The High Court · 2025

Counsel for the Appellant: SRI P.G. NAIDU, SENIOR COUNSEL REPRESENTING Ms. G. BHANU PRTYA Counsel for the Resp,rndents: Ms. L. PRANATHI REDDY, SENIOR S.C. FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT The Court made the following: JUDGMENT * * + * * n a ,i j- 1, b I -7 I THE HOIiTBLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI APARESH KUMAR SINGH AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHruDDIN WRIT APPEAL No. 6O4 of 2O25 JUDGMENT: Heard Sri P.G.Naidu, lcarned Senior Counsel representing Ms.G.Bhanu Priya, lcarned counsel for the appellant, Ms. L.Pranathi Reddy, learncd Senior Standing Counsel for Central Government appearing for the respondents.

2. This Intra-Court Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is filed by the appellant/writ petitioner challenging the order dated 05.03.2O25 in W.P.No. i534O ol 2O14 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the order dated 26.03.2014 passed by respondent No.2-Central [ndustrial Security Force (CISF) is confirmed by dismissing the writ petition. Brief facts of the case

3. The present dispute arises on 2O.1I.2OOB, wherein the appellant/writ petitioner on the pretext of repair of defective delivery valve, alleged to hav-e-cover up the incident of pilferage of 4OO0 liters of diesel by mala fi"de intention by help of some employees of National Mineral Developmcnt Corporation (NMDC) Limited and tanker drivers, who were at the relevant t I ) time serving as Deputy Commandant at the NMDC unit in Kirandul. The primary issue for determination pertziins to the appellant's authorization of the release of the diesel tanker, rvhich, upon interception and subsequent inspection by Head Constable V.R.S. Reddy, was discovered to exhibit a discrepancy between the quantity purportedly decanted from the tank and the quantity remaining therein.

4. The appellant, after consultation with officiats of NMDC, acccpted the explanation tendered by the driver attributing the discrepancy to a defective valve and consequently directed that the tanker bt: repaired and the diesel re-decanted. Subsequently, NMDC instituted action against its oflicials through a vigilance enquiry about the un-decanted vehicle in connection with an alleged attempt to pilfer diesel, wherein the appellant appear,:d as a witness. However, only in .-luty 2011, i.e. after three yt:ars of the alleged incident, the appellant was served with a c hp.rge memo dated Ol.O7 .2Ol1 . The Central Industrial Security Porce (CISF) initiated disciplinarl' proceedings against the appellant based on a report from NMDC, accusing him of a mala fide attempt to conceal the incident. Follorving a departmental enquiry, the charge against the appellant r,r,:rs held to be established.

5. Further, the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) upon reference by the respondents recommended the imposition of the prescribed penalty, which was effected by the Disciplinary Authority on 26.03.2014; that the challenge to the impugned order before the learned Single Judge was dismissed, giving rise to the present appeal. Contentions of the appellant

6. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the non- disciosure and non-supply of the preliminary enquiry reports by DIG Nayeem and Commandant Zhophoneye has violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India and principles of natural justice. Further, the issuance of charge memo after a period exceeding three years from the date of the incident was not only unwarranted but also actuated by mala frde intentions, which is clearly intended to adversely affect the career of the appellant at the behest of vested interests. It is further contended that the departmental enquiry was fundamentally flawed due to procedural impropriefy. This is demonstrated by the arbitrary change of the Enquiry Ofhcer during the course of the enquiry, the denial of the appellant's request to summon material witnesses who are essential for adjudication and the holding of a hearing after the Enquiry f I l I I .1 4 Officer had alreacly submitted his report, all of which are clear violations ol established enquiry procedures. The appellant asserts that the finding of the learned Single .Iuclge that it shall not interfere with the findings of the enquiry offtcer is perverse and as such, it is contended that the enquiry officer failed to afford the reasonable opportunity. Hou,cvcr, it is contended that the observations of the commissions are exclusively based on the hostile testimony of an unreliable wrtness identified as P.W.3 and failed to consider the appellant's bona fide exercise of discretion and judgment in thc matter which cannot sustain the departmental pcnalties. Further, ft:arned counsel for the appellant placed reliance in Agaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan a. Sto:te of Maharashtra and othersl , q,herein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasized in respect of the opportunity made available during the r:ross-exami nation as one of the facets of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the appellant contends that the learned Single Judge erred by dcclining to interfere with the disciplinary, 61d61 despite the prescnce of the above mentioned glaring procedural irregularities. The failure to exercise judicial revie$' in such I (l0l r ) -1 S( ( 1()5 -/ 5 circumstances constitutes a grave error warranting appellate lnterventlon. Contentions of the respondents

7. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that the preliminary enquiry reports ln que stion were internal, lact Iinding documents prepared solely for the purpose of investigation and fact ascertainment. These documents were not relied upon as substantive evidence during the departmental enquiry. Consequentiy, there was no legal obligation to furnish such reports to the appellant in light of the settled legal proposition enunciated in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shatrughan Lo.l2, which exempts disclosure of internal preliminary reports. The respondents contend that the delay of over three years in initiating disciplinary proceedings is suf[-rciently explained by the protracted internal processes ol NMDC and the subsequent necessary verihcations required before formal action could be taken. It is further asserted that the appellant has failed to demonstrate any specific or actual prejudice caused by this delay which would warrant the quashing of the proceedings on the grounds of undue or mola fide delay. ' AtR 1998 scc ioi8 \ "--''1 I I .l 6 It is submitted that the departmental enquiry was - conducted in a fair and proper manner, fully compliant with procedural rcq "rirements. The change of the Enquiry Olficer during the cnquiry was a routine administrative decision and did not introduce any element of bias or mala hde intent. The Enquiry Officer's discretion in deciding whether to summon certain witrresses was lawful and based on relevant considerations, not motivated by any improper purpose. Regardrng the firndings, the respondents maintzrin that the conclusions of guilt of the appellant are founded on evidence and represcnt a plausible and reasonable approach considering facts and circumstances as established during the enquiry. The standard of preponderance of probability is sufficient to shield the findings from interference by the Court, which would not ordinarily su bstitute its own assessment for that of the competcnt disciplinary authority. The respondents further states that the penalty imposed on the appellant was minimal and commensurate with the nature of the misconduct established. The recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), an expert bodv, lends further legitimacy and proportionality to the punishment, which has be<'n rightly upheld. \ 1 l Coasideration by this Court

8. The Hon"ble Supreme Court in State of And.hra Pro.desh u. S.Sree Rama Rao3 has observed that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings is inherently limited and constricted. Further, the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not sit as a Court of appeal over the decision of the authority holding departmental enquiry. Further, when there is some evidence which the alrthority has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is gr.rilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.

9. It is pertinent to note that the judicial interference is vvarranted only under specifrc circumstances, namely: where there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice; where the findings are based on no evidence; or where the conclusion is arbitrary that no reasonable person could have rcached such a decision. iO. These principles have been frrmly established in the dccisions of this Court in S. Sree Rama Rao's case (supra 3) ' Altt 196_.t sc t7l2 I l ! I I .l 'l and B.C. Chaturaedi u. UnTon of Indlaa, which underline that judicial review does not extend to subslitute the Court's own opinion on the rnerits to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. Therefore, unless a finding reached by the disciplinary authoriry is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the rr:cord, it is to be upheld. I 1. ln regard lo the appellant's contentio., i., ,e"pe.t of the non-supply ol' documents and examination of witnesses sought to be called to be without. substance, it is to be noted that it is settled lalv that a delinquent olhcer is entitled only to receive copies of those documents which the department specifically relies upon t<> substantiate the charges framed against him. Conversely, tlo<:uments forming part of the preliminary investigation or those that merely facilitate the initiation of disciplinary proceedings often referred to as enabling or background documents are noL required to be furnished.

12. In the presenl case, it is to be noted that the reports prepared by DICi Naycem and Commandant Zhophoneye fall within the cate61ory of preliminary investigative report. However, the Presenting Officer did not depend on these rcports as evidenie to cstablish the charge of mala fdes ag:rinst the ' ( t9g5) 6 scc ll') 9 ;- appellant, instead, the respondent's premised upon the evidence adduced during the course of the formal enquiry. Therefore, the relusal to supply the preliminary enquiry reports did not result in any infringement of the appellant's right to a fair heaiing.

13. It is pertinent to note that the procedural safeguards and principles of natural justice remain intact when the charges are supported by admissible and relevant evidence, q4d mere non- I disclosurc of documents that are not reiied upon does not constitute a violation of the appellant's rights. 14 . Further, the Apex Court in Secretary, Llinistry o;f Defence and others a. Pro.bhash Chandra Mirdhas has observed that a delay of three years in initiating disciplinary proceedings is considerable. However, for such delay to vitiate or invalidate the proceedings, it is upon the delinquent offrcer to establish that the delay has caused prejudice to the delinquent employee.

