same was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the said case, there was delay in filing the application to secure certified copies and the said delay was not properly explained.

9. In the instant case, there was delay as the appellant was aged about 73 years and has consulted three or four advocates before deciding to file the first appeal befbre the first appellate Court. Educated persons also require legal advice when subject is not known. Such being the case, the appellant being 73 years and uneducated consulting three or lour advocates for legal opinion before settling on one of them to file first appeal does seem reasonable. 'I'herefore, the same covers under the phrase 'sufficient CAUSE I 0. Further, in D. Gopinathan Pillai (supra) relied by the leamed counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4, the order of condone delay of 3320 aulat u. been set aside for not explaining delay property. The present case in hand has delay of 12 days and the same cannot be compared with case t (zoto)a scc eas 61951 scc online 5c a9 6 I I I RY,J sA 277 ?.024 where delay was 3320 days and further, when reason for delay of l2 days is explained. I l. In Balwant Singh (supra), it was held as follows: "27.The application tiled by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex-facie lack bona fide. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not speciff any ol the enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements, then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application is bona fide and based upon true and plausible explanations. as rvcll as reflect normal behaviour of a common prudent person on the part ol'thc applicant, the Courl. would normally tilt the judicial discrction in t'avour of such an applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equatcd rvith doing injustice to the other party."

12. In the aforesaid case, the Court has come to the said conclusion as no details are given the petition expressly lack bona fides. Such a situation cannot be apptied to the present case where delay of l2 days was to consult legal practitioners or sickness on account of old age ol- 73 years cannot be deemed to be incorrect or expressly lacking in bona fides.

13. Reliance is also placed on Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (supra) by leamed a counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4, wherein it is held as under: "15. ...The eff'ect of the explanation is that if the pa(y who has applied lor extension of period shows that the delay was due to any of the facts mentioned in the explanation that rvould be trcated as suflicient cause, and after it is trcated as sufficicnt causc thc qucstion may then arise whether discretion should bc exeroised in lavour of the party or not. In the cases to which the explanation applies it may be easy lbr the Court to 1 I I I RY.J sA,277 2024 '..1 decide that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the party and delay should be condoned... "

14. In the present case, the appellant is a senior citizen aged about 73 years and w,as an agriculturist. Such a person has filed suit to cancel certain .judgment. and decree as being obtained by fraud as the said judgment and decree was with respect to his agricultural lands and were passed without his knowledge. Further, allegations are made to the effect that the alleged judgment and decree was never passed as the alleged presiding officer has never presided the said Court at relevant point ol-time. The truth or otherwise of such serious allegations when it atfects the substantial rights of the parry, need to be looked into as any judgment obtained by playing fraud on a Court would be a nullity.

15. The appellant tlled suit to declare the judgment and decree to be null and void, when he learned about existence of said judgment and decree Thereafter, respondent No.l herein filed petition in I.A.No.269 of 2022 in O.S.No.2l of 2016 seeking rejection of the plaint and the same was allowed leading to filing of first appeal with a delay of 12 days. Said petition to condone delay was dismissed. Consequently, the mandatory right to prefer first appeal is denied. The whole sequence of events do not show lack of bonct fides on the part of the appellanr as the appellant does not stand to gain anything by filing the appeal with the delay. Further, rhe f 8 RY,J sA.277 2024 order passed by the first appellate Court is perverse to the extent it requires disclosure of legal advice given or names of the said legal practitioners, who were consulted by the appellant, which communication is protected as professional communication between the counsel and the client under Section 126 ofthe Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

16. The only ground that remains to be examined is non-disclosure of nature of illness of the appellant or filing documentary proof thereof. When the appellant is aged about 73 years in all probability, he may be suffering with old aged ailments. 1'hc prayer to condone short delay of 12 days in filing the first appeal in the absence of conduct to show mola fide cannot be rejected to deny the mandatory right of first appeal. In case the I delay is inordinate, may be documentary proof is required to support said cause, but when the delay is only 12 days, the same can be considered liberally. As such, since the findings of the first appellate Court are perverse in nature, the same are liable to be set aside.