15. [n the present case, the appellant has failed to tender concrete evidence or particulars in order to demonstrate that any material witness has become unavailable, or that any I I crucial document has been lost or rendered unusable due to the passage of time. On the contrary, the incident underlyinf, the t (:otz) tt scc so: * !i I Y --.1 l0 ..1 disciplinary enquiry was comprehensively and - contemporaneotrsly documented. Further, the explanation tendered by the respondents that the delay was attributabie to the internal procedural requirements and verihcation processes of NMDC is neither inherently unreasonable nor indicative of mala fide intent and in the absence of tangible proof demonstrating prejudice caused to the appellant, this Court is unable to conclude that the delay has operated to vitiate the disciplinary proc eedings.

16. It is to be noted that the reassignment or change of the Enquiry Officer is a matter falling within the administrative discretion of the disciplinary authority. The Honble Supreme Court in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nlgan Limited v. Qirija Shankar Pant and. other*, has held as under:

34. Ihe Court of Appeal judgment in Locobail [20OO QB 4511 though apparentlg as noticed aboue soundezd a different note but in fact, in more occasiott s than orte in the judgment itself. it ho"s been clarified that concepfitallg the issue of bias ought to be decided on th,e facts and cira nnstan<:es of the indiuidual case - a slight shifi undoubtedlg from the oiginal thinking pertaining to the concept <tf bias to tLrc effect that a mere opprehension of bias could othenui.se be sufficient. I I 6 (2oor) I scc 182 1l I

35. The test, therefore, is as to uhether a rlere apprehension of bia.s or there being a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the sunounding cirannstatrces must and ought to be collated qnd necessary conclusion drau.tn therefrom - in the euent hou)euer the conclusion i.s othenuise inescapable thot there i.s existing a reol donger ' of bias, the administratiue action connot be sustained: If on the other hand, the allegations peftaining to bias is rather fanciJul and otherutise to auoid a portiatlar court, Tibunal or authoitg, qu.estion of declaing them to be unsustoinable u-sould not arise. TIE reEtirement is auailabilitg of positiue and cogent euidence and it i.s in this context that u-te do record our conatrrence uith the uieu.t expressed bg the Court of Appeal in Locabail case I2OOO QB 45t] . 17 . It is to be noted that the decision of the Enquiry Offrcer to refrain from summoning the authors of the preliminar5r enquiry reports was a bona fde exercise of discretion as those reports were not part of the evidentiary record. Thus, we are of the opinion that rendering the irregularity which is a mere technical defect does not vitiate the entire enquiry process. In regard to the alleged perversity of the hndings, it is to be noted that the charge against the appellant did not pertain to active collusion but was premised on a failure to exercise reasonable diligence, culminating in a cover-up of an attempted pilferage. The testimony of witness P.W.3 coupled with the attendant circumstances, furnished a rational and legal foundation for the \ Enquiry Officer to conclude that the appellant's conduct amounted to dereliction of duty/ negligence, rathr:r than a bona ftde error of judgment.

18. Learned counsel for the appellant has hled a Ietter dated

15.02.2012 under which the delinquent (appellantl requested the Enquiry O{ficer to call Sri Zhophoneye and Sri S.A.Nayeem for cross-examination wherein it was stated as under: "Kindly refer to gour enquiry noticc No.V-15014,/TS/AIG 'lS/ DE-N.P,/ EN-7/ 2011- 12/ 854 Dated 14th Februory 2012 and mg le'tter Dated 01.02.2012, u,herebA I haue raised certoin legol infirmities and technical laatnae utith regard to conducting of enquiry- The undersigned hcLs ttot been permitted bg the enqttiry ofJicer to cross exctmine Shri S Venkatesan Director, (Production) NMDC Ltd., and Shi. Nishant Shankale, AIG/ Int on their complaints/ reports u.thich qre listed documents on the basis of u;hich charqes haue been franrcd dgainst me. The soicl complaints/ reports contains all presumptiue and assumptiue allegations bg the PWS to _frame charge against nte, duing f lre cross examination of these ttuo PWS enquiry ofrtcer asked me to confine cross examination specific to the charge and statement mode by the PW during the enquiry u.thich is against pinciples of natural justice, because I i:ould not ertroct tntth of the presumptiue and assumptiue alleqations." By the aloresaid letter dated 15.04 .2012, it is clear that the appellant ,vas in fact afforded an opportunil-v 16 ..o."- I t l_l examine the witness, which however was restricted to the charge and statement. The contention raised by the appellant in respect of the denial o[ granting him an opportunity of cross- examination stands negated from his own admission in the said letter, which clearly demonstrates the fact that the deiinquent had in fact sought further cross-examination as he could not extract admissions favourable to him in the previous round of cross-examination. Therefore, it cannot be said that the authorities have not followed the principles of natural justice.

19. Though learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Agaaubkhan Noorkhan Pa,than's case (supra 1), it is to be noted that it is not disputed by this Court with regard to the settled position of law as reiterated by the Apex Court in the said precedent wherein the Court has observed as under: 3O. The aforesaid disanssion mokes it euident that, not onlg should the opportunitg of cross-examination be made ouailable, but it should be one of effectiue cross- examination, so as lo meet the requirement of the pinciples of natural justice- In the absence of such an opportunitg, it cannot be heLd that the matter has been decided in accordance uith law, as cross-examination is an integral part and parcel of the pinciples of naturol justice. t4 The afor,:said observation does not advance t,he case of the appellant in any manner in view of having compietely \ different lacts ald circumstances.

20. Since tht: conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer represents one plausible and tenable interpretation of the facts, it is neither the purpose nor within the jurisdiction of this Court to reappraise evidence or substitute its own evaluation in lieu of the findings o1' the competent authority. The threshold for judicial interference on grounds of perversity is stringent, requiring that the conclusion be one that no reasonable person could have arrived at which in the instant case, remains unmet, thereby affirming the validity of the disciplinary findings.

21. It is otrserved that the penalty imposed namely, withhoiding of two increments without cumulative effect constitutes one of the mildest forms of punishment available for charges implicating an officer's integrity and devotion to duty. Further, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Om Kutnar and others v. Union of Indid by reiterating a similar view taken in Ranjit Thalcrtr o. Unian of Indtd has held as under: I I '(zoor)zscc;to * ( tgsr) + scc ot t l5 7O. In this contert, ue shnll onlg refer to these cases. In Ranjit Tlwlur u. Union of India il1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (LAg 1l this Court refened to "proportionality" in the qtantum of puni"shm.ent but tLLe Court obserued that tlle punishment u)as "shockinglg" disproportionate to the mbconduct proued In B.C. Chaturuedi u. Union of India l(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC &Ag 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 441 this Court stated that the court uill not interfere unless the puni.shment au.tarded utas one uhich shocked the conscience of the court. Euen thery the court uould remit the matter back to the autltoitg and utould not normolly substitute one puni-shment for the other. Howeuer, in rare situations, the court could award an alternatiue penaltA. It uas also so stated in Ganagutham l(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&s) 18061.

22. Further, the recommendation ol the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) emphasises the reasonableness and appropriateness of the penalty imposed and UPSC'S role in advising on disciplinary matters lends credibility and balance to the disciplinary process, minimizing arbitrariness.

23. The appellant's grievance relating to denial of promotions raises a distinct issue that does not undermine the validity of the disciplinary proceedings themselves. It is established that the suspension of a penalty order during the pendency of appeal does not expunge the existence or eflect of the said disciplinary proceedings from the officer's record and the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) being vested with the responsibitity + a \ \ l6 of assessing suitability for elevation, is entitled to consider an ofhcer's complete service record, including any pending charges or disciplinary proceedings, whiie passing a reasoned opinion on fitness for promotion. Therefore, the grievance rn relation to denial of promotion on such grounds does not constitute a ground to invalidate the disciplinary findings. Conclusion

24. This Court is of the considered view that the impugned departmental r:nquiry was conducted in conformity vvith the principles of nettural justice and the applicable rules governing disciplinary proceedings. The findings of the learned Single Judge in regard to upholding the disciplinary proceedings are supported by valid and relevant evidence and are not perverse or arbitrary. Therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly applied the principle of limited scope of the judicial review in disciplinary matters and appropriately refused to interfere with the impugned disciplinary order.

25. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails, being devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed.

26. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. I t1 Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. SD/.MOHD. ISMAIL EPUTY REGISTRAR To //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER \ '1 . One CC to IVls G. BHANU PRIYA, Advocate [OP 2. One CC to Ms. L. PRANATHI REDDY, Senior S.C, for Central Government loPUcl

3. Two CD Copies IVP BS ,iP I I I 't a a a r ., n a t n a '1 + . ; HIIGH COURT DATEIJ:22109t2025 o^ ( o(( 1HE S Ia I4- ? o1t{ott 2s25 t t)asr4Tcu(' .,UDGMENT WA.No,604 of 2025 DISMISSING THE WRIT APPEAL WITHOUT COSTS a(r/ rc b,( 1d a a