17. In the result, the Second Appeal is partly allowcd by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 16.t1.2023 in I.A.No.2799 of 2023 in A.S.SR.No.13388 of 2023 on the file of the first appellate Court and condoning the delay of 12 days in filing the first appeal. The first appellate Court is directed to number the appeal and proceed from that stage. The 9 I RY,.I sA 277 2024 \ prayer with respect to setting aside the judgment and decree dated

02.08.2023 in I.A.No.269 ol 2022 in O.S.No.2l of 2016 on the file of the trial Court is not considered and the same shall be dealt with by the first appellate Couft on merits in the first appeal. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed. SD/. T.KRISHNA KUMAR JOINT REGISTRAR G //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To,

1. The Principar District & sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar 2. One CC to SRt. T SHARATH Advocate IOPUC] 3. One CC to SRt. Tarn G. Reddy, Advocate [OPUC] L." 4. Two CD Cooies W ASR/ PSL a 10 HIGH COURT DATED:0210912025 t THE s / (( () l: * 31 t/.N 70?fr ? ) * P.EO JUDGMENT SA.No.277 ot 2024 I PARTLY ALLOWING THE APPEAL C vA "r/(, L i I IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD TUESDAY,THE SECOND DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE RENUKA YARA SECOND APPEAL NO:277 OF 2024 Between: M Venkat Reddy, Sio Late M Veera Reddy, Age About 75 years, Occ Agriculture, R/o H No 173/1, Kokapet Village, Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. AND APPELLANT/RespondenUPlaintiff

1. M Sathi Reddy, S/o Late M Ranga Reddy, Aged about 66 years, Occ Agriculture, R:/o H.No. 3129, Kokapet Village, Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District 75. RespondenUPetitioner/Defendant No.5

2. Sri Chiperi Mallaiah, S/o Pochaiah, Aged about 76 years, Occ Business, R/o Narsingi Village, Gandipet Mandal , Ranga Reddy District 75.

3. Kosaraju Jagan Mohan Rao, S/o Sri K Ramaiah Chowdary, Aged about 58 years, Occ. Business, R/o Flat No. 149, Road No 72, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad 11 4 Kosaraju Balaji, S/o K Ramaiah Chowdary, Aged about 55 years, Occ Business, R/o BAAS, Sy No. 8 H No. 2118lD, Khanapur, Gandipet Mandal, Rangareddy District 75.

5. The Deputy Coilector and Tahsildar, Gandipet Mandal earlier Rajendranagar, Mandal, Ranga Reddy District 75. (Respondent No.2 to 5 not necessary party in the appeal. I (Rangareddy 2 to 5 are not necessary parties in the appeal) RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS Appeal under section 100 C.P.C., against the Judgment and decree dated16.1'1 .2023 in IA No 2799 of 2023 in AS.SR.No.133BB of 2023 on the file of the Principle District and sessions Judge Rang Reddy District at LB Nagar. E ORDER: This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the ground s of appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the Lower Court and the material papers in the petition and upon hearing the arguments of Sri T. Sharath, Advocate for the Appellant and of Sri Tarun G. Reddy, Advocate for the Respondent Nos.3 & 4 That this Court doth Order and Decree as follows: i. That this appeal is be and hereby partly allowed by setting aside the iudgment and decree dt.16.11.2023 in 1A.No.2799/2023 on ASSR No.13388/2023 on the file of the first appellate Court.

2. fhatthis Court condoned the delay of '12 days in filing the First Appeal. 3. That the First Appellate Court is directed to number the appeal and oroceed from that stage.

4. That the prayer with respect to setting aside the judgment and decree dt.02.08.2023 in 1.A.No.269 of 2022 in O.S.No.21 of 2016 on the file of the trial Court is not considered and the same shall be dealt with by the First Appellate Court on merits in the First Appeal.

5. That there shall be no order as to costs. // 78u c < oGY // SD/. T.KRISHNA KUMAR JOINT REGISTRAR 6 (a-c\ t o^.r o Fprc€A- Trt

1. The Principal District and Sessions Judge, RR. Dist., at L.B. Nagar. 2' Two CD Copies. PSL a t E. HIGH COURT DATED:0210912025 DECREE SA.No.277 of 2024 t * -) i. \ sEiiT 3 1 JA|{ 21126 * a PARTLY ALLOWING THE APPEAL Sh( 6 ,,1" I